Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Does Abortion Benefit the Fetus? A Critique of Himma Part 1

    This series was developed from the paper I gave to the Auckland STAANZ Conference: Eschatology and Pneumatology.

    In Is Abortion Liberal? I suggested that one cannot simultaneously affirm the harm principle, accept that a fetus is a human being, and support permissive abortion laws. If abortion is homicide then it harms a human being, and the harm principle entails that we should prohibit harmful actions.

    Kenneth Einar Himma contests this conclusion. Himma argues that even if one grants that a fetus is a human being, feticide (the killing of a fetus) does not harm the fetus. Consider the doctrine of final punishment which is articulated in chapter 33 of The Westminster Confession of faith.

    I. God hath appointed a day, wherein he will judge the world in righteousness by Jesus Christ, to whom all power and judgment is given of the Father. … all persons, that have lived upon earth, shall appear before the tribunal of Christ, to give an account of their thoughts, words, and deeds; and to receive according to what they have done in the body, whether good or evil.

    II. The end of God’s appointing this day, is for the manifestation of the glory of his mercy in the eternal salvation of the elect; and of his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, who are wicked and disobedient. For then shall the righteous go into everlasting life, and receive that fullness of joy and refreshing which shall come from the presence of the Lord: but the wicked, who know not God, and obey not the gospel of Jesus Christ, shall be cast into eternal torments, and punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

    Himma suggests that, to be plausible, this doctrine should be interpreted so that human beings who lack moral culpability, are saved directly by Gods mercy.

    Insofar as culpability presupposes moral knowledge, someone who lacks moral knowledge through no fault of her own is incapable of culpability and is hence exempt from divine punishment. Thus, for example, someone who instantiates a severe cognitive disability is saved without regard to either her behaviour or her attitude towards Christian doctrine. Such a person is saved no matter how she behaves or what she believes.

    The same is true of children before they have developed the capacity for moral reasoning. Such persons are incapable of culpability in either deed or belief and, as Abelard puts the point, “Are saved without merit of their own, as for instance, infants, and attain eternal life by grace alone.”1

    Himma is not alone in thinking this is the most plausible interpretation of this doctrine. Loraine Boettner, citing Charles Hodge, W. G. T. Shedd, and B. B. Warfield, notes “most Calvinistic theologians have held that those who die in infancy are saved,”2 these theologians, “entertained a charitable hope that since these infants have never committed any actual sin themselves, their inherited sin would be pardoned and they would be saved on wholly evangelical principles.”3

    The implication for feticide is obvious; fetuses have not yet developed the capacity for moral reasoning, hence, according to the Eschatological doctrines Himma has sketched, “fetuses that die before birth are, as a matter of moral necessity, saved without regard to personal merit”4 hence they are “as a matter of moral necessity saved without regard to personal merit.” Himma contends that abortion does not harm the fetus but, in fact, benefits it;

    It can plausibly be argued that premature death conduces maximally to the fetus’s self-interest. To see this, imagine yourself in the following situation. While in the womb, you are temporarily made fully rational and offered the choice between premature death and the opportunity to live a worldly life. The choice is expressed as follows. Should you choose a premature death, you will immediately experience a profound and eternal bliss – an ecstasy beyond any possible in this world. Should you choose an opportunity to live a worldly life, you will be judged at the end of your life for your deeds and beliefs. If you are judged favorably, you gain eternal bliss; if not, you will suffer eternal torment. You are also told there are many temptations that may lead you down a path that culminates in an unfavorable judgment so that the risk of such torment at the end of your worldly life is substantial. Finally, you are told that, after having made our choice, you will forget everything you have been told. Assume that you have no idea whatsoever of what your post-natal circumstances will be. What should you do? 5

    Himma suggest that a rational person would choose to be killed. This is because “the odds of a favourable judgment after a worldly life are probably not in [anyone’s] favor.”6 He notes that if the probability of a favourable judgment is “less than 1. The smallest chance of an unfavorable judgement”7 is multiplied by an infinite cost. Whereas any benefits one gains from a worldly life will be finite.

    Consequently, even if one grants that a fetus is a human being, traditional Christian eschatology entails that a fetus is not harmed if it is killed via an induced abortion. The harm principle, however, affirms that the state should permit, and people should have a legal right to engage in, any activity that does not harm another person; consequently, there should be a legal right to procure an induced abortion.

    Novus Actus Interveniens Objection

    Mark Murphy has argued that Himma’s argument errs by suggesting that the thesis of infant salvation entails that fetuses and infants are not harmed by being prematurely killed. He writes,

    If the fetus enjoys the beatific vision upon being aborted … the fetus’ enjoying that good is caused not by the agent’s act of aborting the fetus but by God’s graciously conferring the gift of eternal life on the child. For not every good or evil that occurs downstream from an act counts as a benefit or harm conferred by that act. This is particularly clear in those cases in which the benefit or harm would not have occurred but for some agent’s free intervention. That the causal chain from act to effect is broken by the intervention of a free agent is a standard view, both in common sense’s attribution of responsibility and in the law’s.8

    Murphy illustrates the point with an example,

    If … a traveler is beaten and left for dead by robbers, is rescued by a Samaritan, and by this transformative experience comes to have a much better life than he or she would otherwise have had, it is nevertheless incorrect to say that the robbers did not harm, or even benefited, the traveler. The robbers merely harmed the traveler; the Samaritan benefited the traveler.9

    Murphy here appeals to the common law doctrine novus actus interveniens. He notes that there is a difference between what a person causes and what one foresees will be caused by others in response to what one does. In a discussion of the doctrine of double effect, utilised in post-reformation Catholic casuistry, Donagan suggests that Catholic and Kantian ethicists,

    … and in general, all moralists who accept the freedom of the will in a non-combatibilist sense, limit an action’s effects, and a fortiori what its agent intends to bring about in doing it, to those that follow from it in course of nature and the ordinary operation of social institutions, and from the free reactions of others to it. (Thus actions in the ordinary course of business, for example, those of postal officers in delivering a letter that has been mailed, are not counted as free reactions.) The principle on which they do is that a free reaction to an action, is a ‘new action’ (‘novus actus’), the effects of which are their effects, and not those of the action to which they are reactions.10 [Emphasis added]

    Donagan does note that another person’s actions can be considered an effect of one’s actions if they follow in the ordinary operation of social institutions. For example, if I mail poison to another person and this kills him or her then I have killed him or her despite the fact that numerous other people’s actions intervened between my action of placing the poison in the mailbox and the person’s death. This is because social institutions are in place whereby the mail service acts as an agent on my behalf and such institutional rules mean that my actions can be attributed to it.11 For similar reasons, taking out a contract to kill another is culpable homicide because the institution of contract means that the killer kills on my behalf and hence I act in his or her actions. In the absence of such institutions, the free actions of others to my actions are not effects that I cause. Donagan notes that in some situations12 a person is culpable of wrongdoing if he does something which he foresees will be met with an immoral action on the part of others. However, he does not cause these actions.

    I think this is plausible. Augustine proposed the following example. Suppose a man approaches a woman and tells her that he will kill himself if she refuses to have sex with him. Does that mean that she is a murderer if she refuses?13 Her refusal would not constitute homicide even though his death is a foreseeable result of her choice. Although she foresaw his or her death, she did not cause it. It was caused by the free decision of the tempter to commit suicide. Similarly, a company knows that some people will use the roads they build to engage in reckless conduct that will kill innocent people.

    Applied to the context under discussion, a person who kills a fetus causes the evils inflicted on the fetus, such things as, damage to the fetus’s bodily integrity and deprivation of their earthly life. However, these actions do not cause the fetus to attain eternal life; this is brought about by the gracious mercy of God. Hence when a person kills a fetus they do not benefit it, they only cause it harm.

    In my next post in this series I will argue that Himma’s response to this line of argument fails.

