Category: Professional

  • New publication Online: “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?”

    My paper, “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?” was published in Philosophia Christi, vol 21. No 1 2025. A copy is now available  online at my academia.edu page. The abstract is below.

    Abstract:
    Defenders of divine command metaethics (DCM) often argue that one of its key advantages is its ability to vindicate the objectivity of moral judgments. Critics, however, contend that DCM is a subjectivist theory and therefore inherits the difficulties such theories face in accounting for the apparently objectivist features of moral thought. In this paper, I examine and critique three prominent versions of this objection: David Brink’s appeal to appraiser independence, Elizabeth Tropman’s appeal to stance independence, and Michael Huemer’s concept of observer independence. I argue that none of these criticisms succeeds.

  • Goodbye NCEA, Farewell, Get lost, Good Riddance

    Some readers of this blog will know that I work as a secondary school teacher. Recently, several people have asked my opinion on the government’s decision to ditch the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA). My thoughts follow.

    When I was at teachers’ college, we were taught that New Zealand had the best curriculum in the world. Unlike other curricula, which focused on subject content, New Zealand’s curriculum focused on certain kinds of skills—analysis, critical thinking, research, etc.

    A comparison between the NCEA standards for Religious Studies (my specialist subject) and Cambridge illustrates the contrast. For IGCSE World Religions, students study two major religions over the course of a year. The syllabus requires them to learn a huge amount of content—about the religion’s history, doctrines, modes of worship, and so on. The assessment is an examination in which any of these topics could be assessed.

    By contrast, Level 1 NCEA has standards such as: Demonstrate understanding of the development of a community that shares religious or spiritual beliefs. This is flexible—teachers can choose any religion. One gets an Achieved if they show understanding of the development of the religious community, a Merit if they can explain it, and an Excellence if they examine it. The focus is on analytical skills. Prima facie, this is a good idea. Education should not be about regurgitating facts; it should develop skills of understanding, explaining, and examining.

    This appearance, however, has not withstood my experience at the coalface, teaching Religious Studies to Year 11–13 boys.

    My first practical experience with NCEA was during my practicum in 2009. I was placed at a low-decile school in South Auckland. The school was almost entirely in Pasifika in its demographic. Despite being in a poor area and having a demographic that statistically underachieves, the school was getting good results—large numbers of students were getting Achieved. Here was the method I encountered:

    • Period 1: Tell the students the questions they will be assessed on. Get them to copy them down.
    • Period 2: Tell them the answer to Question 1. Write it down.
    • Period 3: Tell them the answer to Question 2. Write it down.
    • Rinse and repeat
    • Then the assessment: Take the sheet of paper you’ve copied the answers onto into an exam where you will be asked the memorised questions.

    I am not joking. What was interesting was that even under these conditions, students would talk during the assessment and not finish. So extensions were given until the students all passed. Or they were held in till they finished.

    Here I discovered the perverse incentive structures of NCEA. Because there were certain prescribed skills (such as “explain” and “describe”) which were internally assessed by the school, and because the school’s reputation was tied to how well it got traditionally low-achieving groups to pass, tactics like this actually made the school “successful.” Students who struggled with basic skills and academic discipline would pass at high rates.

    My experience in the teaching sector has suggested to me that this sort of thing is not an aberration. I have seen many NCEA programmes where students who lack basic skills pass because they are spoon-fed the answers. I have seen, for example, courses where students copy notes into a workbook in each class, then have a week of classes to copy those notes into a resource, and are then given a structured worksheet on how to write an essay. They fill in the worksheet with the material from the resource. Despite the apparent ease of this, I have witnessed teachers offer several weeks of classes—including lunchtime and after-school sessions—to get students to complete the task. If all else fails, threaten a detention until they fill out the sheet. Instant, Achieved. In a short time, this student who can’t write an essay or hand one in on time gets University Entrance. A school has managed to get large numbers of students known for lack of academic ability to university level. It looks impressive—but of course, in the long term, it is fraudulent. These students haven’t achieved the “skills”; they’ve ticked boxes and been micromanaged on how to tick them.

