Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    In my last post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. In this post, I begin looking at and critiquing some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint.

    II         Arguments for the Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    Of the reasons advanced in favour of the DRR most fall into one of two categories, an appeal to respect or arguments around the dangers of religion.

    A         Arguments from Respect
    Two variants of the argument from respect are common in the literature; one appeals to the golden rule, that we should do to others what we would have them do to us, the other is that religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible.

    1          The golden rule
    Audi advances a version of the golden rule;[12]

    Let us apply the do-unto-others rule to that case: one would not like having a different religious group, with which one deeply disagrees, press for its religiously preferred policies solely for religious reasons of its own, even if a good secular reason could be offered. … We are especially likely to disapprove of the dominance of religious motivation if the policy or law in question is backed by severe punishments.

    Audi expands a hypothetical example offered by Kent Greenawalt[13] where people advocated voting for candidates on religious grounds because they would protect animals. [14]

    Suppose, however, that much money must be spent in enforcement and that many jobs will be lost through the changes in the food sector of the economy, so that human conduct is significantly restricted, even if meat consumption remains legal. Then one might ask the religious voters in question whether they would accept comparable restrictions of their conduct, as well as similar job losses or mandatory shifts, on the basis of coercive legislation protecting the dandelion as a sacred species.

    Audi’s example imagines a “religious group, with which one deeply disagrees,” and gives the example of a belief in “the dandelion as a sacred species.” However, it is not just that one is being subjected to coercion on religious grounds, it is that the grounds are ones that we consider to be false. Lydia McGrew explains,[15]

    A major reason, perhaps the only reason, why many of us would not want other people to impose their religious standards on us is that we think their religions false, not that there is something special about religion. …. So the Golden Rule argument turns out to have very little to tell us about religion, specifically. [Emphasis added]

    Imagine the situation where a false secular belief is being imposed; an environmentalist political party seeks to impose a policy that the aesthetic value of dandelions requires all adults within society to make the same substantial sacrifices Audi refers to. The policy could be reasonably objected to in spite of its grounds being secular. The same is true in reverse. Consider a policy most people strongly agree with being proposed on religious grounds; a Christian party advocates the abolition of female circumcision on the basis that the practice conflicts with its religious belief of the body being sacred. The policy could attract widespread support despite its grounds being religious.

    These examples suggest that the merits of the policy itself are what is important and not that the grounds used for its justification are religious or secular.[16] Audi disagrees;[17]

    Citizens in [a democracy] are naturally and permissibly resentful about coercion by religious factors…in a way in which they are not permissibly resentful concerning coercion by, for instance, considerations of public health. Even the moral errors of others are, for many, easier to abide as supports of coercion than religious convictions having the same result.

    McGrew responds by contrasting two cases; first she argues that, “A slave owner would not be permissibly resentful of the emancipation of his slaves on the grounds that their emancipation had come about as a result of religious arguments.”[18] Conversely she argues, a parent would “be permissibly resentful of the forcible administration to his perfectly healthy child of mind-altering drugs even if such a policy was argued for from secular premises.”[19] So it appears that[20]

    How permissible (if one means, as Audi must mean, something like “understandable” or “reasonable”) one’s resentment of some law is depends on how reasonable the law is. It does not depend upon the origin of the considerations that brought about the law but rather upon whether the law is good or bad, merely annoying or outrageous, and so forth.

    That we should do to others what we would have them do to us does not just apply to the religious. While it is true that most people would strongly object to having to abide by religiously-grounded policies they reject as false, it is also true that they would strongly object to having to abide by secularly-grounded policies they reject as false. Consider a Muslim woman who believes it is her religious duty to wear a burqa. The passage of a law requiring her to remove her burqa for her driver’s license photo would likely be offensive to her. A parallel golden rule argument would require us to oppose coercive laws drawn from secular grounds.

    2          Epistemic inaccessibility
    Simplified, the most prominent type of argument offered in support of the DRR is that in a pluralistic society, coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people. People disagree over which religious views, if any, are correct; therefore, any coercive laws justified on religious grounds cannot be legitimate because not all reasonable people accept religious premises. As such, religious reasons are epistemically inaccessible. Eberle sums this up, “the norm of respect imposes on each citizen an obligation to discipline herself in such a way that she resolutely refrains from supporting any coercive law for which she cannot provide the requisite public justification.”[21]

    The paradigmatic and most influential version of this argument is that of John Rawls. Rawls argues that society [22]

    is always marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. Some of these are perfectly reasonable, and this diversity among reasonable doctrines political liberalism sees as the inevitable long-run result of the powers of human reason at work within the background of enduring free institutions.

