Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

    This two-part series criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Micheal Tooley in The Knowledge of God, the print debate between him and Alvin Plantinga.1 My critique proceeds in four parts. Initially I will sketch Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and will argue that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on “controversial ethical claims;”2 claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists.”3 Then I will outline Tooley’s deontological version and focus on the moral assumptions upon which it is based and Plantinga’s criticism of these. This will conclude Part I of the series.

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.

    Deontological and Axiological Arguments from Evil
    Tooley distinguishes axiological versions of the argument from evil from deontological versions. The former, “are formulated in terms of axiological concepts—specifically, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability of states of affairs.”4 [Emphasis original] The latter, “uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the–rightmaking or wrongmaking–properties that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed.”5

    Tooley suggests that axiological versions are problematic. He takes as a paradigm the version proposed by William Rowe. Central to Rowe’s argument is the following conceptual claim about a perfectly good being.

    (2) Any omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect person would prevent the existence of any state of affairs that is both (a) intrinsically bad, or undesirable, and (b) such that he could prevent its existence without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good.6

    Rowe applies (2) to concrete evils in the world. He identifies various concrete evil states of affairs and contends that these concrete cases meet the criteria (a) and (b) specified in (2).

    There are well rehearsed problems with Rowe’s attempt to do this.7 While Rowe can maintain that there are cases where we do not know of any greater good lost or greater evil prevented by the allowance of these evils, this is insufficient to show that the cases meet the specified criteria. His argument requires that we know that there are no greater goods lost or evils prevented known to an omniscient being. Tooley notes that the step from “we don’t know” to the claim that an “omniscient being does not know” is difficult to bridge and Rowe’s attempts to do so have been unsucessful.8

    Tooley’s most important objection is to contest (2) itself. Tooley notes that (2) appears to rely on a,

    common consquentialist claim … namely, the claim that an action is morally wrong if it fails to maximise the balance of good states of affairs over bad states of affairs. But the difficulty then is that “such a claim is, within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists, and others.9

    In response, Tooley develops and defends an argument from evil which does not rely on “controversial ethical claims,”10 one that focuses “upon the rightness and wrongness of actions.”

    Tooley’s Deontological Argument
    Tooley summarises his argument succinctly,

    The basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil is then as follows. First, it is claimed that the world contains certain states of affairs such that any action of allowing any of those states of affairs to obtain would involve one or more known wrongmaking characteristics that would outweigh the sum total of known rightmaking characteristics that the action would have. If this is right, then any such action is prima facie wrong, relative to the total information that one presently has concerning the action’s rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. Secondly, the crucial question is then whether there is any sound inductive argument that will take one from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the further conclusion that the action is probably wrong all things considered. If there is, one will then have an ‘inductively sound’ version of the evidential argument from evil.11 [Emphasis original

    As Tooley notes the argument has two crucial steps. The first is the claim that an argument that allows a certain states of affairs to occur is prima facie wrong. The second is an inductive argument from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the claim that it is ultra facie wrong; that is, wrong all things considered.

    It is clear that Tooley considers the second step to be the ‘crucial question’ and he spends most of his article defending the inductive inference he draws. Tooley appears to think that the first step is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial. His defence of it consists of a few paragraphs.

    Tooley’s Argument for Step One
    Tooley’s argument for the first step consists of three premises,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 .ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.

    (13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.

    Therefore, from (12) and (13):

    (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.

    Tooley then adds as an additional premise,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.12

    Tooley believes that (12)-(15) are uncontroversial “(12) makes a moral claim, but one that does not seem at all problematic while statement (13) makes a historical claim for which there is, I believe, very good evidence.”13 Tooley appears to think that the only potentially controversial premise is (15) but that this would be denied only by philosophers who offer a theodicy.14 Tooley maintains that (15) is,

    [V]ery reasonable, given the relevant facts about the world, together with the moral knowledge that we possess. For what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake, and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the wrongmaking property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed.15

    Tooley concludes that, in the absence of a defensible theodicy, there are compelling arguments for concluding that allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. This is not an insignificant conclusion. Many contemporary theists discuss the argument from evil by conceding that there are no defensible theodicies and then arguing that even in the absence of such a theodicy, belief in God is not rendered improbable by the existence of evil. If Tooley is correct, this line of argument is mistaken. The burden of proof is clearly on the theist to provide a theodicy; if he or she cannot then God’s action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. Moreover, if Tooley’s inductive arguments hold, the God’s actions will be ultra facie wrong.

    Plantinga’s Response
    Plantinga responds to Tooley’s argument by calling into question (15).

    Christians and other theists believe that God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of having been performed by a perfectly good being. Furthermore, Christians and other theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake has the property of having been performed by God, who is a perfectly good person. This is a rightmaking property that clearly outweighs and counterbalances any wrongmaking properties that action has.16

    In this citation, Plantinga denies that only theists who offer a theodicy would contest [15]. Plantinga suggests that theists will typically believe that there is a right making property of which they know of; the property of being permitted by God. This property overrides all others and the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake has this property. Hence, the Theist has good reasons for rejecting [15] even if he or she cannot offer an adequate theodicy.

    Tooley’s response is to deny that being permitted by God is a right making property,

    Suppose that God exists, and, thus permitted the Lisbon earthquake. One can ask “What property did the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake have that made it morally permissible for God to permit it?” The response that it had the property of having been permitted by God, who is perfectly good, is not a satisfactory answer to that question: there must be some other property that made it permissible for God to permit the Lisbon earthquake. The property of having been permitted by God, while it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, is not itself a rightmaking property.17 [Emphasis original]

    The phrase “having been permitted by God” is ambiguous. In one sense it could refer to God allowing an event to occur; if he does not stop it occurring then God permits the Lisbon earthquake. In another sense, however, it can refer to God refraining from forbidding an action. God permits drinking alcohol, for example. If God refrains from issuing a command to abstain from drinking alcohol then it is clear, I think, that Plantinga means the former and Tooley seems18 correct in suggesting that in this sense it is clear that being permitted by God is not a right making property but this leaves an important question hanging; couldn’t Plantinga’s critique be reformulated in terms of the “second sense” of the phrase “having been permitted by God.”