    My next experience was doing professional development on NCEA marking. At a best-practice workshop, I was given a model answer for the standard Describe the beliefs of a religious community. It stated: “According to Christianity, Jesus was a good moral teacher.” Achieved or Not Achieved?

    I said Not Achieved. My reason: this is not an accurate description of what Christianity teaches. Muslims believe Isa (Jesus) was a prophet, so they would consent to this statement. An agnostic could—and many do—accept that Jesus was a good moral teacher. Christianity teaches Jesus is the Messiah and God incarnate.

    I was told I was being too precise. To meet the standard, they only need the most generic answer. The student should get an Achieved simply for writing that down.

    We went on to look at exemplars of Merit and Excellence. To get an Excellence, a student needs to “evaluate.” I pointed out that the evaluation provided was extremely poor. I was told that the standard didn’t say “evaluate well”—it simply said “evaluate.” That meant the student used words like therefore and in conclusion. If they used such words, they were using evaluative language and hence got an Excellence.

    On another occasion, I was learning the ropes of moderation. The course was on the Reformation. To get an Achieved, the student had to describe the key facts. To get a Merit, they had to show the implications of the facts. I  was told that because the word “facts” is plural, NZQA required that a student get two facts correct. Facts were things like names, places, and dates. This meant that if a student, after studying the Reformation for several weeks, wrote only: “Martin Luther, Wittenberg 1517,” they got an Achieved.

    Here I learned how words like “describe,” “evaluate,” “discuss,” and “analyse” did not mean what they appeared to. Due to bureaucratic requirements and moderation procedures, they had highly specific meanings which reduced them to a checklist. A student could know in advance what the checklist was and tick the boxes. They didn’t need to understand, analyse, or evaluate in the ordinary sense of those terms. Or at least not in terms of what would be expected by the canons of the discipline.  

    Students were often aware of this. I’ve had several classes where I assigned an essay and got the response: “Sir, if I don’t write an intro and a conclusion, but just write X, Y, Z, will I still get an Achieved?” The honest answer, according to the requirements I had been told, was yes. What do the students do? They don’t bother learning to write an essay. They can Google the basic “facts” they need to meet the minimum standard. Do it, pass. They haven’t learned to write an essay, or research, or think critically. They’ve learned that they don’t have to. The most efficient path to success is to not do these things. They know the game.

    This was exacerbated by a third feature of NCEA. When I was teaching it, a student could pass an entire course by doing two or three internal assessments early in the year. Once they had ticked the box and got an Achieved, they could tune out for the rest of the course. They could fail to show up for the exam and still get an Achieved. I had many students ask me: “Sir, if I don’t hand in X and Y or do the exam, I’ll still get an Achieved, right?” They were right. I saw large numbers of students pass subjects without ever successfully sitting an exam. They left with University Entrance.

    The school I currently teach at has a dual pathway: NCEA and Cambridge. A few years ago, the leadership began assigning me fewer NCEA classes and more Cambridge ones. Here’s what I noticed.

    First, students were much more concerned about learning the content. They knew that anything they learned might be in the examination—and they didn’t know which topics would be. Second, they were keenly aware of risk. They understood that if they failed the exam, that was it—they failed the year. They also knew I couldn’t give them a break; I wasn’t the examiner—Cambridge was. A re-sit might mean they would repeat another six months of work. It couldn’t be done for two days during my lunch hour.

    Third, I discovered that appearances can be deceiving. While Cambridge had a huge amount of content, when it asked questions in the exam, it used terms like “discuss,” “describe,” and “explain.” These terms were not redefined in non-standard ways. The people marking the exams were subject specialists who knew what these terms meant, and the marking schedule reflected that. Students were assessed on things like “used relevant information,” “took into account various views,” and “some inaccurate information.” “detailed evidence” “technical precision”. They also had to write answers in essay form. Through the process of doing practice exams, students learned those skills. To prepare, they had to research a massive body of content and ask how they could put it into essay form—how to analyse and draw on relevant information. They weren’t just regurgitating facts; they were developing the requisite skills.

    Fourth—and most disturbing—I noticed that every year I taught bright students with potential who told me they were going to transfer to NCEA because it was easier. They could get into university without doing an exam and could, with minimal stress, get an Excellence in every subject—often in the first half of the year. Even more pernicious, I encountered Māori and Pasifika students who told me that because of their race, they are “too dumb” for Cambridge. These students—often bright and full of potential—lack self-belief. Because of this, they doubt themselves, and they know they can get academic success without the risk, effort, or fear of failure. Every year, I try to talk students out of dropping out and switching to NCEA because “it’s easier to pass.”

    Here I reflect on the irony of my first experience with NCEA. People were concerned about Māori and Pasifika fail rates. They were using NCEA to fix the problem. Large numbers were passing. The problem is—they were not being educated. We were defrauding society and the students themselves by declaring they were educated and certifying them as having skills they didn’t have. Academic skills are acquired through work, practice, and the risk of failure. Making errors is part of the process. It requires students to take ownership and responsibility for their learning. It cannot just be given for free by a teacher or from the ministry. These students were learning that they didn’t need any of that to pass. Someone else would just give them the results if they checked a box.  

    So, when I heard the government was scrapping NCEA, my initial response was this: Goodbye NCEA. Farewell, get lost. Good riddance.

    Cross-posted at kiwiblog

     

     

  • Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Secularism and “reasons” to be moral. Part One:

    In his book Morality Without God, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that a secular account of the nature of moral properties—namely, that wrongness is constituted by the property of harming others—is preferable to a theistic account, in which wrongness is identified with the property of being contrary to God’s commands

    Chapter 6 is entitled “Why be moral?”
    In this chapter, Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut the idea that secular meta-ethical theories—such as the one he proposes—cannot provide an adequate answer to this question.

    Sinnott-Armstrong begins his discussion by citing an argument that purports to show that secular accounts of morality cannot answer the question: why be moral? He summarises the argument as follows:

    “Harming others is sometimes in some people’s best interest, even considering probable costs. In those cases, some theists say that only a divine threat of Hell provides a reason to be moral. Since atheists and agnostics do not believe in God, they do not believe in divine retribution for sins, so they have to admit that sometimes some people could get away with immorality and then they have no self-interested reason to be moral. Does that mean that these people have no reason at all to be moral?”[1]

    He responds to this argument as follows:

    No. That conclusion would follow only if every reason had to be self-interested, selfish, or egoistic. There is no basis for that assumption. Many reasons are not based on self-interest. That should be common ground between theists and atheists… The fact that an act prevents harm to another person can be a reason for me to do that act. The fact that an act causes harm to another person can be a reason for me not to do that act. These facts are reasons, even if the other people are strangers. Crucially, these reasons are not self-interesting. They are facts about the interests of other people, not me. These unselfish reasons can answer the question, “Why be moral?”[2]

    There are some infelicities in the way this argument is described and set up. Sinnott-Armstrong’s version of the argument relies solely on the appeal to fear of Hell and divine retribution. He doesn’t, for example, couch the argument in terms of hope of eternal life. Moreover, in the paragraphs leading up to this one, he gives a sarcastic, literalistic reading of the Book of Revelation on the topic of Hell. These all rhetorically prime negative reactions in the reader; they also border on crude caricature.

    However, in this post and in future ones, I will focus on what I take to be the main thrust of Sinnott-Armstrong’s response to this argument. Sinnott-Armstrong makes three points. First, he argues that this argument is only sound if one assumes that “every reason” is “self-interested.” Second, he argues that this assumption is false. It should be granted by both theists and non-theists that there are “unselfish reasons” based on the fact that an action will “harm” (or benefit) other people. Third, he contends these unselfish reasons can answer the question of why they are moral.

