Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Take Nobody’s Word for Anything – Especially Bob Brockie’s

    In one of the definitive discussions of the issue, Philosophers Alvin Plantinga and Robert Pennock debated the teaching of evolutionary theory in public schools of religiously pluralistic societies at the December 1998 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association.

    [The following is a crude rendition of the issues in the debate – read the debate here: Pennock’s case and Plantinga’s response]

    It is widely held that it is inappropriate for public schools to teach that a particular religion is true given that a segment of children attending the school come from families that do not believe in that religion. What is less noticed is the converse. If the former is correct then it must equally be true that it is inappropriate for a public school to teach that a particular religion is false given that a number of children attending the school come from families that do believe in that religion. Evolution contradicts the teachings of some religions; hence, the question arises, should evolution be taught as uncontested truth?

    Having just re-read this debate in preparation for a lecture I delivered last week on the topic, stumbling upon Dr Bob Brockie‘s piece, Take Nobody’s Word for Anything, in the Dominion Post was intriguing; intriguing in how little he understood the issues involved and how he would manifest his own ignorance on the broader question of religion and Science for all in print. The number of straight-forward factual and Philosophical mistakes in one article was breathtaking.

    At the heart of Brockie’s argument is a mistaken epistemology and fairly naïve Philosophy of Science. Brockie contends that “true scientists question all authority, trusting only to experimental and verifiable evidence”. However, if science is defined in these terms, science is an incoherent position. The claim that one should question all authority and trust only “experimental and verifiable evidence” is not itself an empirical claim. Hence, if the claim is true we should reject it because Brockie has not provided any “experimental and verifiable evidence” of its truth.

    If scientists truly proceed on this assumption, their position will always be self-contradictory as to proceed on this assumption would lead to scepticism on all sorts of issues dear to Brockie’s heart. As a scientist, Brockie assumes that his senses are reliable and reason is a reliable method of getting at truth. Neither of these, however, can be verified experimentally by a non-circular argument. To verify anything, one needs to utilise one’s senses and reason from them, and hence, will presuppose the very sources under question.

    However, the errors, myths and lack of verifiable evidence do not end here. Brockie began with the statement “Creationism is just a codeword for biblical Christianity.” This is mistaken. The term “creationism” normally refers to a particular theory of origins that holds the world was created a few thousand years ago in six 24 hour days (not seven as Brockie stated), and that the fossil record is the result of a worldwide flood.

    To equate this with “biblical Christianity” is erroneous. First, many non-Christians, particularly Jews and Muslims, hold this theory. The story of Adam, Eve and Creation is shared by the three major monotheistic religions. Second, many Christian’s, even conservative evangelicals, do not accept creationism.

    Creationism is premised on the assumption that the first two chapters of Genesis are literalistic history. Whether the genre of early Genesis is literal history is a hotly debated point in Biblical studies, one over which conservative scholars disagree.

    Brockie ignored the subtle differences and issues and castigated Christianity as a whole, suggesting no rational person can believe in “answered prayer” a “virgin birth” or “life after death” much of his argument however consists of citing crude caricatures; such as, the claim Christians believe in the existence of “magic apples”.

    Brockie’s central theme is the example of Isaac Newton. According to Brockie Newton believed the Latin slogan “Nullius in Verba” which Brockie translates as “take nobody’s word for anything”. Apparently “then” as “now” scientists adopted a policy of questioning “all authority, trusting only to experimental and verifiable evidence.” A stance Brockie asserts is incompatible with Christianity.

    In fact, Newton was a devout Christian who wrote theological tracts and believed in “answered prayer” and “life after death”. Moreover, in the preface to Newton’s Principia Mathematica, Roger Cotes notes that Newton’s research rested explicitly on theological assumptions. Newton, in fact, even appealed to direct action of God to solve problems within his theory. The picture Brockie paints is well out of accord with the facts.

    Incidentally, the Royal Society’s own website states it was founded in 1660 and not 1663 as Brockie stated. Moreover, his translation of “Nullius in Verba” is mistaken. The phrase is an abbreviation of a quotation from Horace; the full translation is, “not compelled to swear to any master’s words.” It does not advocate trusting no one, but rather praises objectivity; it the contention that one should be free to come to conclusions at odd with one’s political masters.