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will propose a Plantingan reformulation and address some objections.

    1 Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 70-147.
    2 Tooley “Does God Exist?”105.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid, 106.
    6 William Rowe “Evil and Theodicy” Philosophical Topics 16: 119-32. I am following Rowe’s enumeration.
    7 Stephen John Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil;” Peter van Inwagen “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” and “Reflections on the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale;” William P Alston “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition” and “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil;” Daniel Howard-Snyder “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 1996). See also, Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
    8 Tooley “Does God Exist” 104.
    9 Ibid, 105.
    10 Ibid.
    11 Ibid, 116.
    12 Ibid, 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
    13 Ibid, 122.
    14 Ibid.
    15 Ibid.
    16 Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 170-71.
    17 Michael Tooley “Closing Statement and Reply to Plantinga’s Comments” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 238.
    18 I say seems because Linda Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations would challenge this contention as I will argue in part IV.

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    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

  • John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II

    In my previous post, John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I, I argued that Loftus’ position was based on a confusion between ontological and epistemological foundations. I will now address his arguments against divine command theory.

    Loftus’ Arguments Against a Divine Command Theory
    After misconstruing the divine command theory as an epistemological theory, Loftus offers a series of fairly standard criticisms of divine command theories. Here I will focus on the two most important,

    1. The contention that acceptance of a divine command theory makes it impossible to coherently attribute goodness to God; and,
    2. The claim that a divine command theory makes God’s commands and hence, moral obligations, arbitrary.

    The emptiness of God is Good
    To support the first contention Loftus offers two reasons which I term the Empty Tautology Objection and the Arbitrariness Objection. I will address each in turn.

    Empty Tautology Objection
    The first is that on a divine command theory claiming God is good becomes an empty tautology as seen in this statement, “If we think that the commands of God are good merely because he commands them, then his commands are….well….just his commands.”

    Here we see Loftus mistakenly assuming that a divine command theory is an account of “goodness.” As I argued above it is not, it is an account of deontological properties such as right and wrong. Suppose, however, we recast the objection in terms of deontological properties, the objection still fails. Loftus contends that if something is right because God commands it then God’s commands become right by definition; and hence, the claim ‘God commands what is right’ becomes a tautology, it is just the assertion that “his commands are….well….just his commands.”

    This argument is mistaken. It rests on the assumption that if something (in this case an action) has a property (in this case the property of being right) because it has another property Q (in this case the property of being commanded by God). Then the claim that Q is P is a tautology with no substantive content. However, this assumption is mistaken.

    Consider the claim that water is H20. This is a statement that one property is constituted by and hence cannot exist independently of, another property. Yet one who makes the claim ‘water is H20’ is uttering a substantive, non-tautological statement. Claiming ontological dependence between two properties does not entail that a statement attributing such a relationship is a tautology.

    Independent Standard
    The second and perhaps major argument Loftus offers is that we cannot call God’s commands good unless we appeal to a standard independent of him. He expresses different versions of this objection in several places in his argument. He writes,

    We cannot call them good, for to call them good we’d have to have a standard above them to proclaim that they are indeed good commands. But on this theory they are just God’s commands. God doesn’t command us to do good things, he just commands us to do things. “All that could mean is that God wants us to do what he wants us to do.

    Responding to Moreland he makes the same argument,

    But think of what Moreland is saying here. He’s saying that morality is grounded in God’s nature, not in his commands. But this is a difference that makes no difference. It does no good to step back behind the commands of God to God’s purported nature at all. For we’d still want to know whether or not God’s nature is good. God cannot be known to be good here either, without a standard of goodness that shows he is good. For unless there is standard that shows God is good beyond the mere fact that God declares that his nature is good, we still don’t know whether God is good.

    Elsewhere he makes essentially the same point,

    [T]he modified divine command theory becomes equivalent to the autonomy thesis: the Good (or right) is not good (or right) simply because God commands it. Furthermore, if this is correct, then we can discover our ethical duties through reason, independent of God’s command. For what is good for his creatures is so objectively. We do not need God to tell us that it is bad to cause unnecessary suffering or that it is good to ameliorate suffering; reason can do that. It begins to look like the true version of ethics is what we called ‘secular ethics.’

    Loftus goes on to summarise his point as follows,

    The bottom line here is that if there is no moral standard for us to appeal to when we’re assessing the claim that God is good, and all we have to go on is the fact that God said he was good, then we cannot asses whether or not God is good. We still haven’t been given as answer to what he means by the word good.

    Much can be said about these arguments. First, Loftus again construes divine command theories as offering an account of axiological properties such as goodness. I have already noted this is mistaken.

    Second, Loftus again confuses ontology with epistemology. He affirms that “God cannot be known to be good … without a standard of goodness that shows he is good.” if there is no moral standard for us to appeal to when we’re assessing the claim that God is good, … we cannot assess whether or not God is good.” Also, “we can discover our ethical duties through reason, independent of God’s command.” These are all statements about epistemological independence of our beliefs about right and wrong. They show that one can know right and wrong independently and prior to any beliefs one has about what God commands. The problem is that divine command theorists do not deny this. They do not claim that one needs to believe in the existence of divine commands to be able to tell what is right and wrong. They claim that the property of being wrong is ontologically dependent on the property of being contrary to God’s commands.

    Turning again to the analogy regarding H20 and water, most people throughout history have known what water is without knowing water is H20. In fact, one cannot determine whether H20 really is water unless we have an independent standard of some sort in our minds as to what water is. It does not follow from this, however, that water is not H20 and given that something cannot exist apart from itself, it does not follow that water and H20 are ontologically independent. The same is true of divine commands; people can know what is right and wrong without believing in God. Further, to know whether God’s commands are right, one will have to have some standard of what things are right and wrong. It does not follow from any of this that right and wrong can exist independently of divine commands.

    Loftus’ arguments for the claim that one cannot coherently attribute goodness to God then fail. These arguments rely on the conflation of ontological and epistemological dependence I mentioned above.

    Arbitrariness Objection
    The second argument Loftus appeals to is the claim that a divine command theory makes God’s commands arbitrary. Again, he offers two versions of this.

    No Reasons for Commanding
    Loftus claims that a divine command theory means that God cannot have reasons for his commands and hence, they are arbitrary,

    If we say, on the one hand, that something is right because God commands it, then the only reason why we should do something is that God commands it. It makes God’s commands arbitrary, because there is no reason why God commanded something other than the fact that he did.

    This argument is again based on a failure to distinguish epistemic and ontological questions. Loftus argues,

    [1] According to a divine command theory the only reason an action is wrong is because God commands it.

    He infers from this that,

    [2] Therefore there can be no reason why God issued the commands he did; hence,
    [3] God’s commands are arbitrary.

    This argument equivocates on the word “reason”. William Wrainwright notes that the word reason can be used in two different senses; the “constitutive” sense, one affirms that the reason water has certain phenomenological properties is because it is H20. This use of the word “reason” denotes a special kind of ontological relationship. The second sense is a “motivational” reason, as in when I state that the reason I feed my daughter is because I love her. This sense is more psychological or epistemological.[19]

    It is important to note that these two senses are not the same. Suppose my son pours water into a glass. If we ask what the constitutive reason is for him to pour water into the glass, the answer is  that he poured water into the glass because he poured H20 into the glass. This was not the motivational reason for him pouring water into the glass; the  motivational reason will be that he wanted a drink. His wanting a drink does not constitute water and water being H20 is not the motivational reason he wants the drink.

    Turning to Loftus’ argument, when Loftus states in [2] that God has no reason for commanding as he does, he clearly means that he has no motivating reason; this is why he can draw the conclusion that God’s commands are arbitrary. If God has motivational reasons, such as concern for the welfare of others for issuing the commands he does then God’s commands are not arbitrary.

    The problem is that [2] follows from [1] only if one interprets [1] as affirming that a divine command theory contends that the only motivating reason an action is wrong is because God commands it. But this is false. As noted, when divine command theorists claim that the only reason an action is wrong is because God commands it, they have in mind constitutive reasons. The only constitutive reason an action is wrong is that God prohibits it; it does not claim anything about motivating reasons. Hence, Loftus’ argument commits the equivocation fallacy.

    Abhorrent Commands Objection
    The second version of the arbitrariness objection Loftus cites is the claim that a divine command theory entails that abhorrently evil acts could be morally required.

    God could’ve commanded something else, or even something contrary, or something horribly evil and simply declared it good. If God is the creator of morality like he’s purportedly the creator of the universe, then he could have simply declared any act good, and there would be no moral reason to distinguish such a God from the Devil. This presents us with the “seemingly absurd position that even the greatest atrocities might be not only acceptable but morally required if God were to command them.

    Turning to the second version, Loftus proposes two premises;

    [1]If a divine command theory is true then it follows that if God commanded something abhorrently evil it would be required.
    [2] It is possible for God to command something that is abhorrently evil.

    From this it follows that it is possible for abhorrently evil actions to be required.

    I agree with [1]; it is an implication of divine command theory that if God commands an abhorrently evil action then the action is required. This is not as significant as it seems for two reasons. First, any meta-ethical theory, whether secular or religious, that contends that some property P is equivalent to moral obligation will entail an analogous conditional; it will be the case that if an abhorrently evil action has P, the abhorrent action will be required. Hence, [1] by itself does not render a divine command theory implausible unless any and every account of obligation is implausible.

    Second, according to the standard account of counterfactual conditionals, a conditional, such as “if God commanded something abhorrently evil it would be required,” is true if the antecedent is impossible. If the antecedent is impossible, the conditional is on par with claims such as “if there were a round square, its area would equal the square of one of its sides”[20] or “if there were no prime numbers, all numbers would have been Prime.”[21] The real issue then is [2]; is it possible for God to command abhorrently evil actions?

    The problem is that [2] is false. Divine command theorists contend that an action is right, if and only if, God commands it. God here is used to refer to a personal being that is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good. Hence, for [2] to be possible, there needs to be a possible world in which a perfectly good being would command an action which is gratuitously abhorrently evil. This is an incoherent notion.

    I think Loftus does have a response to this; it can be seen in his reply to essentially the same line of argument proposed by Robert Adams,

    If Adams wants to claim that it is goodness plus God’s command that determines what is right,” Pojman rightly asked, “what does God add to rightness that is not there simply with goodness…If love or goodness prescribes act A, what does A gain by being commanded by God? Materially, nothing at all.” It is at this point where both a modified divine command ethic and a secular ethic share the exact same grounding.

    Loftus here asks, if the commands of a good and loving God constitute right and wrong, why can’t a secular ethicist simply appeal to goodness and love to ground ethics and bypass an appeal to divine commands? What do divine commands add to love and goodness that is not “simply there with goodness?” Loftus seems to think Adams is refuted by the mere raising of this question.

    This is rather puzzling because in an article Loftus cites, Adams himself raises this question and answers it. Adams notes,

    It may be objected that the advantages of the divine command theory can be obtained without an entailment of God’s existence. For the rightness of an action might be said to consist in the fact that the action would agree with the commands of a loving God if one existed, or does so agree if a loving God exists. This modification transforms the divine command theory into a nonnaturalistic form of the ideal observer theory of the nature of right and wrong. It has the advantage of identifying rightness and wrongness with properties that actions could have even if God does not exist. And of course it takes away the basis of my metaethical argument for theism.

    The flaw in this theory is that it is difficult to see what is supposed to be the force of the counterfactual conditional that is centrally involved in it. If there is no loving God, what makes it the case if there were one, he would command this rather than that? Without an answer to this question, the crucial counterfactual lacks a clear sense I can see only two possible answers: either that what any possible loving God would command is logically determined by the concept of a loving God, or that it is determined by a causal law. Neither answer seems likely to work without depriving the theory of some part of the advantages of divine command metaethics.

    No doubt some conclusions about what he would not command follow logically or analytically from the concept of a loving God. He would not command us to practice cruelty for its own sake, for example. But in some cases, at least, in which we believe the act is wrong, it seems only contingent that a loving God does or would frown on increasing the happiness of other people by the painless and undetected killing of a person who wants to live but will almost certainly not live happily.6 Very diverse preferences about what things are to be treated as personal rights seem compatible with love and certainly with deity.[22]

    Adams’ point is that “the essential features of a loving and omniscient creator would seem to under-determine the creator’s preference.”[23] God is not required, by the facts of the world or by his own nature, to issue the exact commands he does. Of course there are some things a loving good God will not command, such as cruelty for it own sake but once these options are eliminated, there is still no one set of commands that a loving being in a world like ours must command. There are possible worlds like ours where a loving being would issue one set of commands and there are other possible worlds like ours in all other respects in which a loving being would issues other commands. Hence, if we ask what a perfectly good and loving being would endorse, no correct answer can be ascertained. As such, one cannot ground moral obligations in the notion of lovingness or goodness alone. One needs to ground these things in the commands of an actually existing, loving and omniscient being.

    Conclusion
    My conclusion, then, is that Loftus’ critique fails. Loftus mistakenly construes defenders of divine command theories as claiming an epistemological dependence of goodness upon belief in God. It, in fact, claims that right and wrong ontologically depends upon God’s commands. Loftus’ major objections fail as a result. He fails to show that the idea of a good God is incompatible with a divine command theory and he fails to show that God’s commands are arbitrary. Finally his critique of Adams consists merely of a rhetorical question and ignores the responses actually made to this question by Thomas Carson and Robert Adams himself.

    [19] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality.
    [20] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 172.
    [21] Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience” 32.
    [22] Robert Adams “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” 3 http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/ADAMS1phil1reading.pdf.
    [23] Thomas Carson Value and The Good Life (Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2000) 243. Carson defends the idea of under determination in more detail in his The Status of Morality (Dordrect: Reidel, 1984).

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    John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I

  • John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I

    Several Christian thinkers, most notably, C S Lewis, John Hare, Robert Adams and William Lane Craig have argued that Theism provides a superior foundation for moral obligation than Naturalism does. Most of these thinkers defend this notion by developing and defending a divine command theory.[1] John W Loftus is aware of this and in The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority, he offers a refutation of divine command theory. I will argue that Loftus is mistaken; his arguments are based on a confusion between ontological and epistemological foundations.

    Avoiding Strawmen
    Before turning to Loftus’ arguments, it is necessary to spell out exactly what a divine command theory of ethics is. It is the thesis that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[2] two things are noteworthy about this definition.

    What is a Divine Command Theory?
    First, the thesis is limited to deontological properties. Philip Quinn defines deontological properties as follows, “I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.”[3] Deontological properties are contrasted with axiological properties such as goodness and badness. Evans notes, “it does not appear that the concept of obligation is identical to the concept of what it is ‘good to do’ … It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it not an act I am obliged to do.”[4]

    Despite frequently being portrayed this way in common critiques, divine command theories do not offer accounts of broader axiological properties. This is evident from the writings of those who defend such theories. Quinn, after defining deontological properties in the aforementioned way, affirms he is not offering a divine command theory of axiological properties. In this he is followed by Adams, Alston, Craig, Wierenga, Hare and Plantinga and, even to some extent, Thomas Carson. This is not something unique to modern divine command theories; older divine command theorists such as Paley, Locke, Berkley and Suarez typically limited divine command theories to accounts of deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness in general.

    The second point is to note is that the word “because” in English is ambiguous. When a divine command theorist claims that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[5] The theorist could mean either, that one cannot know what is right and wrong unless one believes in divine commands; or that right and wrong cannot exist independently of Gods commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically dependent on beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties, such as right and wrong, are ontologically dependent on God’s commands.

    It is important to note that epistemological dependence and ontological dependence are not the same thing. Take a straightforward example of identity; the property of being water is identical with (or constituted by) the property of being H20. As such, H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it and use it without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of the existence water is not dependent on our knowledge of H20.

    When divine command theorists state that an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God they are using “because” in an ontological sense. The locus classicus for contemporary defences of divine command theory is the work of Robert Adams who affirms that “ethical wrongness is [identical with] the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.”[6] Adams here states that the relationship between the property of being contrary to God’s commands and wrongness is the ontological relationship of identity.

    Elsewhere in the article he is explicit about this; he suggests that wrongness is identical with or constituted by being contrary to divine commands in the same way that water is constituted by (or identical with) H20. Other divine command theorists explicitly follow Adam’s lead on this. Stephen Evans and William Alston both affirm that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and note Adams’ identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[7] Craig cites Alston[8] as the inspiration for his position and contends that “commands constitute our moral duties”[9] he explains that by this he means to make divine commands an ontological foundation, and in particular, the concept of “informative identity”[10] analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[11] Craig is explicit that he is not offering divine commands as an epistemological foundation, “It would, indeed, be arrogant and ignorant to claim that people cannot be good without belief in God. But that was not the question.”[12]Also, “My concern here is with moral ontology not moral epistemology … to repeat, my concern is with an ontological foundation for morality, not with epistemological foundations.”[13]

    The other leading defenders of divine command theory are equally clear that they are proposing a theory of the ontological and not the epistemological foundations of moral obligation. Quinn,[14] Weirenga,[15] Hare[16] and Plantinga[17] all offer accounts of the ontological foundations of deontological properties. Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, divine command theories were usually understood as ontological theories and not epistemological theories about how one knows what is right and wrong.[18]

    John Loftus’ Mischaracterisation of Divine Command Theories
    These observations lead into my main criticism of Loftus’ discussion. Loftus mistakenly understands divine command theories as signifying epistemological dependence. At the beginning of his article Loftus refers to the view that “[moral] standards are grounded in the commands of a good creator God, and these commands come from God’s very nature” and infers from this that “the Christian claims to have absolute and objective ethical standards for knowing right from wrong, which is something they claim atheists don’t have” [Emphasis added] here Loftus suggests that the claim that right and wrong depend on God’s commands is the claim that knowledge of right and wrong depends on belief in divine commands.

    The same interpretation is seen elsewhere in his chapter when he defines a divine command theory Loftus states Morality is based upon what God commands. “No other reasons are needed but that God so commanded it. If God commanded it, then it is right. If God forbids it, then it is wrong.” and citing the Divine Command theory of William Lane Craig he states “Many Christians will maintain they have a superior foundation for knowing and for choosing to do what is good. They claim to have objective ethical standards for being good, based in a morally good creator God, and that the atheist has no ultimate justification for being moral.” [Emphasis added] Despite the fact that Craig and other divine command theorists have repeatedly stated they claim no such thing.

    Another problem with Loftus’ characterisation is that in several places he suggests that divine command theories claim that axiological properties such as goodness depend on God’s commands. He states, for example, that divine command theory entails that “God could’ve commanded something else, or even something contrary, or something horribly evil and simply declared it good” or that “If we think that the commands of God are good merely because he commands them, then his commands are….well….just his commands.” Examples could be multiplied; the problem is, as I have noted, divine command theorists typically do not offer their theories as foundations for axiological properties, they limit their theories to deontological properties.

    These misconstruals undermine many of the criticisms Loftus makes. As I will show, many of his objections are based on a conflation between epistemology and ontology.

    In my next post, John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II, I will address Loftus’ arguments against a divine command theory, the emptiness of God is good and his arbitrariness objection.

    [1] C S Lewis rejected a divine command theory; I believe, however, that Lewis’ dismissal is based on unsound arguments and the divine command theory coheres better with his argument in Mere Christianity as I argued in my paper “God and the Moral Law in C. S. Lewis” Theological Perspectives on C S Lewis Conference Carey Baptist College, Auckland, 1 July 2008.
    [2] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.
    [3] Philip Quinn “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 291.
    [4] C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 16.
    [5] Frankena Ethics 28.
    [6] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.
    [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-304.
    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 186.
    [9] William Lane Craig “The Craig/Kurtz Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” Eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 30.
    [10] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 127.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] William Lane Craig “The Indefensibility of Theistic Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality” Foundations 5 (1997) 9.
    [13] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 168.
    [14] Ibid, 293.
    [15] Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [16] John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 49.
    [17] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience”
    www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/plantinga.pdf.
    [18] Janine Maree Idziak “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989) 60.

    RELATED POSTS:
    John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II

  • Antony Flew v William Lane Craig debate “Does God Exist?”

    In 1948 Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston debated the existance of God on the BBC radio. That debate was considered the definitive debate of that generation.

    Fifty years later, to commemorate this debate, a debate re-examining the arguments for and against the existence of God was arranged between William Lane Craig and Antony Flew before 4,000 students at the University of Wisconsin in 1998.

    Flew has since, famously, become a theist but at the time he was one of the world’s leading atheists so this is a great engagement of minds. This debate is now online. Watch and enjoy.

    Hat Tip: Many thanks to Josh Darville who sent us this link via Twitter.

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

    This is the first of a two-part series where I examine a recent argument criticising religious ethics by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.

    In many of his publications and debates William Lane Craig has defended the contention that if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties. In a recent article, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticised this contention. Armstrong has claimed that his criticisms do not just call into question Craig’s argument for a theistic based system of ethics, he contends that his arguments are conclusive against any theistic account of ethics which is compatible with Christianity. He states, “Other theists might try to give better arguments for a religious view of morality. I don’t see how they could avoid all the problems in Craig’s account without leaving traditional Christianity far behind.”[1]

    Before discussing Armstrong’s critique it is important to define a few key terms; this will become important later on. First, by theism, Craig means, belief in a necessarily existent, all powerful, all knowing, perfectly virtuous, immaterial person who created the universe. By foundation, he means, an ontological or meta-physical foundation. The ontological grounding he has in mind is that of “informative identification;”[2] an example of this is the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[3] Craig argues that if theism is true then one can informatively identify moral obligations with divine commands; hence, providing a plausible and defensible foundation for moral obligations.

    “his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions”Armstrong’s critique begins by noting that Craig defends “traditional divine command theory.” Armstrong contends that such a position is “incredible”[4] and subject to a “cavalcade of devastating objections.”[5]

    Two initial points are worth making. First, the position Craig defends is not a “traditional divine command theory” but rather a version of the modified divine command theory defended by Robert Adams,[6] more recently by William Alston[7] and Stephen Evans[8], also I have defended it here.

    This theory affirms that the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands in much the same way that water is identical with H20. Second, many of the “devastating objections” consist simply of a repetition of the tired old lines always used against divine command theories; most of these objections have been subjected to rigorous criticism in the literature on divine commands over the last 30 years by people such as Philip Quinn,[9] Edward Weirenga,[10] Robert Adams,[11] William Wrainwright[12] and again by me[13]. Armstrong does not address any of these criticisms; he merely repeats the standard arguments without even mentioning, much less, addressing the problems noted by these authors. In fact, in several places, his arguments display a conflation of epistemic and ontological questions which is a common error as I have argued here.

    Armstrong’s Argument from Harm
    Putting these niggles to one side, however, Armstrong’s main line of argument is fairly novel.[14] He states,

    There is a much more plausible foundation for morality. It seems obvious to me, and to everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions, that what makes rape morally wrong is the extreme harm that rape causes to rape victims.[15]

    Armstrong suggests that Craig’s conditional, if theism is true then there exists a sound foundation for moral duties, is mistaken because a more plausible foundation exists for our duties, one that is independent of God’s commands. The wrongness of actions can be founded in the harm caused by immoral actions such as rape. Armstrong provides two arguments as to why this harm-based or secular account of the nature of wrongness is superior to a divine command theory.

    (a) The harm account is more economical than a divine command theory;
    (b) The harm account makes moral obligations more objective than a divine command theory does.

    In my next post I will address arguments (a) and (b). I will leave you with the thought that it is worth noting that Armstrong’s conclusion misses the point. He contends that everyone who does not start with peculiarly religious assumptions will see that the harm-based foundation is more plausible than a divine command theory. Nothing in Craig’s contention contradicts this. Craig’s contention is that if God exists then there is a sound basis for moral obligations. The sound basis he identifies is divine commands. Craig, then, was not arguing that a divine command theory was the most plausible theory in the absence of religious assumptions, Craig argues that in the absence of religious assumptions it is Nihilism, not divine command theory, which is the most plausible account of moral obligation. Craig’s contention is that a divine command theory is plausible if one grants such assumptions. Armstrong’s conclusion actually has no bearing on the contention he is attempting to refute.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 114.
    [2] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 127.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
    [5]Ibid, 108.
    [6] Robert Adams Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; “Divine Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987) 262-275. [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-26.
    [8] C. Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    [9] Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978); “Divine Command Theory” in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh LaFollette (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing Co, 1999) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” in The Oxford Handbook to Ethical Theory Ed David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
    [10] Edward Weirenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory,” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [11] Robert Adams “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness” in Divine Commands and Morality ed Paul Helm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981) 83-108; “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 66-79; Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Rationality and Religious Belief ed C F Delaney (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 116-140.
    [12] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
    [13] Matthew Flannagan “The Premature Dismissal of Voluntarism” in Colloquium: The Australasian Theological Review (forthcoming).
    [14] I say “fairly novel” because a very similar objection was raised in Don Marquis’s seminal essay, “Why Abortion is Immoral” The Abortion Controversy: 25 Years after Roe v Wade, A Reader eds Louis Pojman and Francis Beckwith (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998) 345.
    [15] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Maverick Philosopher on the Historical Atrocities Argument

  • The Problem of Evil: Why does God Allow Suffering?

    One of the most common objections to the Christian faith is the problem of evil. Of all objections mounted against the Christian faith, prima facie, it does seem the most compelling, one of the hardest things for us to get our heads around.

    How does a Christian reconcile the fact of evil and suffering in the world in the face of a God that is omnipotent, omniscient and benevolent? If he is omnipotent then he knows about all evil before it occurs so why does he allow it? Surely if god is omnipotent then he can halt evil. If he is benevolent then why will not act against it?

    Marc raised the same question in the comments section of, Good Friday: Why Celebrate Easter? In the discussion that followed I charged him with special pleading, of holding Christians to a higher standard than the standard he tacitly holds skepticism to. As discussions in comments sections are often missed instead of continuing the debate with Marc I thought I would express myself more clearly here. In doing so I will borrow extensively from a talk Matt gave for the launch of Thinking Matters (which you will see when we finally get the video footage of the talk online). [Given the difficulties of footnoting notes and impressions from talks and knowledge obtained through years of discussions with one’s spouse (though some came from primary sources that I read myself) pretty much from this post from this point onwards, though not in entirety, should be seen as being authored by MandM as opposed to just me though it is posted by me because overall it I put it together.]

    Before addressing an objection of this nature one should first establish the correct approach to take towards addressing criticisms of the faith and be clear as to what constitutes a fair set of rules for the terms of engagement. Timothy Keller writes,

    All doubts, however sceptical and cynical they may seem, are really a set of alternate beliefs. You cannot doubt belief A except from a position of faith in belief B….

    The only way to doubt Christianity rightly and fairly is to discern the alternative belief under each of your doubts and then ask yourself what reasons you have for believing it. How do you know your belief is true? It would be inconsistent to require more justification for Christian belief than you do for your own, but that is frequently what happens.

    In fairness you must doubt your doubts. My thesis is that if you come to recognise the beliefs on which your doubts about Christianity are based, and if you seek as much proof for those beliefs as you seek from Christians for theirs – you will discover that your doubts are not as solid as they first appeared.[1]

    In making his assertions, Marc, criticised my beliefs from a position of belief, or faith, in the correctness of his own. He asked a standard of my beliefs that he did not require for his own.

    When one encounters a charge like the one Marc raised, I understand that even if Marc didn’t set the problem out in the manner the world’s top atheist philosophers might have done, his question nevertheless hides a disguised argument that warrants addressing. Daniel Howard-Snyder states,

    [T]he theoretical “problem” of evil is often expressed in the form of a pointed question. God is able to prevent evil and suffering and He would know about them before they happened, right? Moreover, since He is unsurpassably good, surely He would not permit them just for the fun of it. So why doesn’t He prevent them?[2]

    In the literature this argument is typically more formalised so that it reads something like:

    [1] That as God is omniscient and omnipotent (all-knowing and all-powerful) he would be both able to know about all the suffering that exists and act to prevent it;
    [2] Given that God is good, he would not allow such evil to exist unless he had a good reason for it.

    [2] is what Snyder calls a justifying reason “a reason that was compatible with his never doing wrong and his being perfect in love.”[3]

    These premises entail that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing suffering. I agree with Marc and those who have gone before him on this part of their objection, I am sure that God does had a good reason. However, the question that follows from here, which is typically “then, what is God’s reason for allowing suffering?” which I concede has powerful rhetorical force, contains a critical flaw.

    If one is to look at the question purely rationally it is should become apparent. This flaw is widely noted and discussed in the literature by the likes of Steve Wykstra, Alvin Plantinga, Peter Van Ingwagen, William Rowe, Micheal Tooley, William Alston, and Howard-Snyder to name a few.

    So what is this flaw? I have not contested the claim that if God exists then he must have a good reason for allowing evil. However this has not satisfied Marc who wants to know what that reason is. Asking this latter question tacitly attempts to add a further premise to the above argument,

    [3] If a Christian cannot provide a detailed account of God’s reasons in [2] then it follows that God has none.

    This assumed premise is the point at which the argument succeeds or fails. If the failure to provide God’s reasons in detail does not provide any grounds for thinking that God in fact has no reasons then failure to answer the question, while deeply perplexing and emotionally unsatisfying, does not establish a reason for rejecting God.

    Alvin Plantinga provides an illustration of the flaws inherent in [3]. Paraphrasing him; suppose I ask you too look in a tent and tell me if there’s a St Bernard inside. In this instance, I would have every reason to trust what you say you see as a St Bernard the sort of thing I would expect you to be able to observe if it were inside a tent. But suppose I ask you to look inside and tell me if there are any ‘no-see-ums’ inside the tent (a no-see-um is gnat with a big bite that is small enough to pass through the netting of a tent, as such it is too small to see). Now, I have no reason to trust your answer in this instance, as you can’t see no-see-ums. Here’s the problem; the sceptic is assuming that if there is a reason for our suffering then it is more like a St Bernard than it is like a no-see-um. However, this is simply assumed, not argued for. It is certainly, if not at least possible, that we suffer for a reason but that that reason may not be something that we can easily detect.[4]

    As Keller notes, “we see lurking within this hard nosed skepticism an enormous faith in one’s cognitive faculties. If our minds cannot plump the depths of the universe for answers to suffering, well there can’t be any!. This is blind faith of a tall order.”[5]

    For the problem of evil to succeed the sceptic must provide some argument as to why God’s detailed reasons for allowing evil are like St Bernards and such an argument must be grounded on premises that Christians are rationally required to accept or else we could simply escape the charge by justifiably rejecting the premise.

    Now if a finite human being, such as myself, with limited factual knowledge, limited perspective in time and space and an imperfect moral character cannot produce a good reason as to why evil occurs then I fail to see why the Christian must accept the conclusion: ‘therefore, God cannot possibly have any such reasons.’

    William Alston has noted that the sceptic argument in this context is a bit like a person who, with no background in quantum physics, decided that when he failed to understand why the world’s best physicist held a particular view that if followed that the physicist obviously had no reason to hold it.[6]

    Suppose I am wrong. Suppose that the failure to provide an answer does mean that it is improbable that one exists and from this, that it follows the existence of God is improbable given the existence of evil. What follows from this? Nowhere near as much as you might think because the fact that the existence of God is improbable on one fact does not mean that it is improbable per se.

    Plantinga notes that there are many beliefs that we hold to which are improbable on some body of evidence we believe. If I was playing poker was dealt four aces, then this is highly improbable given the number of cards in the pack and number of possible combinations that I could have been dealt. Yet I am rational in believing that I was dealt four aces as I can see that I have four aces in my hand (to give but one defence).

    Moreover, it is well known that a belief can be improbable on one sub-set of beliefs a person possesses and yet highly probable by every thing that the person believes. For example, if I know my friend is French and I know that most French people cannot swim then my belief that my friend is a swimmer is improbable based on this set of evidence. On the other hand, suppose I know that my friend is a life guard by profession and that all life guards, even French ones, can swim. Then despite the fact that a belief is improbable on the basis of one set of evidence, it is not necessarily improbable on the whole.

    Finally the question needs to be raised about how well Christianity performs regarding the existence of evil relative to alternative views. Some Philosophers have suggested that the existence of evil might also make the non-existence of God impossible. I can only sketch the reasons briefly but they are worth noting.

    First, in order for suffering to exist sentient life forms must exist. However, there have been various discoveries from contemporary physics which establish that a universe evolving life is extremely improbable. For life to evolve there are around 15 constants necessary, each must have precise values and if they were off by a million or even one in a million, life could not evolve. Even if some of these constants had differed by 1 in 10 to the power of 60 then life could not evolve.[7]

    Second, some of the worst forms of evil involve human cruelty and evil but in order to identify these things as such this requires the existence of moral principles or rules that prohibit this kind of conduct and deem them as cruel or evil. Now one question that can be raised by many in the literature, William Lane Craig and J.L. Mackie spring to mind, is whether the existence of objective moral principles is likely on an atheistic view of the world.

    Is it likely that in a universe composed entirely of matter and energy that objective principles or rules could come into existence independently of any mind? Many people find this a puzzling question. My point is not to endorse (or reject) these lines of inquiry; it is simply to show that it is not obvious that the typical sceptical view is any more defensible given the existence of evil than belief in God is and more work would need to be done by the sceptic to show that it is.

    So my response to the problem of evil then is three fold. The objection relies on an assumption that is false or at any rate, an assumption that no reason is forthcoming as to why a Christian should accept it. Further, even if evil does make the existence of God improbable one would need further argument to show that this meant Christianity was irrational. Finally, even if the sceptic could do this it the problem of the mirror remains, one would need to show that the alternatives to Christianity, such as skepticism, were better able to account for the existence of evil. As none of these criteria have been met, I remain a Christian.

    [1] Timothy Keller Reason For God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton, 2008) xvii-xviii.
    [2] Daniel Howard-Snyder “God, Evil, and Suffering” in Reason for the Hope Within (Eerdmans 1999), ed. Michael J. Murray, 3, http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~howardd/god,evil,andsuffering.pdf.
    [3] Ibid, 4.
    [4] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press: 2000) 466.
    [5] Keller Reason for God xvii-xviii.
    [6] William Alston “Some Temporary Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington Indianapolis, Indiana University Press: 1996) 317.

    [7] Francis S. Collins The Language of God: A scientist Presents Evidence for the Existence of God (Free Press, 2006) 75.

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II

    In my previous post I criticised the rationalist objection to belief in God. In this post I want to sketch an alternative view of faith and reason defended by Alvin Plantinga. In my next post I will address two common objections to this conception.

    Belief in God as Properly Basic
    In several of his works Alvin Plantinga has suggested that the best way for Christians to proceed is to take belief in God as properly basic. Let me explain what this statement means. In Part I, I quoted Roy Clouser to the effect that if everything needs to be proven we get an infinite regress of proofs and can never know or rationally believe anything. One obvious way of avoiding this problem is to get to a point where proof is no longer needed, to have a set of beliefs which are rationally believed independent of proof. Plantinga refers to these beliefs as properly basic beliefs. It is important to elucidate carefully how such beliefs function.

    First and very importantly, properly basic beliefs are not arbitrary or groundless. While one does not believe a basic belief based on an inference or proof, basic beliefs are often based on some form of experience. Plantinga discerns two types of experience; sensory evidence, such things as appearing to see, hear or feel a given object and doxastic evidence, which he describes as “the belief feels right, acceptable, natural,”[1] “the belief seems true, appropriate, the right thing to believe.”[2]

    An example of sensory evidence would be the grounds for perceptual beliefs; I have an experience of a certain shape, colour and sound and so I form the belief that a car has driven past. I do not infer the belief from the experience by way of argument yet the belief is nevertheless grounded upon this experience.

    An example of doxastic evidence is belief in basic axioms of logic; when one entertains the conditional of modus ponens it just seems to be correct, modus ponens feels obviously true in a way that an overtly-fallacious inference does not. Similarly, with memory beliefs; for me the claim that I used to live in Hamilton seems true. I have a strong experiential pull towards it. It feels right in a way that the belief that I used to live in Iran does not. I seem to remember one being the case and not the other.

    The second thing to note is that while properly basic beliefs are rational in the absence of proof for their truth, it does not follow that they remain rational when one is aware of good arguments against them.

    If I see John screwing his face up in a particular way and grasping his leg, I might form the belief that John is in pain. However, if later John tells me that he was not in pain but rather rehearsing his death scene in the coming dramatic play he is acting in. I take his word for it and believe he was not in pain.

    The initial belief was properly-basic; however, because of what I later discovered its rational status was defeated. Sometimes we form other beliefs that lead us to question or deny our basic beliefs. Plantinga refers to these types of beliefs as defeaters.[3]

    There are two types of defeaters, undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. The former are beliefs that cause you to question the grounds on which the original belief was held. The latter are beliefs that are inconsistent with the original belief so that accepting the defeater entails rejection of the original belief.[4]

    Finally, properly basic beliefs are foundational beliefs. Beliefs that we believe on the basis of proof are inferred from other beliefs which themselves must be rational if the proof is to stand. These further beliefs will need proofs and so on. Eventually the demand for proof will terminate in a set of beliefs that do not need proof. This is what I have referred to as a properly basic belief. What needs to be noted is that these beliefs will be the starting points that one reasons from to prove and assess everything else. Everything else one accepts or believes will be justified on the basis of whether or not it is supported by basic beliefs.

    In a short treatment like this a full examination of Plantinga’s work is impossible. Instead I will simply spell out briefly a summary of his position. Plantinga notes that when rationalists argue that belief in God is irrational independent of proof they typically use the word ‘rational’ in what is called an internalist sense.

    [W]hether for all I can tell from the inside, so to speak, my beliefs meet the appropriate internal standards … whether I have properly taken account of other things I know, whether I have paid proper attention to objections and to what others say. [5]

    The basic idea here is that of “epistemic responsibility,”[6] “believing responsibly given ones evidence … being formed responsibly in light of the available evidence.”[7] He notes that in this sense of rationality a belief can be totally deluded, even false but still formed responsibly given the evidence. “My memory unbeknown to me starts malfunctioning; I remember things that never happened. If I see no reason to think my memory is malfunctioning, and no reason to think those things didn’t happen.”[8]

    Plantinga suggests that in this sense of the word ‘rational’ belief in God can be justified in the absence of proof. He notes that “for many people the doxastic evidence for belief in God is very strong.”[9] In Reason and Belief in God he gives a series of examples,

    Upon reading the Bible, one may be impressed with a deep sense that God is speaking to him. Upon doing what I know is cheap, or wrong, or wicked, I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I have done. Upon confession and repentance I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I have done. A person in grave danger may turn to God asking him for help; and then of course he or she has the belief that God is indeed able to hear and to help if he sees fit.[10]

    Plantinga suggests that if a Christian has some doxastic or perceptual experience that makes it seem to them that God exists then provided that they have no defeaters for this belief and they have done things such as “carefully considered the objections”[11] they have encountered and “considered how it [theism] fits with other beliefs they hold”[12] then they are rational in continuing to believe. If one finds oneself in certain situations with a strong sense that God exists and on reflection finds no defeaters for this claim then one is internally rational in believing God exists. One may be deluded but one is not acting irresponsibly in believing what seems to oneself to be true and for which, one has no reason for doubting.

    This internalist sense is contrasted with a more externalist sense, a conception of rationality “that is more attuned to truth or falsehood or probably of truth or falsehood,”[13] An externalist sense of rationality implies “not just that, that a justified belief has been formed in relation appropriately in response to doxastic evidence but, also that the doxastic evidence is not seriously misleading.”[14] The basic idea is that the belief “is produced by a cognitive faculty or process that is reliable, one that produces a preponderance of true over false beliefs.”[15]

    With regards to external rationality, Plantinga’s position is more nuanced. Plantinga argues that if Christian beliefs are in fact true then one is externally rational in believing in God in the absence of proof. This is because if Christian beliefs are true then the kinds of process mentioned above are reliable processes. On the other hand if God does not exist then it is not reliable. Hence any argument that Theism belief is externally irrational will have presupposed from the outset that it’s false.

    Of course the Christian cannot demonstrate that these processes are reliable in a non-circular fashion. This, however, is not as significant as one might think because one cannot provide a non-circular argument for the claim that reason or our perceptual faculties, are reliable either; nor can I provide a non-circular argument to the conclusion that my memory is reliable. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, as I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it, any such argument could not get off the ground.

    Nor would any other argument be forthcoming. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without first assuming the reliability of memory, one cannot reason at all.

    With basic beliefs we simply trust the grounds upon which they are based are reliable and proceed on the assumption that they are and that what they deliver us is true. We cannot prove any of this by a non-circular argument; nevertheless we continue to trust them in the absence of evidence that the beliefs they deliver are false or that they are unreliable.[16] There is no reason why Christians should treat their basic beliefs any differently.

    In my next post I will address two common objections to Plantinga’s position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 110-111.
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” Knowledge of God ed. Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 175.
    [3] For further elaboration of Plantinga’s understanding of defeaters see Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism Defeated” (1994) http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/alspaper.htm.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Alvin Plantinga “On Being Evidentially Challenged” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed. D Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996) 259.
    [6] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 174.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 175.
    [9] Ibid.
    [10] Alvin Plantinga “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, ID: Notre Dame University Press, 1983) 80.
    [11] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 225.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 176.
    [14] Ibid.
    [15] Ibid.
    [16] For a good discussion of this point see William Alston Perceiving God: An Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991) Ch 3-5.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III