    Does the argument assume that all reasons are selfish?

    Let’s look at the first point: does this argument assume that all reasons are selfish? That depends on how one interprets the phrase “reasons to be moral” and the rhetorical question “Why be moral?”

    When we talk of “reasons” to act, we can mean one of two things. Sometimes the word “reason” functions as a mass noun, referring to what we have decisive reasons to do—what we have reasons to do all things considered, when we consider everything that counts in favour of an action and against it. Alternatively, the word “reason” can function as a count noun, referring to what we have a pro tanto reason to do—what we have reason to do all else being equal. Here we ask whether there is anything that by itself counts in favour of the action.[3]

    An illustrative example: It is a rainy day, and I have to walk fifteen minutes outside to the bus. The fact I will get wet if I don’t take an umbrella is a pro tanto reason to take an umbrella. The fact that carrying an umbrella is cumbersome is a pro tanto reason against it. When I consider all the relevant factors—the burden of carrying the umbrella and the prospect of getting wet—I conclude that I have decisive, all-things-considered reasons to carry it.[4]

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor asks: if we are not accountable to God for our actions, and harming someone promotes our long-term self-interest, what reason do we have to refrain from doing harm? He could mean two things:
    (a) He could be asking whether, in the given circumstances, we have a pro tanto reason to refrain from harm; or
    (b) He could be asking whether, in those circumstances, we have decisive reasons not to harm.

    If he means (a), then Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticism seems on point. The interlocutor is assuming that all reasons are selfish. He is saying that if it is not in our self-interest to avoid harming others, then there is no consideration of any sort at all against harming them. This follows only if all reasons are selfish.

    I suspect that this is how Sinnott-Armstrong interprets the argument in question. The problem is that this is a very idiosyncratic understanding of the question “Why be moral?” Normally, in philosophical discussions, this is not what is meant by the question.[5]

    Consider what  Sinnott-Armstrong himself writes in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on moral skepticism. He writes about a form of skepticism known as “practical skepticism,” which asks the question:

    “Why be moral?” This question is used to raise many different issues. Almost everyone admits that there is sometimes some kind of reason to be moral. However, many philosophers deny various universal claims, including the claims that there is always some reason to be moral, that there is always a distinctively moral reason to be moral, and/or that there is always enough reason to make it irrational not to be moral or at least not irrational to be moral…
    Practical moral skeptics usually deny that there is always enough reason for moral action.[6]

    In a supplementary paper, he explains:

    What such practical moral skeptics deny is that I always have reason to do what is morally required… Practical moral skeptics do not deny that there is sometimes reason not to do what is morally wrong. After all, some wrongdoers are caught and punished. However, practical moral skeptics can still deny that there is always reason to do what is morally required or to avoid what is morally wrong.
    How much reason? Some practical moral skeptics claim that sometimes there is no reason at all to do what is morally required. If all reasons are self-interested, this means that sometimes doing what is morally required does not serve the agent’s interest in any way. That extreme position would be refuted if doing what is morally wrong always creates even a slight risk of some negative repercussion. A more plausible and common version of practical moral skepticism denies, instead, that there is always an adequate (or non-overridden) reason to do what is morally required. To establish this position, practical moral skeptics need only one case where there is overriding reason not to do what is morally required. (emphasis mine)[7]

    So, according to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, if we interpret the rhetorical question “Why be moral?” charitably—in a way that reflects how the question is commonly used—it is not a denial that agents lack any pro tanto reasons to do what they are required to do. Instead, the interlocutor is challenging the idea that agents always have decisive reasons to refrain from harm when doing so is contrary to their self-interest.