    If we can learn anything from Brockie’s article it is that uninformed knee-jerk fundamentalists exist on both sides of this debate. The real informed debate on Evolution v Creationism in the public school system is far more nuanced and deserves to be heard; not caricatured, misrepresented and then dismissed on that basis.

  • John Key on Religion and Public Life

    A few weeks ago someone gave me a copy of this interview with John Key. Now the first thing to note is that the article was published by Gaynz.com. Gaynz.com are not a terribly reliable media outlet, and Madeleine would say that they are beneath the term “media outlet”. Hence, much of what is written may be highly inaccurate. Despite this, if John Key did say these things, how should one respond to them? I will endeavour to do this in this post.f

    Key states he voted against civil unions because the majority in his electorate were opposed it. This is clearly an inadequate stance, suppose that same-sex sex is wrong, contrary to the laws of God. If this is the case, Key is suggesting that he would follow the beliefs and will of the majority over the beliefs of an omniscient, all knowing, perfectly-good God. This is irrational to say the least. The mistaken views that are popular are more authoritative than the decree of God.

    On the other hand, suppose there is nothing wrong with same-sex sex. Suppose that discriminating against such unions is on par with discriminating against inter-racial unions. Then Key is suggesting he would follow the racial prejudices of the majority even though he abhors this prejudice himself.

    Such a position is bizarre. For my part I expect legislators to be people of integrity and have the courage of their convictions to stand against evil and injustice even when it is unpopular to do so.

    Key dismisses the argument that “civil unions undermine marriage” in a far too cavalier manner. Though I myself do not endorse this argument, I believe a critique of it should be based on an accurate and fair interpretation which must also be a valid argument. Key’s is neither. Key responds by saying, “I have been married for 22 years and the fact that a gay couple may choose to have a Civil Union would have absolutely no impact on my marriage to my wife”. But that is not the issue. Opponents of civil unions claimed it would undermine the institution of marriage not that it would under mine one particular person’s marriage.

    Of course Key is not alone in dismissing the arguments of others simply by a cavalier caricature, but this fact does not alter the spuriousness of doing so.

    Key states “I don’t care what people’s sexual preferences are” and states that a persons sexual preference “is their business and their business alone.” Several things can be said here; first whether Key cares about an issue is irrelevant. The issue is whether certain actions are right or wrong and this is not determined by Key’s personal feelings.

    Second, if a person’s “sexual preferences” are “their business alone” why does he have no problem with the State solemnising and legally recognising a person’s sexual union. If it is no one else’s business then why is it the states business?

    Thirdly, contrary to what Key says, a person’s “sexual preference” is relevant. Some people prefer little children; by definition this is a sexual preference. If Keys’ trite sounding slogan were correct, this is their business alone and no one else’s.

    Similarly Key notes that “We have friends who are gay and lesbian, just as we have dozens of friends who are heterosexual.” This may be true but it is beside the point. The fact that you know people who do something does not mean the State should endorse their activity through recognising and solemnising it. I have had friends who sleep around and regularly get intoxicated. Does that mean that the government should set up state funded clinics for those who want casual sex or provide tax payer funded alcohol?

    In discussing the origins of same-sex attraction Key states “I believe it is innate. I am not an expert in these areas but I have had all these religious groups in my electoral office trying to argue that this is learned behaviour, personally I believe that is crap.” It is not just religious people who make that claim (and not all religious people do anyway). Socially liberal New York University Sociologist, Dr David Greenberg, in his book “The Construction of Homosexuality” concluded that homosexual conduct is socially learned. He based this on a huge survey of cross-cultural studies. This work may be mistaken, but I think Key is reaching if he thinks his credentials warrant writing off such research as “crap” because of what his consciousness tells him.

    Key goes on to note: “I think we largely live in a secular society, I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate. I’m no supporter of these hard right religions. [For instance,] I was never offered, I would never have accepted any financial support from the Exclusive Brethren. I met them as a constituency MP, as I would meet anyone as a constituency MP on constituency issues as I believe it’s wrong to discriminate.”

    There is so much here it is hard to know where to begin.

    Key states “we live in a secular society”. This mantra is trotted out by politicians of the left and right continually, but it is spurious. The fact that society currently displays a trait does not mean it ought to display that trait, we currently live in a Labour led society, does Key think that means Labour ought to continue to lead?