    1Kenneth Einar Himma “No Harm, No Foul: Abortion and the Implication of Fetal Innocence” 19:2 Faith and Philosophy (2002) 179.
    2
    Loraine Boettner The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination by Loraine Boettner The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company
    (Philadelphia, PA; 1963) 143.
    3
    Ibid.
    4Himma “No Harm No Foul” 179.
    5Ibid 180.
    6
    Ibid.
    7Ibid.
    8Mark Murphy “Pro-Choice and Presumption: A Reply to Kenneth Einar Himma” 20:2 Faith and Philosophy (2003) 241.
    9Ibid.
    10Alan Donagan “Moral Absolutism and the Double-Effect Exception: Reflections on Who Is Entitled to Double-Effect?” 16 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1991) 498.
    11This is not to say that an agent acting unknowingly, such as the mail-man, is culpable for this action only that his actions are attributable to me. If I therefore do this willingly, I am culpable for his actions on my behalf while he is not.
    12
    Theses situations are ones where one incites, induces or persuades a person to engage in wrongdoing or where in “pursuing his legitimate ends, a man finds that several effective courses of action are open to him, each legitimate in itself , but one of which will be foreseeable be met with a wrongful action by somebody else.” Alan Donagan The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago Press, Chicago; 1979) 48-50.
    13 Augustine On Lying 9.

  • Rangiora New Life College, Religion and Discrimination

    On Wednesday I flew to Christchurch for an interview regarding a religious education (RE) teaching position in a Catholic School. On having the interview and receiving the subsequent rejection email, it was clear what the reason I did not get the position was: I am a protestant, the school has a particular Catholic ethos that it was trying to instill in the students; this ethos involved such things as Marian devotions, praying the rosary, prayers for the dead and regular involvement in the Eucharist. As a leader in the school I would be expected to, by my teaching and life, encourage and model this ethos. Given I am an evangelical protestant I could not do this. I could, of course, explain to students what the Catholic teaching was on these issues and respect the special character of the school but due to my religious convictions, I could not truly fit with the ethos of the school because I could not model it, as fact, in my own example.

    Now in no way do I think I was treated unfairly, it was afterall a Catholic School and this was something that was  obvious both from the name on the advertisement in the education gazette and from the website linked to from the same ad. The function of this school was not simply to impart information; it was to imbibe a particular religious way of life, some of it involving what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls “educating for responsible action,”

    The ultimate goal of all education, as Christians see it, is that those who are taught shall live in such a way as to carry out their responsibilities to God and find joy and delight in so doing. … But if responsible action is to ensue, more is necessary than for the students to have knowledge of the relevant matters and the ability to perform the relevant actions. Knowledge and ability are not yet performance. It is also necessary that the students’ tendencies, ranging all the way from their unreflective habits to highly self-conscious commitments, be those of acting in accord with the normative laws for right action. Education, accordingly, must have among its goals to secure–always in morally defensible ways–the formation of right tendencies.[1] [Emphasis original]

    Wolterstorff argues that modelling plays an important role in cultivating tendencies. He notes that a series of studies show that students who view other people resisting the temptation to act in an immoral or inappropriate way fortify their own resistance to temptation.[2] Wolterstorff states, “The evidence seems to be that not only do a model’s low standards influence the student to lower the standards which otherwise he or she would adopt, but also a model’s high standards influence the child to raise his or hers.”[3] [Emphasis original]. An important caveat of this is that studies show “the self-denial induced by a stringent model gives way rather readily when the subject is confronted by another model with lower standards.”[4] Because the school was seeking to train students to internalise a Catholic ethos, and an important part of the pedagogy of internalising such an ethos is modelling, it follows that leaders within communities committed to this goal must themselves follow and be committed to the basic moral teachings of the community. I was not. I am a protestant and so would buck (internally) against many of the tendencies the RE department were trying to teach.

    This does not seem terribly controversial to me. Schools dedicated to inculculating a religious way of life into their students have the right to demand that the leaders in their schools be committed to and reflect this way of life. It is perfectly reasonable for Jewish schools to expect people in positions of leadership to be faithful followers of the Torah. It is perfectly reasonable for Muslim schools to expect leaders in their community to be faithful Muslims; for atheist schools devoted to promoting atheism to expect their leaders to be atheists.

    I reflect on this because of the recent outcry in response to a Campbell Live story that a Christian school in Rangiora, Rangiora New Life School, expelled a student for getting pregnant and subsequently revoked the deputy head-boy status given to her fiancé, the father of her child. Now, in light of what the media has reported, I will say I am not in agreement with everything the school did (I should qualify this by stating that I have very little faith that the media to report events like this terribly accurately – so take that concession with a grain of salt).

    For example, Ollie Sterrit the deputy head-boy and his fiancé Sara Etherington stated that “if we decided not to keep her [abort their daughter] they didn’t support it, and they still didn’t support us if we did keep it. So we were stuck in the middle and couldn’t do anything to please them.” The media reports that the teen couple “are engaged and determined to stay together.” Now, I am inclined to think that if a teenage couple respond to getting pregnant unmarried by taking their responsibilities seriously by refusing to kill their child, getting engaged, making a commitment to stay together and to continue their education they should be supported and commended for doing the right thing. They are of course not yet “legally married” but given their age, in this country, that is impossible; hence it is not clear cut to me that this couple’s choice should not be supported. In fact, I think that a scriptural case could be made that people in this situation can, in certain circumstances, be viewed as being in a constituted kind of common law marriage and that, in fact, it is the duty of the father to marry the woman he has impregnated and to take his responsibilities to her and the child seriously (which is what appears to be happening in this situation).  However, Sara’s parents tell a different story (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link) “We have consistently tried to encourage Ollie and Sara to see the bigger picture (others affected by there decisions) all along, their choice of course. Sara has had every love and support from RNLS  [the school] and her family.“

    Whatever the truth is on the matter of the school supporting the couple, stripping someone of a position of leadership is not the same thing as not supporting them –  though not permitting Sara to finish her education (she was apparently asked to leave the school) might be. Also giving someone a position of leadership, knowing about the pregnancy and then removing it from them, perhaps demonstrated a lack of wisdom in the first place on the part of the school or some dud processes (or bad media reporting).

    However, these issues are not the focus of my concern in this blog post. First, Dave Crampton at Big News seems to suggest that the school had no policy on sex outside of marriage and as such they could not claim that this was part of the ethos they were trying to impart, meaning the school had no right to suddenly make an issue of the sexual conduct of its students, “The schools handbook has no mention of policies on sex, although swearing and alcohol are forbidden in school grounds, as are piercings for males.” If you visit Rangiora New Life’s website a very different picture emerges. First of all, the name of the school  “New Life” immediately suggests it is evangelical or pentecostal. On the front page the school mission states “Providing quality Christian education that equips and inspires all students to reach their life’s potential in order to serve God’s purposes.” There is a clear indication by the use of words such as “their life’s potential” and “serve God’s purpose” that the type of education they are seeking to inculculate is holistic, they hope that it will impact all aspects of the students’ lives. Click through to their Mission, Vision and Values page and you’ll find under the heading “Vision,”

    GODLINESS – Building character in the students that will enable them to lead by example.

    LIFE SKILLS – Equipping students with skills in relationships, home-life and vocation.

    EVANGELISM – Taking every opportunity to share the life changing message of the gospel.

    SERVICE – Impacting our region and beyond through sacrificial service and giving. [Emphasis added]

    Here we see concern with character, leading by example, reference to relationship skills, home-life and vocation tell us they mean more than relationships with their school peers and teachers. Evangelism and reference impacting the region and beyond show, again, the broader ethos of the school. The “guiding values” on this page continue these motifs and among these we find “Ensuring school relationships, procedures and policies reflect Biblical principles and the highest Christian conduct” and “Promoting personal responsibility in learning and conduct, and community responsibility by way of service and leadership skill.” Does anyone really think, on reading these, that banging your fellow teenage school peer and knocking her up is compatible with Rangiora New Life’s understanding of these terms and is the sort of example in leadership or high biblical standard that the school is seeking to promote by example and that this sort of conduct is what the other parents with kids in the school want modelled to their kids?

    Now, as Madeleine points out, when contracts are formed (I’m getting at here Dave Crampton’s contractual suggestion) all aspects of the communication between the parties, the information freely offered about the parties states of mind, intent, etc as well as the surrounding documentation speak to how the minutae of the handbooks and policies should be read and interpreted. The school is clearly a conservative, pentecostal/evangelical bible believing Christian school. Did anyone miss the memo that people with such beliefs tend to frown on pre-marital sex and that such people have high expectations of the example of their leaders – that’s why church leaders being hypocrites is such a big deal.

