Category: Professional

  • “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” Now Online

    Recently, Philosophia Christi published Matt’s article “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg”. This article consisted of some critical commentary and responses to Erik Wielenberg’s bookdefaul1 Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.

    Since then Matt’s article has received a little bit of unexpected attention. One of my arguments was discussed in a dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg that took place at North Carolina State University earlier this year, and on the back of this, we have received several received requests to read the paper. It is now available here: Flannagan Robust Ethics PC 19 2 (1)

    Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution. Learn more about the Journal by going to www.epsociety.org/philchristi.

  • “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” published in Philosophia Christi

    Matt’s article, “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg” has been published in the wiPhilosophia Christinter issue ( Vol 19 Num. 2 – Winter 2017) of Philosophia Christi.  An overview of the contents of the full issue can be found here.  The editor has given Matt permission to upload the article in a couple of months. For now here is the abstract:

    In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that (I) the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; (II) Godless normative robust realism (GRNR) can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and (III) GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives.

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part Four

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part four.


    How to do Philosophy of Religion: A tale of Two Religious Skeptics

    I think the demise of verifications and the questioning of evidentialism then changed the landscape of philosophy of religion dramatically.  A good way of highlighting the change is to compare the work of two philosophers who probably have made the most rigorous cases for atheism in the last fifty years.

    The first is J L Mackie’s work “The Miracle of Theism” published in 1982. Mackie’s work was for many years the definitive defence of atheism in Philosophy; I quoted Mackie above, let’s look again:

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted thatJohn_Leslie_Mackie they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . [i]t [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. (Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 4-6;)

    The second, atheist I want to look at is Graham Oppy; Oppy is a philosopher at Monash University, his book Arguing about God, is rightly hailed as the best contemporary attack on the theistic arguments and he is, in my view, the leading defender of philosophical atheism writing today.  Here is what Oppy says in an article “What Derivations can do” published in 2015.

    Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. Indeed, philosophy of God should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. In so far as philosophy of religion – or philosophy of God – is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic world-views, the proper way to proceed is: (1) to develop best theistic Oppyand atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like (  Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328

    The contrast between these two writers is illustrative.

    Mackie focuses on the fact that the claim that God exists isn’t verifiable. He acknowledges the collapse of verificationism: despite not being directly verifiable the central assertions of theism are meaningful. However, he does think this lack of verifiability places a burden of proof on the Theist. The Theist is required to produce arguments for Gods existence. Deductive, abductive, inductive, arguments presumably from premises which ultimately are verifiable in this way.  Oppy, by contrast, doesn’t focus on whether the claim “God exists” is verifiable. His focus is on this belief, embedded in broader philosophical theories, verification, when it occurs, is applied to theories.

    An even clearer contrast is over evidentialism.  Mackie affirms evidentialism. He contends that “any rational consideration” of the question of God’s existence depends on the Theist providing “deductive, abductive, inductive arguments for Gods existence. “Nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. Oppy however explicitly repudiates this he states Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God.”

    Instead, Oppy suggests that the important question is what happens when people utilise theological assumptions in philosophy. Theists and atheists will reason from their prospective presuppositions and construct theories which attempt to answer important philosophical questions. Questions such as “why is there something rather than nothing?” “why are there and what are laws of nature”? “what are moral obligations” and so forth? Philosophy of religion is about how defensible these theories are. Can they be defended against objections, do they provide coherent answers to these questions, and how do the answers they give compare with each other.

    Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Achievement Standards.
    You’ll probably guess my sympathies lie with Oppy, and it’s at this point that I think it’s interesting to look at the NCEA standards for Religious Studies

    One barrier to doing Philosophy in secondary schools is the fact there are no nationally recognised qualifications for the subject. There is an absence of any standards for philosophy under NCEA. Many people in this organisation have been lobbying for the government to introduce philosophy as a NCEA subject and I support this cause.