    Key goes on to state he does not believe in discrimination. However, he then immediately notes that he does not “support hard right religions.” His position is contradictory; unless Key does not support any groups at all (which is clearly false he supports National) he is discriminating against these groups as he is supporting some but not others.

    Moreover, legislation by its nature discriminates. A law regulates human conduct, it states that people who engage in certain actions will be censured (incarcerated or fined) while people who do not engage in those actions will not. This is discrimination. Contrary to what Key states discrimination in and of itself is a morally neutral concept. Some types of discrimination are wrong i.e. depriving people of their life on the basis of their race, and others are not, depriving people of liberty because they have committed murder. The fact that such an elementary and obvious point is lost on someone who seeks to lead the country speaks volumes for the intellectual and moral acumen of today’s politicians.

    However, Key’s core argument is “I think there are many religions operating in NZ and it is in the best interests of the state to make decisions that are on a secular basis so they don’t discriminate.” The argument here seems to be that because there are many differing religious groups in NZ, it would be discriminatory to base the laws on moral principles taught by only some of these groups. Hence legislation should be based on secular (i.e non-religious) values and ideals.

    The problem is that if this argument is not sound. If it were, there is an equally sound argument for the claim that we should not base laws on secular values and ideals.

    Consider, there are many secular philosophies operating in NZ. They disagree on all sorts of matters. Compare the Socialist Workers Party with the Objectivist Society, or both with the New Zealand Association of Rationalists and Humanists. Hence, if we follow Key’s logic, to avoid discrimination we need to base laws on “non-secular aims”.

    In fact one can push this silly argument further, there are numerous different political parties in NZ, hence to avoid discrimination we should not base laws on the aims or values of any political party. Which means that if elected Prime Minister, Key will not support any National Party policies being implemented.

    Does any of the above mean that people should not vote for National? Not necessarily. While Key is clearly mistaken on these issues, it does not follow that he is mistaken on every other issues. Moreover, it could be (lets face it, it is probably the case…) that the alternative to National will contain people who are more mistaken on more issues. John Key has a lot of faults but he has one big tick in his favour, he is not Helen Clark.

  • More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda

    Those of you who have followed my discussions with Peter Cresswell on the history of Christianity and the relationship between faith and reason in the middle ages may find this abridged article by Dr James Hannam interesting. Dr Hannam has recently completed his PhD on the History of Science at the University of Cambridge.

    UPDATE:
    Dr Hannam emailed me to advise that this article is no longer available online (it had to be removed at his publishers insistence) but is available in full in the book, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science, which is apparently now available in New Zealand. Bethyada will be interested to hear, “as one of the comments on your blog asked, I have included a discussion of the trebuchet and other weapons developed in the Middle Ages.”

    Some reviews:

    “A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development… captures the wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity and its engaging strangeness.” Sunday Times

    “This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable no-nonsense clarity… James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down an old caricature.” Sunday Telegraph

    Guess what I’m adding to my Christmas list? …Madeleine…

    God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science

    Rethinking Science in the Middle Ages
    The most famous remark Sir Isaac Newton (1642 – 1727) made is, “If I have seen a little further then it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.” What most of us assume he meant is that his scientific achievements were built on the discoveries of his predecessors. In the same passage, he alludes to René Descartes (1596 – 1650), the French philosopher and mathematician, so presumably this is one of those whom he meant. Few people realise, however, that Newton’s aphorism was first coined in the twelfth century by the theologian Bernard of Chartres (d. c. 1130). Even fewer are aware that Newton’s science also has its roots embedded firmly in the Middle Ages.

    This book will show just how much of the science and technology that we take for granted today has medieval origins.

    ….

    During the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church actively supported a great deal of science, which it also kept control of when speculation could impinge on theology. Ironically, by keeping philosophers focused on nature instead of metaphysics, even the limitations that the Church set may have benefited science in the long term. Furthermore and contrary to popular belief, the Church never supported the idea that the earth was flat, never banned human dissection, never banned zero and certainly never burnt anyone at the stake for scientific ideas. The most famous clash between science and religion was the trial of Galileo (1564 – 1642) in 1633. Academic historians are now convinced that this had as much to do with politics and the Pope’s ego as it did with science. I will examine the trial fully in the last chapter of this book when I will also explain how much Galileo himself owed to his medieval predecessors.

    ….

