Category: Philosophy of Religion

  • Sentience Part 1

    Following on from my series on the illiberality of Abortion, discussion in the comments section turned to the issue of sentience. Commenters asked whether perhaps sentience is the property that a newborn possesses and a fetus does not that warrants such unequal application of the non-initiation of force principle by liberals. Is sentience the property that enables the liberal to be consistent in otherwise violating the non-initiation of force principle when it comes to abortion, by permitting feticide, and yet not when it comes to liberal opposition of infanticide?

    Some commentators claim that feticide is not homicide until the fetus is sentient. Bonnie Steinbock made perhaps the most sophisticated defence of this position. In an article summarising her position Steinbock states, “my thesis is that killing fetuses is morally different from killing babies because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.[i] She states that she finds the notion that feticide is on a par with infanticide and hence homicide, “completely implausible” because:

    A newborn can feel, react, and perceive. It cries when it is hungry or stuck with needles. Very soon after birth it cries from boredom or loneliness as well and can be soothed by being rocked and held. By contrast, the first-semester fetus cannot, think, feel, or perceive anything.[ii]

    I propose two responses. Firstly, I will analyse Steinbock’s argument in favour of this thesis, then I will criticise her conclusion in Sentience Part 2. In both cases, I will argue that Steinbock does not provide a reason for thinking that feticide is different from infanticide. On the contrary, her arguments in favour of feticide are also arguments in favour of infanticide.

    Steinbock’s Argument
    Steinbock argues that being sentient is essential for possession of interests.

    [S]entience is important because nonsentient beings, whether mere things (e.g., cars and rocks and works of art) or living things without nervous systems (e.g., plants), lack interests of their own. Therefore, nonsentient beings are not among those beings whose interests we are required to consider.

    Why is sentience necessary for possession of interests? Steinbock says “[I]t is only sentient beings to whom anything matters… since non-sentient beings cannot be hurt or made to suffer it does not matter to them what is done to them”.[Emphasis original] Elsewhere Steinbock states that what is necessary for a being to have interests in something is that it desires or wants the thing in question.

    Steinbock’s argument then rests on these claims. Firstly, that killing an individual is homicide only if continued life is in the interests of that individual. Secondly, an individual cannot have an interest in living unless it cares about living. Thirdly, that sentience is necessary to be able to care about anything.

    This argument equivocates on two separate senses of the word ‘interests’. Interests can refer to things a person is interested in, what a person likes or cares about; in this sense, tramping is one of my interests. On the other hand, to talk of someone’s interests can mean to talk about what is best for him or her, what enhances and promotes his or her welfare.

    When we examine the second premise of this argument it is clear that it is true only if interests are defined in the first of these senses. In order for something to be in someone’s interests in the first sense, then it must matter to him or her. He or she must care about the thing in question. It is not necessary for a person to have interests in the second sense. A thing can be in someone’s best interests even if he or she is not interested in it. Matters in the best interests of children such as nutritious food, clothing, shelter and education are often things they have never taken an interest in. People who suffer from mental illness can fail to take care of their interests correctly. Consequently, the second premise of the argument is true only if the word ‘interest’ is used in the first sense.

    However, if the first premise is to have any plausibility at all then interests must be understood in the second sense. If one has a duty to refrain from taking something from an individual only if the individual cares about the thing in question, then depriving the insane or children of what is in their best interests will not be wrong as long as they are not interested in it. Infants lack the mental ability to conceive, and hence, care about their future existence so infanticide would not be homicide by this line of reasoning. The argument is unsound.

    This problem with Steinbock’s position leads naturally to a second one. From the quotes above Steinbock seems to think that sentience is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition. She concedes that it would be wrong to kill unwanted infants but adds that this is different from killing a fetus “because fetuses are not, and babies are, sentient”.

    The problem is that her above argument does not justify this conclusion at all. What the argument says is that sentience is necessary for possessing interests. Moreover, it explicitly states that in order to have an interest in continued existence, an individual’s existence must matter to it; it must care about it in some way. While sentience is clearly necessary for caring about one’s continued existence various other factors are also necessary.

    Michael Tooley has argued one must also be able to conceptualise one’s continued existence and this requires awareness of one’s self as a subject of future experiences. An infant does not acquire the neurological capacity for this until some time after birth. In fact, an infant’s awareness of itself and future-orientated preferences to live are less developed than those of a mature cow. Consequently, if the premise of the argument offered is correct then infants do not have an interest in continued existence and consequently infanticide is not homicide.

    Steinbock offers a second argument in favour of sentience as a significant threshold.

    “[G]olden rule”- type reasons do not apply to nonsentient beings. That is, no one would explain opposition to burning the flag of the United States of America by saying, “How would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?

    Here, Steinbock appeals to a version of the Golden Rule. This rule prescribes consistency in one’s ethical judgments so that if one holds that it is permissible for you to do a particular action X to another person in certain circumstances then one must also hold that it is permissible for someone to do X to you in the same circumstances. Steinbock’s point is that such consistency is impossible with non-sentient beings. It does not make sense for one to object to destroying a flag because if one were a flag I one would not object to being burned. Flags after all cannot object to anything.

    Again, Steinbock’s argument relies on concealed ambiguities. Harry Gensler has distinguished two different interpretations of the Golden Rule. In one, the rule asks for our reaction to a hypothetical case involving ourselves. On the other it asks how we would react if faced with the actual case itself.

