Tag: Role of the State

  • Pacifism, the Bible and the Sin of Selfishness

    ‘If someone wants something from us and we do not want to give it to them that is the sin of selfishness and the Bible condemns selfishness.’ This was one of the three points a Christian pacifist speaker made in defending his stance at the panel discussion on War Ethics that Matt mentioned in Pacifism and The Golden Rule.

    Whilst there were a lot of issues raised that night that I wanted to respond to (being a member of the audience, I was only able to ask a question on one) it was this point that I woke up with in my head the next morning; I awoke with the question/statement I wished I’d have asked/said on the night fresh in my mind. Here it is:

    Mr Pacifist, you said that if someone wants something from us and we do not want to give it to them that is the sin of selfishness; if someone wants to take from us we should let them without resistance because that is what Jesus did when he let himself be crucified. Is that about right?

    Gun=Better Protection than any Pacifist Male

    So if I go out to the parking lot and a man pins me to the ground and starts raping me and my hand find a rock in the darkness next to me, is what you are saying that I should let him take what he wants, that I should not use the rock to smash him in the head but rather I should lie back and think of Jesus?

    I think the point you are missing is that Jesus let his life be taken to save humankind. If I let myself be taken I am saving no one; if I smashed the rapist in the head with a rock I could at least save the next victim. I could mount the argument that by responding with my choice to be pacifist I was selfishly not thinking of the next victim?

    And what if it was my daughter? What if I heard a noise in the night and found some man pinning my 10 year old down raping her? Should I tell her to lie back and think of Jesus too? Not call the police who might force him away in handcuffs to face a justice system that will deprive him on his liberty? Not smash him over the head with a frying pan or attack him with a kitchen knife? Because I’ll tell you what, anyone who I found doing that to my daughter would leave my house in a body bag or I would give my life trying.

    Pacifism might sound trendy but it misses the point that while Jesus might have lived a fairly pacifist looking life when he was on earth, Jesus is part of a Trinity and there are other parts of the Trinity that judge, that wage war, that strike down and destroy. Yet another part of the Trinity inspired the writing of  the whole Bible. All three elements of the Trinity’s example must be read together to understand the contexts they fall in and I believe  (more…)

  • Sunday Study R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: 666 The Number of the Beast, I exegeted Revelation 13’s infamous reference to the mark of the beast, in that post I argued that the first beast is a reference to Rome; a world empire, built on seven hills that ruled over all the nations of the earth at the time of John’s writing. The historical context of the book was the emperor cult; the roman state, in the person of the emperor, was considered a god and was to be worshiped. The reference to 666 (616 in some early manuscripts) was probably a Jewish literary technique known as gematria applied to Nero Caesar, who was the sixth roman emperor after the “Five” [who] have fallen”; and hence; is the one “who is.” In its historical and literary context then Revelation 13 was exhorting Christians, who lived during the Neroian persecution, to resist the emperor, to refuse to worship the state as divine and to resist Christian or Jewish religious authorities who encouraged them to do so. To see my full argument for these conclusions, readers should read the linked post above; here I simply want to revisit one important point that occurs in the text;

    And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, and on each head a blasphemous name. The beast I saw resembled a leopard, but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority.(Re 13:1-2)

    The first beast, the roman emperor, is said to get its “power,” “great authority” and “throne” from the dragon. The imagery of the dragon is explained later in Rev 20 as “that ancient serpent, who is the devil, or Satan.” The text then explicitly states that the Roman Empire and the emperor’s authority, was satanic. While space does not allow me a full treatment here, the text goes on to predict the destruction of the Roman Empire and those who support it.

    Why the excursus into apocalyptic literature? Because it is important to put in context another, more well known passage, which is widely quoted; the locus classicus passage on obedience to the state in Romans,

    Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

    The contrast here is important, in both Revelation 13 and Romans 13 we have a reference to the roman emperor. In Romans the emperor’s authority has been established by God and he is a servant (minister) of God, Christians are called to submit, obey and to not resist the state. In Revelations 13 the Roman emperor and empire is said to gain its authority from Satan, is implicitly said to be a minister of Satan and Christians are called to not submit to or obey its demands to absolute obedience and worship.

    The contrast is fairly evidently explained by the different contexts the passages occur in. The book of Romans was written around 55-57 AD; this puts it just after the death of Claudius and during the early part of Nero’s reign. During this time, Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. Revelation 13 is written later, after the great fire of Rome in 64 AD where Nero had transformed into the infamous persecuting, brutal, power-hungry tyrant he is immortalised as.

    Similarly, the specific literary context makes the differences clear. In Romans 13, after commanding Christians to submit to authority, the text goes on to give reasons as to why Christians are to do this, “He [the state] is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience.” The reason we submit out of conscience i.e due to a moral requirement, is because the state is God’s servant and this is explicated as “an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” The context makes this clear when after spelling out that governments are God’s servants the text explicates this as “he [the state] is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” In other words, the government acts as an agent of God in its function of commending good and punishing evil.

    Revelation 13, however, is not talking about the emperor punishing wrongdoing and commending good;

    The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority…. Men worshiped the dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?” The beast was given a mouth to utter proud words and blasphemies and to exercise his authority for forty-two months. He opened his mouth to blaspheme God, and to slander his name and his dwelling place and those who live in heaven. He was given power to make war against the saints and to conquer them. And he was given authority over every tribe, people, language and nation. All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast–all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world. (Rev 13)

    Here the context is quite different; rome is a world empire, which makes war against other nations and through violence gains dominion over every tribe, nation and language. It is a state that demands worship and absolute obedience and which persecutes and murders innocent people. In this context, Christians are called to resist it and its authority is said to be from the dragon.

    This is vitally important because some people apparently misinterpret Romans 13 to support absolute dictatorship. A correspondent of Madeleine’s once wrote the following,

    “Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” To be blunt the above makes me feel sick. I don’t think the Nazi regime, or fascist Italy can be compared to the individualism that occurred in the birth of the United States. How can you hold these in the same regard under the excuse that they’re established by God? The only bromidial, evasive and ludicrous comeback that the victims under those totalitarian regimes got was “its God’s purpose and plan” even if you don’t understand it just have faith and follow Christ.

    Madeleine’s correspondent here interprets Romans 13 to teach that dictatorships and totalitarian regimes are instituted by God and are morally on par with limited governments. He also seemed to think that throughout history Christian theologians have never addressed this issue but have just told people to “have faith and follow Christ” in the face of being governed by dictators and tyrants.

    Apart from the flawed understanding of the history of theology, the author here misunderstands the passage. Romans 13 needs to be read next to Revelation 13. When one does this one sees that the picture is quite different. Romans 13 says that states that use force, “the sword,” to punish the guilty and to defend the innocent act as Gods agents and hence, have legitimate authority which must be respected. Revelation 13 states that when states grossly exceed their mandate like the Nazi unjust conquest of other nations, persecution of the innocent and Hitler’s deification of the state are not exercising a legitimate, God given, authority but rather are portrayed as something satanic.

  • When Did Solving Your Own Problems Become "Unreasonable"?

    What is so “appalling” about tightening your belt and sorting out your own financial mess? Stuff reports:

    Social Development Minister Paula Bennett is tracking down the Work and Income staffer who wrote to beneficiaries telling them to take out loans to cover their debts.
    After being tackled on it in Parliament, Ms Bennett said last night she was “appalled” by the “totally unacceptable” advice …

    So what was that advice? The NBR reports it as:

    * Taking out loans to cover arrears;
    * Pawning cellphone and children’s PlayStation;
    * Ringing debtors to reduce payments or refinance debt; and
    * Seeking budgetary advice.

    Of course spun well the advice becomes ‘go to a loan shark and deprive your children of their toys’ but the letter never said that, despite the headlines and the title of the Labour Party press release.

    I think the advice is pretty reasonable.

    As a family going through a rough financial patch, due to my recent job loss and the need for Matt to retrain this year, we have very quickly run into financial difficulties as our income has significantly dropped.

    The first thing we did was take a good hard look at our budget and asked ourselves what we could live without – cell phone costs were an obvious first choice but there were a lot of other areas too. When too many things hit us in one week we pull out the credit card and then immediately make a plan to pay it off which includes an assessment of what we could sell on Trade Me and what additional things we could all go without until it was sorted.

    We don’t have any HP’s or loans currently, but in the past when we have we have and they have gotten on top of us, we took out a debt consolidation loan and we exercised the other advice above by contacting those we owed money to and seeing what we could sort out.

    None of this is of course easy or pleasant. Sherry is most peeved that we cannot buy her a new pair of jeans until we get a week without any extra costs (and even then it won’t be the brand she wants) and the kids all complain that we now never take them out for hot chocolates or to places you have to pay an entry to get in anymore and that dinner is never takeaways. We are all sick of mince night after night too – though threatening them with lentils shuts them up. It is going to get worse the deeper into the year we go; we have survived it before when we spent Matt’s PhD years living on a $20,000 p/a scholarship in Dunedin so we know what is coming – the lentil threat is not an idle one.

    The case worker wrote the letter in question in the context of having granted the person financial assistance; it wasn’t like the person was refused help. I mean, if you want a handout then I fail to see how you get to complain about getting a how-to-manage-your-money-better lecture.

    Personally I wouldn’t advise anyone to pawn their possessions because the money you get isn’t great and the interest rates are steep but the general idea that you give up some of your less necessary items to get yourself out of the hole is not unreasonable. I am not saying sell the shirt off your back but then neither was the case worker.

    Kids don’t need PlayStations, adults don’t need cellphones. I don’t begrudge anyone on a low income having these items as we don’t know the circumstances they got them in, they may have been gifts, bargains picked up on Trade Me or might have been purchased when the family was financial but you have to be able to recognise them for what they are – luxuries.

    Sheridan knows that if she cannot pay for her horse this year, then she has to sell him as we cannot bail her out. Non-essentials can always be replaced no matter how attached to them we might be.

    Before you put your hand in someone else’s pocket would it really kill you to tighten your own belt first? People not on WINZ benefits do the sorts of things mentioned in the letter off their own bat to sort out their own messes so why shouldn’t those on benefits.

  • Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

    [For the benefit of our international readership: Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand; Pakeha is a term used to describe Caucasian New Zealanders; The Treaty of Waitangi is a significant founding document of our nation over which many historical and current differences have arisen around its role, interpretation and application.]

    Recently I read a document that stated, “This institution seeks to honour the partnership between Pakeha and Maori that is laid down in The Treaty of Waitangi.” I have seen this type of statement numerous times before in the mission statements of many different kinds of New Zealand institutions. I think this claim is nonsense. Below I will argue why.

    At the heart of this kind of statement is the notion that The Treaty of Waitangi (The Treaty) constitutes a partnership between Maori and Pakeha; Maori and Pakeha apparently entered into an agreement which contains mutual obligations.

    The problem with this claim is that only persons can enter into contracts. Persons are either rational self-conscious agents, such as adult human beings or legal persons which are an organisation of rational agents into an institutional structure of some sort. One cannot enter into a contract with concrete objects that are not persons such as rocks or trees; nor can one enter into contracts with abstract objects such as the colour blue. One would have thought this was an obvious point which did not need pointing out.

    ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha,’ however, are not persons. Individual Maori people and individual Pakeha people are persons, and individuals of either race can organise themselves into an institution which will have a legal personhood separate from their own individual personhood, but the racial groups ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha are not persons.

    The term Pakeha is an abstraction, it is simply a reference to an aggregate of individuals who share a particular genetic trait. It is false that everyone who has these genetic traits signed The Treaty. In fact, as The Treaty was signed in 1840, no individual alive today signed The Treaty. It is equally false that simply because someone with the same genetic traits as me at some point in history signed a treaty that it follows that all members of my race signed a treaty.

    What is accurate is to say is that two institutions entered into an agreement, the Crown and various Maori tribes. No Pakeha individual can be identified as the crown and no Maori individual can be identified as a tribal group unless the individuals are acting in an official capacity as the agent of these institutions. Hence, no Maori or Pakeha individual is bound by The Treaty; no individual is responsible or culpable for breeches of The Treaty.

    Someone might object that the Crown being the head of a representative government acts on behalf of all Pakeha and hence, Pakeha can be said to have entered into a partnership via The Treaty. I think this claim is mistaken. It assumes that whenever a government performs an action one can attribute the actions of the government to any and all private citizens of that government.

    This error is precisely the error we condemn when terrorists target a civilian population. When terrorists target non-combatants they assume that because a government has unjustifiably committed aggression against them that it follows that the citizens of that government can be attacked. The principles of non-combatant immunity, however, deny this. If a state engages in aggression then the military personal who act as the state’s agents can be attacked but citizens who are not acting as agents for the state cannot be. They are innocent third parties.

    Maori and Pakeha, therefore, did not enter into a partnership at the time of The Treaty was signed, and private individuals from either race have no obligations to each other under The Treaty. To suggest they do is to commit the error of attributing personhood to racial groups as opposed to individual members of that group. It suggests that the actions of one person who has a particular genetic trait can be attributed to everyone who has that trait. The implication of this is that whenever a Maori gang member commits a crime one could justly claim that ‘Maori’ committed the crime. This is of course racist and would justifiably be condemned in any other context. It should equally be condemned in the context of discussions over The Treaty of Waitangi.

    Of course this is not to say that Pakeha and Maori individuals do not have duties to each other. The normal duties to not steal from each other or vandalise each others property, to refrain from rape and assault, etc still apply. These apply because these are general duties laid down by God. I am not bound to fulfil them because some other person signed a contract with a third party. Moreover these have nothing to do with race. I have a duty to not steal from a Maori individual because I have a duty to not steal from any human being. The duty would hold whether the person in question was Maori, Chinese, Persian or Tongan. The duty has nothing to do with a historical event in 1840.

    Nor are my comments meant to deny that one party to The Treaty was treated unjustly and unfairly by the other. There is probably good historical evidence that they were. My comments simply point out who the parties in question are. They are not Maori and Pakeha. They were the Crown and certain Maori groups.

    By all means let’s have a discussion about what the Crown should do to honour its obligations under The Treaty. I have no problem with the idea that a state should keep its obligations to other states and parties. I have no problem with the idea that government should both protect and respect the property rights of its citizens regardless of their race. I also have no problem with courts demanding the state compensate its victims if it can be proven in a court of law that the state has not done these things – one of the insidious features of the former government was its continual rejection of these principles. But stop suggesting that Maori and Pakeha are “partners” under The Treaty and that they and private individuals have obligations under it. They do not. As Dr Martin Luther King said, individuals should be judged by the content of their character not the colour of their skin.

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership

  • What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined

    When I began university I had strong socialist leanings. The reason was that I believed, as a Christian, we had a duty to help the poor. Studying at Waikato University, however, brought me face to face with socialist academics and left-wing activists and I discovered a hostile and dangerous social agenda that I could not in good conscience embrace.

    That, however, left me with a burning question. What about the poor? If the classical liberal or conservative view is correct. What about the poor?

    In the next two posts I want to discuss my thoughts on this a bit. I will do so by examining Nicholas Wolterstorff’s defence of welfare or sustenance rights. I will argue that, as initially stated, Wolterstorff’s position is subject to three problems. In my second post, What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights, I will suggest that while Wolterstorff’s position can escape these problems, it does so only by qualifying itself in such a way that there is no necessary link between accepting the poor’s right to sustenance and the kind of statist re-distributionary policies favoured by the left

    In, When Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” Wolterstorff suggests further that this conclusion is orthodox Christian teaching. He provides citations from Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Aquinas to substantiate this claim.

    One immediate problem with this line of analysis is it ignores something of the context in which these theologians wrote. They were addressing the situation of alms-giving. A wealthy person living in a small town or village in the Roman Empire would come across destitute people in his community whom would ask for assistance in most cases a wealthy lord would be able to do so. In the age of the mass media, however, things are quite different. It is not just about the poor person down the road; I am regularly bombarded with stories of poverty and suffering of thousands of people all across the globe when I turn on the new or surf the web.

    In this context, to suggest that failure to alleviate any poverty I know about violates the person I fail to help and is analogous to assaulting them is problematic for a couple of reasons.

    First, take my duty (and corresponding right on the part of others) to not assault people. This duty applies 24-7, it is not like I can refrain from assault on Fridays but smash peoples heads in on Sunday. There are 6 billion people in the world, as I have a duty to not assault anyone I owe that duty to all these 6 billion people. Moreover, each one of them holds a right to not be assaulted against me. This is not problematic, because discharging my duty to all 6 billion is not hard, I can do so by refraining from assault.

    Discharging such a duty and its corresponding right, is unproblematic because the duty to not assault is a duty to not do something

    A claim right; a right requiring me to do or give assistance, however, is different. Clearly I cannot give assistance to all 6 billion people in the world at all times. I simply do not have the resources or the ability to do that. Hence, each individual poor person cannot hold a right to assistance against me. At best, I have a duty to help some people, some of the time, with some of my resources.

    A related problem is that unless I live just above the sustenance level and force my family to do the same, and donate every cent I earn above that level to the poor then I will be failing to discharge my duty. Hence, accepting Wolterstorff’s claim would quite literally imply that everyone has a duty to live just above the poverty line. Wealth of any sort is a sin, a conclusion at odds with scripture which commends many wealthy people (like Job and Abraham) as Godly people and not as mass murderers.

    A second problem is the quite oppressive political implications of Wolterstorff’s claim. Given what I have outlined above, if failure to give to a poor person when we can is analogous to assaulting them then every person who does not live just above sustenance level and does not donate everything they own and earn to charity is in fact a serious criminal. A just government would then be required to lock all these people up, their children would end up in foster care and all their property confiscated and given to the poor as restitution. The implications of accepting a right of the sort Wolterstorff affirms is totalitarianism; a system where everyone is poor and anyone else is arrested and detained. The state would be obligated to take almost everything.

    A third problem, which follows on from the first and second, is that if everyone must be self-frozen in their income to just above sustenance level and any falling below it grants one a right to receive what’s needed to get above the sustenance line wouldn’t this destroy all incentives to work or be productive in any shape or form?

    The problems with the idea of ‘sustenance right’ were not lost on Aquinas, whom Wolterstorff interestingly cites. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas addresses the question of whether a destitute person who steals food to avoid starvation has committed theft. Aquinas’s answer is no and he cites with approval the claim of Ambrose of Milan that the poor have a right to sustenance and any property given to those unable to maintain themselves is money they are owed.

    However, Aquinas goes on to offer some important qualifications. First, in the articles prior to this section of the Summa, Aquinas defends the concept of private property and argues that those who claim the private property of others are in sin, further, those who claim we are required to renounce property to be Christians are expounding a heretical doctrine. Second, Aquinas states that;

    Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all
    to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the
    stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of
    those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that
    it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at
    hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no
    other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by
    means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
    properly speaking theft or robbery.

    Aquinas observations are worth noting. Because there are so many in need and I cannot give to all I am not required to give to every needy person I know of. Instead I have a duty to give some of my money to some needy people and it is my choice to decide who. It follows from this observation that giving to the poor is an imperfect duty. Unlike the duty to refrain from assault it is not a duty to be discharged to all people at all times, but rather it is a duty to give some money to some poor people. But it is at the discretion of the property owner to decide who.

    While there is a duty to give to the poor there is not a duty to give to any specific poor individual and hence no individual poor person has a right to my property (although I will be in serious dereliction of duty if I give to no-one).

    Aquinas does provide an exception; what has been called the case of extreme necessity. As Donagan puts it, if a person “encounter[s] another who then and there needs help, which only he can give without disproportionate inconvenience” then such a person has a duty to give it and the other has a right to such help.

    The medieval position Aquinas expounded is well summed up by Donagan in The Theory of Morality. Donagan suggests that all people have a duty of beneficence, “it is impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in and of themselves permissible, in as much as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience.” By promoting the well-being of others, Donagan means things such as [paraphrasing Donagan] promoting the well being and up-bringing of those who are not adults, especially orphans; helping those who have duties, which owing to bereavement, injury, illness or desertion, they can’t perform without help; restoring to a condition of independence those who have been incapacitated with illness, accident, or injury and caring for those who are crippled, deaf, blind, are chronically ill, or senile.

    However, the principle of beneficence is an imperfect duty. No individual poor person has a right to my assistance except in cases of extreme necessity. Donagan draws the appropriate conclusion; apart from cases of extreme necessity,

    Duties of beneficence, seeing they are not owed to specific individuals generate
    no enforceable rights; and apart from duties of beneficence, no innocent
    person has any obligation to contribute to the wellbeing of others, except as he
    may freely undertake.

    Donagan suggests that the duty to benefit the poor is an imperfect duty to pursue a particular end and not based on a right that another may have. While one has a duty to pursue this end, it is at a person’s discretion as to how exactly they would pursue it.

    It would seem then that social polices based on alleged welfare rights of the poor and the authority of the state to coercively uphold such rights are unjust. While we have a duty to aid the well-being of the poor as an end, no poor individual, outside of cases of extreme necessity, has a right to such assistance and hence one cannot justly be forced or required to give any individual such assistance.

    In my next post I will look at how Wolterstorff responds to criticisms of this sort and how he qualifies his position to do so.

  • The Myth of Left Wing Moral Superiority

    Irish Bill at The Standard writes:

    One of the things I like about being left wing is how often the best moral decision is also the best economic decision.

    Take economic stimulus for example. In a recession it’s the most vulnerable such as beneficiaries, low paid workers and youth that are hit worst because they are the ones least likely to have any financial backstop. The good thing is the best way to ameliorate the effects of a recession on society as a whole is to help these people out.

    Irish Bill here insinuates that only left-wingers support giving to the poor and right wingers do not. The problem is that this claim is false. As I pointed out here, evidence suggests that religious conservatives actually give significantly more money to assist poor people than secular liberals do.

    The difference between the left and right is not about whether or not financial assistance should be provided to the poor. Contrary to the false moral superiority (and slander) propagated by left wing activists, the difference is that the left primarily believe in taking other peoples money by threats of violence and giving it to the poor and in practice they give very little of their own money voluntarily. Conservatives, on the other hand, give generously of their own money and take others by force only when as a last resort.

    The Standard can con themselves into thinking that the former is the more moral stance, but I think that is fairly questionable.