Category: Science and Religion

  • Plantinga & Ruse on Methodological Naturalism & Science Definitions

    Michael Ruse (and many others) contend that science is constrained by methodological naturalism, which is the thesis that that neither the data, for a scientific investigation, nor a scientific theory nor the background beliefs, against which a theory is assessed, can properly refer to or contain supernatural beings or propositions based on revelation. In Darwinism Defended Michael Ruse seems to think science, by the very definition of science, is constrained by methodological naturalism.  He writes,

    Furthermore, even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins. The Creationists believe that the world started miraculously. But miracles lie outside of science, which by definition deals only with the natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law.[1]

    Ruse’s specific target here are creationists who typically contend that the world was created around 6-10 thousand years ago, in 6×24 hour days and that the fossil record is the result of a world-wide flood. However, the definition he offers excludes far more than this specific position. Ruse’s definition entails that any reference to God’s activity is unacceptable in scientific theorising. Any claims such as that the universe was created (in some way or another), that God created the universe ex nihlo, that God sustains the universe, upholds laws of nature God or even theological interpretations of the big bang and the advocacy of theistic evolution would be ruled out as non scientific.

    Moreover, this ruling out is a prori. It is not that scientists have examined whether God exists, that they have gathered evidence showing he does not exist and this has become a settled, peer-reviewed, consensus; science has, in fact, done no such thing. Further, Ruse is clear that his definition would hold even if God does exist and even if there is compelling evidence for his existence. Science would not consider such facts in its theorising; the very rules governing scientific inquiry would rule it out of consideration from the outset. This is because, according to Ruse, science by definition deals only with what is:

    (i) natural;
    (ii) repeatable;
    (iii) law-governed.

    Elsewhere in the same article Ruse defines in more detail what he means by (iii). He states,

    [A]n approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or an other we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.[Emphasis added][2]

    Ruse contends that science only postulates and presupposes objects and properties that are natural, repeatable and governed by laws of nature. He understands these as regularities grounded in some form of necessary succession.

    Plantinga’s critique
    Alvin Plantinga argues that Ruse’s definition of science is mistaken,

    What about the Big Bang: if it turns out to be unrepeatable, must we conclude that it can’t be studied scientifically? And consider the claim that science, by definition, deals only with that which is governed by law—natural law, one supposes. Some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there aren’t any natural laws (but only regularities): if they are right, would it follow that there is nothing at all for science to study?[3]

    Plantinga here suggests that Ruse’s conditions (ii) and (iii) are subject to straightforward counter-examples and that, as such, his definition is mistaken. In Methodological Naturalism Under Fire Ruse responds to both these criticisms. Below I will examine Ruse’s response and argue that it is unsuccessful.

    The Repeatability Requirement
    Turning to (ii), Plantinga notes that on at least one possible cosmological model the big bang is unrepeatable. Despite this studies into the first instant of the big bang are clearly parts of science and would continue to be so even if this model is true and the big bang is unrepeatable. It follows from this that science can study unrepeatable events which renders (ii) false.

    Ruse’s response is two-fold; first Ruse suggests that Plantinga is repeating a common line of argument,

    As a matter of fact, Plantinga here is raising an objection which has often been raised by critics of the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law. His point, as was theirs, is that there are many unique events that science must surely try to cover and under stand, but that given the uniqueness of these events, in some sense this precludes lawful understanding.[4]

    Ruse then goes on to address this common line of argument,

    But, as many critics of the critics have countered, there surely has to be some thing wrong with this argument. Take for in stance the demise of the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous. This was in it self a unique phenomenon and un repeat able; but, uniqueness not with standing, the demise was made up of many factors which can individually be brought beneath lawful under standing. To day, it seems most probable that an asteroid or a comet or some such thing hit the earth. This was no unique phenomenon, nor was the hit ting of the earth by the asteroid or comet such that the normal laws of nature – that is to say Galileo’s laws of motion – could not be applied.[5]

    Ruse’s response misses its target. Ruse construes Plantinga’s objection to be aimed at (iii), “the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law.” This, however, is false. The appeal to the big bang was actually proposed as a counter example to (ii), Ruse’s contention that science deals only with repeatable events. The common line of argument Ruse responds to is not the line of argument Plantinga actually offers.