    However, I want to suggest that if one looks at the standards which already exist for NCEA religious studies. There is already in the curricula plenty of scope for doing contemporary Philosophy of religion. In fact, if you move away from an excessive focus on the arguments for and against Gods existence and ask about religious and secular theories, NCEA asks and requires students to engage in contemporary philosophy of religion. The most obvious is the final achievement standard for level 3 NCEA:

    Analyse the key beliefs of a religious tradition and a secular worldview in relation to ultimate questions

    This sounds very much like the method Oppy refers too. Here students are asked to look at secular and religious worldviews and the theories they offer in response to critical philosophical questions. They are told to analyse these views: to discern their key premises and assumptions. When one looks, however, at the Merit and Excellence criteria for this standard it asks students to do work out the implications of these different answers, and to evaluate them, that sounds very much like Contemporary Philosophy of Religion.

    Similarly, in level Three, NCEA asks students to analyse a religious tradition(s) in Aotearoa New Zealand.  And analyse the response of a religious tradition to an ethical issue. Here, again, students are asked to analyse, to work out the assumptions and presumptions, assess the implications significance and evaluate the case for and against particular theories about right and wrong this is all contemporary philosophy of religion.

    Of course, there are challenges to doing philosophy of religion under NCEA. NCEA classifies Religious Studies as a subset of the social sciences, and some moderators tend to interpret the words analyse or implications in more sociological senses. But, if we understand what it actually is to analysis a religious tradition or its response to an ethical issue or how it answers an ultimate question, then we are doing philosophy.

    And I think this applies not just to level three religious studies where the standards require analysis. Consider the level two standard.  “Explain the key beliefs within two religious traditions in relation to a significant religious question.” This uses the word “explain” however the standard defines a significant religious question. As questions regarding ” life after death, the nature of God, the existence of suffering, good and evil, the nature of the human being.” To get an achieved they have to compare how traditions answer these questions. But For merit and excellence, they are asked to ask questions about the significance and what are the implications of these views. This is asking students to engage in philosophical reflection: its asking, if these answers were true what follows, what difference would it make why is it important and so on.

    Even the more descriptive level 1 standards have this, level 1, for example, asks students to “Describe key beliefs of a religious tradition” this sounds purely descriptive however to gain a merit and excellence students are asked to think through the significance of these beliefs, to look at links between the beliefs and to ask questions about their implications. Done well, this has the potential to foster a lot of philosophical reflection on the beliefs in question.

    Conclusion

    So in conclusion, Philosophy of religion involves “the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions”. This has been done by assuming a default position of religious scepticism and examining the arguments for and against religious beliefs or asking if religious beliefs are verifiable and meaningful and the temptation is for this to be the modus operandi in philosophy courses in secondary school.

    I am suggesting a different approach. Today Philosophy of religion is much broader; it involves looking at the answers religions have offered to some of the most profound philosophical answers, developing these as charitably and defensibly as possible and seeing if they can stand against objections. Finally, it involves asking whether religious views of the world answer these questions in a better and more plausible way than secular views do. Interestingly, as worded, this is the sort of questions  NCEA  Religious Studies achievement standards ask of students.

    This means there is plenty of scope for doing Philosophy of religion as part of Religious Studies programs. It is my hope that those of us who want to see philosophy taken seriously in the secondary sector can, where appropriate, use the current NCEA   standards to develop religious studies programs, which ask students to take these questions seriously. To get them to understand clearly various religious perspectives on various issues, to wrestle with them, significance and implications, to compare them to alternative religious or secular theories, and to critically consider the answers given.

    I think this is an important part of a general education. Today’s students grow up in a philosophically pluralistic society, moreover, at a certain point in anyone’s life they will be confronted with different answers to very pressing existential questions, questions which are unavoidable, people will want to know who they are and how they should live. Avoiding these questions or allowing people to be uninformed and ignorant of how others answer them isn’t education. To allow people to be informed about different question’s and to think through carefully and honestly what these answers are, there significance and implications, and to critically evaluate them is in my view what Philosophy at the secondary level should be all about. So, I suggest that Philosophy programs at secondary school start to take seriously religious studies and religious studies take seriously philosophy of religion.