    Second, what is my concern is the widespread belief of some commentators that a religious school cannot demand that leaders in their community abide by the moral teachings of the religious ethos the school seeks to inculculate. Idiot/Savant of No Right Turn’s comments are typical,

    This is clearly unlawful discrimination on the basis of marital status and family status, in violation of sections 21(1)(b) and s21(1)(l) of the Human Rights Act 1993. It may also constitute discrimination on the basis of religious belief in violation of s21(1)(c). Rangiora New Life School is a religious school, so it has an exemption for the latter – but not for the former. It can not legally exclude or punish students who have children or are in de facto relationships, any more than it can exclude or punish them for being divorced (or the children of people who are divorced).

    Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof as Madeleine insists) of Idiot/Savant’s legal analysis here there is a moral point here worth addressing. Idiot/Savant seems to think that religious schools can discriminate on the grounds of religious belief but not on grounds of sexual behaviour. It is hard to see the sense in this because in many circumstances, and certainly in this case, a person’s religious beliefs include a set of beliefs about sexual morality. If we are to take this line of argument seriously a religious school can discriminate against people who believe that sex outside of marriage is wrong but they cannot discriminate against people who refuse to practice this belief. It is hard to see how such a view could be taken seriously; surely the whole point of these teachings is that they be followed.

    Idiot/Savant continues,

    But there’s another aspect to this: Rangiora New Life School is a state integrated school, and therefore effectively part of the state education system. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act therefore clearly applies. By discriminating against its students and denying them any involvement in the decisions about them, the school has violated the right to be free from discrimination and the right to justice. And that is something we should not be tolerating from any part of our government. Rangiora New Life School’s board must be told to obey the law, cease its discrimination, and reinstate the student it has excluded. And if they do not, they should be replaced.

    Idiot/Savant here makes heavy weather over the fact that Rangiora New Life is an integrated school. While this is true, it is also a religious school which aims to inculculate a particular religious way of life. Integrated religious schools, with special characters allowing them to promote a particular religion, are extremely common. If Idiot/Savant’s, position is correct none of these schools should be allowed to require leaders in the school or students who attend the schools to uphold a certain religious ethos. This would of course make a mockery out of their mission to promote such a way of life.

    Lurking behind this complaint is, I think, a mindset that schools that promote a particular religious ethos (or at least take the ethos seriously) should not get public funds; only secular schools should get such funds. In practice this means that a school that promotes a secular perspective antithetical to a particular religion will get state funds whereas a school that inculculates certain religious beliefs will not. It’s odd that people like Idiot/Savant who maintain the right to be free from discrimination on the part of the state would support such a policy that clearly discriminates against tax paying parents with religious views.

    Wolterstorff notes a deeper problem,

    there are parents within society for whom it is a matter of religious conviction that their children receive a religiously integrated education. … If those parents are forbidden by law to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their religious convictions, then the discrimination is embodied in law. If they not legally forbidden to establish and patronize such schools then the discrimination is embodied in economics. Were those parents to establish and patronize schools that teach in accord with their convictions, they would have to pay for those schools out of their own pockets, while still contributing to the general tax fund for the other schools, obviously there free exercise of religion is thereby infringed upon in a way in which that of others is not. They do not enjoy equal freedom to live their lives as they see fit.[5]

    To insist that schools either forgo public funds or compromise the religious ethos they seek to inculculate is itself discrimination. Wolterstorff notes the only escape from this dilemma apart from privatising education entirely is to “fund equitably all schools that meet minimum educational requirements” and this means allowing schools to take public funding that will require strict standards of sexual morality from student leaders. Of course one could always admit that one does not actually support the right of all to be free from religious discrimination…


    [1] Nicholas Wolterstorff Educating for Responsible Action (Grand Rapids MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co) 14-15.
    [2]
    Ibid 51-55.
    [3]
    Ibid 55.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Political Issues” Religion in the Public Square

    RECOMMENDED READING:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy

    While it is not central to my point I cannot ignore the fact that in two places now (see the second comment on the Campbell Live link for one) I have seen the parents express anger at Campbell Live’s intrusion into their home without their consent. They had apparently categorically told the producers that they did not give permission for their property to be used for the interview but Campbell Live ignored their wishes and waited til they were not home to film the piece. Appalling.

  • Plantinga & Ruse on Methodological Naturalism & Science Definitions

    Michael Ruse (and many others) contend that science is constrained by methodological naturalism, which is the thesis that that neither the data, for a scientific investigation, nor a scientific theory nor the background beliefs, against which a theory is assessed, can properly refer to or contain supernatural beings or propositions based on revelation. In Darwinism Defended Michael Ruse seems to think science, by the very definition of science, is constrained by methodological naturalism.  He writes,

    Furthermore, even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins. The Creationists believe that the world started miraculously. But miracles lie outside of science, which by definition deals only with the natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law.[1]

    Ruse’s specific target here are creationists who typically contend that the world was created around 6-10 thousand years ago, in 6×24 hour days and that the fossil record is the result of a world-wide flood. However, the definition he offers excludes far more than this specific position. Ruse’s definition entails that any reference to God’s activity is unacceptable in scientific theorising. Any claims such as that the universe was created (in some way or another), that God created the universe ex nihlo, that God sustains the universe, upholds laws of nature God or even theological interpretations of the big bang and the advocacy of theistic evolution would be ruled out as non scientific.

    Moreover, this ruling out is a prori. It is not that scientists have examined whether God exists, that they have gathered evidence showing he does not exist and this has become a settled, peer-reviewed, consensus; science has, in fact, done no such thing. Further, Ruse is clear that his definition would hold even if God does exist and even if there is compelling evidence for his existence. Science would not consider such facts in its theorising; the very rules governing scientific inquiry would rule it out of consideration from the outset. This is because, according to Ruse, science by definition deals only with what is:

    (i) natural;
    (ii) repeatable;
    (iii) law-governed.

    Elsewhere in the same article Ruse defines in more detail what he means by (iii). He states,

    [A]n approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or an other we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.[Emphasis added][2]

    Ruse contends that science only postulates and presupposes objects and properties that are natural, repeatable and governed by laws of nature. He understands these as regularities grounded in some form of necessary succession.

    Plantinga’s critique
    Alvin Plantinga argues that Ruse’s definition of science is mistaken,

    What about the Big Bang: if it turns out to be unrepeatable, must we conclude that it can’t be studied scientifically? And consider the claim that science, by definition, deals only with that which is governed by law—natural law, one supposes. Some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there aren’t any natural laws (but only regularities): if they are right, would it follow that there is nothing at all for science to study?[3]

    Plantinga here suggests that Ruse’s conditions (ii) and (iii) are subject to straightforward counter-examples and that, as such, his definition is mistaken. In Methodological Naturalism Under Fire Ruse responds to both these criticisms. Below I will examine Ruse’s response and argue that it is unsuccessful.

    The Repeatability Requirement
    Turning to (ii), Plantinga notes that on at least one possible cosmological model the big bang is unrepeatable. Despite this studies into the first instant of the big bang are clearly parts of science and would continue to be so even if this model is true and the big bang is unrepeatable. It follows from this that science can study unrepeatable events which renders (ii) false.

    Ruse’s response is two-fold; first Ruse suggests that Plantinga is repeating a common line of argument,

    As a matter of fact, Plantinga here is raising an objection which has often been raised by critics of the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law. His point, as was theirs, is that there are many unique events that science must surely try to cover and under stand, but that given the uniqueness of these events, in some sense this precludes lawful understanding.[4]

    Ruse then goes on to address this common line of argument,

    But, as many critics of the critics have countered, there surely has to be some thing wrong with this argument. Take for in stance the demise of the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous. This was in it self a unique phenomenon and un repeat able; but, uniqueness not with standing, the demise was made up of many factors which can individually be brought beneath lawful under standing. To day, it seems most probable that an asteroid or a comet or some such thing hit the earth. This was no unique phenomenon, nor was the hit ting of the earth by the asteroid or comet such that the normal laws of nature – that is to say Galileo’s laws of motion – could not be applied.[5]

    Ruse’s response misses its target. Ruse construes Plantinga’s objection to be aimed at (iii), “the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law.” This, however, is false. The appeal to the big bang was actually proposed as a counter example to (ii), Ruse’s contention that science deals only with repeatable events. The common line of argument Ruse responds to is not the line of argument Plantinga actually offers.