    Moreover, Ruse’s response fails to address Plantinga’s counter example completely. Plantinga’s counter example was based on big bang cosmology. Instead of showing that his definition can accommodate the big bang, Ruse instead notes that other people (not Plantinga) have offered a different counter-example, the extinction of the dinosaurs, and that this different counter example is unsuccessful. Ruse may well be correct; the extinction of the dinosaurs is not a valid counter-example to (iii) however, Plantinga never said it was. What he said was that the possibility that the big bang is unrepeatable is a counter-example to (ii) and to this line of argument Ruse says nothing.

    Requirement of Being Law-Governed
    Of course Plantinga does offer a response to (iii), the idea that science, by definition, deals only with what is governed by law but his argument against this is very different to an appeal to the extinction of the dinosaurs. Plantinga turns to the issue of being law-governed in the next paragraph and raises quite a different objection to this,

    Consider next the property of being governed by law. The first point, here, would be that the very existence of natural law is controversial; Bas van Fraassen, for example, has given an extended and formidable argument for the conclusion that there are no natural laws. There are regularities, of course, but a regularity is not yet a law; a law is what is supposed to explain and ground a regularity. Furthermore, a law is supposed to hold with some kind of necessity, typically thought to be less stringent than broadly logical necessity, but necessity nonetheless. … So suppose van Fraassen is right and there are no natural laws: would it follow by definition that there isn’t any science? That seems a bit strong.[6]

    Plantinga’s point is that some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there are not any natural laws, there are only regularities. Regardless of whether one agrees with van Frassen or not, even if he is correct it clearly would not follow that science does not exist. This entails that the existence of science does not depend on the existence of laws of nature; hence it is a mistake to define the former in terms of the latter.

    Ruse’s response is as follows,

    Now, whilst I am the last per son to belittle the formidable philosophical powers of Bas van Fraassen – as eminent in the field of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as Plantinga is in the field of the philosophy of religion – what is being extrapolated here is far stronger than van Fraassen or any one else would want (should want) to claim. Certainly there are questions about how one might interpret the necessity of laws: I myself have al lowed that already. But neither van Fraassen, nor any one else is going to deny that there are certain sorts of regularities of some kind and that these are pre -supposed in the activity of science.[7]

    Here Ruse states the existence of science does not presuppose the existence of natural laws, it merely presupposes regularities in nature and this is compatible with the empiricist critiques of laws of nature. The problem is that this explicitly contradicts Ruse’s definition. Ruse states that science deals only with the natural, the repeatable and that which is governed by law. In elucidating this Ruse states that science is “an approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or another we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.” As Ruse defines science then it presupposes more than mere regularities. This position requires that these be necessary in some sense and it is precisely this understanding of laws of nature that empiricists, such as van Fraassen, do criticise.

    Ruse appears to be in a dilemma; if he accepts natural laws as necessary in some sense then his argument is subject to the objection Plantinga raises. Some empiricists reject the existence of laws so understood but even if they are correct it would be erroneous to claim that science did not exist. If Ruse contends that science need only presuppose regularities then his definition is false because his definition states science demands an understanding in terms of a necessity over and above mere regularity. It seems then that Ruse’s definition of science is problematic; if this is the case, attempts to argue for methodological naturalism on the basis of such a definition are unsound.


    [1] Michael Ruse Darwinism Defended (Reading, MA: Addison -Wesley, 1982) 322.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy accessed 8 December 2009.
    [4]
    Michael Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1) 2005 47.
    [5]
    Ibid.
    [6] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism” Perspectives on Science and the Christian Faith 49 (September 1997).
    [7]
    Ruse, above n4, 48.

  • Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth

    A while back I made a passing comment on my blog criticising an advertisement which claimed that, prior to Columbus, the Church taught that the world was flat. In response I received the following email from a high-school student in the US,

    I’ve been studying Christopher Columbus in my history class and my history books say that prior to Columbus everyone did think the world was flat……..I don’t know if it was a mistake in the history book or your mistake…..but anyway….I guess I have some things to learn! God bless ~ Katie

    We have all heard the story behind this. Prior to Columbus, the Church and its theological scholars taught that the world was flat. For this reason they opposed Columbus’ proposed voyage in 1492 as they believed he would sail off the edge of the earth (or that he would prove them wrong and they would lose standing in society). Despite this Columbus sailed anyway and his rejection of the Church’s position was vindicated, he scored a victory for science and reason.