     

     

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Three Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Human Rights and Dignity without God

    In my last post I looked at Erik Wielenberg’s response to the objection that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands.  A second objection Wielenberg briefly addresses is that without certain theological doctrines, one cannot provide a plausible basis for human rights and dignity.  Wielenberg, here again, takes Craig as paradigmatic.

    defaul1If there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time[1]

    Craig’s rhetorical question alludes to a serious point, made in more detail by Peter Singer, Louis Pojman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, this is that it is hard to plausibly accommodate the thesis that all human beings have equal dignity and rights outside a theistic framework. Wielenberg’s response is that human rights are grounded in “non-moral intrinsic properties of human beings” He notes: “Human beings can, reason, suffer, fall in love, set goals for themselves and so on. God or no God, human beings obviously differ when it comes to intrinsic properties than dogs or mere lumps of clay[2]”

    Wielenberg here appeals to certain higher cognitive capacities human beings possess that other animals lack.

    This brief response to Craig is central to his Wielenberg’s rebuttal of evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism latter in the book. Sharon Street and others have raised epistemological challenges to moral realism by noting that many of our basic evaluative capacities, our disposition to judge certain types of behaviour as morally wrong, has been shaped by naturalistic evolution.  Naturalistic evolution, however, isn’t guided by considerations of truth, in selecting such dispositions, but by adaptability, these basic evaluative judgements exist, because making such judgements enabled our ancestors to reproduce effectively in the environment in which they lived. Street notes “the striking coincide between independent moral truths posited by the realist and the normative views evolution has pushed us towards” and “challenges the realist to explain this coincidence.”[3]

    Wielenberg proposes that “our cognitive capacities” explain the coincidence. Moral rights D supervene upon any creature that possesses certain cognitive capacities.  Seeing these are the same cognitive capacities which produce moral beliefs. It follows that any being which believes it has moral rights will necessarily have them.[4]

    Wielenberg specifies that the supervenience relationship here involves both modal covariation, and a form of “robust causation” analogous to the way theist understand God’s relationship to the created universe, just as Theists believe that God immediately sustains the universe in existence moment by moment simply by willing its existence. So, natural those properties which constitute our higher cognitive faculties, robustly cause the existence of moral rights, without any intermediatory agency or laws of nature.

    This answer both to the grounding of human rights and evolutionary debunking arguments has a cost.  As Wolterstorff [5] and Singer [6].  have both pointed out, while it is true that normal adult humans have the cognitive capacities in question, many important categories of human beings do not. Infants and small children cannot reason, or fall in love, set goals for themselves, nor do they have the developed moral cognition Wielenberg refers to. In fact, David Boonin has noted: “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows, and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[7].

    So, Wielenberg’s answer gives us no reason for thinking a child or infant has a rights or dignity, over and above any other animal. In fact, seeing moral rights modally covary with possession of the relevant cognitive faculties, such capacities are necessary and sufficient for the possession of moral rights.  Consequently, His position seems to entail that infant’s small children, and mentally impaired human adults have no moral rights.


    [1] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 51, the citation is from William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong God: A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 18

    [2] Ibid 51

    [3] Ibid 155

    [4] Ibid 134-175

    [5] Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) 325-341.

    [6] Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001) 186-187

    [7] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121, the neurological data is summarised in Michael Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Two Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Reasons to be Moral Without God

    defaul1The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date.

    Wielenberg argues three things. First, I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers. Second, II  robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. Third, III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In a previous post I discussed I, I argued Wielenberg’s critique of divine command meta-ethics fails. This post will begin looking at his second major claim II. As an alternative to DCM, Wielenberg proposes a position he labels Robust Realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties. By itself, robust realism is compatible with both theism and atheism. Wielenberg refers to the conjunction of robust realism and atheism as Godless Robust Normative Realism (GRNR) Wielenberg contends that his formulation of GRNR avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis.  Here I’ll look at one such objection.