    Moreover, Ruse’s response fails to address Plantinga’s counter example completely. Plantinga’s counter example was based on big bang cosmology. Instead of showing that his definition can accommodate the big bang, Ruse instead notes that other people (not Plantinga) have offered a different counter-example, the extinction of the dinosaurs, and that this different counter example is unsuccessful. Ruse may well be correct; the extinction of the dinosaurs is not a valid counter-example to (iii) however, Plantinga never said it was. What he said was that the possibility that the big bang is unrepeatable is a counter-example to (ii) and to this line of argument Ruse says nothing.

    Requirement of Being Law-Governed
    Of course Plantinga does offer a response to (iii), the idea that science, by definition, deals only with what is governed by law but his argument against this is very different to an appeal to the extinction of the dinosaurs. Plantinga turns to the issue of being law-governed in the next paragraph and raises quite a different objection to this,

    Consider next the property of being governed by law. The first point, here, would be that the very existence of natural law is controversial; Bas van Fraassen, for example, has given an extended and formidable argument for the conclusion that there are no natural laws. There are regularities, of course, but a regularity is not yet a law; a law is what is supposed to explain and ground a regularity. Furthermore, a law is supposed to hold with some kind of necessity, typically thought to be less stringent than broadly logical necessity, but necessity nonetheless. … So suppose van Fraassen is right and there are no natural laws: would it follow by definition that there isn’t any science? That seems a bit strong.[6]

    Plantinga’s point is that some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there are not any natural laws, there are only regularities. Regardless of whether one agrees with van Frassen or not, even if he is correct it clearly would not follow that science does not exist. This entails that the existence of science does not depend on the existence of laws of nature; hence it is a mistake to define the former in terms of the latter.

    Ruse’s response is as follows,

    Now, whilst I am the last per son to belittle the formidable philosophical powers of Bas van Fraassen – as eminent in the field of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as Plantinga is in the field of the philosophy of religion – what is being extrapolated here is far stronger than van Fraassen or any one else would want (should want) to claim. Certainly there are questions about how one might interpret the necessity of laws: I myself have al lowed that already. But neither van Fraassen, nor any one else is going to deny that there are certain sorts of regularities of some kind and that these are pre -supposed in the activity of science.[7]

    Here Ruse states the existence of science does not presuppose the existence of natural laws, it merely presupposes regularities in nature and this is compatible with the empiricist critiques of laws of nature. The problem is that this explicitly contradicts Ruse’s definition. Ruse states that science deals only with the natural, the repeatable and that which is governed by law. In elucidating this Ruse states that science is “an approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or another we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.” As Ruse defines science then it presupposes more than mere regularities. This position requires that these be necessary in some sense and it is precisely this understanding of laws of nature that empiricists, such as van Fraassen, do criticise.

    Ruse appears to be in a dilemma; if he accepts natural laws as necessary in some sense then his argument is subject to the objection Plantinga raises. Some empiricists reject the existence of laws so understood but even if they are correct it would be erroneous to claim that science did not exist. If Ruse contends that science need only presuppose regularities then his definition is false because his definition states science demands an understanding in terms of a necessity over and above mere regularity. It seems then that Ruse’s definition of science is problematic; if this is the case, attempts to argue for methodological naturalism on the basis of such a definition are unsound.


    [1] Michael Ruse Darwinism Defended (Reading, MA: Addison -Wesley, 1982) 322.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy accessed 8 December 2009.
    [4]
    Michael Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1) 2005 47.
    [5]
    Ibid.
    [6] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism” Perspectives on Science and the Christian Faith 49 (September 1997).
    [7]
    Ruse, above n4, 48.

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. I examined and critiqued Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and his idea of open justification. In this post I will look at the dangers of religion as a justification for its asymmetrical treatment within the DRR and conclude the series.

    B          The Dangers of Religion

    One explanation as to why this asymmetry is applied to religious reasons is offered by Quinn; “Some people fear that religious argument is apt to be dangerously divisive.”[82] Audi concurs, “[religious reasons] are special in relation to liberal democracy even by contrast with [secular reasons] … that are not accessible to any normal adult.” [83] He gives five “salient points” to support his case, all based on the idea that religious reasons are dangerous to society. [84]

    First Audi claims that religious reasons are often “directly or indirectly taken to represent an infallible authority”.[85] The second point is that religious people often “believe that anyone who does not identify with [the ultimate divine source] is forsaken, damned, or in some other way fundamentally deficient.”[86] Third, “religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content (such as prayer) or intent (such as preserving the fetus on the ground that it is a gift from God)”.[87] Fourth, with many religious leaders, especially leaders of cults, there is a risk that they are “cloaking their prejudices with absolute authority.”[88] Finally, Audi contends that religious people tend to be “highly and stubbornly passionate about the importance of everyone’s acting in accordance with religious reasons”.[89]

    Again these features are not unique to religion. As McGrew argues, all these features can be equally present in secular people and movements;[90]

    It is sadly amusing to read this list and to consider how well its negative aspects apply to secular people and movements. Communism, for example, is as fanatical as any conventional religion and demands group-think on an unrivaled scale. Contemporary feminism aspires to control worldview, language, and behavior. The New Atheists are exceedingly passionate about making people behave in accordance with their own beliefs (making sure children are taught Darwinism as unquestioned fact, for example), and Richard Dawkins and P.Z. Myers have an inflated sense of self-importance that would make many a Christian megachurch pastor look modest by comparison. Dawkins is infamous for having repeatedly and insistently called a religious upbringing “child abuse,” and while Dawkins has shied away from the obvious legal implications of this accusation, not everyone who thinks as he does is so cautious. Other secularists, self-styled “comprehensive liberals,” have expressly advocated the use of the power of the state to monitor and limit parents’ ability to transmit their religion to their children (see Hitchcock, 2004). As for the vicious condemnation of children who do not fully conform to their parents’ secular ideology, a good example of this phenomenon is the strange story of Rebecca Walker, daughter of feminist icon Alice Walker. And, on the other hand, there are plenty of religious people who do not display such negative characteristics. It simply does not appear to be true that we reduce fanaticism, self-important leadership, attempts at thought control, and the like in society by reducing the role of religion in public life.

    McGrew suggests there are secular analogues of even Audi’s third reason, that religious reasons often dictate practices that are distinctively religious in content or intent;[91]

    It would certainly be undesirable if people were being coerced to pray to any God, even the true God. But then, secular ideology can and sometimes does demand that we do homage to itself—in the form of changing our language to make it politically correct, for example, or treating two men or two women as “married” in all of our business activities. The problem with forcing people to pray to the true God is that the true God is not truly worshiped in that fashion. The problem with forcing people to pray to false gods and to pledge allegiance to false ideologies is that they are false. You will not avoid the problem of the coercion of conscience by limiting the role of religion in public life. You will only shift that problem so that the unreasonable coercion comes from some quarters rather than others.

    Audi’s first point invites a parallel rejoinder. He defines infallible propositions as those that are “impossible that they be both endorsed or accepted by God and false”.[92] On this definition of infallibility every proposition is infallible. God, as Audi understands him, is omniscient. God only believes true propositions. It follows then that any proposition God accepts cannot be false; this is true whether it is a religious proposition or a secular one.

    Audi’s main concern is that a person who believes an action is commanded by God believes that an omniscient, infallible being has endorsed that action. Appeals to purported divine commands are therefore problematic. However, some secular ethical theories face precisely the same problem.  One of the most influential secular theories, endorsed by ethicists as diverse as David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, Richard Hare, Roderick Firth, John Stuart Mill, Tom Regan, Richard Brandt, Immanuel Kant and others, is the ideal observer theory. On this theory an action is wrong, if and only if, it would be proscribed by an ideal observer, by a person who is perfectly impartial and perfectly informed on all the relevant facts. A hypothetical ideal observer is no less infallible than religious believers take God to be. It is hard to see how invoking religious reasons is not acceptable but invoking the secular reasons is.[93]

    C         Argument from Religious Wars
    A more forcible danger of religion argument invokes the spectre of religious wars. Audi states “if religious considerations are not appropriately balanced with secular ones in matters of coercion, there is a special problem: a clash of Gods vying for social control. Such uncompromising absolutes easily lead to destruction and death”[94] Wolterstorff articulates the concern;[95]

    One reason which liberals have offered ever since the emergence of liberalism in the seventeenth century is that it’s just too dangerous to let religious people debate political issues outside of their own confessional circles, and to act politically, on the basis of their religious views. The only way to forestall religious wars is to get people to stop invoking God and to stop invoking canonical scriptures when arguing and determining politics.