    My correspondent is correct. They do teach this in high school text books. I was taught it at both primary and high-school. In fact, not too long ago Prentice Hall published claims to this effect in their middle school textbook Prentice Hall Earth Science.

    At a philosophy conference at Otago University, shortly after I graduated, I recall one speaker using the example of “medieval flat-earthers” in his paper as an example of an irrational belief. Almost everyone in attendance nodded their heads in agreement; no one contested the historical assumptions implicit in the example. More recently Victoria University ran a slick television campaign stating that in the 14th century most people believed the world was flat. The ad showed a picture of a boat sailing across the sea only to fall over the side of the earth and concluded “It makes you think.”

    You might have gathered from obvious clues like the title and from the way I have set this article up that I dispute the veracity of much of these historical claims. If I state this publicly there are very few settings where this admission does not at least earn me an incredulous stare (as if I were, in fact, asserting that the earth was flat). Invariably some comment follows, “come on Matt, everyone knows this story is true, didn’t you learn this at school? Haven’t you read any history textbooks?”

    It is true that I did learn this story at school and that I have read it in more than one history textbook but because I took the time to research the history of theology when I was at university I know that this story is fiction. It is a slanderous fabrication invented by opponents of Christianity in the 19th century and has been thoroughly debunked by contemporary historians of science.

    The definitive study is undoubtedly that of Jeffrey Burton Russell in Inventing the Flat Earth: Columbus and Modern Historians. Russell summarised his findings, in a paper presented to the 1997 American Scientific Affiliation Conference, as follows,

    [W]ith extraordinary few exceptions no educated person in the history of Western Civilization from the third century B.C. onward believed that the earth was flat. A round earth appears at least as early as the sixth century BC with Pythagoras, who was followed by Aristotle, Euclid, and Aristarchus, among others in observing that the earth was a sphere. Although there were a few dissenters—Leukippos and Demokritos for example–by the time of Eratosthenes (3 c. BC), followed by Crates(2 c. BC), Strabo (3 c. BC), and Ptolemy (first c. AD), the sphericity of the earth was accepted by all educated Greeks and Romans.

    Nor did this situation change with the advent of Christianity. A few—at least two and at most five—early Christian fathers denied the spherically of earth by mistakenly taking passages such as Ps. 104:2-3 as geographical rather than metaphorical statements. On the other side tens of thousands of Christian theologians, poets, artists, and scientists took the spherical view throughout the early, medieval, and modern church. The point is that no educated person believed otherwise.

    Russell traced the story about Columbus and medieval flat-earthers back to the 19th century; it originated in a fictional novel by Washington Irving The Life and Voyages of Christopher Columbus I (1829). Later it was picked up by two influential books, John Draper’s History of the Conflict between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew Dickson White’s book A History of The Warfare Between Science and Theology in Christendom. These books famously used the Columbus story plus many others to defend the thesis that the Church, for centuries, suppressed science and worked to prevent its flourishing; this is known as the conflict thesis.

    These books and the conflict thesis they spawned, are highly influential in popular science and media coverage of theological and scientific issues today despite most historians rejecting them as propaganda. In The Encyclopedia of the History of Science and Religion, Collin Russell notes,

    Draper takes such liberty with history, perpetuating legends as fact that he is rightly avoided today in serious historical study. The same is nearly as true of White, though his prominent apparatus of prolific footnotes may create a misleading impression of meticulous scholarship.

    Steven Shapin wrote in the same vein in The Scientific Revolution,

    In the late Victorian period it was common to write about the “warfare between science and religion” and to presume that the two bodies of culture must always have been in conflict. However, it is a very long time since these attitudes have been held by historians of science.

    Numerous other specialists in the field of the history of science and religion concur that the existence of medieval flat-earthers is a myth. Numbers and Lindberg noted in a journal article, “there was scarcely a Christian scholar of the Middle Ages who did not acknowledge [Earth’s] sphericity and even know its approximate circumference.” In his study of medieval cosmology, God and Reason in the Middle Ages, distinguished historian Edward Grant noted that,

    All medieval students who attended a university knew this. In fact any educated person in the Middle Ages knew the earth was spherical, or of a round shape. Medieval commentators on Aristotle’s “On the Heavens” or in the commentaries on a popular thirteenth century work titled “Treatise on the Sphere” by John of Sacrobosco, usually included a question in which they enquired “whether the whole earth is spherical”. Scholastics answered this question unanimously: The earth is spherical or round. No university trained author ever thought it was flat.