    Popular opinion, journalistic cliché and misinformed historians notwithstanding, recent research has shown that the Middle Ages were a period of enormous advances in science, technology and culture. The compass, paper, printing, stirrups and gunpowder all appeared in Western Europe between AD500 and AD1500.

    True, these inventions originated in the Far East, but Europeans developed them to a far higher degree than had happened elsewhere.

    ….

    The development of printing and paper meant that an incredible 20 million books were produced in the first fifty years after Johann Gutenberg had published his printed Bible in 1455. This dwarfed the literary output of the ancient world. Printing probably had an even greater effect than gunpowder, which, like the stirrup before it, revolutionised warfare and allowed Europeans to dominate the rest of the world.

    Meanwhile, the people of medieval Europe invented spectacles, the mechanical clock, the windmill and the blast furnace by themselves. Lenses and cameras, almost all kinds of machinery, and the industrial revolution itself all owe their origins to the forgotten inventors of the Middle Ages. Just because we don’t know their names, does not mean that we should not recognise their achievements.

    They lived much tougher lives than we do and we are the ones reaping the rewards for their hard work.

    Most significantly, the Middle Ages laid the foundation for the greatest achievement of western civilisation, modern science. It is simply untrue to say that there was no science before the ‘Renaissance’. Once medieval scholars got their hands on the work of classical Greeks, they developed systems of thought that allowed science to travel far further than it had in the ancient world. Universities, where academic freedom was guarded against all comers, were first founded in the twelfth century. These institutions have always provided scientific research with a safe home. Even Christian theology turned out to be uniquely suited to encouraging the study of the natural world because it was believed to be God’s creation. Thus, my own research over the last decade has led me to believe that it is a gross injustice to label the Middle Ages as ‘stagnant’, ‘barbaric’, or ‘uncivilised’.

    ….

    Watermills had existed in the ancient world but the Greeks and Romans never adopted them in large numbers. In the Early Middle Ages, they became increasingly common and the Domesday Book lists over 5,000. Tidal mills were adopted on suitable estuaries where a dam harnessed the high tide and released it through a channel containing a watermill. Finally, the first recorded European windmill sprouted in Yorkshire during the twelfth century and the idea quickly spread all over those parts of northern Europe where suitable rivers or estuaries were not available.
    Taken together, these improvements in agriculture led to a population explosion. Estimates for the population of France and the Low Countries rise from three million in 650AD to 19 million just before the arrival of the Black Death in 1350AD. For the British Isles, the equivalent figures are 500,000 people and five million. In Europe as a whole, the population increased from less than 20 million to almost 75 million. These figures must be estimates, if not guesstimates, but the upward trend is clear. For comparison, at the height of the Roman Empire about 33 million people lived in Europe. Well before 1000AD, the population far exceeded what is was when the continent was ruled by Rome and remained above that level even after the Black Death had killed a third of the inhabitants of Europe in the fourteenth century.

    ….

    In some ways, the medieval worldview was closer to ours than we sometimes imagine. For example, Gerbert and all his fellow men and women of any education in 1000AD were perfectly well aware that the Earth was a sphere. They also knew that the universe was very large compared to the Earth. As Boethius wrote in his Consolation of Philosophy:
    It is well known and you have seen it demonstrated by the astronomers, that in comparison to the extent of the heavens, the circumference of the earth has the size of a point. That means that, compared to the heavenly sphere, the earth may be thought of as having no size at all.
    Comments we hear today about people in the Middle Ages inhabiting a ‘poky little universe’ or believing that the Earth is flat are born of modern rather than medieval ignorance.

    ….

    Another modern misconception about the medieval worldview is that people thought the central position of the Earth meant that it was somehow exulted. In fact, to the medieval mind, the reverse was the case. The universe was a hierarchy and the further from the Earth you got, the closer to Heaven you came. At the centre, underneath our feet, the Christian tradition placed Hell. Then, second worse only to the infernal pit was our Earth of change and decay. Above us, acting as a boundary between the earthly and the heavenly, was the sphere of the Moon. This marked the dividing line between the perfect unchanging heavens and the transient sub-lunar region containing ourselves, doomed to die. Next, there were the crystalline spheres of the seven planets – the Moon, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn – eternally orbiting with uniform circular motion. The spheres were thought to be made of a transparent and imperishable fifth element called ether or quintessence. Above them were the fixed stars whose positions relative to each other never appeared to change. Above even them was the firmament and beyond that, Christians like Gerbert imagined, was the realm of God. This hierarchical system gave people absolute directions of up and down, one towards the heavens and one down to Earth at the bottom of the celestial ladder. To move the Earth away from the centre of the universe was not to downgrade its importance but to raise it up towards the stars.