    The adequacy of this argument can be contested on several grounds. First, Quinn, Greenwald and Wolterstorff note that while it was true of 17th century England, “social peace did depend on getting citizens to stop invoking God, canonical scriptures, and religious authorities when discussing politics in public”,[96] it is not plausible that such a danger exists in 21st century Western countries like New Zealand, Australia and the United States. Quinn notes, “current political debate in the United States exhibits failure to comply with Audi’s principles on a massive scale and yet shows no tendency to reignite the Wars of Religion of the early modern era.”[97]

    Wolterstorff makes two other related points. He notes that “the slaughter, torture, and generalised brutality of our century has mainly been conducted in the name of one or another secular cause–nationalism of many sorts, communism, fascism, patriotisms of various kinds, economic hegemony.”[98] Second, he notes that “many of the social movements in the modern world that have moved societies in the direction of liberal democracy have been deeply and explicitly religious in their orientation”[99] He cites the abolitionist movement, the civil rights movement and movements resisting communism, facism and apartheid as examples. The invocation of religious reasons risks war and civil strife when certain types of religious reasons are invoked in particular socio-political contexts. This is equally true of secular reasons; certain types of secular reasons can be dangerously incendiary in particular socio-political contexts. There seems no basis for an asymmetry between secular and religious reasons on these grounds.

    Eberle and Cuneo add that 17th century “confessional conflict … [was] typically rooted in egregious violations of the right to religious freedom, when, for example, people are jailed, tortured, or otherwise abused because of their religious commitments.”[100] Given that few, if any, who appeal to religious reasons advocate such violations or could plausibly bring them about, such appeals are unlikely to have tumultuous effects.

    In terms of protecting freedom of religion from these kinds of abuses it is not obvious that secular reasons fare any better, “secularists have a long history of hostility to the right to religious freedom and, presumably, that hostility isn’t at all grounded in religious considerations”.[101] Moreover when[102]

    religious believers have employed coercive power to violate the right to religious freedom, they themselves rarely have done so in a way that violates the DRR … when such rights have been violated, the justifications offered, even by religious believers, appeal to alleged requirements for social order, such as the need for uniformity of belief on basic normative issues. One theological apologist for religious repression, for example, writes this: ‘The king punishes heretics as enemies, as extremely wicked rebels, who endanger the peace of the kingdom, which cannot be maintained without the unity of the faith. That is why they are burnt in Spain’.

    Similarly, Aquinas, in a Rawlsian vein, famously justified the suppression of heretics by appealing to the accepted political culture of his day which required that counterfeiters be executed.

    Consequently, the religious wars of the 17th century were caused, not by the appeal to religious reasons per se but rather by the violation of religious freedom; this violation has often been defended on secular grounds. It is unlikely that the DRR provides a bulwark against such abuses.

    III        Conclusion

    On examining the DRR it appears that there is no good reason for singling out religious reasons for a particular restraint and limiting discourse to secular reasons. The grounds offered for doing so, the golden rule, the epistemic accessibility of religious premises, the dangers of religion and the potential for religious wars all apply with equal force to secular beliefs. Hence, the restriction appears arbitrary. Moreover, as applied, the DRR is often incoherent and if applied consistently would render most substantive coercive laws unjustified. The current practice of equating secularism with neutrality is flawed.

    As Carter eloquently puts it,[103]

    What is needed is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism develop a politics that accepts whatever form of dialogue a member of the public offers. Epistemic diversity, like diversity of other kinds, should be cherished, not ignored, and certainly not abolished. What is needed, then, is a willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice but because the speaker has the right to speak. Moreover, the willingness to listen must hold out the possibility that the speaker is saying something worth listening to; to do less is to trivialize the forces that shape the moral convictions of tens of millions of Americans.

    This series was written as a supervised research paper in pursuit of my LLB.


    [82] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 143.
    [83]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 31.
    [84]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [85]
    Ibid 31.
    [86]
    Ibid.
    [87] Ibid.
    [88]
    Ibid 31-32.
    [89]
    Ibid 32.
    [90]
    Lydia McGrew “The Irrational Faith of the Naked Public Square” (2008) 1 The Christendom Review (at 2 October 2009).
    [91]
    Ibid.
    [92]
    Audi, above n83, 63.
    [93]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [94]
    Robert Audi Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000) 103.
    [95]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “Why we should Reject what Liberalism tells us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious Reasons” in Paul Weithman (ed) Religion and Contemporary Liberalism (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame IN, 1997) 167.
    [96]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 79.
    [97]
    Quinn, above n82, 39.
    [98]
    Wolterstorff, above n96, 80.
    [99]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [100]
    Ibid.
    [101]
    Ibid.
    [102]
    Ibid.
    [103]
    Stephen Carter The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialise Religious Devotion (Basic Books, New York, 1993) 230.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. I examined Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility. In this post I will examine and critique Gaus’ idea of open justification in more detail.

    (ii)        Are religious reasons ever subject to open justification?

    Gaus might rejoin that commitments to freedom of religion can be defended in terms of open justification. Consider some of the cases that divide society that I listed earlier; at least one side in such debates is mistaken, has made an error in rejecting the purported open justification presented to them. This is entirely possible. It could also be true of Qutb; perhaps he mistakenly rejected a premise that, given other things he believes, he should have embraced.

    While this rejoinder would avoid the thinness objection, the problem is that it would no longer be clear or obvious, in the absence of substantive argument, that any viewpoint could be openly justified. Neither side in the above debates is likely to concede its position as the one in error. Cuneo and Eberle note the problem;[66]

    Were we to ask Qutb whether he would have reasons to support laws that protect a robust right to religious freedom if he were adequately informed and reasonable, surely he would say: no. Moreover, he would claim that his compatriots would reject the liberal protection of such a right if they were adequately informed about the divine authorship of the Quran and the proper rules of its interpretation. While Qutb’s say-so doesn’t settle the issue of who would believe what in improved conditions, liberal critics maintain that his response indicates just how complicated the issue under consideration is. Among other things, to establish that Qutb is wrong it seems that one would have to deny the truth of various theological claims on which Qutb relies when he determines that he would reject the right to religious freedom were he adequately informed and reasonable. That would require advocates of the standard view to take a stand on contested religious issues. However, liberal critics point out that defenders of the standard view have been wary of explicitly denying the truth of religious claims, especially those found within the major theistic religions.

    Gaus’ case for open justification can only succeed if one makes certain assumptions as to the merits of substantive contentions about morality, philosophy of religion, the truth or falsity of various religious doctrines and questions of meta-ethics. However, such contentions are controversial.

    An additional problem is that open justification commits one to the DRR only if one assumes that religious reasons can never be openly justified. Recall that Audi’s definition of a religious reason is one that possesses “normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God.” This suggests that proponents of the DRR must assume that belief in God cannot ever be openly justified. I would dispute this.

    Philosophers and theologians have offered arguments for God’s existence entailing that the beliefs most rational people already accept commit them to theism.  Richard Swinburne has written several works arguing that Christianity is more probable than not on the public evidence than any alternative.[67] Robert Adams has argued that the best account of moral obligation is such that they are the commands of a loving God.[68] Alvin Plantinga sketched 26 arguments for God’s existence, which are currently being defended in the literature.[69] Blackwell recently published an encyclopaedia containing 11 current arguments used to defend the existence of God.[70] Edward Feser agrees,[71]

    Versions of these arguments were defended by the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Newton, and their defense had absolutely nothing to do with ignorance of modern science — indeed, some of these thinkers were among the founders of modern science — because the arguments do not ultimately stand or fall with any scientific results in the first place. … Among the contemporary defenders of the arguments are writers like Alvin Plantinga, Richard Swinburne, John J. Haldane, James F. Ross, Richard Taylor, William Lane Craig, David S. Oderberg, David Braine, Barry Miller, Robert Koons, Charles Taliaferro and many others — analytic philosophers highly respected within the field and applying the most rigorous methods of analysis and argumentation. … anyone familiar with the classical and contemporary literature on philosophical theology [cannot] deny that the arguments for the theistic worldview mentioned above are every bit as defensible today as any other philosophical argument.