    Two examples demonstrate the difference between these two interpretations; a temporarily-unconscious individual and a case of infanticide. Taking the unconscious individual first, the first interpretation of the Golden Rule asks, would I object to the idea of someone killing me if I ever fell into a temporary coma? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I were, in fact, already in a coma? The answer to the first question is yes, I do object to the idea of someone killing me in the event I fell temporarily unconscious. I do not think it permissible for a surgeon to kill me while I was under general anaesthetic, for example. However, the answer to the second question must be no. If I were already unconscious, I could not object to being killed. While unconscious, I would not be capable of objecting to anything at all.

    The infanticide example demonstrates these differences further. Applying the first interpretation I would ask, would I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant? The second interpretation asks, would I object to being killed if I was an infant? Again, I would answer yes to the first question but no to the second. I do object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant. However, I clearly could not object if I were an infant because infants lack the cognitive development to be able to object or even understand what it means to object to being killed.

    Returning now to Steinbock, it is evident from her discussion that she is interpreting the Golden-Rule in the second way. Her question, “how would you like it if you were a flag and someone burned you?” asks us how we would react if we were a flag. Such a question is absurd because as a flag we could not have any cognitive reactions at all. However, interpreted this way it is equally absurd to apply the Golden Rule to infants or the temporarily unconscious. Consequently, if feticide is not homicide because the Golden Rule questions interpreted in this manner do not apply to fetuses, then killing infants and killing the temporarily unconscious are also not homicide.

    On the other hand, if the golden rule is interpreted the first way a different result emerges. It remains absurd to ask whether I would object to the idea of being killed in the event that I became a flag. It is dubious that I could ever be a flag, that a human adult and a flag could ever be the same individual. However, it does make sense to ask whether I object to the idea of being killed when I was an infant or when I was a fetus. This is because rational agents like myself once were fetuses and infants. The fact that a being is a potential rational agent makes it possible for rational agents to ask Golden Rule questions about them.

    Steinbock’s arguments for the sentience threshold are unsound. Further, when conjoined with certain facts of neurology they entail that infanticide is not homicide. The claim that feticide is not homicide while infanticide is appears ad hoc and arbitrary.

    I will address Steinbock’s conclusion in my next post, Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Bonnie Steinbock, “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” in Advances in Bioethics: Bioethics for Medical Education, Vol. 5, ed. Rem B. Edwards & E. Edwards Bittar (Stanford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 248.
    [ii] Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Ibid.
    Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 47.
    Steinbock “Why Most Abortions are Not Wrong,” 248-49.
    Harry Gensler, “Abortion and the Golden Rule,” in The Abortion Controversy 25 Years after Roe v Wade: A Reader, ed. Francis Beckwith & Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1998), 323.

  • Some Autobiographical Remarks: How I Discovered Christian Philosophy

    Increasingly so of late, I find myself in conversations, in the receipt of email requests or blog comments asking where to begin and how to expand one’s Christian philosophical understanding. I have been asked to recommend books and places to study and to share my own journey in this area.

    I started my studies at Waikato University in 1993. I was advised by the leadership at the church I attended, a church with some 300 student members I might add, to not study philosophy. I was told that this subject was one Christians should avoid or risk being led astray. However, for the reasons of timetabling, I was left with no option but to study Introduction to Philosophy.

    At that time the only apologists I was familiar with were Josh McDowell and Steve Kumar, who had spoken to our youth group. In Kumar’s book, Christian Apologetics: Think Why You Believe, there was a bibliography and for some reason I decided to go to the University library and follow these books up. I did not end up following the bibliography exactly as the first book that stood out on the shelf when I went into philosophy of religion section of the library was a book called God, Freedom and Evil by Alvin Plantinga and something prompted me to pick it up. I had never heard of Alvin Plantinga and had no idea that I had just picked up the definitive discussion of the logical problem of evil. As a first year student, with no background in philosophy, I actually managed to read it from cover to cover.

    This is not where I recommend people to start, as Plantinga is hard going, but it did give me one advantage. I had not been captivated by a superficial treatment of the issue but by arguably the best treatment of that issue in the literature. Plantinga opened my eyes to the possibilities of Christian theorising.

    I began devouring other authors. I stumbled on Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God, one of the most rigorous arguments for the existence of God written in the last century. I read Paul Helm’s discussion Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time and Reichenbach’s defence of the cosmological argument in Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Following up a footnote in Helm’s book, I came across another author I had never heard of, William Lane Craig and read his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. I discovered Thomas Morris’s The Logic of the God Incarnate (I don’t know why more theologians don’t read Morris) and began reading various anthologies on Philosophy of Religion.

    At the same time I was studying religious studies under Doug Pratt, someone very sympathetic to Lloyd Geering, and we covered the rationality of theism in our Introduction to Philosophy course. I can honestly say the sceptical focus of these courses had absolutely no effect except to teach me how superficial the scepticism I was being subjected to was. To be told by Geering that no intelligent person can believe in God with only brief justification and then be informed that Christianity must be completely re-worked alongside contrasted by the detailed point by point rebuttal of arguments for atheism in my extra-curricula reading by Plantinga and Swinburne meant there was no contest.

    By my second year, I had read Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. This book was absolutely brilliant. Plantinga demolished several common arguments for atheism; however, he also made some astutely critical points against the standard Christian arguments for God’s existence. Two thirds through the book he concluded that the arguments for and the arguments against were inconclusive, he the made what seemed to be a bizarre move and turned to the problem of other minds, he pointed out that the arguments for and against the existence of other people were equally inconclusive and in some cases the arguments failed for reasons very similar to the arguments for the existence of God. Yet, belief in other minds was clearly rational, so why wasn’t belief in God?