    RELATED POSTS:
    The “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda
    Things They Don’t Teach you in Public Schools…
    The Flat Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

  • Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism – Invitation to a Thinking Matters Event

    Taken from Thinking Matters – Events & Announcements:

    Cultural Confusion and Ethical Relativism

    Dr Matthew Flannagan PhD, MSocSci, BSocSci

    When: Tuesday 2nd September
    Time: 7 – 9pm
    Where: Bethlehem Community Church Center – 183 Moffat Rd, Bethlehem, Tauranga
    Cost: Free
    Event Format: Live Presentation followed by Q&A and discussions

    Christian moral obligations are often seen as bigoted and intolerant. It is widely held that it’s wrong to impose “private moral perspectives” on to others. In this talk Matthew will critically examine the arguments for relativism and look at some of its implications. He will argue that popular moral relativism is confused and incoherent, and that Christians should not be intimidated by it.

    Dr Flannagan currently teaches part time at Laidlaw College. He holds a Masters degree in Philosophy from the University of Waikato and a PhD in Theology from the University of Otago. His research interests are Ethics, Apologetics, and Philosophical Theology.

    Thinking Matters
    Thinking Matters is an inter-denominational group where you can come to analyse and discuss some of the deeper issues of the Christian faith in the areas of Philosophy, Science and Apologetics (see definitions here).

    The purpose is to make Christian truth claims more relevant to an increasingly sceptical and secular culture, showing the reasons why we believe what we believe and providing answers that simply make sense.

    More on Thinking Matters Tauranga

    Who is Welcome?
    It’s open to Christian and Non-Christian alike – anyone who is seeking the truth in philosophy, science and scripture. You don’t need a philosophy or a theology degree to be able to understand the speakers.

    More Thinking Matters Tauranga Events
    More Thinking Matters Auckland Events

  • Self-Reference and Little-p philosophy

    I am a closet “ego surfari” (to coin one of Maverick Philosopher’s phrases); I enter my name into Google to see where my name comes up and what people are writing about me. It is an old hang up that goes back to my student politics days at the University of Waikato when Matt and I got defamed a lot.

    Anyway, I digress, recently I have been finding people commenting about me in relation to this blog and I find myself being described as a Philosopher, my name being included in a list of New Zealand’s top Christian Philosophers alongside Matt and Glenn Peoples. Whilst this is flattering to be included in this list I have to state for the record that I only hold a few philosophy papers in a minor capacity as part of my almost-complete LLB and whilst I did originally major in jurisprudence type papers towards my LLB and I do still tend to choose to answer those types of questions in exams and assignments where I have a choice and, after all, I did edit both Matt’s Masters and Doctoral theses and most of his academic and all of his published papers (he even footnotes to me and uses some of my writings in his PhD thesis), I cannot in good conscience call myself a Philosopher with a capital P, (a little p perhaps). Far too many people think that because they have done 1 or 2 papers and read a few books on the subject that makes them qualified to be a Philosopher or worse to lecture or write papers and books on Philosophy.

    That aside, I do enjoy dabbling in “little p” philosophy and I particularly enjoy philosophical refutations that employ self-reference. Others, usually those whose arguments have been destroyed by their application, write them off as semantic tricks or make false statements that you can use logic to prove anything but I love them, they make me laugh.

    Here is a list of my favourites and how they work:

    1. There is no such thing as truth.

    Example (1.) asserts a truth, so if it is true that there is no such thing as truth then (1.) is false. Conversely, if it is false that there is no such thing as truth then (1.) is false.

    The negation of (1.) that there is such thing as truth is not just true but is necessarily true. Example (1.) is self-refuting and its negation is self-verifying.

    Conclusion: There is such thing as truth. Anyone who says there is not is wrong.

    2. It is wrong to judge.

    Example (2.) asserts a judgment; as such, it refers to itself, so if it is true that it is wrong to judge then (2.) is false, the asserter purports to make a correct moral judgement. Conversely, if it is false that it is wrong to judge then (2.) is false.