    Just as there are numerous secular arguments, each defended by intelligent and capable scholars, held to be sound by their proponents even if rejected by their opponents, so too are there arguments for the existence of God that meet these criteria. In light of this it seems arbitrary to simply assume that religious arguments cannot meet the standard of public justification. Critics can argue the merits of these arguments and claim that only secular arguments can succeed but this will not give proponents of religious reasons a real reason for accepting such claims. Religious believers hold quite different assessments on the cogency of these arguments. Therefore, the demand of open justification does not appear to be a sufficient reason for the restriction of religious reasons but not others.

    (iii)       Are secular reasons for coercive laws subject to open justification?
    Gaus contends that religious reasons cannot be openly justified and that secular beliefs can. Many thinkers have argued that secular perspectives cannot justify the core commitments of a liberal democracy. Nihilist thinkers have argued that secular naturalistic views of the world entail that all moral claims are false.[72] Stephen Layman[73] and George Mavrodes[74] have argued that a secular view renders belief in morality irrational. Using a Kantian line, John Hare has argued that atheism makes the moral life rationally unstable.[75] Mark De Linville argues that atheism, when combined with evolutionary theory, provides good reason for thinking our moral beliefs are unreliable.[76] Alvin Plantinga has articulated the case for the conclusion that evolution, when combined with atheism, provides a reason for being sceptical about everything we believe (public policy would be no exception).[77] Michael Perry and Wolterstorff claim that human beings possessing inherent rights (a fundamental commitment of liberal democracy) cannot be adequately defended on secular grounds and is only defensible if one assumes religious doctrines.[78]

    As with many secular arguments, religious justifications for coercive policies have been advocated by intelligent and capable scholars, held to be sound by their proponents even if they are rejected by their opponents. It would be arbitrary to simply assume that secular arguments meet the criteria of open justification and that religious ones do not.  Cuneo and Eberle note the problem;[79]

    Liberal critics maintain that we are simply not in good epistemic position to judge the reasons an agent would have to support laws that protect basic liberal commitments were he better informed and more reasonable. More exactly, liberal critics maintain that we are not in a good epistemic position to determine whether a secular agent who is reasonable and better informed would endorse or reject the type of theistic commitments that philosophers such as Wolterstorff claim justify the ascription of natural human rights. The problem is that we don’t really have any idea how radically a person would change his views were he to occupy these conditions. The main, and still unresolved, question for this version of the standard view, then, is whether there is some coherent and non-arbitrary construal of the relevant counterfactual conditions that is strong enough to prohibit exclusive reliance on religious reasons but weak enough to allow for the justification of basic liberal commitments.

    Given the divide between intelligent and capable people over various arguments for and against particular coercive policies it is not prima facie evident that any of these arguments can meet the standard of open justification. Moreover, if an argument could, there appears to be no reason to assume that it could not be a religious one. Now Gaus could examine all currently unsettled policy disputes in society and defend the ones he agrees with and attack the others but the inevitable result will be that many who do not share Gaus’ position will likely be unconvinced. If this is the outcome, there seems no reason why those who do not agree should accept the DRR.

    Feser suggests that this arbitrary singling-out of religious reasons for restraint with little or no basis seems to be based more on ignorance and bigotry than reason,[80]

    The problem, in the view of many liberals, is that religious considerations are matters of faith, where “faith” connotes in their minds a kind of groundless commitment, a will to believe that for which there is no objective evidence. Opinions on matters of public policy, they would say, can only appropriately be arrived at via methods of argument assessable by all members of the political community, not by reference to the idiosyncratic and subjective feelings of a minority.

    If religious arguments were in general really like this, then I would agree with the liberal that they ought to be kept out of the public square. But in fact this liberal depiction of religion is a ludicrous caricature, and manifests just the sort of ignorance and bigotry of which liberals frequently accuse others.

    Jeremy Waldron makes a similar point,[81]

    Secular theorists often assume that they know what a religious argument is like: they present it as a crude prescription from God, backed up with threat of hellfire, derived from general or particular revelation, and they contrast it with the elegant complexity of a philosophical argument by Rawls (say) or Dworkin. With this image in mind, they think it obvious that religious argument should be excluded from public life, … But those who have bothered to make themselves familiar with existing religious-based arguments in modern political theory know that this is mostly a travesty;

    A common theme in the arguments from respect, despite both possessing the features considered relevant, is the asymmetry between religious reasons and secular reasons. On the golden rule argument, Audi privileges secular reasons over religious reasons even though secular reasons were potentially subject to the same charges of being false and burdensome. Similarly with the argument from epistemic inaccessibility, reasonable people are able to reject both secular and religious reasons in a pluralistic society yet Audi and Rawls use this fact to exclude the latter and not the former. Likewise, with open justification, prima facie, there is no reason to accept that religious beliefs cannot be openly justified whilst secular beliefs can. Nor is there a prima facie reason for assuming that liberal commitments can be openly justified on secular grounds. In both cases intelligent and capable scholars have advanced arguments from premises which they believe others are committed to holding. Further in both cases the cogency of these arguments can be reasonably disputed.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI, I will look at the dangers of religion as a justification for its asymmetrical treatment within the DRR and conclude my argument.


    [66] Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [67] Richard Swinburne The Coherence of Theism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977); The Existence of God (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979); Faith and Reason (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2005); Responsibility and Atonement (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989); Revelation (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007); The Christian God (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); Providence and The Problem of Evil (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998).
    [68]
    Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford University Press, New York, 1999); “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” (1979) 7:1 Journal of Religious Ethics 66; “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Robert Adams (ed) The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford University Press, New York, 1987) 144; “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” (1987) 4 Faith and Philosophy 262.
    [69] Alvin Plantinga “Appendix: Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments” in Deane-Peter Baker (ed) Alvin Plantinga
    [70] JP Moreland and William Lane Craig Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, 2009).
    [71]
    Edward Feser “How to Mix Religion and Politics” (20056) TCSDaily (at 6 October 2009).
    [72]
    Prominent examples are: JL Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977); Michael Ruse “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics” in Michael Ruse (eds) The Darwinian Paradigm (Routledge, London, 1989) 251-273.
    [73]
    C Stephen Layman “God and the Moral Order” (2002) 19:3 Faith and Philosophy 304; “God and the Moral Order: Replies and Objections” (2006) 32:2 Faith and Philosophy 209.
    [74]
    George Mavrodes “Religion and the Queerness of Morality” in Robert Audi and William Wrainwright (eds) Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986) 213-226.
    [75]
    John Hare The Moral Gap (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996); “Naturalism and Morality” in JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (eds) Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Routledge, London, 2000) 189-211; “Kant and the Rational Instability of Atheism” in Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell (eds) The Ethics of Belief (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005).
    [76]
    Mark D Linville “The Moral Argument” in JP Moreland and William Lane Craig (eds) Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, 2009) 391 449.
    [77]
    Alvin Plantinga Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford University, New York, 1993) 216-239; “The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism” and “Replies to Beilby and his Cohorts” in James K Beilby (ed) Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Cornell University Press, New York, 2002) 1-15 & 204-277; “Naturalism vs Evolution: A Religion Science Conflict” in Paul Draper (ed) God or Blind Nature? Philosophers Debate the Evidence (at 3 September 2009).
    [78]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice Rights and Wrongs (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2008); Michael Perry Toward a Theory of Human Rights: Religion, Law, Courts (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).
    [79]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 65.
    [80]
    Feser, above n 71.
    [81]
    Jeremy Waldron God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 20. Gaus appears to agree; in his book review of Eberle’s work on the subject he writes, “At the outset, however, let me stress that Eberle has written a very good book indeed. It is manifest that he has thought much harder and deeper about justificatory liberalism than justificatory liberals have thought about religious justification and belief. His analysis of religious epistemology and mysticism (ch. 8) clearly demonstrates the extent to which many liberals have attacked caricatures of religious justification. After Eberle’s book, secular liberals must be much more careful in their claims about religious beliefs and their justifications.” Gerald Gaus “Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics” (2003) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (at 13 September 2009) (book review).
    (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007) 203-229.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI


  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. In this post I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility.