    This struck me as odd. Surely belief in God was totally different to belief in other minds. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff changed my stance. Until then I had been devouring books by Craig and Swinburne arguing for the existence of God. Plantinga, however, suggested that there was a flawed method behind the demand for evidence. Many discussions on the existence of God tacitly assumed that there was a neutral body of propositions assented to by believer and non-believer alike. All other propositions were rational only if they followed from this original body by evidence. Plantinga’s radical suggestion was that Christians and non-Christians started with a different body of evidence to each other. The idea of a neutral agreed upon starting point was a fiction and usually incoherent. Frequently assumptions that made sense only from a naturalistic viewpoint were smuggled in to the ‘neutral’ starting point, subtly rigging the debate.

    This opened my eyes, particularly in the area of ethics. I started seeing why people came to the conclusions they did and Christians seemed unable to combat them despite perceiving that there was something wrong with their argument. The idea that religion had no place in public life or scholarship and people had to bracket their faith commitments when answering normative questions meant that the fundamental premises Christians relied on for their conclusions were discounted from the outset. Christians were being forced to justify their conclusions from a perspective that was really hostilely secular but was taken for granted as the neutral starting point that nobody could question.

    I went on to write my Masters thesis in Philosophy on Plantinga’s ideas on faith and reason. I took the lessons I learned into my PhD in Theology and extended them into ethics. At no point, at any institution I studied in, was I ever taught these things in class. The textbooks used contained superficial treatments of Christian ethics that had been shredded by Christian Philosophers. The lecturers hadn’t read Christian Philosophy or if they had, they had only dabbled in it and had a superficial understanding or were unaware of the extent it went focussing on minor players. I had no choice but to teach myself by reading widely.

    So in summation, in New Zealand, there is nowhere (yet) where I could recommend people to study Christian Philosophy. If you want to become proficient in this field you are probably best to enrol in a secular philosophy degree program, and hunt down and read all the counter arguments from the high-level Christian philosophers as you progress.

    As a starting point, accessible to anyone without a background in Philosophy, I would recommend the book Reason for the Hope Within: Alvin Plantinga edited by Michael Murray. This book is hands down, the best introduction to Christian Philosophy and Apologetics as it combines rigour with accessibility to the lay person. I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

    Further, in conjunction with Thinking Matters Tauranga, we are developing a critical thinking course for lay people to teach the basics of logical analysis of arguments, some intro to Christian Philosophy and how to approach common objections to the faith. This will initially be launched in Tauranga early next year but we intend to bring it to Auckland and hopefully make it available more widely from there.

  • Does Pluralism Make Faith Arbitrary?

    Recently I have been reading Timothy Keller’s book The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism. (This is not like me because I don’t typically read popular apologetics books, and it is even more rare that I would lead a blog entry with one.)

    One thing that interested me is that when Keller examines the objections to the Christian faith he addresses first, not the problem of evil, but rather the claim that it is arbitrary, dogmatic, irrational, bigoted, etc to claim that Christianity is true in the face of pervasive religious pluralism. The fact that affirming Christianity involves adopting an epistemic stance that contradicts the stance taken by so many people, is seen as arbitrary and dogmatic.

    This is particularly so if one believes, as I do, that certain Christian beliefs are properly basic, that is, one can rationally assert them independently of any proof of their veracity. Doesn’t the fact that so many other people do not hold these beliefs and often hold contrary beliefs, make faith of this sort some kind of arrogant bluster? Isn’t it arbitrary for me to assume that my particular faith is true and everyone else is incorrect? I do not think so and in this blog I will sketch some of my reasons why.

    The first thing to note about this objection is that it is based on a claim that it is arbitrary to believe a proposition in the absence of proof if numerous other people do not hold that proposition.

    Now a little reflection should demonstrate the problem with this claim; the claim itself is one many people do not hold, hence, if the claim is true it is arbitrary to believe it without proof. As none has been offered, I am inclined to take the proponent of this view’s word and reject it. Moreover, as the proponent himself has not offered a proof it must be irrational for him to accept this proposition. In fact, there is an obvious incoherence in this kind of objection; the objector proposes that I reject Christian belief on the basis of the above claim, however, I can only do that if I accept the above claim. But if I accept the above claim, I am in the very epistemic situation the claim says I should avoid. It is hard to see how any coherent or sensible objection of this sort can be raised.

    There is another problem with this objection. Suppose, for the sake of example, I accept the objector’s advice, presumably then I should cease to believe in the Christian faith. But if I do this, aren’t I adopting an epistemic stance that is contrary to that held by many people? What about the many Christians, for example, who do not reject the Christian faith? By rejecting Christianity I am taking up an epistemic stance that differs from them and hence, am taking up a stance contrary to that held by many people.

    One needs to bear in mind too that the pluralist mindset, the concern so pervasive in our culture today, that all religions are equal and it is wrong to say one is incorrect and another is right is a peculiar western phenomena. Many religions reject this mindset, most religions claim that they are true. People generally don’t believe things that they think are false; to believe a proposition is to affirm it. Once this is realised it is clear that pluralism itself is one religious perspective, one that is contrary to most, if not all others. Until the pluralist can provide compelling proof of his position, it would be silly and outright irrational, to become a pluralist on the grounds that one shouldn’t adopt views widely rejected by others unless one can prove them.

    [At a later date I hope to review Keller’s book for this blog. It is a very interesting book as although it is popular, it draws on some fairly high level Christian Philosophers such as Plantinga, Alston, Swinburne, etc and for that reason alone is worth reading. It is interesting to see how a pastor can take these writings and ideas and make them accessible to a lay congregation. I am not so impressed with the second half of the book but I have not finished it yet. Reason for the Hope Within is, I think, a better introduction to apologetics, for those who have never studied it but who want to find a starting point, but this is, so far, a good second.]

  • Faith and Logic

    Recently, Patrick left the following comment in response Madeleine’s post on the Role of the State.

    “[L]ogic and reason are secular, even humanistic processes. Faith is neither of
    those. Logic and faith can be in conflict, I think. From a humanist viewpoint
    there is nothing particularly logical about believing in an invisible God.”

    Apologies to Patrick for whom I have great respect for and whom I have known for years but his statements are sufficiently common amongst evangelicals that they warrant some treatment.

    Essentially Patrick makes three claims:

    1) Logic and reason are secular, humanistic processes.
    2) Faith can be in conflict with logic.
    3) There is nothing logical about belief in an invisible God if you are a humanist.

    Starting with 3). Even if it is true that from a humanist view point there is nothing logical about believing in an invisible God it does not follow that in fact there is nothing logical about believing in an invisible God. This latter claim follows only if a humanist perspective is true.

    Now Patrick, I know, does not believe the humanist perspective is correct and neither do I so it is hard to see what the relevance of this is supposed to be. The fact that a perspective he and I think is mistaken has a particular view does not provide either of us for a reason for affirming the view.

    Further, the claim that it is “illogical” to believe in an “invisible” God is simply false. Patrick here seems to be speaking of the confusion that some Humanists espouse between the question of whether something is logical with whether something is visible. These are quite different matters. Affirming the existence of something is logical if the proposition is logically possible; that is, it does not entail a contradiction.

    However, there are many things that although logically possible, are not visible. In fact, there are many things that though logically possible are in fact false. Possibility after all is not actuality. A couple of examples may help illustrate this point. The claim that there exists promiscuous virgins, or married bachelors is illogical. This is because a person is promiscuous only if he or she has sex and a person is a virgin if they have not had sex. Similarly, a person is a bachelor if they are unmarried and can only be married if they are not unmarried. Hence, the claim that promiscuous virgins or married bachelors exist entails that a person both is and is not married and has and has not had sex. This is a contradiction and so violates a fundamental rule of logic.

    The claim that there is a field of red grass in my back yard on the other hand is false yet not illogical. There is nothing illogical about the concept of a red field of grass in my back yard; if I painted the grass in my yard this possibility would be actual, however, as a matter of fact the grass in my yard is green, but that is not because of any impossibility of it occurring.

    So the fact that God is invisible does not mean it is illogical. If one accepts that the only source of basic knowledge about the world is our five senses, one could argue that belief in an invisible God is unwarranted but this is different from saying it is illogical. I don’t think that the five senses are our only source of basic knowledge about the world (in fact I am inclined to think it is an incoherent claim, after all the claim “the only source of basic knowledge is our five senses” is itself something one can’t prove by hearing, touching, tasting or smelling and hence if this claim were true one could not be warranted in believing it).

    Turning now to 1); that logic is a secular or humanistic process. This is mistaken. Logic is simply a set of rules, most of which are intuitively obvious to properly functioning cognisers, by which one can infer conclusions from premises. Note this last point, logic simply gets one proposition, the conclusion, from other propositions, the premises.

    It in and of itself tells us nothing about what those premises are except that they cannot be premises from which one can infer a contradiction. The premises could be drawn from information gleaned from the five senses, or they could be drawn from revelation, or from memory or some other basic source of information. Nothing about logic rules out having premises that a person believes on the basis of faith. If faith is a basic source of information about God and the world then one can, and should, use logic to draw conclusions from premises obtained via this source.

    Perhaps Patrick things that logic is an unreliable method of inferring conclusions from premises. Christianity is true (and Patrick holds this) yet he thinks that logic and the Christian faith conflict. That seems to suggest that logic cannot be reliable.

    I think this position is problematic; for starters Patrick’s post was, after all, a reply to Madeleine’s. Madeleine had affirmed something and he was attempting to defend the negation of this affirmation. But if logic is unreliable this whole process makes no sense. Negation and affirmation assume the law of non-contradiction, a fundamental rule of logic. In fact without logic human language and discourse would break down and be impossible. Words can have meaning because they refer to something and not to something else and they do so consistently. If a term can mean one thing one day and the opposite the next with no basis or predictability one would never understand anything.

    Patrick also suggests that reason and logic are secular. In one sense he is correct; the word secular comes from the latin word which means temporal or of this world and it is true that logic is a process utilised in this world and for purposes in this world. This is not limited to reason and logic, in this sense of use theology is also secular at least when it is telling us about things of this world and how to live in this world.

    However, I don’t think that Patrick intends this, he is using secular in the modern sense of the word where it means, godless or “practical atheism,” a view which either affirms the non-existence of God or acts for practical purposes as if God does not exist. In this sense, I think Patrick is clearly mistaken; as I noted above, logic simply gets one from a premise to a conclusion there is nothing in logic that entails an assumption that God does not exist. To claim that logic and reason are secular is like claiming that eyesight is secular or that memory is secular as these like and logic and reason are simply methods that human beings naturally use to gain information and understanding about reality. I think that God is part of reality. Just as we use our eyes to read scripture or we use our ears to hear a sermon and we use our memory to recall these things we can use logic and reason to infer conclusions from them.

    The medievals called this process faith seeking understanding. One starts with what one knows by faith and reasons from it to gain a comprehensive, coherent and accurate understanding of reality and answers to the fundamental and philosophical existential questions that we face. It is this project that the evangelical church needs to reclaim.

    If someone says that some aspect of Christianity is illogical they have merely stated it. To prove that it is illogical then they would need to provide us with a proposition or propositions that:

    a) are essential to Christianity;
    b) can be demonstrated to entail a logical contradiction by a valid argument form; and,
    c) utilise premises that Christians are rationally required to accept.

    In the literature some people claim to have done this but such claims are highly controversial and I have yet to come across one that has not been refuted. In light of this, it frustrates me many in the Church uncritically accept this claim and retreat without a single fight and then hide in a false, anti-intellectual pietism.

  • On the Meta-Euthyphro Objection

    According to proponents of the Euthyphro Objection, defenders of a Divine Command Theory of Ethics face a dilemma, actions are morally-required either because:

    (i) God commands them;

    or,

    (ii) God commands them because they are morally-required.

    The latter (ii) entails that actions are right and wrong independently of God’s commands and as such, a Divine Command Theory of Ethics is false. The former (i), however, is said to be problematic for two reasons: [a] if things are morally-required because God prohibits them, then God’s commands are arbitrary; if God commanded gratuitous torture then gratuitous torture would be morally-required. Moreover [b], the claim that God is good is emptied of any substantive content; to say God is good is simply to say God does what He wills.

    I am unimpressed with this argument. In previous posts I have argued why. Despite the popularity of this line of argument (seen by its repetition in almost every first year ethics text book I have read) I think these two arguments are not powerful at all. On a Judeo-Christian concept of God, God is understood to have a certain type of character and to possess certain virtues. As the Westminister Confession states, God is:

    [M]ost loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin; the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him; and withal, most just, and terrible in His judgments, hating all sin, and who will by no means clear the guilty.

    Once this is realised, one can take (i) and avoid the problems [a] and [b] that are supposed to afflict the affirmation of this horn of the dilemma that the Euthyphro Objection raises. One can avoid [a] because it is not coherent to claim that a being with certain virtues would command actions like gratuitous torture. Likewise, one can avoid [b] because claiming God possesses certain character traits does not commit one to the claim that his goodness consists merely in doing as he wills, and these traits provide substantive content to the claim that God is good.

    In the discussion here Mark V posted an astute response:

    “You say that God is good because he posseses certain character traits that we regard as good. But why do we regard them as good? Is it because God possesses these traits or because they conform to some external standard of goodness?”

    If I understand Mark’s objection here, he is suggesting that even if my solution to the Euthyphro Objection is successful, the same problem arises again on another level, now we are faced with the same dilemma all over again with regard to the goodness of God’s character traits. Either they are good because God possesses them or God possesses them because they are good.

    Although Mark doesn’t say so, I think he means to suggest that the same problems with each option of the Euthyphro Objection also apply to this new issue. If a person claims that God possesses these traits because they are good then goodness exists independently of, and prior to God, which appears to compromise the doctrine of divine aseity. However, if a person claims that God’s traits are good because he possesses them then analogues to the arbitrariness [a] and emptiness [b] objections apply. Let’s call this line of argument the Meta-Euthyphro Objection.

    I want to suggest that neither option Mark suggests is quite right. It is not the case that God’s character traits are good because he possesses them, neither is it the case that they are possessed by God because they are good. Instead I want to suggest that these traits are good because God prefers himself to have them.

    An obvious rejoinder to this claim is that it really avoids the issue. Whether God’s character is good because he prefers himself to have it instead of it being good because he possesses it does not make an iota of difference. I am still faced with analogues of [a] the arbitrariness and [b] the emptiness objections aren’t I?

    Actually I think the answer to this is no. To see why, note that when Mark asks:

    “You say that God is good because he posseses certain character traits that we
    regard as good. But why do we regard them as good?”

    He grants there is nothing problematic about God having these traits but rather that the question is what makes Him having them a good thing? But this fact disarms both the arbitrariness [a] and emptiness [b] objections.

    Turning to [a], the arbitrariness objection, when this objection is applied to the claim that God’s character traits are good because God prefers to have them, the [a] contends that God’s preference of the traits in question is arbitrary; after all, he could just as well have preferred to be vicious and cruel, and if he did, it would be good to be vicious and cruel.

    The problem is that this is based on a false assumption. If God has the character traits in question then it is not true that he could have preferred just any traits; a person who has the following traits will not desire to be a vicious or cruel person “loving, gracious, merciful, long-suffering, abundant in … truth, forgiving…” Holding these traits means that there are certain things that one does not desire or want to see happen. That is part of what having such traits means.

    Similar things apply to the emptiness charge [b]. Just as before, one could say that when we say that God is good, we mean that he possesses certain character traits which are normally recognised as paradigmatic examples of goodness. Now the suggestion that a trait is good because a being who displays paradigmatically good character traits prefers it does not seem trivial at all.

    I conclude then that the Meta-Euthyphro Objection does not fair any better than its predecessor; one can meaningfully attribute goodness to God and say that God’s duties constitute our obligations, and we can do so without making goodness independent of God. I maintain then that the standard textbook objections remain unsound.

  • Voting, the Role of the State and Similarities Between libertarianism and Christianity

    Someone emailed us a while ago asking what the difference was between Matt’s classical liberalism and my libertarianism, where did we part company and why did we define ourselves this way. We never answered because we have never really tried to pin it down before, we knew there we differed on some things and we knew that those difference put us in these particular camps but putting it into words was something we didn’t get to until now.

    We definitely differ; see our respective scores on The World’s Smallest Political Quiz, mouseover to see whose is who’s.

    Madeleine

    Matt

    So I am clearly in the libertarian camp (I am not in the Libertarian camp as in capital L or “Objectivist” (Randian)). Does that mean I can be both Christian and libertarian? Well not if my approach to the role of the state is to simply hold the single absolute principle “that nobody should initiate force against another.” However, yes if the outworking of what I do hold puts me closest to the libertarian perspective than any other position.

    I find the non-initiation of force principle to have no basis in divine or natural law. However, something close to is definitely there and I believe that it is the closest secular position to the correct application of Christianity to the role of state for the following reasons.

    Scripture teaches that it is wrong to kill an innocent human being. This prohibition on killing can plausibly be extended to a prohibition against violence and force in general. This is the heart of traditional Christian positions on war, abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, etc. The idea is that the state can use retributive force against guilty people but it can never threaten the life, liberty and property of an innocent person unless they engage in unjustified aggression against another. In both situations there are important limits further still, for example, retributive force can only be used by a lawful authority after a impartial trial has found the person guilty the force must be proportionate to the offence and cruel and degrading punishments are illicit. Similarly, with defensive force. It can be used only when it is necessary to stop the aggression and again the force used must be proportionate to the perceived threat.

    A government that limited its use of force to these functions and only taxed its citizens to ensure that these functions were carried out would be severely limited and would look like no current government anywhere, yet this is the Biblical picture and you can see that it does look a lot like the libertarian non-initiation of force principle (and nothing like the strawman-caricature that Rand paints in her books).

    The key passage on the role of the state is Romans 13:1-7:

    Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been stablished by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor.

    This passage spells out the reasons why we are required to obey the government and why we are required to pay taxes. Paul states that governments act as God’s agent, that is on his behalf, to perform a specific function, namely, to punish wrong-doing. Paul emphatically states that the state does not bear the sword, have the power to use force, for nothing but to act as an agent of retributive punishment. It is because it is an agent of God in carrying out this function that it can legitimately demand obedience and financial support. Nothing in this passage provides any basis for claiming that a government that did other things apart from these basic functions and used force to back it up would be acting as God’s agent (in fact the opposite is suggested in 1 Samuel 8:10-22 – any government that taxes its people more than 10% and undertakes functions outside its legitimate mandate is corrupt). If a government steps outside this mandate then it is acting unjustly. The passage states that the government is God’s servant, it is under God and therefore subject to the same laws as its people. In Revelation, written in the latter part as opposed to the earlier part of Nero’s reign, the same ruler is no longer described at God’s servant but as Satan incarnate because he sought to be God, he stepped outside the mandate of legitimate government.

    In summation, if you are a Christian you should either be a libertarian or a classical liberal. You might end up as a conservative if you throw some pragmatism in but if you end up as a centrist or left wing you have failed to understand Scripture, you are placing government in the role of God.

    One of the biggest problems New Zealand faces is the same the world over and was the same at the time of Samuel; the people want a government in the place of God, they want the government to provide welfare, health, education, families commissions, art, television (well maybe not that one at the time of Samuel but you get the picture). It feels and seems easier if we don’t have to take our responsibility to love our neighbour personally.

    Biblically speaking, the state’s role essentially boils down to law, order, justice and defence. Do we then get to forget about all the rest? No.

    “Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?” Jesus replied: ” ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.”

    This means that looking out for others is our responsibility but, contrary to the picture Rand paints, this is strictly qualified. We do not have an obligation to give to everyone who has their hand out. If their own choices and refusal to help themselves has led them to the dire situation they find themselves in then unless they are prepared to get off their buts and help themselves and learn from their mistakes we owe them no charity. If people refuse to help themselves then we are justified in not helping them. The scriptures are full of examples, if people refuse to work then they don’t get to eat (2 Thess 3:10), you left the corners of your crops un-gathered so the poor could come and work and feed themselves – you did not hand them the fruit of your day’s labour while they sunned themselves all day, they had to work for it (Deut 24:19-22), families had to take responsibility for their own, the needy only receive private assistance if they could not work and had no family who would provide for them and were not idle people (1 Tim 5), etc.

    Given this, I have less than a month to decide who I will vote for. The choices below (in the order they appear on the Decision 08 website) are not great because none of them fit the criteria above.

    Resident’s Action Movement
    The Bill and Ben Party
    ACT
    Alliance
    Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis
    Party
    Democrats for Social Credit
    Direct Democracy Party
    Green
    Labour
    Libertarianz
    Maori Party
    National
    New World Order
    New Zealand Pacific Party
    NZ First
    Progressive
    The Family Party
    The Kiwi Party
    The Republic of New Zealand
    Party
    United Future

    Matt and I want to be really careful to not endorse a political party so we are still debating each other as to whether we will publicly state who we vote for but we agree we can take this next step, the first cull, namely getting rid of the no-way, no-how parties and assessing the pro’s and con’s of the remaining possibilities. Our intention is to more thoroughly look at and read up on these parties, their philosophy, their people and their policies. The revised list, and this goes for both of us (at this stage, last election we each voted differently), is this (again the order is the order as above):

    ACT
    Libertarianz
    Maori Party
    National
    New Zealand Pacific Party
    The Family Party
    The Kiwi Party

    Libertarianz and ACT would be the closest to my political position but the points I part ways with them are fairly major. Both parties philosophically adhere to the non-initiation of force but both throw their well reasoned, consistent thinking out the window on the topic of abortion (and a few other issues).

    Rodney Hide spoke at the recent Forum on the Family outlining clear and sensible policies all sharply reasoned, setting aside emotion, appealing to doing what is right, promoting a consistent
    theme of personal responsibility as opposed to state dependency and then when asked for his position on abortion outlined a mushy, soft and sentimental pile of rubbish. Gone was his consistent personal responsibility – non-initiation of force reasoning, suddenly his reasoning skills dropped to that of Sue Bradford’s as he spoke of it being a conscience issue (it is not – abortion is either killing, therefore the initiation of force, 100% homicide or it is not killing and is on par with tonsillectomy’s and there is zero problem with it). Rodney, citing his emotions, said he didn’t want to impose his beliefs onto women (but apparently he can when it is restricting women from, say, theft). [Here are some secular reasons on why libertarians should be pro-life]

    Rodney, ACT and the Libz on this subject are inconsistent. I am not. I have a problem with voting for a party that 1. endorses or is agnostic on homicide (and has no reasoned position that can withstand defeaters justifying their stance) and 2. that is that inconsistent.

    Further, the Libz and to a lesser degree ACT, are riddled with pathological secularists who have a closed, caricatured view of Christianity – extremely closed minded which makes supporting them difficult as many within their ranks refuse to see the similarities and work together. Also the Libz are prone to massive in-house fighting amongst the factions which seriously kneecaps them at times.

    The Maori Party make our list because they get it right on a number of issues, less often than ACT and the Libz, but best demonstrated by their policy on the seabed and foreshore where they are a seemingly lone voice speaking against the Labour government’s worst attack on the right to due process in recent times otherwise known as the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (all Christians should be horrified at the passage of this law). Further we respect Tariana’s daring to cross to Helengrad and the fact that they are, by and large, a party that stands on principles not on popularism and even though many of their principles are too left/statist you have to respect that and you definitely want more politicians like that in parliament.

    National. National is not Labour. If their policies reflected their stated principles I might say more.

    The Christian Parties. First of all, so what if there are three of them? How many secular parties are there? Christians need to get over this. How many denominations of Christianity are there? Demanding that the three merge before you will support them is as ridiculous as refusing to attend church unless every denomination merges. We still somehow manage to be one body despite our differences. As with denomination and church choice, if you want to go there, look at the options and pick the one that best reflects which is right.

    • NZ Pacific. Putting aside the accusations against Taito, remember due process, Taito was part of Labour which makes him left/statist. However, like Tariana he earns brownie points for sticking it to Helengrad and he is a Christian so he makes the cut.
    • The Family Party. Putting aside the Destiny factor, they must be judged on their merits and not a knee-jerk reaction, there have been serious allegations made that they do not adhere to the theological position of separation of church and state, if this is true then they are no go, but again they are a Christian party so we will look at them.
    • The Kiwi Party. Probably the holds the number one spot of the three at this stage but this is the party that has candidates who stood with Labour and were responsible for inflicting the families commission on us and worse they seem to have not learned from their mistakes and are advocating government sponsored marriage promotion. That said their intention is good but like all the other Christian parties they are too statist and fail to understand that only when we get the state out of the lives of good law abiding citizens and when the state stops usurping the role of God can the church really flourish.

    The Christian parties are really disapointing because all of them have access to the truth and have missed it. Contra Celsum writes on the issue of whether Christians should be in politics at all. He outlines four critical reasons why he believes it inappropriate for Christians to seek political office at the present time. His four reasons are right on the button in terms of my issue with our choice of Christian parties, particularly the part on vacuous minds and points 2.d) and e)., I just am really reluctant to concede his conclusion. Am I really in that much of a minority? How did we fall this far?

    1. Whipped parties. In Jerusalem, one of the most important institutions is the believing and confessing heart. In Romans 10: 9,10 we read: “ . . . if you confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in your heart that God raised Him from the dead, you shall be saved; for with the heart man believes, resulting in righteousness, and with the mouth he confesses, resulting in salvation.” This means that each individual must be free, as a Christian, to profess and act according to his belief. The institutions of Jerusalem are built on this principle. This is why Luther’s declaration at the Diet of Worms is in accord with the heart of the Gospel and the Kingdom of God:

    Unless I am convinced by Scripture and plain reason – I do not accept the
    authority of the popes and councils, for they have contradicted each other – my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not recant anything for to go against conscience is neither right nor safe. God help me. Amen.

    But the modern political convention of whipped parties, where one is bound to vote and act, not according to conscience but to the policy of party [this applies equally to parties controlled by churches], means that Christians in the modern political arena are inevitably forced to approbate and vote for actions, laws, and policies which they
    know to be wrong and intrinsically evil.

    Of course, opponents would counter by pointing out that this does not preclude a Christian party from participating, provided that such a party stipulate that all votes would be conscience votes. This is true, as far as it goes, but we immediately see that such an approach would be virtually inconsequential within the current functioning of Parliament itself, contributing little to justice and the legislative task. It would therefore be of little use. There are far more urgent and practical things which Jerusalem should be engaged in at the moment.

    2. The Prevailing Dominant Ethic of Secular Humanism. We have seen in recent history that parties can only win reasonable support if they ground themselves in the incumbent control-beliefs of our day. Every political party can only build appeal if it agrees with the following controlling creed:

    a.) The Living God has no relevance to politics and government.

    b.) All government must be secular.

    c.) Government is the ultimate power in our society.

    d.) Government has a duty to expropriate income from some and extend welfare to others.

    e.) Government has a duty to provide for the health, education and well-being of its people.

    As long as people generally are held in the thrall of this creed, no Christian or Christian party can make any meaningful contribution. However, when sixty or seventy percent of the society are professing Christians who fear and love the Lord, it will be a very different matter. The creed of secular humanism will be seen for what it is and Christian politics and government will come into its own.

    3. The Small Numbers of Believers. Part of wisdom in God’s Kingdom is knowing when something is appropriate, and when it is not. In the end, government and law reflects the heart of the people. When such relatively small numbers are found in Jerusalem, talk of political activities is premature. The priorities before us now are the extension of the Kingdom through the preaching of the Gospel, on the one hand, and the building up a Christians in the faith, on the other. It is only as we act consistently with our God-given duties and responsibilities that we can expect the covenantal blessings of God to fall upon us. As they fall, the cultural power and influence of God’s people in the community will grow as an inevitable result. Eventually, the citadels of unbelief will be surrounded, and the halls of government captured. But we must build an army first—a host of God’s people living, working, serving in the community, doing good to all men, but especially to those of the household of faith.

    4. Vacuous Christian Minds. The majority of professing Christians have been taught all their lives in the state’s secular education system. They have been indoctrinated to think as humanists in almost every area of life. Jerusalem’s great and urgent duty is the reformation of Church, Family and School. Until we are able to educate our children in a manner consistent with our faith, we cannot expect that the Christian community will be able to distinguish between the counsels of secular humanism, on the one hand, and faithful Christian principles, on the other.

    Until our children are properly taught and educated, we will not produce faithful Christians who think and act Christianly in their professions, whether they be in science, medicine, law, the liberal arts, or whatever. It is only upon such a foundation that true, God-honouring political views can emerge.

    If Christians cannot distinguish between the justice of secular humanism and the justice of Jerusalem we are utterly ill-equipped and malformed for roles in politics. If we are not clear according to Scripture on the God-ordained roles and responsibilities of the Church, the Family, the State, the School, the Corporation, how could we distinguish between the policies of God and of Baal in the civic and public sphere? And if we cannot even get our thinking right on these matters, any actual Christian political involvement will end up as an abortion.

  • The Point of Intellectual Engagement: Why Thinking Matters

    For some faith and reason is an anathema; Christianity is the realm of feelings and is totally separate from academia, reason and logic.

    After the Craig v Cooke debate a Christian reporter asked me “aside from people being intellectually stimulated, what was the point of having a Christian Philosopher dialogue with an Atheist Historian at Auckland University, what was gained from it? The assumption appeared to be that engaging at the intellectual level as opposed to the emotional level [a false dichotemy but that’s for another post] was not what Christianity was about – where were the immediate conversions?

    When Dominic was recently asked what the point was of Thinking Matters (an organisation dedicated we sometimes contribute to), I found his answer to have broader application to the issues of faith and reason and apologetics in general and spoke to the heart of the inherent problem found both within and without Christianity mentioned above. His comments are reproduced below.

    The purpose of Thinking Matters and Apologetics

    Darryl Burling recently asked the Thinking Matters Contributor mailing list,

    “What is the purpose of thinking matters? I know the answer that is here, but what I want to understand is what constitutes success? What is the purpose of “examin[ing] and explain[ing] the defense of the Christian faith”? I have my ideas but want to know what others think.”

    1. The purpose of Thinking Matters is primarily to provide a “common area” for New Zealand apologists. Our aim is to give some focus to the various individuals and groups in New Zealand who would otherwise be doing their own thing without much awareness of the efforts of others. In that vein, I think we’ve been fairly successful already; although admittedly we need a new injection of enthusiasm to galvanize some further action.

    2. Because of (1), the purpose of apologetics is not something that Thinking Matters, as an organization, has taken a specific position on. I think it has, so far, been sufficient simply that we all agree apologetics is necessary and important. The views of the individuals who contribute to TM may differ on the precise purpose of apologetics—some widely. Similarly, our views on apologetics methodology may differ. As you know, I’m strongly presuppositional. But to be a well-rounded apologetics organization, I think we also need some classical and evidential apologists filling out the mix.

    3. For my own part, I believe that apologetics is an important pre-evangelical, and post-evangelical discipline.

    (i) In terms of pre-evangelism, apologetics is often necessary to remove the epistemic defeaters to Christian belief. Since faith is rational, we cannot expect it to obtain in situations which would render it irrational; such as when people hold strong beliefs which contradict that faith. This is especially important given that we aren’t living in a Christian society any more, but a post-Christian one. People are increasingly skeptical of Christian faith-claims because they increasingly (a) fail to understand them, and (b) are influenced by scientism/modernism (I don’t believe post-modernism has actually had the societal effect some people think it has had). Apologetics in this context isn’t only or even perhaps primarily about laying the groundwork for evangelism itself; as you commented to me privately, the rational defense of the faith is a necessary condition for “ensuring ongoing freedom to be Christian in an increasingly hostile, left brained, rational and intellectual world.” Christianity needs champions in the academic arena to show that our faith is intellectually justified and defensible. This is very important in the universities in particular, since they are the breeding grounds for the upcoming movers and shakers in society—and they are largely secular.

    (ii) In terms of post-evangelism, apologetics is extremely important for dealing with doubts, and for growing in faith. Again, faith is rational—so where defeaters exist for it, cognitive dissonance occurs. This can be really damaging; especially for people who are converted through more emotional and less intellectual means. A lot of people have powerful conversion experiences, but then later when they start to really think about their faith, and perhaps share it with others, they encounter a lot of objections and doubts. This is especially true online, where there are lots of New Atheists who are highly hostile to Christianity, and have prima facie reasonable objections to faith, backed up by a lot of attitude which replaces the work of actual reasoning and underwrites the appearance of a righteously indignant worldview which opposes Christianity because it is so irrational. Without apologetics, this can be fatal to faith. Christians need to know that (a) doubts are not sinful; and (b) that answers do exist. And currently, I don’t believe that most pastors in New Zealand are actually equipped to provide the sorts of answers that some Christians may need. A lot of questions are not really considered seriously and addressed, so such as dismissed and swept under the rug (particularly in less conservative churches; I think Pentecostalism has a lot to answer for with its generally anti-intellectual, emotion-based faith).

    Note that none of this is to say that faith is only rational. Thinking Matters’ declaration of belief is thoroughly Reformed in its view (albeit implied) that faith is an actual ontological change caused by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the new believer. However, it’s important to still affirm that faith is rational; and that because it is rational, doubts will occur where certain presuppositions or beliefs conflict with it. Apologetics is a means God uses to defeat unbelief, and to then preserve the saints in faith.