    The negation of (2.) that it is right to judge is not just true but is necessarily true. Example (2.) is self-refuting and its negation is self-verifying.

    Conclusion: It is right to judge. Anyone who says it is not is judging you.

    Now we have the basics, let’s try something trickier.

    3. All religions are true.

    Christianity is a religion. If (3.) is true, then Christianity is true. Christianity teaches that it is the only true religion, therefore, all religions except Christianity are false. According to (3.),Christianity is the only true religion.

    Turning now to some slightly more useful examples

    4. Nothing is true unless science proves it.

    Really, including example (4.) itself?

    5. Nothing can be known.

    Example (5.) itself cannot be known, as such it is not known whether anything is knowable or not.

    Whilst in their simple form they may make us laugh (or make us mad) they have their uses. The best Christian Philosopher in the world, Alvin Plantinga, utilises a sophisticated version of a self-refuting argument in his infamous Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism first articulated in Warrant and Proper Function and later in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in Naturalism Defeated and Naturalism Defeated? and in An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism and most recently in Knowledge of God.

    Plantinga uses a self-referential critique to argue that if the combination of Metaphysical Naturalism and evolutionary accounts of the origin of human life are both true then there would be grounds for rejecting the trustworthyness of human cognitive faculties.

  • The Bible Tells Me So

    Suppose a person upon reading scripture and hearing the scriptures expounded through preaching from the pulpit believes that God has prohibited a certain class of actions. Suppose further that the believer is aware of no conclusive argument either for God’s existence or for the affirmation of the command in question. Nor is he or she aware of any cogent arguments for the reliability of scripture. The believer on discerning that God affirms this in scripture simply takes it at its word and finds himself or herself deeply convinced or persuaded that the action is wrong. Does this person believe in an intellectual acceptable manner?

    Many people think the obvious answer is no, here I want to reflect on one particular argument for this negative assesment.

    In an lecture expounding Calvin’s view of faith, Greg Dawes has argued that a person who believes in this fashion does act irrationally. A claim he repeats in his text book Philosophy of Religion which was , at least couple of years ago, the proscribed text for Philosophy of Religion at Otago University. ( I should add that Dawes was one of my thesis examiners) Dawes states

    One can concede that it would be perfectly reasonable to believe something on the authority of God, even if one had no other evidence for its truth (what could be more reasonable than to believe something told me by an omniscient and morally perfect being). But on the face of it one would still need evidence in
    support of one’s belief that (a) that these propositions are revealed by God; and, (b) that God is a reliable source of knowledge. We’ll see in a moment how believers have responded to this demand.[1]

    Here Dawes claims that although it is true that one is warranted in accepting things on a reliable authority such as God, before one does so one needs evidence that the authority in question is, in fact, reliable, that the testimony is from God and that that God is a reliable testifier.

    Dawes goes on however to argue that in the case of faith in scriptural testimony, no non-circular evidence is forthcoming. In questioning what makes believers think God speaks authoritatively through Scripture he states,

    The more common response … is to ‘bootstrap’ the believer’s sense of certainty: to base the certainty of his belief on the very revelation in which he believes. … Religious faith believes certain propositions on the authority of God on the authority of God. (This is not a typographical error.) The authority of God is simultaneously that which (id quod) and that by virtue of which (id quo) one believes.

    The circularity in this position might seem to be the Achilles’ heel, not just of the Protestant system, as David Friedrich Strauss suggested, but of this traditional, ‘bootstrapping’ view of faith in whatever form it is expressed.[2]

    Dawes’s argument rests on two assumptions. Firstly, that the believer has no non-circular reasons for thinking that the scripture is a medium of divine discourse. Secondly, that the believer must have such reasons if he or she is to be warranted in accepting anything on these grounds. I think both assumptions are false.

    1. Does the Believer Need Reasons for Thinking his Source Reliable?
    I suspect Dawes conflates two separate questions in the second of his assumptions; whether a given ground is, in fact, reliable and whether one has grounds or reasons for thinking it is reliable. These are not the same question. It is possible for a ground to be reliable without knowing or having any reason for thinking it is. Likewise, the fact that a person has no reason for thinking something is reliable does not entail that it is not reliable.