    Rawls uses the fact of diversity of comprehensive viewpoints, present in a pluralistic society, to argue for his version of restraint. Any justification drawn from such distinct grounds will always be reasonably rejected by someone.[23] Given this, some form of restraint is necessary.

    Unlike most advocates of the standard view, Rawls’ version of the DRR does not only exclude religion but also other comprehensive secular doctrines that reasonable people disagree over. He notes,[24]

    Our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.

    Note that the reason that Rawls excludes comprehensive views is that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse [such views] in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Rawls argues that when comprehensive views are removed from consideration there remains sufficient common ground from which coercive laws can be justified to all reasonable people. Rawls refers to this “public reason,” which he explains as follows;[25]

    We start by looking to the public culture itself as the shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles. We hope to formulate these ideas and principles clearly enough to be combined into a political conception of justice congenial to our most firmly held convictions. We express this by saying that a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, or in what I have called elsewhere, ‘reflective equilibrium.’

    Public reason should comprise[26]

    presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial … we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines–to what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole truth–nor to elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium, say, if these are in dispute.

    Whilst the boundaries being drawn this way enables Rawls’ position to escape the charge of asymmetry, his critics and even many of those who also advocate some form of restraint on justificatory reasons claim that his position excludes too much.

    (a)        Incoherence
    Nicholas Wolterstorff identifies several problems; [27]

    No matter what principles of justice a particular political theorist may propose, the reasonable thing for her to expect, given any plausible understanding whatsoever of ‘reasonable and rational,’ is not that all reasonable and rational citizens would accept those principles, but rather that not all of them would do so. It would be utterly unreasonable for her to expect all of them to accept them. It would be unreasonable of her even to expect all her reasonable and rational fellow theorists to accept them; the contested fate of Rawls’ own proposed principles of justice is illustrative. What is reasonable for her to expect is that her proposals will stir up controversy and dissent not only at the point of transition from the academy to general society, but within the academy.

    In short, there is no more hope that reasonable and rational citizens will come to agreement, in the way Rawls recommends, on principles of justice, than that they will come to agreement, in the foreseeable future, on some comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrine. It is odd of Rawls to have thought otherwise; [Emphasis original]

    The divisions in society over welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on seem very broad; in most cases no argument or reasons advanced for these issues are likely to be accepted by all reasonable people. That reasonable people will disagree over what constitutes public reason does, prima facie, seem plausible. If this is the case then Rawls’ position is incoherent.

    Rawls argues that we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.” Public reason will “alone give a reasonable public answer to all, or to nearly all, questions involving the constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice.”[28] However, as Wolterstorff pointed out, even the deliverances of public reason are such “that not all reasonable people will agree.” Wolterstorff’s reference to the lack of consensus on Rawls’ own “principles of justice” supports this claim. In A Theory of Justice Rawls attempted to expound on his idea of public reason to develop principles of justice that a society could be ordered by.[29] The reception to A Theory of Justice was not a consensus in favour; present in the literature are a number of rejections, offered by reasonable people, on anything from the conclusions drawn, through to the methods used, to the principles themselves.

    If we have a moral obligation to reject any view that “[not] all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” and principles drawn from public reason are themselves things that not all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse then, by Rawls, we have a moral obligation to reject any principles drawn from public reason.

    Matthew Flannagan agrees,[30]

    Rawls rejects appeals to comprehensive doctrines because people can reasonably reject them and argues that there is a duty to not decide questions of basic justice this way. If this is true then we should reject appeals to public reason as well; in fact, we have a duty to not follow public reason.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III, I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.