    (d)        Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility

    I have argued that the argument from respect is subject to two objections, incoherence and thinness. One should not appeal to religious reasons to justify coercive legislation because people can reasonably reject religious reasons; as religious reasons are not shared by all reasonable people there is a duty to not appeal to them.  However, if this is true then both the DRR in its “public reason” form, as exemplified by Rawls, and in its more secularist form, as exemplified by Audi, should also be rejected. Reasonable people do not agree on secular moral theory nor do they agree on the principles of public reason.

    In addition to being incoherent the DRR excludes far too much. It leaves us with content that is insufficiently thin to justify substantive legislative questions. I cited Gaus above who agreed that “little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”

    In response to the thinness objection Gaus introduced the idea of “open justification.”[55]

    Open justification … takes a person’s current system of beliefs and asks, first, whether given this system that person is committed to accepting some new piece of information, and, second, whether that person is then committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.

    According to Gaus, what respect requires is not that laws be justified to all reasonable people in such a way that those reasonable people can be expected to accept the justification, but rather “a coercive law is justified to an agent only if, were he reasonable and adequately informed, then he would have a sufficient reason from his own perspective to support it.”[56] [Emphasis added]

    Peoples explains,[57]

    [One] might hold to all kinds of prejudices and false beliefs that would lead him to reject a policy, and yet we might still be justified in advocating that this policy be imposed on him because if he were a bit more reasonable and open to new information, he would have a reason to endorse it. Stated differently, a person can be openly justified in accepting a policy, and yet consciously reject that policy because he doesn’t realise that if he only knew a bit more, understood the situation a little better, or was more open minded, he would have reasons to accept the policy.

    Gaus prefers open justification over two other forms he identifies as “closed justification” and “strong externalism.” Gaus describes closed justification as being justified internally from the viewpoints that person currently holds.[58] He defines strong externalism as being justified from a viewpoint where one was adequately informed and had no mistaken beliefs. Gaus suggests that respecting others means that one is able to openly justify the policies one supports to other reasonable people in society. He does not require that persuasion is achieved or that a person’s current comprehensive viewpoint endorses the policy in question. Rather he holds that one must be able show the person that his or her current viewpoint provides grounds or reasons for believing things they currently do not. Further, that if they did accept these other things then they would have reasons for embracing the coercive policy being advocated.

    Gaus’ opinion does appear to improve on that of Rawls. He is not alone in suggesting this. Audi has offered a solution to the thinness problem along the lines Gaus suggests.[59]

    Two people who disagree on the justice of allowing a Nazi group to present its case may share intuitions about freed speech in general and be divided by, for instance, paranoia about Nazis, which one party has and the other does not. When this happens, there is often a possible route from the shared intuitions about the justice of protecting freedom of expression to agreement on the case in hand. It appears, moreover, that among rational civilized people, establishing agreement on what factual information is relevant and on what the relevant facts are tends to bring intuitions closer together.

    Often when two people disagree there will be a set of moral intuitions[60] on which they do agree. The disagreement stems from other facts brought about by certain biases. If people can be shown that they are mistaken on these facts, it is possible that the biases can be corrected and agreement might occur. Audi suggests that something like open justification will decrease the amount of disagreement between rational people on at least some issues of justice.

    As Audi’s example is simply that of a dispute between two people I am not sure that it escapes the thinness objection. It is one thing for a person to openly justify his or her position to one other but, according to Gaus, it is wrong to advocate a coercive law unless one can provide open justification to all reasonable people. Further, in the context of a defence of the DRR, and in the face of a charge of unjust asymmetry, Gaus must also contend both that religious reasons can never achieve open justification in this manner and that secular reasons can.

    (i)         Open justification and the thinness objection
    According to Gaus, the provision of open justification for a policy, to another person who rejects that policy, should proceed in two stages. First, one should assess whether the other person’s viewpoint commits that person to “accepting some new piece of information”. If it does, then one should assess whether the person is then “committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.” Consequently, a person is only permitted to advocate a position if he or she can show that the position follows from premises that all reasonable people in society currently accept and according to a type of inference that all reasonable people recognise as valid.

    An immediate problem arises, namely that few, if any, laws are justified by arguments that meet this standard (probably because few arguments on any substantive topic meet this standard). Marilyn McCord Adams notes, “the defence of any well-formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises which are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable persons.”[61] Consider the list of controversial issues I gave earlier: welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on. Do any of the proponents on either side of these debates offer arguments that ultimately appeal to premises that all rational people accept, without ever appealing to some premise, that is either drawn from or depends for its plausibility on, a comprehensive perspective that only some reasonable people accept? Could anyone advance such a justification? I doubt it.

    This doubt stems from the fact that in such ethical debates often the very foundations of the subject are a matter of dispute. Nihilists deny moral claims are defensible at all. Non-nihilists disagree fundamentally over whether moral language is descriptive, prescriptive, both or merely an expression of emotion. There is disagreement over how moral knowledge is gained, what the fundamental criteria for right actions are and so on. Given this, almost any moral premise will be subject to dispute by some reasonable people.[62]

    Eberle and Cuneo raise a related point by citing the example of Islamic intellectual, Sayyid Qutb.[63]

    While in prison, Qutb wrote an intelligent, informed, and morally serious commentary on the Koran in which he laid the ills of modern society at the feet of Christianity and liberal democracy. The only way to extricate ourselves from the problems spawned by liberal democracy, Qutb argued, is to implement shariah or Islamic legal code, which implies that the state should not protect a robust right to religious freedom. In short, Qutb articulates what is, from his point of view, a compelling theological rationale against any law that authorizes the state to protect a robust right to religious freedom.

    People like Qutb are not alone in society. Whatever we might think of the conclusions they draw, Islamic intellectuals appear to be educated, rational and morally serious people. Qutb rejects “a robust right to religious freedom” and liberal democracy itself. A coercive law that protects a robust right to freedom of religion and any of the other substantive commitments of a liberal democracy is only defensible if secularists can provide a valid argument for these commitments, from premises that Qutb accepts, to the conclusion that such commitments are correct. It is doubtful that secularists have done this or even that they would be able to.[64] Cuneo and Eberle note the conclusion.[65]

    If respect for persons requires that each coercive law be justified to those reasonable persons subject to that law, and if a person such as Qutb were a citizen of a liberal democracy, then the argument from respect implies that laws that protect the right to religious freedom are morally illegitimate, as they lack moral justification—at least for agents such as Qutb.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V, I will examine and critique Gaus’s idea of open justification in more detail.


    [55] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 32.
    [56]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [57] Glenn Peoples “Religion in the Public Square: Is it Justified?” (speech delivered at Thinking Matters, Laidlaw College, 12 May 2009, 14; text obtained via Email from Glenn Peoples to Madeleine Flannagan, 12 October 2009.
    [58]
    Gaus, above n 54, 36.
    [59] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 132-133.
    [60] Audi is a moral intuitionist. He believes people can discern basic moral truths through moral intuition; hence, for Audi, agreement on intuitions means agreement on basic moral principles.
    [61] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999) 180.
    [62] I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [63] Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.
    [64] For a critical discussion on the standard arguments for religious freedom and the controversial premises on which they rest see, Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in William E Mann (ed) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Reference Online 2004) (at 7 October 2009).
    [65]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. I looked at and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint. In this post I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.

    (b)        Thinness

    A closely related problem is that if it is applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. If justification is limited to principles that no reasonable person can reasonably be expected to reject then little will be able to be justified. Glenn Peoples notes the problem;[31]

    Given this view of justification, you can only endorse a policy if it is such that it can be endorsed in light of the actual beliefs and goals held by the KKK, the Catholic Church and the humanist rationalist society.