    Draper’s and White’s books remain widely cited despite being debunked as historically inaccurate. In fact, the kinds of textbooks Katie mentioned have been subject to scathing criticism precisely for making the aforementioned claims. Lawrence S. Lerner, a professor in the Department of Physics and Astronomy at California State University who is a member of the panel that wrote the 1990 framework for science education in California’s public schools criticised Pretence Halls history text denouncing it as “ignorant fakery.” In an article entitled “Fake ‘History’ That Is Flatly Wrong,” Lerner described the flat-earth claims as a “popular piece of pseudo historical folklore” he added that it “remains popular today among people who have had little education. These evidently include the people who produce ‘science’ books for Prentice Hall.”

    The historical facts are difficult to dispute. During the, so called, “dark ages” Boethius (480-525) cited a well known and accepted ancient Greek cosmological model that affirmed the sphericity of the earth in the Consolidation of Philosophy. Isidore of Serville (560-636) affirmed a round earth in the Etymologies. Bede (672-735) in The Reckoning of Time taught the earth was round; as did Rabanus Marcus in the ninth century.

    The late middle-ages are no different. Hemannus Contractus (1013-155) measured the circumference of the world. Hildegard of Bingen (1098-1179) taught the world was round as did John of Sacrbosco (1200-1256) and Peire d’Ailly (1350-1420). Dante’s Divine Comedy portrays the earth as a sphere. In the Summa Theologicae Thomas Aquinas wrote,

    The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth.

    Even medieval textbooks taught the world was round. Both the Elucidarium of Honorius Augustodunensis, a twelfth century manual for educating clergy, and On the Sphere of the World, the standard cosmological textbook of medieval universities in the 13th century, taught that the world was round.

    As I have delved into religious history further I have found that this had not been the first or only instance where I was fed false propaganda about Christianity. I could document several other false versions of history; the flat-earth story will suffice for now. As New Zealand blogger Contra Celsum wrote, “the flat earthers are those who think they existed.”

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the December 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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  • Guest Post: Dan Brown’s History of Science

    This guest post was submitted by Dr James Hannam. Dr Hannam is a UK based historian with degrees in physics and history from the Universities of Oxford and London and a PhD in the history of science from the University of Cambridge. He blogs at Quodlibeta.

    The film adaptation of Dan Brown’s Angels and Demons was released this year and, on top of Brown’s new novel, appears to have done a roaring trade. Reports suggest that this is a better effort by director Ron Howard than his The Da Vinci Code, although most critics would feel that making a worse film would have been a stiffer test.

    For those lucky enough to be unfamiliar with the book, Angels and Demons is set in Rome where hunky Harvard symbologist Robert Langdon, played by Tom Hanks, is trying to prevent the Illuminati from detonating an anti-matter bomb.  According to Dan Brown’s alternative view of history, the Illuminati are a secret society of scientists (Copernicus and Galileo were, of course, members) who were persecuted by the Catholic Church.  After a great purge in the seventeenth century, we learn, the society went underground and plotted revenge. For some reason, it has taken them over three hundred years to get their act together.

    The Da Vinci Code launched the literary careers of a whole faculty previously-obscure professors of New Testament Studies. Admittedly, they had good reason for wanting to put the record straight about Brown’s distortions of early Christian history.  This time, it’s historians of science who might be upset by Brown’s misrepresentation. Because his contention that the Catholic Church has spent the last two millennia holding back the advance of science is as wrongheaded as the story that Mrs Jesus retired to the south of France with her kids.

    Of course, it’s not just Dan Brown who believes in the battle between science and religion. While few people think that the Illuminati really were a group of scientists suppressed by the Church, the perception of an eternal conflict between reason and faith is widespread. It’s true that the Church did make a single significant mistake in 1616, when it banned Copernicus’s opinion that the earth orbits the sun. But the subsequent trial of Galileo over the issue had more to do with papal self-esteem than astronomy. And even in this case, the Catholic Church was siding with the scientific consensus of the time. Still, you can’t manufacture an eternal conflict from a single example, so proponents of the hypothesis have had to resort to a different strategy – inventing the evidence.

    For example, in the book of Angels and Demons, Brown alleges that the Church had Copernicus murdered for his heliocentric model. While this is a more extreme allegation, there is a general belief that Copernicus feared persecution for his ideas. It’s widely thought that he refrained from publishing them until he was on his deathbed. In fact, he had circulated a pamphlet outlining his theory decades before he died. This was favourably received by senior churchmen and he was urged to publish by a cardinal. He even dedicated his great book, On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, to the Pope.

    Alas, as long as the likes of Dan Brown sell far more books than historians of science, this is a myth that is unlikely to go away.

    James Hannam’s book God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science is published by Icon. The best price we could find for it from a New Zealand bookseller, with free delivery, was through The Nile Online Bookstore at the above link. International readers can buy it through Amazon. As I have previously stated elsewhere, it would make a good Christmas gift…

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  • Common Historical Myths About the Church

    This post is part update, part recycle.

    Earlier on in this blog’s life, I ran a small series of posts last year on common historical myths about the Church that  are so pervasive in society that most Christians fall for them. Anyway, after receiving some correspondence, I have updated this post, More on the “Dark Ages” and Other Propaganda.

    [I hope I am being mysterious enough to make you want to check it out – especially you Bethyada]

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  • Darwinian Evolution, God and Ockham’s Razor

    In a previous post, Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design, I argued that the contention that Darwinian evolution occurs by chance does not entail that it shows the world was not designed. Once one sees how the concept of chance is defined in evolutionary theory one can see that it does not rule out design.

    It is possible at this stage to argue that evolutionary theory rules out design by appeal to Ockham’s razor. Suppose one grants that chance is used in a limited sense to refer to the fact that, following Sober, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.”[1] Or following Mayr, it means, “that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptation needs of an organism in a given environment.”[2] Suppose that evolution occurring by chance in this sense is well supported by the evidence. One could go on to interpret this theory in at least two ways; one might argue that evolution was in some sense guided by God or that it occurred by chance in a stronger sense that precludes design. Both arguments would be compatible with the empirical evidence. However, the sceptic could argue that the latter is preferable in virtue of the principle of Ockham’s razor, “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”

    The idea is that that the hypothesis of unguided evolution is simpler, more in accord with Ockham’s razor, than the hypothesis that God guided evolution. The former theory explains everything in terms of natural causes without appeal to a supernatural being such as God; hence, to claim God did it is to add an extra entity and is superfluous. Something like this argument is sometimes given by scientists writing in the field. George Gaylord Simpson writes,

    Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors.[3]

    Similarly, Douglas Futuyma states,

    By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.[4]

    In this post I will respond to this appeal to Ockham’s razor and identify two problems with this line of argument. The first is that Ockham’s razor is only one criteria used to adjudicate rival hypotheses; the fact that one hypothesis is preferable on grounds of simplicity does not entail that it is preferable all things considered. There are at least couple of other considerations to take into account.[5]

    One other consideration to bear in mind is which hypothesis is more probable? To answer this question one would need to assess whether the probability that the history of life coming to be by a process of guided evolution is significantly higher than the probability of life coming to be by an evolution of blind chance and it seems to me, on the face of it at least, quite plausible to suggest that the chances of life evolving by chance is significantly lower than its coming about by divine guidance. If this is correct, then while atheistic evolution gives a simpler or more economical explanation of the origin of species it is considerably less probable.

    A further consideration is that Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For naturalistic evolution to be preferable to theistic evolution it would need to be argued that it explains all the data equally as well.[6] The person who proposes the above line of argument, however, does not do this; all he or she does is show that both theories equally explain the history of life on earth. However, the history of life is only one feature of the world that scientists seek to explain. Showing that your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory is a long way from showing that it explains all features as well.

    This is important because one of the arguments theists offer is that God can explain numerous features of the world better, better than theism’s rivals. It has been argued that theism explains the origin of the universe, the continued existence of the contingent universe, the existence of laws of nature, the existence of cosmic fine-tuning, the existence and nature of objective moral duties  and so on. To show that unguided evolution is a better theory then, one would need to show that unguided evolution provides a better explanation of all these phenomena together than theistic evolution does. If it does not then theism explains the history of life equally as well as atheistic naturalism but it also provides a better explanation of various other features of the world, thus it is a better overall theory.

    So even if we grant that unguided evolution conforms to Ockham’s razor better than theistic evolution, it is not at all clear or obvious that this means it is a better theory, all things considered. Theistic evolution may be a significantly more probable theory and have significantly greater explanatory scope and comprehensiveness.

    A second problem with the appeal to Ockham’s razor is that what constitutes a simpler hypothesis in a given context depends on the background information one has about what exists. Plantinga makes this point,

    The theistic noetic structure already, of course, includes the existence of God.  Relative to that noetic structure, therefore, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in the hypothesis of guided evolution.  As an analogy: suppose we land a space ship on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures.  We find something that looks exactly like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations made in the process of shaping and sharpening it.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and fashioned by the inhabitants.  Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter.  He’d be wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking those structures designed. The same would go for evolution; theists already accept divine design, and do not incur additional Ockhamistic cost by way of thinking of evolution as guided.[7]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor in favour of the erosion hypothesis would have “teeth.”  If this argument works at all, it only works if one begins with an agnostic perspective and then postulates “the existence of a divine designer in order to explain the course of evolution.” If, however, one already knows that God exists and rationally believes God and has created the world on other grounds then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of God to explain the evolutionary process.

    Evolutionary theory then might mean that an agnostic has reason for accepting atheistic evolution over theistic evolution as an explanation of the origin of species (I say “might” because the problem of relative probabilities and explanatory comprehensiveness still would need addressing). However, it does not show that those who believe in God, are irrational in doing so, nor does it provide a theist with any rational reason to reject his or her belief.

    Again then, it seems that evolution by itself does not make belief in God untenable. Before it could the objector would first need to show there were no other grounds for believing in God other than the evolution of life on earth. Then he or she would need to show that one could construct a theory that has as much explanatory power as theism and on which the evolution of life by blind chance was not significantly less probable than its occurrence by divine guidance. Only after both these things were done could evolution be used to defeat theism. It is evident, however, that evolutionary theory by itself establishes none of these claims. Whether they are defensible is a substantive philosophical question over and above anything established in contemporary evolutionary theory.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?


    [1] Eliot Sober “Evolution Without Metaphysics” (unpublished).
    [2]
    Ernest Mayr Toward a New Philosophy of Biology; Observations of an Evolutionist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 98.
    [3] George Gaylord Simpson The Meaning of Evolution (Yale University Press, rev ed., 1967) 344-345.
    [4]
    Douglas Futuyma Evolutionary Biology (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Inc, 1986) 2.
    [5]
    Alvin Plantinga
    “Science and Religion: Where Does  the Conflict Really Lie?” (unpublished).
    [7]
    Ibid.

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  • Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design

    In a previous post, God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument, I argued that evolution does not refute the teleological argument. Also, even if it did, a lot more significant philosophical work over and above any appeal to natural selection would be needed to infer from this that theism is rationally untenable. There is, however, a second concern lurking in this area; it is that Darwinian evolution shows that evolution occurs by chance. Chance is incompatible with design; hence, Darwinian evolution shows that biological organisms were not created by God. Del Ratzsch summarises the argument succinctly,

    [I]f it is genuine evolution, then the theory itself demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance … On the other hand, if its genuinely guided [by God], then the process must involve not chance but deliberately designed intervention.[1]

    The argument has two premises,

    [1] If evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance;

    [2] Genuine evolutionary theory demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance.

    I think this argument is mistaken. To be a valid argument, the word “chance” would need to be used the same way in both premises. The kind of chance that is incompatible with creation in [1] would have to be the kind of chance that is part of genuine evolutionary theory in [2].

    Alvin Plantinga has argued that when one examines how the word “chance” is being used in this kind of argument it is evident that the word is not being used the same way in both premises and that when the ambiguity is cleared up the kind of chance that is involved in contemporary evolutionary theory is compatible with the idea that God created human beings.[2]

    Let us turn to the first premise; [1] the claim that if evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance. This statement is true only if chance is defined a certain way, both that its existence is incompatible with the idea that God caused the event to happen (either immediately or indirectly via normal secondary causation) and that God did so intentionally and with purpose. To say then that an event occurs by random chance, on this definition, is to say the event was not caused, intended or planned by God.

    The problem is that if chance is defined this way premise [2] is false; genuine evolutionary theory does not demand that mutations are not caused by chance, when chance is defined in this way. According to Eliot Sober, when the word chance is used in the context of evolutionary theory it means, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.” Ernest Mayr makes a similar point, “When it is said that mutation or variation is random, the statement simply means that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.”

    Defined in the manner of Mayr and Sober, chance is entirely compatible with the idea that evolution is caused, intended or planned by God. The fact that there is, “no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment” and “no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur,” does not mean that the events had no cause and it certainly does not mean that they were not intentionally caused by God.

    To show that evolution occurred by chance, where chance is incompatible with divine design, contemporary biologists would need to show not just that no physical mechanism detects which mutations are beneficial and causes them and it would have to do much more than fail to produce a correlation between the “production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.” It would have to show that there was ultimately no supernatural cause to the process that intended evolution of human life to occur. Contemporary biology has not done this and it is certainly very difficult to see how it could do so without stepping outside the bounds of science, as currently practised, and venturing into controversial areas of philosophy and theology.

    [1] Del Ratzch Battle for Beginnings: Why Neither Side is Winning the Creation Evolution Debate (Downers Grove IL: Intervarsity Press, 1996).
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Evolution and Design” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology ed. James Beilby (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006) 201-217.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?

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    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument

  • Faith and Science Conference Write-Up

    The Challenge Weekly has written an article on the recent Faith and Science Conference I participated in. Apart from the unfortunate title, “Conference fuels controversy” which gives a false impression of the largely collegial atmosphere, the mis-characterisation of certain views as deism and the omission of a mention of Dr Jeff Tallon’s memorable talk it is a reasonable report on the papers given.

    Extracts below:

    CHRISTIAN scientists and theologians expressed their belief at a conference in Auckland recently that they believed in evolution, and that the universe, earth and life were millions of years old. However, they made it clear that evolution did not remove the need for God’s existence. Some of the presenters said they believed God had “intervened” or had more of a hands-on approach at points in evolution, while others held a view more in line with Deism – that God had set up the physical laws (natural law) of the universe and since then let the universe and nature run by itself. Several of the presenters affirmed that humans had descended from a primitive species of ape-like creatures which lived before humans and the present-day ape family.

    These controversial claims were made at a full-day seminar, entitled “Faithful Science” at Northcote Baptist Church, North Shore, on August 1. The event was attended by about 200 people of all ages and featured nine speakers. The conference was run by TANSAA (Theology and the Natural Sciences in Aotearoa Auckland.) Presenters the Rev Dale Campbell of Northcote Baptist Church and the Rev Dr Graham O’Brien who is on the InterChurch Bioethics Council, spoke of how they deal pastorally with people, particularly young people. Many people they said had questions and their own struggles or doubt regarding what to believe about God in relation to creationism, and the theory of evolution.

    Mr Campbell said evolution “loads people down; they are expected to carry problems if they feel they can’t believe in it. “Dealing with evolution-creation conflict can distract people from the main issue of sharing the gospel and doing [God’s work]. There are so many important issues which need to be dealt with by Christians and the Church”. Dr O’Brien said the process of evolution was true as “it scientifically accounts for natural selection, Mendelian inheritance, molecular biology, cosmology and the age of the universe, principles of physics, and geology including plate tectonics”.

    Yael Klangwisa, a lecturer in world-view studies at Laidlaw College, said the stories of creation, Adam and Eve, and the fall in Genesis were symbolic, and tended towards a poetic-style when read in Hebrew. She said it was essential to read Genesis using linguistic and cultural tools and analysis, and in the figurative or metaphoric way it was written, rather than taking or reading it in a literal sense. Dr Graeme Finlay, a senior lecturer in molecular medicine and pathology who gave a message entitled “Just a Glorified Ape?” maintained that humans could be seen genetically to be strongly related to the various species in the ape family such as orangutans and gorillas. Dr Matt Flannagan, an adjunct lecturer at Laidlaw and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute rounded off the seminar with his topic on “Does Evolution make Belief in God Untenable?” Dr Flannagan said “evolution does not, if it’s true, disprove God.” …