    In defending Calvin’s view of faith Alvin Plantinga and those who follow a similar tack such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff utilise a highly-influential theory of knowledge known as Reliabilism. Reliabilism holds that a belief is warranted if, and only if, the source, grounds or mechanism that produces the belief, or that it is based on, is reliable, i.e. likely to produce true beliefs on the topic in question. Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, John Armstrong, Alvin Plantinga and William Alston have advanced versions of this theory.

    The exact version of Reliabilism does not matter too much but for clarity I will use Alston’s version. Alston suggests that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground or grounds.[3] A person’s belief is warranted if the grounds on which the belief is held are reliable grounds for holding a belief of that sort. He also adds that the person who holds the belief must not have a reason for thinking that the belief is false nor a reason for thinking that the belief is not reliable.

    On a reliabilist account, it is the former and not the latter condition that must be met for a belief to be warranted. Alston’s Reliabilism entails that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground; it does not hold that it must be based on what one has reason for thinking is a reliable ground. The same can be said for most Externalism and Reliabilism theories in general. Noting that a person has no reason for thinking that something is reliable does not show that this condition is not met and hence, does not show that the belief in question lacks warrant.

    An obvious response to this line of argument would be to claim that there is some kind of epistemological principle or requirement to avoid believing something based on a given ground or source until one has reasons for thinking that such sources are reliable and that the believer violates this requirement. However, this position has at least two problems.

    Firstly, it leads to absurd conclusions. If I cannot believe any thing on a given ground until I have good reasons for thinking the ground reliable, then I cannot believe anything because I remember it happening. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it and hence, any such argument could not get off the ground. Similarly, I would be unable to rationally rely on the deliverance of reason. After all, how can I show that a reason is reliable? This can only be done by offering reasons.

    The problems do not stop here because memory is essential to any given line of reasoning one engages in. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without memory one cannot reason at all. This creates an unsolvable sceptical situation. One cannot trust memory if one does not have a reason for thinking it is reliable but one cannot get any such reason unless one trusts one’s own memory. Moreover, one cannot engage in reasoning at all if one does not trust it. This position leads to the destruction of all reason.

    The second problem created by this kind of stance is that it leads to an infinite regression. To show that the source were reliable, I would have to appeal to certain premises that are based on some other source but then I would have to show that this source was reliable and so on. The claim that one needs reasons for thinking a ground is reliable before one can be warranted in believing anything on the basis of that ground appears problematic.

    A further rejoinder suggests that it is in general true that I do not need to have reasons for thinking a ground reliable before I am warranted in accepting a given proposition on this ground. However, I do need such reasons if the ground of my belief is testimony, that is, the say-so of some other person. Dawes suggests something like this in his paper.[4] He distinguishes beliefs based on testimony from basic beliefs. He states that basic beliefs are such that one is warranted in believing them independently of any argument for them, whereas beliefs based on authority are warranted by “indirect evidence”. By indirect evidence, he means evidence that the testimony in question is reliable. A person who believes something based on testimony will, if they are rational, have “reasons to believe the trustworthiness of the source” from which he or she “gained the information”.[5]

    However, this view of testimony is mistaken. Coady summarises the problem. If one is going to have grounds for the reliability of a given authority or testimony then these grounds will be either some other testimony or authority, in which case there is a problem of circularity, or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. [6] The problem with this second horn of the dilemma is that if we exclude what we know by way of testimony we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

    To demonstrate this, consider an example Dawes himself provides, the belief that E=MC2. Dawes writes,

    Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[7]

    Dawes suggests that a non-physicist can rationally believe e=mc2 because he or she has reasons to believe that his or her sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable. Presumably, it would be because the author of the book in which he read it or the person who told him it was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does he know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or been told them by the person himself but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was awarded in order to check its original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He would also have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the university in question.

    Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information which he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on would be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable to be warranted in believing in testimony.

    I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know by way of being told by others accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learnt at school, university, from parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc. is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to.

    2. Does the Believer have Non-Circular Reasons for Believing in Scripture
    These observations also give us grounds for calling into question the first contention Dawes makes in his criticism of believing in scriptural testimony. Dawes assumes that the believer has no non-circular grounds for thinking that scripture is a medium of divine discourse.[8]

    Here his argument appears to be as follows. Dawes grants that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on scriptural testimony. He then notes that the only way one could get to the conclusion that such beliefs are warranted is by affirming the antecedent of this conditional and affirming that scripture is in fact a medium of divine discourse.

    However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

    What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.

    Here his argument appears to be as follows. First he conceeds that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on the basis that scripture affirms them. He then suggests that this entails that one can believe on the basis of scripture only if one has good reasons for thinking scripture is the word of God. However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

    What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it and hence believes such propositions as basic. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.

    Perhaps what Dawes is driving at is not that this claim that scripture mediates divine discourse is based on a circular argument but rather, it is circular in some other fashion. The distinction between logical and epistemic circularity is helpful here. Logical circularity occurs when a person affirms in the premise of the argument what he or she is attempting to establish in the conclusion. Such circularity can then only apply to arguments and not to basic beliefs. However, William Alston has pointed out that there is also such a thing as epistemic circularity. This occurs when one in practice relies upon a particular source or type of ground in order to establish the reliability of the type of ground in question. A person who relied on perceptual judgements to argue for the reliability of sense perception would be an example. This approach is not logically circular; the person need not argue from premises affirming the reliability of perception. However, it is circular nevertheless.[9]

    It is clear, I think, that the model is epistemically circular. The real question is whether there is anything wrong with such circularity. This is borne out by another point Alston stresses, that every, major, doxastic practice, even ones that are paradigmatically rational, are epistemically circular. [10] I noted this with memory above; one can only establish that memory is reliable by relying on the deliverance of memory as premises in a deductive argument. Similarly, with beliefs based upon a sound, deductive argument. Such arguments can be shown to be reliable only with other arguments and so on. Even an omniscient being could not demonstrate that his cognitive faculties are reliable without appealing to those faculties. Hence, if the practice of believing in divine commands because they are affirmed in scripture is problematic because one cannot believe the reliability of scripture without engaging in epistemic circularity, then various paradigms of rational belief are also problematic. In fact, rationality is impossible. This is, of course, absurd.

    [1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion, (so far unpublished) 46.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] William Alston, “The Concept of Epistemic Justification,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.
    [4] Ibid., 38.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
    [7] Dawes, “Faith and Reason,” 34.
    [8] Ibid., 9.
    [9] William Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 319-349.
    [10] By doxastic practice, I refer to the practice of forming beliefs in response to certain grounds, whether the ground is argument, some form of experience or the assertion of some authority.

  • Of course I think I’m right!

    I find it really frustrating when I encounter someone who throws the “you think you’re right” accusation at me and assumes that this obviously makes me arrogant and that I should therefore back down and run away ashamed.

    I am sick of it. I will not be made to feel guilty for thinking my opinion is right, or worse, for what that entails, that I think opinions in conflict with my own are wrong!

    Further, I will not engage in the ridiculous practice of beginning every sentence with “it’s just my opinion, but…” (as if that somehow makes what follows the “but” any less of an assertion that I think my position is correct).

    The expectation that I should not believe that I am right and everyone else is wrong, that I should not express and argue that my belief is the correct one in the context of a discussion is a ridiculous standard that even those who trot it out do not hold themselves to. You see, everyone thinks that they are right and that all other conflicting beliefs are wrong.

    E v e r y o n e.

    The statement, “you think you are right” is always asserted by someone who themselves thinks they are right to assert that I think I am right. If their objection is cogent, then I should reject their objection (but, if it is not cogent then I should reject it anyway because it is self-refuting).

    The person who objects that I think I am right is suggesting that I adopt an irrational stance, that I should believe something that I think is incorrect; but if I think it is incorrect then I am not going to believe it.

    (If I lost you just then, perhaps you had to reread the preceding once or twice, then perhaps that should tell you something about the reasoning behind the assertion you should not think you are right)

    People like to pretend they don’t think they are right and dress up their “arrogance” by starting sentences with “in my humble opinion,” but like the emperor’s new clothes it’s a crock; it’s all smoke and mirrors, because no sane person holds to a belief they think is wrong or inferior to other viewpoints. I mean why would you? You would hardly rank the differing views and then decide to hold the second or third most plausible view? You’d hold the view you thought most plausible and by doing that you tacitly reject the other views.

    So why not just admit this? Why do we play these games? Why do we buy into the theory that there is something wrong with thinking we are right? Admitting we think we are right does not mean that we have to paint ourselves into a corner, refuse to be open to other’s counter arguments or to refuse to consider new facts. It’s simply an admission that we hold a position. Is there really something wrong with not sitting on the fence? (Which in and of itself is to take a position to not hold a position but lets not go there.)