    [12] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 30.
    [13]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 67.
    [14]
    Audi, above n 12, 28.
    [15]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [16]
    Wolterstorff makes the same point, above n 3, 106.
    [17]
    Audi, above n 12, 32.
    [18]
    McGrew, above n 15.
    [19]
    Ibid.
    [20]
    Ibid.
    [21]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 12.
    [22]
    Ibid 3-4.
    [23]
    The policy itself might be accepted as it may be able to be justified on grounds the person does accept, though these grounds are not immune from being reasonably rejected by other people. I am grateful to Glenn Peoples for the development of this point.
    [24]
    John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 217. Note: Rawls limits his support of a form of the DRR in the policy areas of “constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice.” Rawls’ critics argue that his position commits him to holding to his version of the DRR for all coercive legislation; see for example, Wolterstorff, above n 3, 106; Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 88; Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 200.
    [25]
    Ibid 8.
    [26]
    Ibid 224-225.
    [27]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 99.
    [28]
    Rawls, above n 24, 225.
    [29]
    John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1971).
    [30]
    Matthew Flannagan Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century? (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2006) 195.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    In this series I set out the doctrine of religious restraint, the idea that in a pluralistic, liberal, society religious beliefs should not be utilised in the formation of public policy. I note that this doctrine entails an asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular beliefs, which appears to conflict with the central notion of liberal democracy that all people are equal and that the state should be neutral in respect to different conceptions of the good. I examine several key arguments in support of the doctrine and some defences of this asymmetry. I argue these arguments are subject to numerous difficulties and the asymmetry appears arbitrary and unjustified.

    As far back as the birth of liberal democracy commentators have proposed various forms of epistemological restraint on the nature and extent of the justifications offered for coercive laws. Justification is important because central to the concept of liberal democracy is the notion that all people are free and equal. Broadly speaking, the state must accord equal protection to all who come within its territory. Public policy must allow people equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit. Every adult must have an equal voice in the governance of society through the democratic process. Charles Larmore sums this up,[1]

    The familiar constitutional rights of free-expression, property, and political participation, though no doubt serving to promote the goal of democratic self-rule, also have an independent rationale. They draw upon that most fundamental of individual rights, which is the right [of every person] to equal respect.

    A diversity of beliefs, views and religions flourishes as people avail themselves of these liberties and come to different understandings about life, the world they live in, the meanings and purposes thereof. The fact of this plurality invites an important corollary to the concept of liberal democracy, typically formulated as the idea that the state must remain neutral with respect to the different religions and comprehensive viewpoints present within society.

    This is not to say that the state must hold that all views are equally true, just or good. Likewise, it is not a requirement that the state must adopt the incoherent stance of affirming (as a truth) that there is no such thing as truth. Nor that it should not concern itself with injustice or deleterious conduct. What is meant by this requirement is that, as a body that exists to serve the people, it is not the state’s role to rule on what is or is not the correct philosophy, worldview or religion; each person must be free to determine this. The state being neutral in this way shows equal respect for the freedom of all people.

    When state neutrality is conjoined with the concepts of all people being free, equal and worthy of respect, it follows that coercive legislation needs justification. If people are worthy of respect then there exists a prima facie presumption against state coercion. A commitment to state neutrality entails that justification must be drawn from neutral grounds. I will refer to this view of liberal democracy as “the standard view.”

    Common to almost all versions of the standard view is some form of restraint on religious reasons being offered as a form of justification. Richard Rorty, alluding to Jefferson’s famous reference to a wall of separation, describes this as [2]

    the happy, Jeffersonian compromise that the Enlightenment reached with the religious. This compromise consists in privatizing religion — keeping it out of … “the public square,” making it seem bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy.

    The doctrine is more than just a restraint on religious reasons; Nicholas Wolterstorff expounds further;[3]

    Definitive of the position is a negation at this point: citizens (and officials) are not to base their decisions and/or debates concerning political issues on their religious convictions. When it comes to such activities, they are to allow their religious convictions to idle. They are to base their political decisions and their political debate in the public space on the principles yielded by some source independent of any and all of the religious perspectives to be found in society. … The source must be such that it is fair to insist that everybody base his or her political decisions, as well as public political debates, on the principles yielded by that source.

    Paul Rishworth writes, “some have contended that the nature of religious belief is such that, while it may be integral to individual autonomy and development, it has no proper role in public policy debates and that these ought to be conducted exclusively in secular terms that are equally accessible to all.”[4]

    Christopher Eberle and Terence Cuneo refer to this position as the doctrine of religious restraint (DRR) that they define canonically as[5]

    The DRR: a citizen of a liberal democracy may support the implementation of a coercive law L just in case he reasonably believes himself to have a plausible secular justification for L, which he is prepared to offer in political discussion. [Emphasis original]

    Eberle and Cuneo explain the implications of the DRR, “if a citizen is trying to determine whether or not she should support some coercive law, and if she believes that there is no plausible secular rationale for that law, then she may not support it.”[6]

    I           The Doctrine of Religious Restraint

    As Wolterstorff identifies in the quotes above, the restraint is negative; justifications for coercive laws must not be religious. The extent and nature of the independent source that acceptable justifications may be drawn from varies depending on which advocate one reads; all agree that a coercive law must be able to be justified by a plausible secular justification if it is to be neutral.

    Defenders of the DRR claim that it need not be codified. It is a moral requirement upon people regardless of their role within society; some form of censure rather than legal stricture is what is suggested. Rorty reflects this when he refers to it being “bad taste” to bring religion into the public square. Stephen Carter puts it clearly;[7]

    One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.

    There is an asymmetry present in most versions of the DRR; state coercion can be justified by some secular justifications but it can never be justified by religious justifications. In reviewing a definitive defence of the DRR advanced by Robert Audi, Philip Quinn observes;[8]

    These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking.

    Eberle and Cuneo, in their discussion of the DRR, note the same asymmetry;[9]

    There is an important asymmetry between religious and secular reasons in the following respect: some secular reasons can themselves justify state coercion but no religious reason can. This asymmetry between the justificatory potential of religious and secular reasons, it is further claimed, should shape the political practice of religious believers. According to advocates of the standard view, citizens should not support coercive laws for which they believe there is no plausible secular rationale, although they may support coercive laws for which they believe there is only a secular rationale.

    Not surprisingly, the DRR is controversial despite its current orthodoxy. Religious believers are required to omit beliefs they understand to be true or hold as important when they grapple with public policy. Stephen Carter captures the sentiment well when he labels this “the separation of church and self.”[10] Yet defenders of the DRR maintain that some form of religious restraint is not only in accord with the notion of liberal democracy but essential to it, as Rorty puts it, “we shall not be able to keep a democratic political community going unless the religious believers remain willing to trade privatization for a guarantee of religious liberty.”[11]

    For the DRR to be as pervasively held in the literature, in society generally and within religious-freedom jurisprudence there must exist good reasons as to how the DRR does uphold the concepts of equal protection, freedom, voice and neutrality in spite of the charges critics level against it.

    In my next posts in this series, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II, I will look at some of the arguments for the doctrine of religious restraint. These are mostly variants of appeals to respect (such as the golden rule, epistemic inaccessibility) or arguments around the dangers of religion.


    [1] Charles Larmore quoted in Michael J Perry Under God? Religious Faith and Liberal Democracy (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003) 36.
    [2] Richard Rorty “Religion as a Conversation-Stopper” (1994) 3:1 Common Knowledge 1, 2.
    [3] Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 73.
    [4] Paul Rishworth “Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Hushcroft, Scott Optican and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 277-307, 279.
    [5]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [6]
    Ibid.
    [7]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 23-24.
    [8]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
    [9]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 5.
    [10]
    Carter, above n 7, 1.
    [11]
    Rorty, above n 2, 3.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB. I am very grateful to a number of people who personally encouraged me, gave feedback, recommended  resources  or were good enough to supply me with their own – particularly my supervisor, Paul Rishworth; philosophers: Glenn Peoples, Lydia McGrew, Alexander Pruss, Francis J Beckwith, Nicholas Wolterstorff and my husband, Matthew Flannagan.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion

    Recently Madeleine was on a TV panel discussion regarding the issue of abortion and parental notification/consent which will go to air in the next week. During the ensuing dialogue Dr Paul Hutchinson, National Party Member of Parliament for Hunua, specialist in Obstetrics and Gynaecology and former member of the Abortion Supervisory Committee, raised the famous backstreet abortion argument for abortion rights. In many respects this is hardly surprising. In almost any media discussion of the issue of abortion the back-street abortion argument comes out. In Abortion: A Feminist Perspective, Susan Sherwin states, “Feminists recognise that women have abortions for a wide variety of compelling reasons.”[1] One reason she immediately cites is,