    Reasons for being Moral without God.

    One objection Wielenberg discusses is the perennial concern that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands. Wielenberg takes the following comments by Craig as representative of this objection.

    Even if there were objective moral values and duties under naturalism, they are irrelevant because there is no moral accountability. If life ends at the grave, it makes no difference whether one lives as a Stalin or as a saint…Why should you sacrifice your self-interest and especially your life for the sake of someone else? There can be no good reason for adopting such a self-negating course of action on the naturalistic worldview… Life is too short to jeopardize it by acting out of anything but pure self-interest. [2]

     Wielenberg initially suggests that Craig is arguing that “if people had moral obligations, but God did not exist, then people would have no normative reasons to carry out their obligations”.[3] He re-joins, plausibly, that people often do have normative reasons to refrain from wrongdoing. “the fact rape harms its victims is a compelling reason for me not to rape, regardless of whether refraining from rape benefits me” (emphasis mine).[4]

    Wielenberg then suggests that Craig might be offering a different argument. He might be contending that “if God does not exist then people lack self-interested normative reasons to perform their obligations” Wielenberg suggests taken this way, there are two problems with the argument. First, even if it were true, it wouldn’t follow that people lack any normative reasons to perform their obligations.  Second, this claim isn’t true “people often do in fact do have powerful self-interested reason’s for caring about fulfilling their obligations”[5] Wielenberg cites various empirical studies which show that immorality tends to disrupt, and damage people’s social relationships and harm meaningful connections.[6]

    However, it seems implausible to me that Craig is maintaining either of these positions. Elsewhere.  Craig clarifies his position as follows:

    [I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest. That’s consistent with saying that in other cases it is, indeed, prudent to act morally.[7]

    Here Craig affirms that if atheism is true, people often can have both moral and prudential normative reasons to carry out their moral obligations. So he doesn’t affirm, either of the positions, Wielenberg attributes to him.  He isn’t saying that no one ever has reasons to refrain from wrongdoing, nor is he claiming that no one ever has prudential reasons to refrain from wrongdoing.  Craig’s objection is rather that, if atheism is true, moral and prudential reasons can and do come into conflict. When they do people lack any reason to comply with what morality demands. “One has moral value pulling in one direction and prudential value tugging in the opposite, and no way to decide rationally which choice to make”[8].

    Latter Wielenberg suggests a different way of formulating the argument:

    [1] If GRNR is true then morality and self-interest sometimes diverge in the long run.

    [2] But, morality and self-interest never diverge in the long run.

    [3] Therefore, GRNR is false[9]

    Wielenberg grants the truth of [1], the empirical studies he earlier cited show only that people “often” have powerful prudential reasons to do what is right, not that they always or necessarily do. Wielenberg states that “an important different between a theistic universe and a godless universe” is that “without God, there is always the possibility that we will face a deep conflict between what is in our self-interest and what morality requires of us”. On the other hand, if God exists “there is a perfect correlation between morality and self-interest”[10]

    Wielenberg’s rebuttal, therefore, focuses on denying [2], his treatment of [2] consists of a single paragraph:

    It is hard to imagine a convincing non-question begging rationale for (2) that wouldn’t at the same time tell against (1). One might appeal to the existence of God to support (2) but this obviously begs the question. Alternatively, one might find a secular ground for (2)-but to the extent that such a ground is convincing it undermines the first premise…Craig often proceeds as if (2) were a datum for which any plausible moral theory must account. But such an approach has nothing to commend it. It is no more plausible than the falsity of (2) as a datum and arguing against Craig’s view. Such arguments get us nowhere.[11]

    Wielenberg provides two reasons for rejecting [2]. These are (a) that there is no non-question-begging reason for affirming [2] which does not undermine [1], and (b) that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory.  Neither is compelling.

    Regarding first (a), the problem is that several people, including Craig, have offered reasons for affirming [2] which neither assume theism or tell against [1].

    Robert Adam’s, for example, has appealed to the intuition that moral judgments “have an action- and preference-guiding force that they could not have unless everyone had reason to follow them in his actions and preferences.”[12]  Adam’s argues that “if happiness will, in the long run, be strictly proportioned to moral goodness, that explains how virtually everyone does have an important reason to want to be good.”[13] However, if this is not the case, it’s hard to justify the conclusion that “everyone does have reason always to be moral.”[14]

    Adam’s here focuses on the idea that everyone has a reason to be moral.  That if an action φ is morally wrong for a person P to perform, then P has a reason to not φ. Stephen Layman has offered a similar line of argument, focusing instead on the idea that people always have decisive reasons to do what morality demands.  Layman refers to what he calls the “The Reasons Thesis: The strongest reasons always favor doing what is morally required.” The idea that if something is obligatory, we not only have a reason to do it but that this reason is always decisive. Other reasons we may have for not complying such as reasons of self-interest or economics do not override it. Layman provides several examples which suggest that “If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms).” Layman argues that if such cases obtain,  reasons of prudence will override moral reasons we have doing the action in question.[15]

    Neither of these arguments begs the question by assuming God exists. They appeal not to God’s existence, but theses about the authority of moral requirements, that they provide virtually everyone with decisive reasons for acting.  Nor do these arguments give us reason for questioning [1]. Both, of them, in fact, concede and incorporate [1] in their thinking. So, Wielenberg’s claim, that it’s hard to imagine a non-questioning begging rationale for [2] that doesn’t undermine [1], is false. Several such rationales have been offered in the literature which he does not even mention let alone address.

    Moreover, Craig himself provided a similar rationale.   Craig claimed that:“[I]f God does not exist, then prudential reason and moral reason can and often do come into conflict, in which case there is no reason to act morally rather than in one’s self-interest”[16]. Elsewhere, Craig has stated:

    “I agree with Layman that on atheism, what he calls the overriding thesis ( namely that moral value always trumps prudential value) is not true, for one can have extremely strong prudential reasons for not acting morally, and there seems to be no common scale in which to weigh moral against prudential considerations”[17]

    This brings us to  (b), Wielenberg’s objection that [2] is not a datum to be explained by a moral theory. While he is correct that [2] itself is not a datum of moral theory, the claim that moral demands are authoritative so that everyone always as a decisive reason to be moral is something that, at least prima facie, a meta-ethical theory should explain.[18]  Wielenberg himself seems to accept this. He states “as I suggested in Chapter 1, to have an obligation just is to have decisive reasons to perform a certain action.” Therefore, according to Wielenberg, it is a necessary truth that we always have decisive reasons to do what we are moral required to do, and it is impossible, for people to not have such reasons or them to be overridden by other reasons such as self-interest”. Adam’s, Layman and Craig, therefore, appeal to something that is, on his view, a datum a meta-ethical theory should explain.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 56-57, the citation is from William Lane Craig “The Indispensability of Meta-Ethical Theological Foundations for Morality” available at http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/meta-eth.html

    [3] Ibid, 57

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Wielenberg’s examples all deal with Hume’s idea of the sensible knave, the individual who has a reputation for morality but engages in undetected wrongdoing when it’s in his self-interest. They don’t, however, address Kai Neilsen’s example of a “classist amoralist” who forms deep and genuine relationships with others within his class but ruthlessly exploits members of other classes to his advantage. See Kai Nielsen Why be Moral (Buffalo, N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1989) 295-296

    [7] William Lane Craig  “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 182-183

    [9] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 59

    [10] Ibid, 59

    [11] Ibid, 59

    [12] Robert Adams “Moral Argument for Theistic Belief” in The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 158

    [13] Ibid

    [14] Ibid.

    [15] See C Stephen Layman “God and the moral order”, Faith and Philosophy, 19: 3 (2002) 304-16.

    [16] William Lane Craig “Q&A 230 Is Life Absurd without God?” available at http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-life-absurd-without-god. Accessed 6/2/2017

    [17] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 183

    [18] Terence Cuneo makes this point, see  Terence Cuneo “Erik J Wielenberg Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.03.24 available at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/56511-robust-ethics-the-metaphysics-and-epistemology-of-godless-normative-realism/ accessed 7/2/17

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: part one Wielenberg’s criticism of Divine command meta-ethics

    The autonomy thesis contends that there can be moral requirements to φ regardless of whether God commands, desires, or wills that people φ. In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism,[1] Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defences of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that: I the most plausible alternative to the autonomy thesis, the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers;  II robust realism, the thesis that moral requirements are sui generis non-natural properties which supervene upon natural properties, can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis and,  III robust realism provides a better account of intrinsic value than any meta-ethical theory that identifies moral goodness with states of God.

    In this and future blog posts, I will argue Wielenberg’s defence of the autonomy thesis fails. This post will address I. Future posts will look at II and III

    defaul1Let’s look at the first claim, that the divine command theory, is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers.

    By divine command theory, Wielenberg has in mind the command meta-ethics (DCM) defended by Adam’s, Craig, Alston, Evans which holds the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God

    Wielenberg takes for granted the existence of “reasonable non-believers”[2] people who “have been brought up in nontheistic religious communities, and quite naturally operate in terms of the assumptions of their own traditions.”[3] Or the “many western philosophers, have explicitly considered what is to be said in favour God’s existence, but have not found it sufficiently persuasive.” Wielenberg assumes that many of these people “reasonable non-believers, at least in the sense that their lack of belief cannot be attributed to the violation of any epistemic duty on their part.”[4]

    Wielenberg argues that If the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God these people would have no moral obligations, they clearly do have moral obligations. Consequently, DCM is false.

    Wielenberg cites the following exposition of the problem from Wes Morriston:[5]

    Even if he is aware of a “sign” that he somehow manages to interpret as a “command” not to steal, how can he [ a reasonable non-believer] be subject to that command if he doesn’t know who issued it, or that it was issued by a competent authority? To appreciate the force of this question, imagine that you have received a note saying, “Let me borrow your car. Leave it unlocked with the key in the ignition, and I will pick it up soon.” If you know that the note is from your spouse, or that it is from a friend to whom you owe a favor, you may perhaps have an obligation to obey this instruction. But if the note is unsigned, the handwriting is unfamiliar, and you have no idea who the author might be, then it’s as clear as day that you have no such obligation. In the same way, it seems that even if our reasonable non-believer gets as far as to interpret one of Adams’ “signs” as conveying the message, “Do not steal”, he be under no obligation to comply with this instruction unless and until he discovers the divine source of the message[6]

    Morriston’s argument contains a subtle equivocation, in the first line he expresses a disjunction: a person is not subject to a command if he doesn’t know (a) who issued it, or (b) that it has an authoritative source. The example he cites, the case of an anonymous note to borrow one’s car, is a case neither of these disjuncts holds. The owner of the car knows neither who the author of the note is, nor whether its source is authoritative.

    However, the conclusion Morriston apparently draws is that failure to know who the author is, by itself, is sufficient to exempt someone from being subject to the command. This clearly doesn’t follow.[7]

    The mistake can be illustrated, by reflecting on examples where, a person doesn’t know who the author of a command is, but does recognise that it has an authoritative source. Suppose I am walking down what I take to be a public right of way to Orewa beach I come across a locked gate with a sign that says: “private property, do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. In such a situation, I recognise that the owner of the property has written the sign, though I have no idea who the owner is. Does it follow I am not subject to the command? That seems clearly false. To be subject to the command a person does not need to know who the author of the command is. All they need to know is that the command is authoritative over their conduct.

    In fact, being subject to a command is compatible with having mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command is. Suppose I believe that the beach property I am in front of is owned by Holly Holmes, having read about her purchase in the New Zealand Herald, in fact, the Herald, has gotten details wrong and the house was sold to Kim Schmidt. In this situation, it is still the case that, when I read the sign, “private property trespassers will be prosecuted”, I am subject to the command. The fact I have all sorts of mistaken beliefs about who the author of the command does not seem to make any difference.[8]

    Wielenberg concedes the problem, and concludes that a reasonable unbeliever does not need to recognise moral obligations as God’s commands to be subject to them, all that’s needed is that they recognise these commands as coming from “some authority or other” However, he thinks this rejoinder “doesn’t address the central worry” Morriston raises. Taking Robert Adam’s version of DCM as paradigmatic, Wielenberg notes:

    An important part of Adam’s strategy for accounting for the moral obligations as of non-theist’s is the idea that some divine commands are issued by ways of “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in the evolution of our species[9]

    The problem is that “reasonable non-theists lack of belief prevents them from recognizing any divine signs they receive-including their own “moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them”[10] while they will recognise certain actions as obligatory, “some reasonable non-believers do not construe the deliverance of their consciences as commands at all”[11]

    There are two problems with Wielenberg’s objection.

    First, he misconstrues Adam’s position. Consider Adam’s reference to “moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings” the full quotation is as follows:

    [P]rinciples of moral obligation constituted by divine commands are not timeless truths because the commands are given by signs that appear in time. People of who are not in the region of space-time in which a sign can be known are not subject to the command given by it. Of course, if the signs by which divine commands are given are moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings since some (not too recent) point in human evolution, all of us can be fairly counted as subject to those commands. But the conception of a divine command allows for divine commands with historically restricted audiences. (emphasis added)[12]

    Adam’s the words “if” and “but” here suggest Adam’s isn’t claiming that divine commands are “given through, moral impulses and sensibilities common to practically all human beings”. Adam’s is alluding to a hypothetical possibility to which he thinks there are alternatives.

    And in fact, Adam’s, elsewhere explains he thinks that “divine commands are revealed” largely “through human social requirements”.[13] That is through requirements and demands other people make on our conduct and blame us for not complying with. He states “a divine command against murder” has “been made known very widely to the human race” and “dissemination of such prohibitions has surely taken place largely through human systems of social requirement”.[14] He elaborates:

    On this view, divine ethical requirements will not form an entirely separate system, parallel and superior to systems of social requirement. Rather human moral will be imperfect expressions of divine commands, and the question of their relation to God’s commanding will be whether and how far they are authorized or backed by God’s authority, not whether they agree with an eternal divine command laid up in the heaven[15]

    This takes the sting out of Wielenberg’s criticism, because even though reasonable non-theists don’t construe “own moral impulses and sensibilities”- as commands issued by someone who has authority over them” they will inhabit social relationships where other people other people, parents, teachers, spouses, children, employees, courts, governments, make demands upon them which they recognise as authoritative, and demands will clearly be understood as real commands.

    Second, it’s not clear that Wielenberg is correct, that “reasonable believers” don’t perceive the deliverances of their conscience as authoritative commands.

    Consider, John Hare’s recent analysis of a divine command[16]. Hare, starts by noting that commands are a type of speech act, and in particular they are prescriptive speech acts which involve imperatives. However, commands differ from other imperatives such as exhortations, advice, warnings, requests, advice “instructions for cooking omelettes”[17] in certain important respects. Commands differ from advice or exhortations, in that commands presuppose authority on the part of the commander, additionally “in command there is standardly some expectation of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[18] And one is not permitted or given consent by the commander to not follow the command. Similarly, commands, unlike say cooking instructions aren’t “conditional, or, in Kant’s term, ‘hypothetical.”[19]

    Commands then are categorical prescriptions “with which the person commanded is not permitted not to comply, and a prescription in which there is an internal reference, by the meaning of this kind of speech act, to the authority of the speaker, and to some kind of condemnation if the command is not carried out.”[20]

    It is striking how these features of a command are also features of moral obligations. Moral requirements are prescriptive, telling us what to do, and purport to be not just advice but authoritative, telling us what we must do and are not permitted to not do. Similarly, moral requirements are categorical in that their applicability is not contingent on some goal or end those subject to them have. Similarly, moral requirements condemn our behavior, failure to comply without an adequate excuse render us guilty and blameworthy, and others can justifiably censure us, rebuke you and even punish you, and even punish you.