    Suppose we interpret Sinnott-Armstrong’s interlocutor in terms of (b). In that case, he is arguing as follows: if there are cases where harming another is in our self-interest, then we will not always have all-things-considered reasons to refrain from harm. This argument does not assume that all reasons are selfish. Even if there are unselfish reasons based on the fact an action harms others, these reasons will not always be stronger or weightier than the selfish reasons we have to the contrary. One can accept that we have a pro tanto reason to do an action and also admit that when one considers everything that is relevant—for and against—the total balance of reasons does not support it.

    We can conclude our discussion as follows: Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim—that his interlocutor’s argument rests on a false assumption, namely that all reasons are selfish—is true if one interprets the question “Why be moral?” in an idiosyncratic and uncharitable way, contrary to how the question is typically used. However, if the question is interpreted charitably, in line with its usual philosophical usage, then  Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim is false.


    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 114

    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality Without God 117

    [3] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12 (2017): 2. Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/What%20Are%20moral%20reasons.pdf accessed 28 August 2025

    [4] See Stephen Darwall, “What Are Moral Reasons?” 2-3

    [5] This point is made by Mark Murphy’s review, Morality Without God, available at https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/morality-s-without-god-s/ accessed 28 August 2025

    [6] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/index.html accessed 28 August 2025

    [7] Walter Sinnott Armstrong, Practical Moral Skepticism, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/supplement.html accessed 28 August 2025

  • New publication: “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?”

     

    My paper, “Can a Divine Command Theory Vindicate the Objectivity of Morality?” has been published in the latest issue of Philosophia Christi.

    Abstract:
    Defenders of divine command metaethics (DCM) often argue that one of its key advantages is its ability to vindicate the objectivity of moral judgments. Critics, however, contend that DCM is a subjectivist theory and therefore inherits the difficulties such theories face in accounting for the apparently objectivist features of moral thought. In this paper, I examine and critique three prominent versions of this objection: David Brink’s appeal to appraiser independence, Elizabeth Tropman’s appeal to stance independence, and Michael Huemer’s concept of observer independence. I argue that none of these criticisms succeeds.

  • Published: Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value

    My paper, “Theological Utilitarianism, Supervenience, and Intrinsic Value” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic God and Ethics. The abstract is as follows:

    Erik Wielenberg has argued that robust realism can account for the “common-sense moral belief” that “some things distinct from God are intrinsically good”. By contrast, theological stateism cannot account for this belief. Hence, robust realism has a theoretical advantage over all forms of theological stateism. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Wielenberg distinguishes between R and D-supervenience. The coherence of Wielenberg’s robust realism depends upon this distinction. I argue that this distinction undermines his critique of theological stateism. I will make three points. First, once you utilize the distinction between R and D-supervenience, his argument for the incompatibility of theological stateism and intrinsic value fails. Second, theological stateism is compatible with intrinsic value. The historical example of theological utilitarianism, expounded by thinkers George Berkeley and William Paley, shows someone can accept that moral properties simultaneously R supervene upon God’s will and D supervene upon the natural properties of actions. Third, robust realism and theological stateism are in the same boat regarding intrinsic value once we distinguish between R and D-supervenience.

  • Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle? Comments on James Sterba’s Argument from Evil

    My paper, “Is Theism Incompatible with the Pauline Principle?” has been published in a special issue of Religions, devoted to the topic Do We Now Have A Logical Argument From Evil? The abstract is as follows:

     

    This paper criticises James Sterba’s use of the Pauline principle to formulate a logical version of the problem of evil. Sterba’s argument contains a crucial premise: If human agents are always prohibited from doing some action, God is also prohibited from doing that action. This implies that the Pauline principle applies to both Divine and human agents. I argue that any Theist who affirms a divine command theory of ethics can consistently and coherently deny this premise and its implication. If a divine command theory is coherent, a theist can affirm that the Pauline principle governs human agents’ actions but not God’s actions. I will also criticise Sterba’s criticisms of a divine command theory and argue that they fail.

     

    Enjoy.

  • Published in Sophia “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument”

    My paper, “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument” has now been published by Sophia here.  The abstract is as follows:

    A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

    A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page.