    No one denies that if abortion is not made legal, safe, and accessible in our society, women will seek out illegal and life-threatening abortions to terminate pregnancies they cannot accept. Antiabortion activists appear willing to accept this cost, although liberals definitely are not; feminists, who explicitly value women, judge the inevitable loss of women’s lives that results from restrictive abortion laws to be of fundamental concern.[2]

    In similar vein Dr Zoe During, former President of the Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand (ALRANZ), in a debate with the me, gave a paper entitled “Is Abortion Justifiable: An Examination of the Evidence”, in which she argued,

    But the majority of women, poor women, have had to go to backstreet practitioners or swallow dubious potions or use knitting needles on themselves. Attempting illegal abortion by such means has always been dreadful and dangerous and greatly increased maternal mortality.

    The World Health Organisation estimates that worldwide there are 20 million abortions each year, half or more being illegal, these causing up to 78,000 maternal deaths and hundreds of thousands of disabilities. A New York statistic is illuminating. For the three years before abortion became legal in that state, the maternal death ratio averaged 51 per 100,000 live births. For each of the three years immediately following legalisation it dropped to a mere 38, and there was the additional bonus of a 5% reduction in the neo-natal mortality rate. Thus not having access to legal abortion unjustifiably kills mothers and babies, while legalising abortion saves lives.[3]

    During’s argument rests upon three contentions:

    (a) That prohibiting feticide results in the death of women.
    (b) That (a) entails that prohibiting feticide kills women.
    (c) That killing of thousands of women in these circumstances is unjustifiable.

    Firstly, this is an argument not to the conclusion that feticide is permissible but rather that it should not be a criminal action. The fact (if it is a fact) that there are reasons why an act should not be a criminal offence does not entail that the act is morally permissible. Strictly speaking, this argument is compatible with the position that feticide is morally wrong. However, even as an argument for decriminalisation it is unsound.

    Many debates swirl around (a). As the citation shows During bases her conclusion on statistics from the World Health Organisation (WHO) and an un-referenced study about mortality in New York. These statistical claims are vigorously debated in the literature,[4] however, for our purposes this debate can be set aside. More interesting, I think, are the normative premises encapsulated in (b) and (c). If these are mistaken, the argument as a whole is unjust regardless of any merits of (a).

    Regarding premise (b) During appears to think that if passing a law results in the death of large numbers of women then to pass such a law is to kill these women. This is false. It is an empirical fact that building motorways results in innocent people dying, yet it does not follow that a person who builds a road kills innocent people. It is also a fact that by allowing people to swim at beaches some people will drown yet in permitting people to swim at beaches the government cannot be said to have drowned these people. Even if it could be demonstrated that restricting feticide results in women dying it does not follow that such restrictions kill women.

    During fails to distinguish between an action that foreseeably results in a person’s death and an action that causes that person’s death. Suppose that Parliament were to criminalise feticide and this led to a chain of events one of which was the death of a woman due to septic abortion. Somewhere in this chain, between the act of the legislature and the death of the woman, are the free actions of various people who choose to ignore or breach these laws. Parliament does not perform these actions; in fact they are done in defiance of Parliament’s will and hence without Parliament’s consent. Such actions include the choice of a woman to violate the law and procure an abortion and the choice of an abortionist to perform an abortion and to violate hygiene and safety standards. The death and injury that occurs is caused by these actions. It is the abortionist’s decision, acting as an agent of the woman, to perform unsafe surgery that causes the injury to occur. These facts make it evident that Parliament does not cause such deaths. The actions of the woman and abortionist are un-coerced. They are free, voluntary actions and as such not caused by someone else. It follows immediately that they were not caused by the state. If they were not caused by the state, then the effects that follow from them were not caused by the state either. The suggestion that one causes the free (and hence uncaused) reactions of others to decisions one makes is far fetched.

    The failure to distinguish caused and foreseen effects is illustrated well by Augustine. In contending with the consequentialists of his day, Augustine proposed the following example. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?[5]

    One response to this kind of rejoinder is to claim that a woman’s choice is not free; rather it is made out of desperation and anguish. She feels compelled to abort given the psychological and economic pressures she faces. Three responses can be given to this argument.

    Firstly, even if it is granted, the same cannot be said to be true of the abortionist and given that it is the abortionist’s actions that kill the woman, the fact that these are uncaused entails that Parliament cannot have caused them either.