    Wolterstorff observes that “in our actual societies, anyone who embraced this position would simply refrain from advocating any position whatsoever on any issue of importance to society.”[32] Quinn agrees, “as Wolterstorff notes, he knows of no law or policy that has come up for discussion in the United Sates in recent years that has had the support of a consensus of all the rational adult citizens.”[33]

    Gerald Gaus, who is otherwise sympathetic to the DRR, also agrees; he notes that, given Rawls’s requirement for consensus, public reason “loses its character as a liberal doctrine, for little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”[34] Kent Greenawalt argues that public reason is incapable of grounding policy on most contentious political issues.[35] Peter de Marneffe concurs.[36]

    Wolterstorff contends that public reason must be supplemented by ideas drawn from comprehensive doctrines or it will not be able to function as an adequate base for justifying many substantive policies. To make his point, Wolterstorff cites the welfare debate. Advocates for the varying perspectives appeal to ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ but mean different things by these terms; they prioritise the relevant rights differently, they disagree as to how such rights should be weighed against social utility. It is unlikely that public reason, common sense and uncontroversial science can justify welfare legislation to a standard that all can reasonably accept. [37]

    Wolterstorff makes similar points over the fundamental premise in the abortion debate; equal protection has radically different meanings depending on how one interprets public reason’s answer to the question, ‘is the fetus a person or not?’[38] Eberle,[39] Quinn[40] and Jean Hampton[41] agree that public reason cannot settle the question as to whether a fetus is a person yet Rawls argues that public reason can settle the abortion debate (case in point: reasonable people disagree over the answers public reason can give). [42]

    Rawls’ version of the argument from respect is not the only one that faces these problems; similar issues arise with other conceptions of the DRR. Any attempt to ground the DRR in the notion that coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people will face the same problem. This is evident when one examines other versions of the DRR which do not employ Rawls’ idea of public reason.

    Rawls employs public reason to place a restraint on all comprehensive viewpoints, whether religious or secular. Robert Audi’s position is less restrictive. Audi applies the restraint primarily to religious reasons. He proposes a principle of “secular rationale”, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[43]

    His secular rationale principle claims that “one should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support.”[44] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[45] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[46]

    Audi argues that “an adequate reason for a law or policy is a proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify it.”[47] He places the restraint on religious reasons;[48]

    A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.

    Given that comprehensive secular perspectives are not excluded by this version of the DRR, it appears that Audi’s conception can escape the problem of thinness that Rawls’ public reason faces. Comprehensive secular viewpoints should provide people with a thicker perspective, broad enough to justify many substantive policies.

    However, an examination of the reasons Audi advances in favour of his version of the DRR will reveal this contention to be mistaken. By broadening public reason to adequate secular reason Audi’s position is thicker than Rawls’ but its asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular views puts it back in the path of the charges of incoherence and thinness. I will elaborate.

    Like Rawls, Audi offers a version of the argument from respect. He states “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose”[49] [Emphasis added] In another article, he argues that[50]

    adherence to the principle of secular rationale helps to ensure that, in determining the scope of freedom in a society, the decisive principles and considerations can be shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.

    Audi assumes that secular views are accepted by all whereas not everyone accepts the truth of religious premises. This is a big assumption. In fact some secular views are not accepted by all; religious people can and do reasonably reject secular views. This renders Audi’s position incoherent as adherence to Audi’s position, by Audi’s position, requires us to reject it. Quinn explains, [51]

    If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds. For example, justification of a restrictive law or policy by an appeal to its maximization of utility should be excluded because many citizens reasonably reject utilitarianism. Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens of a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies can be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcomed only by anarchists.

    In addition, Audi’s position imposes a burden on religion that is not imposed on secularism despite secularism possessing the same features used to exclude religion. In the absence of some other factor, specific to religion and not applicable to secularism, the asymmetry is arbitrary. To escape this problem Audi would have to reject not only religious reasons but all reasons that are not “shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.” However, if he takes this line, his position is rendered too thin and fares no better than Rawls.’

    (c)        Audi’s defence

    In a defence of his position against this line of critique, Robert Audi questions if the DRR is as thin as critics maintain, [52]

    I would think that if we stick to principles of justice, which form only a small part of a comprehensive view, and if we do not take agreement to imply unanimity as opposed to consensus, there is a better chance of agreement than on the whole of such a larger view. Perhaps the chance is still not good, … But is there not a strong consensus, at least among citizens of democratic societies, that justice requires not only equal protection of the laws but also laws that protect liberty, including political and religious liberty and freedom of speech, up to a certain level? There are of course disagreements on matters of detail…

    While it is true that most people hold to some conception of justice and equality, and affirm the right to exercise certain liberties, the details of their understanding of these norms are not as minor as Audi suggests. As I alluded to earlier, people can mean quite different things by these terms and can prioritise and weigh their importance quite differently. Closer examination of these “matters of detail” reveals substantive lack of consensus.

    Equal protection requires agreement over the question as to whom it applies. In Nazi Germany everyone was owed equal protection by the state; however, certain classes of people were deemed sub-human. Likewise with justifications offered for the new-world slavery as practised in the British Empire and antebellum United States, slaves did not qualify; similarly, with the abortion debate over the status of the fetus. Then there is the extent and nature of the protection to consider. Should the state regulate how many times a week one engages in exercise and eats fruit and vegetables on the grounds of protecting the health of its people or should it simply protect people from aggressors? Is Audi suggesting that simply agreeing that such protection should apply equally to all is sufficient to make his case and what form that should take is mere detail? Unless supplemented by definitions as to its recipients, nature and scope the term “equal protection before the law” is a vague statement lacking substantive content.

    The liberties Audi lists are also fraught with difficulty in interpretation as reasonable people do not agree on them.  Are they negative or does the state have a duty to provide or subsidise them? The substantive content and meaning of the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ is disputed depending on whether one is talking to a libertarian or a socialist. Then there are the problems specific to each liberty.

    Consider freedom of religion. Steven Smith has argued that, strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to claim there is such a thing as a right to freedom religion. Instead there exists a spectrum of views about religious tolerance. Diverse writers, such as Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill each agreed that some religious dissent should be tolerated by the state but disagreed both on the limits and on which religions should be tolerated in society. Smith concluded that as no state tolerates all religious sects and very few tolerate none, the idea of a concept of freedom of religion supported by some and opposed by others is illusory. Which account of religious tolerance is correct depends on comprehensive views; adjudication between different understandings of religious tolerance is not possible without appealing to some comprehensive view. Settling these matters from something like public reason or adequate secular reason seems extremely difficult.[53]

    Does freedom of speech entail prior restraint or does it stop at the initiation of force? What about content and the manner of expression? How should we define speech? Does it include a right to engage in hate, racist, blasphemous, defamatory or sexist speech? Is it acceptable to wear Nazi emblems or deny the holocaust?

    Reasonable people disagree over more than just the details; they disagree over the terms, the nature, the extent and hold to a different range of finite cases. People use and understand the relevant terms in very different ways. Audi misconstrues the situation when he argues there is unanimity in society on fundamental principles of justice. The thinness objection stands.[54]

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV, I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and will offer some critical analysis of this.


    [31] Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions
    [32]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 154.
    [33]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review), 488.
    [34] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 293.
    [35]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 141-150.
    [36] Peter de Marneffe “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly232.
    [37] Wolterstorff, above n 32, 103-104.
    [38] Ibid 104.
    [39]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 217-222.
    [40] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 37-46.
    [41] Jean Hampton “The Common Faith of Liberalism” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 208.
    [42] John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 243-244.
    [43]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 25-37.
    [44] Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
    [45] Ibid 284.
    [46]
    Audi, above n 43, 21.
    [47] Audi, above n 44, 284.
    [48] Ibid 278.
    [49]
    Audi, above n 43, 17.
    [50]
    Audi, above n 44, 290.
    [51] Quinn, above n 40, 39-40.
    [52] Audi, above n 43, 131-132.
    [53] Steven Smith Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995). (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 118.
    [54] Paul Rishworth suggests these examples do not show there is no secular consensus but rather that there is a secular consensus at a high level of abstraction. Supervisor’s feedback from Paul Rishworth to Madeleine Flannagan dated 30 October 2009. This may be the case, however, the thinness objection does not maintain that there is no secular consensus; it maintains that there is no secular consensus thick enough to provide an answer to many substantive public policy questions. For Rishworth’s objection to stand, this higher level of abstraction would have to furnish principles thick enough to answer such questions and the examples above show that it cannot.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI