Category: Contra Mundum

  • Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith

    Since the 17th century one of the most common sceptical objections to the Christian faith is the claim that belief in God is irrational because his existence has never been successfully proven. For centuries theologians and philosophers have proposed a range of arguments for the existence of God; sceptics not only contend every one of these arguments fail but also that in the absence of such proof it is irrational to believe in God. The sceptic places the burden of proof squarely on the Christian; Anthony Flew’s famous presumption of atheism is a paradigmatic example of this,

    [T]he debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, … the onus of proof must lie upon the theist…What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it is up to the theist: first to introduce and to defend his proposed concept of God; and second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have an application.[1]

    John Mackie makes the same point,

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . it [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.[2]

    Both writers contend that belief in God is rationally acceptable only if there is good evidence for it. In this context it is clear that the word evidence is being used synonymously with the idea of an argument or a proof. Flew talks of a “burden of proof;” if theism cannot be proven in the manner laid down he contends it is irrational. Mackie contends that the “rational consideration” of theism, which means belief in God, depends on the arguments that can be mustered in support of theism, if belief in God cannot be proven by the kind of arguments he suggests then it is irrational.

    One way of responding to this charge is to try and meet Flew’s burden and provide cogent arguments for God’s existence. In this article I will not take that tack, instead I will call into question the assumption that underlies this objection; the objection assumes that it can only be rational to believe in God if there is a good argument for God’s existence. I am not convinced that we should assume this.

    It is important to note that not everything one believes needs to be proven in order for it to be rational for us to reasonably rely on it. I have two reasons in mind; first the claim that everything must be proven in order to be rationally believed leads to a regress problem. Roy Clouser notes,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[3]

    A second problem is that there are many things that we believe quite rationally which cannot be proved such as memory. Consider my belief that I was in Newmarket yesterday. I reflect on what I did yesterday and automatically find myself strongly inclined to accept the belief ‘I was in Newmarket.’ I believe that ‘I was in New Market’ because I remember being there yet I am unable to provide any argument or proof for this claim but for my memory. To prove my memory is reliable is difficult as any argument I might try to use is circular; to prove memory is reliable one has to rely on one’s memory to remember if one’s memory is usually accurate.

    Nevertheless, my belief that I was in Newmarket yesterday is rational. Similar problems arise with the belief that other people have thoughts and feelings, that objects we see actually exist independently of us, etc. We accept such concepts in spite of proof as we understand that not everything needs to be proven; given this, why then does belief in God need to be proven for it to be rational?

    This is not an idle question. The sceptic criticises Christians for believing certain propositions without good arguments for their truth. This criticism rests on certain premises. It is perfectly valid then to ask what arguments the sceptic has for these premises. If the sceptic asserts them without proof then the sceptic’s position is prima facie incoherent. The sceptic claims, without argument, that other people should not believe without argument. If it is acceptable for the sceptic to believe without proof, why then does the Christian need to provide proof in order to be rational?

    Kai Neilsen’s answer is typical;

    All of us can agree, at least for a large range of cases, whether somebody is in pain, whether he’s thinking, feeling anxious or the like. We do in general agree about these things. Only a madman would claim that no one is ever in pain or that no one ever knows that another person is in pain. The same is true for thinking, feeling anxious or sad and the like… Now the situation is very different in religion.[4]

    Neilsen’s point is essentially that religious beliefs are beliefs that not all people believe, whereas belief that other people have thoughts and feelings are beliefs that no sane person would doubt. Behind the seemingly innocuous claim that belief in God is irrational without proof lurks an implicit standard about what counts as a rational belief. A belief is rational only if it is accepted by all sane, intelligent people or it can be proven via some argument from premises that are acknowledged to be true by all sane people. When measured by this standard, all religious beliefs need to be proven by argument if they are to be rationally believed.

    I think something like this picture is behind much religious scepticism. I also think the picture is deeply flawed as it is self-contradictory.

    Take the standard for rational belief implicit in the above quotes and in much scepticism and turn it back on itself: not every one accepts this standard. Many sane, intelligent people reject it; they do not accept that all beliefs not accepted by everyone must be proven. So, if the standard is correct, no one should believe in it until someone offers a proof for its truth, to the best of my knowledge no one has done this, therefore no one can rationally believe in the standard itself.

    If the sceptic tries to escape this quandary he or she can only appeal to premises that are accepted by all sane, intelligent people. If some sane, intelligent people do not accept the premises then we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof, by the sceptic’s own argument. The sceptic’s position eats its own tail.

    There are, I think, two lessons to be learned here. The first is that some sceptics are inconsistent in their scepticism, they reject belief in God on the basis of certain claims or assumptions which, if true, are subject to the very objections and doubts they level against religion yet they do not question or doubt these assumptions. The second is that in any rational discussion one cannot avoid starting from presuppositions which are, in some sense, controversial; one starts with what one knows by faith and reasons from it to gain a comprehensive, coherent and accurate understanding of reality, to find answers to the fundamental and philosophical existential questions that we face. Sometimes our subsequent inquiry leads us to modify, abandon or revise the presuppositions we began with, other times our inquiry confirms it but the idea that every controversial, substantive claim one accepts needs to be proven in order to be rational is incoherent.


    [1] Antony Flew The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton Publishing, 1976) 14-15.
    [2]
    John Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 4-6.
    [3]
    Roy Clouser  Knowing With the Heart (IVP: Downers Grove, 1999) 69.
    [4]
    Kai Neilsen “The Skeptics Reply” in Faith and the Philosophers Ed. John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1964) 274.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the October 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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    Contra Mundum: Abraham and Isaac and the Killing of Innocents
    Contra Mundum: Selling Atheism
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    Contra Mundum: Fairies, Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups & Spaghetti Monsters
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    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
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  • Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?

    The assumption that ‘it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others’ is almost unilaterally accepted in society. Everyone knows this, only zealous religious types seem to believe that it is acceptable to try to foist their morality onto others; the concept of respecting other people’s beliefs seems to be lost on the religious.

    One does not have to look far to see this assumption at work; in the Aotearoa Ethnic Network Journal atheist commentator, Ken Perrott, writes,

    Non-religious people have the right to be free from interference by religious people and organisations, freedom from proselytising, and freedom from imposition of values, morality and practice. I don’t think religious people should see this as in any way violating their rights. If anything, it helps preserve the sacredness of their beliefs –imposition on others degrades a belief.

    Perrott is clear; those with religious beliefs should not demand that others comply with their views on morality. This criticism is not new, we see it regularly in the media and it is equally prevalent in academia. In her book, The Abortion Myth, bio-ethicist Leslie Cannold writes,

    In the United States, the feminist rejection of the moral had a strong connection to the anti-choice religious right’s promotion of itself as the “moral” voice of the Republican movement. The agenda of the Christian right is, to put it rather baldly, to make the Bible (rather than the secular U.S Constitution) the supreme law of the land. The United States religious right, like most religious extremists, believe their political beliefs are actually God’s will. … [Feminism is opposed] to one religious group’s imposition of its rather narrow version of morality on a pluralistic society.

    Cannold states that any appeals to Gods will, as laid down in the Bible, constitute an imposition of moral views onto others. Feminists such as her, she assures us, oppose such things.

    I find the claim, that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others, strange. Despite widespread acceptance to the contrary, I see nothing objectionable in imposing moral beliefs onto others.

    While this comment may strike many as absurd, I assure you it is not for the following reasons. First of all, to claim that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is self-defeating. Second, the contention is subject to serious counter-examples. I’ll explain what I mean.

    If it is wrong to impose one’s beliefs onto others then it follows that one is required to refrain from such impositions; further, any attempt to impose moral beliefs should be prevented. However, this claim is itself a moral belief and as we’ve just established, it is being imposed on others. Therefore the claim is self-defeating, those who defend it are attempting to impose a moral belief about not-imposing moral beliefs onto others.

    As for the counter examples, consider acts such as rape, assault or infanticide. I personally believe each of these practices is wrong for me to engage in. Further, I think it is wrong for others to do these things. In fact, I even support the commission of these acts being considered a crime punishable by the state. I am sure most would agree with me. However, if it were wrong to impose moral beliefs onto others then our position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. We would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape, assault or kill children – to do otherwise would be to impose our moral beliefs onto others.

    Perhaps I am being uncharitable; Perrott and Cannold and others who advocate the claim, do not object to such impositions in an unqualified manner and certainly do not intend to promote anarchy. Their objection is that it is inappropriate to impose certain kinds of moral principles upon others.

    The types of principles Cannold means to catch are those she labels “narrow”. What is meant by this spatial metaphor is unclear; however, I presume she means that this is a minority religious view, held by only a small segment of society.

    Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be advocated as a basis for rules binding on all people is that the majority accepts the principle. However, this majoritarianism modification to the claim that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is equally flawed.

    Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would Cannold contend that in such a society criticism by a Christian-feminist minority of this practice and their advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow religious perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

    The objection to imposing one’s “narrow” moral beliefs onto others is flawed. What is wrong is not the imposition of someone’s values but the imposition of values that are incorrect, irrational, unethical, oppressive or unjust. If the principles expounded are correct and accurately reflect justice then there is nothing wrong with imposing them onto others, even if they are religious beliefs.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the September 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

  • Contra Mundum: A New Column in Investigate Magazine

    MandM have officially joined the ranks of New Zealand blogs with print columns; Kiwiblog’s David Farrar writes for the NBR, Cactus Kate writes for The Dominion Post and now MandM write for Investigate Magazine – you can now get your MandM fix both online and at your magazine stand!

    Pick up this month’s edition of Investigate Magazine, available now, turn to page 28 and you will find it features a new column, Contra Mundum, authored by Matt.

    Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy. September 09’s Contra Mundum is entitled “What’s wrong with imposing your beliefs onto others?” In it Matt cites feminist bio-ethicist, Leslie Cannold, frequent MandM commenter and blogger, atheist scientist Ken Perrott of Open Parachute and argues the case that it is not always wrong to impose religious beliefs onto others.

    Get your copy today or just subscribe so you don’t miss any columns (I should get commission for sales LOL!).