    Secondly, even if the woman’s actions were not free but caused in some way it does not follow that Parliament caused them. In some circumstances other people, such as the man’s decision to have intercourse and then to not support her or the family’s refusal to help, caused this desperation. Given that these actions are free, then Parliament cannot be held to have caused these either.

    Thirdly, making the claim that a woman was not free to refuse an abortion makes this argument less plausible. Abortion is often trumpeted as a woman’s free choice. If this claim is correct then how can women be coerced into such an operation against their consent? Further, it seems odd to claim that we should legalise forced abortions.

    Turning to (c), this claim is plausible only if it is true that feticide is not homicide. If feticide is homicide then to permit feticide is to permit homicide. Not only will the failure to permit feticide result in human beings dying, permitting it will also result in human beings being killed. If, as During contends, endorsing a rule that results in deaths is wrong then it will also be wrong to permit feticide.

    It is worthwhile noting that the numbers of fetuses killed by legal abortion is significantly higher than the number of women killed by illegal ones. At its highest, the number of women who died from illegal abortion in New Zealand in any one year was 37.[6] The number of fetuses destroyed by legal abortion in New Zealand annually is approximately 18,000.[7] Moreover, according to the stats During cited from WHO, there are around 10 million legal abortions per year and 78,000 deaths resulting from illegal ones.[8] If we follow the argument During offers, then we are permitting the killing of 10,000,000 human beings per year to avoid killing 78,000 human beings.

    During’s argument in favour of feticide is sound only if feticide is not homicide. However, if feticide is homicide she is arguing that in order to prevent thousands of people from harming themselves we should kill millions of people; a claim that on the face of it is absurd.

    This absurdity is not unique to During; the same thing can be said about the arguments offered by Sherwin and Hutchinson.


    [1] Susan Sherwin “Abortion a Feminist Perspective” in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine ed Bonnie Steinbock & John D. Arras (Mountain View CA: Mayfield Publishing Co, 1999) 361.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Zoe During “Is Abortion Justifiable?” New Zealand Rationalist Humanist Spring (1999) 10-11.
    [4]
    The debates on this issue are documented in Francis Beckwith Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments for Abortion Rights (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Books, 1993) 54-59.
    [5] Augustine On Lying 9.
    [6]
    Wayne Facer Criminal Abortion in New Zealand: Public Health Consequences; this study was distributed by the Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand in the 1970’s. Facer was an outspoken proponent of decriminalising abortion.
    [7]
    New Zealand Abortion Supervisory Committee Report 2008.
    [8]
    These figures are not current.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Child Abuse
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II

  • Auckland STAANZ Conference: Eschatology and Pneumatology UPDATED

    The Systematic Theology Association in Aotearoa New Zealand (STAANZ ) are this week holding a conference in Auckland focusing on eschatology and pneumatology.

    What: STAANZ Conference on Eschatology and Pneumatology
    When: Thursday 19 November – Friday 20 November 9:00am-5:30 pm
    Where: Ponsonby Baptist Church, 43 Jervois Rd, Auckland
    Cost: $15

    Pre-conference prayer will be held at 8:00am at All Saints in Ponsonby, 284 Ponsonby Rd, Auckland.
    Dinner at a local restaurant will be organised for the Thursday night.

    Speakers are as follows: [UPDATED]

    Thursday
    “Holy Spirit in the theology of Walter Kasper” – Hugh Bowron
    “Backgrounding Walter Kasper’s Early Thought”- John Dunn
    “Wandering between two worlds: 19th Century Reflections on Hope and Hell” – Carolyn Kelly
    “Conscious Awareness of the Spirit in Symeon the New Theologian” – Jim McInnes
    “Searching for Embers” – Susan Adams & John Salmon

    Friday
    “Abortion, Harm and Eschatology” – Matthew Flannagan
    “Infant Salvation: Is God’s Mercy Enough?” – Myk Habets
    “Participatory Glory : The Eschatological Direction of Karl Barth’s Theology of the Cross”— Rosalene Bradbury
    “The Spirit and Longing” – Judith Brown
    “Filioque, Personhood and Ecclesiology” – Scott Kirkland

    The abstract for Matt’s topic “Abortion, Harm and Eschatology” is as follows:

    In No Harm No Foul: Abortion and the Implications of Fetal Innocence Kenneth Einar Himma offers what I shall call ‘the eschatological argument for abortion rights.’ Himma argues that because a fetus lacks the mental capacity to be culpable for any sin, a plausible Christian eschatology entails that a person who kills a fetus does not actually harm the fetus. Instead feticide benefits the fetus by sending the person killed straight to the afterlife, thus avoiding the possibility of any risk of future sin and consequent damnation. Given abortion does not harm the fetus, and as one should only legally proscribe harmful actions, it follows that abortion should be considered a woman’s right. In this paper I will criticise the eschatological argument for abortion, arguing it has absurd implications that entail infanticide and killing the disabled. Further, that even if one grants the eschatological assumptions implicit in Himma’s critique, abortion does, in fact, harm the fetus.

    Whilst Matt’s paper will find its way onto this blog, it is always nicer to hear it delivered in person so if you are free Friday morning he will be delivering it from 9:00-10:00 am.

  • Richard Dawkins on Thinking Matters

    According to Richard Dawkins, New Zealand apologetics blog, Thinking Matters Talk, “makes for some interesting browsing.”

    The recommendation of Rob Ward’s blog post, Sarfati reviews Dawkins’ ‘The Greatest Show on Earth’, has seen a deluge traffic arrive.

    (This pleases us because we are part of Thinking Matters and are listed as contributors to Thinking Matters Talk even though we don’t contribute there much…)

  • “My Ways are Not Your Ways” Notre Dame Conference

    In September this year, the centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame hosted a conference entitled “My Ways Are Not Your Ways”; the proceedings of the conference can be seen at the previous link and is a good resource.

    The theme of the conference, as outlined on Notre Dame’s webpage,  is as follows;

    Adherents of the Abrahamic religious traditions contend that human beings are made in the image of God and that modeling the character of God in one’s life represents the pinnacle of human flourishing and moral perfection. Defenders of this tradition commonly point to passages in the canonical texts of the Jewish and Christian faiths that portray God as loving, merciful, patient, etc. in support of such a position. Since the seventeenth century, however, numerous critics of these Abrahamic traditions have argued that God, especially in the Hebrew Bible, is often portrayed as anything but a moral role model.

    On the one hand, historical narratives in these texts describe God apparently committing, ordering, or commending genocide, slavery, and rape among other moral atrocities. On the other hand, a number of commands purportedly issued by God seem to commend bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia. In recent days, similar criticisms of the Abrahamic traditions have been raised by philosophers (Daniel Dennett), scientists (Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris), social commentators (Christopher Hitchens), and others.

    Are these apparent commendations and commands of the Hebrew Bible consistent with the claim that the Abrahamic God is perfectly good and loving? Those defending this tradition have two avenues of response open to them. The first response would be to argue that the aforementioned troubling narratives or commands should simply be rejected. Those taking this approach would have to explain how they think such passages could be rejected without placing in peril the Abrahamic religions, which have traditionally claimed that the Hebrew Bible is, represents, or contains the inspired word of God. The second response would offer explanations aiming to show that the apparently untoward consequences can be avoided without rejecting the narratives or commands. Those taking this approach must explain either why the untoward consequences do not follow, or why they are not, in the end untoward.

    However, while defenders of this tradition have both routes available to them, few of these defenders seem to have taken the challenge to heart. Despite these recent, forthright criticisms, only a handful of theologians or philosophers in these traditions have sought to respond to the criticisms.

    The present conference aims to remedy this deficiency, taking as its focus the charge that the Abrahamic tradition should be rejected because of its foundation in the Hebrew Bible, which portrays God as immoral and vicious.  The presenters and commentators include philosophers—both theistic and nontheistic—as well as Biblical scholars.

    For those who are interested, Michael Rea from Notre Dame has put the entire conference online (including the Q & A).

    Enjoy 🙂

  • Audi and the Infallibility of Religious Reasons

    In “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics”,[1] Robert Audi defends the liberal thesis that religious reasons should not be utilised in debate on issues of public policy. Instead he contends that “one should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support.”[2] Audi explains that “an adequate reason for a law or policy is a proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify it.”[3] Audi’s position is that it is immoral for a person to defend any legislation or public policy on theological grounds alone; one can only licitly defend a policy if one has secular reasons for it.

    A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.[4]

    Audi supplants this principle of secular reason with two others, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[5] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[6] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[7]

    So construed there is an obvious asymmetry in Audi’s position. In a review of a book which defends Audi’s position, Philip Quinn observes;

    These principles impose burdens on religious people that Audi nowhere suggests imposing on nonreligious people. … Audi does not propose that nonreligious people must be sufficiently motivated by adequate religious reason for their advocacy or support of restrictive laws or politicise. The lack of symmetry is striking. [8]

    The fact that Audi’s position singles religious reasons out for exclusion from public discourse in a manner which he does not apply to secular reasons, raises the obvious question of why? What’s so special or objectionable about theological reasons being used in public?

    Elsewhere in his article Audi offers some reasons for this; he notes, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.”[9] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society.[10]

    In this post we want to focus on the first of these. Audi thinks any appeal to God’s commands in public debate is dangerously divisive because “religious reasons … are directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority.”[11] This line of thought strikes a chord with many, concern about the infallible nature of divine will is often the basis for criticism of appeals to theology in public discourse.

    However, as Audi defines the term ‘infallible’ any reason a person offers for their position would be infallible; according to Audi, propositions are infallible if it is “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[12] God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition one can imagine, regardless of its content, will be such that it is impossible for both God to believe it and that the proposition be false. Given this it is hard to see how “religious reasons” are especially objectionable on Audi’s contention.

    Perhaps, however, this is a technical point based on a mistaken definition of infallibility. Audi’s main concern is that a person, who believes that an action is commanded by God, believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic because the authority appealed to cannot err.

    The obvious rejoinder is that many secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem. One of the most influential secular theories is the ideal observer theory, which is endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others. On this theory, an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.

    This is probably enough to address Audi’s concerns but there are several other points worth noting.

    Firstly, the fact that the law of God is infallible does not entail that there is or cannot be debate over what the law of God in fact is. Claiming that God’s law is infallible is not to claim that any human never errs in his or her discernment of what this law is, his or her interpretation of it or his or her application of it to particular cases. Claiming that there is debate over the interpretation of divine law and debate over how to apply various precepts of divine law to specific cases, is compatible with affirming that divine law is infallible.

    In this, the law of God is analogous to deductive reasoning. By definition, a sound argument can never have a false conclusion. It is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the argument is sound, hence sound arguments are infallible. It does not follow from this that people never err in constructing arguments that they mistakenly believe are sound or that there is no debate over which arguments are sound. Reason is authoritative; however, human reasoners are not. It is hard to see why the infallibility of the law of God means that appeals to this law are any more problematic than appeals to logic.

    A similar response is available on the immutability of divine law. The fact that God’s law is immutable does not mean that any person’s understanding of this law cannot change. He or she may find his or her particular beliefs about God’s law were mistaken or that he or she had applied it incorrectly.

    In this respect, the law of God is analogous to numerous things that it is unobjectionable to appeal to. Consider an appeal to facts and reason; these too are immutable. If it is a fact that the world was round at the time of Columbus then this is something we cannot change. It cannot be true 100 years from now that the world was not round when Columbus sailed. Moreover, whether an argument is sound is also immutable; we cannot repeal the laws of logic. Therefore, both facts and reason are as immutable as God’s law is.

    Moreover, consider a precept such as it is wrong to torture children for entertainment. Is this mutable so that society could repeal it tomorrow? Is the claim that rape and genocide of Jews is wrong something that is mutable, that human beings can change and repeal these things? Obviously not. Immutability is a feature of any serious, ethical viewpoint. If you cannot base civil law on immutable things, then you cannot base it on facts, reason or secular values.


    [1] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66.
    [2]
    Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
    [3]
    Ibid 284.
    [4]
    Ibid 278.
    [5]
    Audi, above n 1, 25-37.
    [6]
    Ibid 284.
    [7]
    Audi, above n 1, 21.
    [8]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review).
    [9]
    Audi, above n 1, 31.
    [10]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [11]
    Audi, above n 1, 31.
    [12]
    Audi, above n 1, 62.

    This post was jointly authored. It is largely a mash of extracts from Madeleine’s  paper “Religious Restraint and Public Policy” and from Matt’s “Is Historic Christian Opposition to Feticide Defensible in the 21st Century.”