    So, while, reasonable non-believers won’t construe the deliverances of conscience as literally a speech act by a person, it’s not implausible that, their pre-theoretical concept of a moral requirement is something very much like a command in all other respects.

    This, I think, undermines Wielenberg’s objection. Because, it’s plausible to suggest that a person who is aware of all aspects of a command while not recognising it as a speech act from a person, is still subject to the command.

    Suppose for example that an owner of one of the beach front properties in Orewa puts up a sign that states “private property do not enter, trespassers will be prosecuted”. John sees the sign and understands clearly what it says. He understands the sign as issuing an imperative to “not enter the property”. John recognises this imperative is categorical and is telling him to not trespass, he also recognises this imperative as having authority over his conduct, he also recognises that he will be blameworthy if they don’t comply with this imperative. However, because of a strange metaphysical theory, he doesn’t believe any person issued this imperative and so isn’t strictly speaking a command.  He thinks it’s just a brute fact that this imperative exists. Does this metaphysical idiosyncrasy mean that the command does not apply him and he has not heard or received the command the owner issued? That seems to me to be false. While John does not realise who the source of the command is, he knows enough to know that the imperative the command expresses applies authoritatively to him and that he is accountable to it.


    [1] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)

    [2] Erik Wielenberg, Robust Ethics, 77

    [3] Ibid

    [4] Ibid.

    [5] Interestingly, Morriston states “This example is adapted from Wielenberg.” So Wielenberg is citing an example from Morriston, which Morriston cites as an example from Wielenberg. See, Wes Morriston “The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers: A special problem for divine command metaethics,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009), 5

    [6] Wes Morriston “The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers” 5-6

    [7] The inference here would be If P then (Q or R), not R, therefore not P.

    [8] Stephen C Evans gives a similar counter example, see God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 113-114 as do Paul Copan and I in Did God Really Command Genocide: Coming to Terms with the Justice of God (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Publishing House, 2014) 157

    [9] Wielenberg Robust Ethics 76

    [10] Ibid 79

    [11] Ibid.

    [12] Robert Adam’s Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 270

    [13] Ibid 264.

    [14] Ibid 264-265

    [15] Ibid

    [16] John E Hare Gods Command (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 32-44

    [17] John E Hare Gods Command, 37

    [18] Ibid 44

    [19] John E Hare “What is a Divine Command?” Wilde lectures, Oxford University, Wednesday 08 February 2012, 26

    [20] John Hare Divine Command 49

     

  • Is it Immoral to Believe in God? Matt responds to Michael Ruse

    The Christian Research Journal have published an online copy of an article I wrote for their journal last year:

    downloadIn a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times, the distinguished philosopher of science Michael Ruse raises the question, Is it morally wrong to believe in God? Some skeptics maintain there is something irrational about theism. But is it immoral?

    Behind the question is the rhetoric of the New Atheism represented in the writings of people such as Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris. Ruse historically has been fairly critical of New Atheism and maintains that, although New Atheists are “self-confident to a degree that seems designed to irritate,” they display “an ignorance of anything beyond their fields to an extent remarkable even in modern academia.”

    However, behind their remarkable uninformed hubris is a “moral passion unknown outside the pages of the Old Testament.” Ruse notes that “atheists of Dawkins’ stripe don’t just say that believing in God is an intellectual mistake. They also claim that it’s morally wrong to believe in the existence of God or gods.” Ruse appears to have some sympathy with this motif of their thought and attempts to defend it.

    See the rest of my article here