Tag: Bethyada

  • Guest Post: One Less God

    Bethyada from True Paradigm writes:

    I have read a few posts on the ‘one less god’ proposition. Stephen F Roberts originally put it,

    “I contend we are both atheists, I just believe in one fewer god than you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.”

    elsewhere he says,

    “We are all atheists, some of us just believe in fewer gods than others.”

    I have read a few responses against this illogical claim.

    Some of us just go one god further

    One retort is to state that Christians do believe in several gods, it is just that the lesser gods are demons and Christians claim allegiance to the true God. Yahweh is not just a local deity (1Ki 20:23) but the true God, creator heaven and earth

    And Hezekiah prayed before the LORD and said: “O LORD, the God of Israel, enthroned above the cherubim, you are the God, you alone, of all the kingdoms of the earth; you have made heaven and earth. (2 Kings 19:15)

    the most high God,

    Abram said to the king of Sodom, “I have lifted my hand to the LORD, God Most High, Possessor of heaven and earth,…” (Genesis 14:22)

    Though there is truth to this, depending a little on how one defines God, I do not think this rebutal gets to the crux of the problem.

    Another response is to state that polytheists believe in gods for different reasons than monotheists believe in God. Polytheists believe X and monotheists believe Y, thus the monotheist’s refutation of X does not refute Y, which the atheist is claiming. In other words, the reason Christians reject other gods is not the same as the reason they accept the Christian God. This is logically true, and hints at the atheist error, but does not get to the heart of it. It is inadequate though because it is not immediately obvious that polytheists and monotheists have significantly different reasons for theism. Romans 1 suggests that there are some basic reasons why all people are theists, but our fallen nature means this may be distorted such that theism becomes polytheism or, as per Romans, animism and pantheism.

    A related response is to state that Christians see polytheism is a distortion of monotheism. As such, removal of the distortion does not remove the argument. The dismissal of the wrong elements of theism is not an argument against theism. This gets closer to the problem.

    The primary problem with the atheist position is that it makes a category error. The following analogy demonstrates this central issue. As such the analogy is useful, but for several reasons I think it is inadequate and could be improved upon. Nevertheless, if it illustrates the problem it is helpful.

    “Let’s say that people are debating the best colour for stop signs. One person may prefer red for stop signs. Another green. Still others think that any colour can be used and no standardisation is necessary, and others promote the use of all colours on every sign.

    The atheist response is like saying you can’t agree on what colour to use because there are in fact no colours. Colours do not exist.”

    Debating colour preference is not the same as debating the existence of colours. Dropping from one god to no gods is not a continuation of the number-of-gods argument, it is a completely different argument.

    Consider the deity set. It is either empty: atheism; or not empty: theism. The argument over the number of members in a non-empty theism set is unrelated to argument about whether or not the set is in fact empty.

    Douglas Wilson put it well in his response to Sam Harris,

    “You say, “Understand that the way you view Islam is precisely the way devote Muslims view Christianity. And it is the way I view all religions.” Well, no, not exactly. And well, actually, no, not at all.

    Suppose we are considering a phenomenon that is, by most accounts, inexplicable by an unsupervised occurrence—three of us attend a sophisticated party uptown, and halfway through the evening at the party we find a trout in the punch bowl. At this point, the three of us divide into three schools of thought. I think that Smith, a practical joker, put it there; our friend Murphy thinks that Jones, the avant-garde performance artist, put it there; and you think that it has simply shown up as the result of natural forces. My central point is not to interact with the truth or falsity of your naturalistic position—except perhaps through the use of this absurd example of the punchbowl—but rather to show that you are arguing for something completely different from what Murphy and I are arguing. We all have an explanation but your explanation is of a different kind altogether.

    The differences between two of us (between Murphy and me) concern who put the trout in the punchbowl. The difference between the both of us together and you iswhether someone put a trout in the punchbowl. And who and whether represent different questions entirely. Quite apart from who is right and who is wrong about this, it is important to note that we are not disagreeing in the same way or over the same kind of issue at all. Murphy and I are disagreeing over the relative behaviours of Smith and Jones, but not over whether the trout calls for an explanation. Maybe I am more hostile to Smith than I ought to be, and maybe Murphy is deeply prejudiced against Jones. Maybe we are both wrong about who put it there. But thinking someone’s explanation is inadequate (when we agree the phenomenon must be explained) is quite different from arguing with someone who says it calls for no outside explanation whatever.” (Letter from a Christian Citizen)

    RELATED POST:
    Selling Atheism

  • Guest Post: Does Tax Exemption for Churches Directly Cost Taxpayers?

    Bethyada of True Paradigm offers us this guest post. I find it interesting because I wrote some thoughts about the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s position on the issue of religious trusts having tax exemption in Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts back in 2008. There I pointed out that humanist trusts that engage in the equivalent of evangelism for humanism are also tax exempt and promoted by the very same organisation. Anyway, Bethyada writes:

    Ken Perrott wrote about several objections he had to religious charities, specifically churches, being tax exempt. This was in response to my thoughts on proposed tax law changes. Initially he made the unlikely (or perhaps hyperbolic) proposal of how to significantly reduce the tax burden,

    Remove the classification of religion as a charity. That is allow charitable tax exemption only for genuine charity. Not for teaching of supernatural dogma.

    Given that most churches make little surplus money, and taxes are on the profits of a company, this revenue stream is going to be very small. Charities are not able to make large amounts of money and spend it as they wish, they must put the money back into the charity’s cause.

    Ken did also raise a related issue about the cost of charities being born by others. Philosophically I have sympathies with the potential issue he identifies; I object to both covering costs for other people that they should cover, and funding groups that promote ideology I disagree with. I can appreciate that an atheist would object to his money being used for Christian evangelism, much in the way that I object to my money being used to promote humanism. However I am not certain that churches are that costly.

    Now tax exemption is not a direct cost, it is a refusal to tax. When Ken was asked what was the cost to him, his initial reply was twofold: religious charities were using publicly financed resources and they have a responsibility to share society’s financial burden. Interestingly Ken was happy to subsidise genuine charities. Interesting in that I am not certain I support the use of government money in supporting any charities, religious or non-religious.

    Ken’s more detailed response can be read here. He covers several areas. His complaint is

    1. Religious organisations can get charity status and tax exemption but science, reason, or atheist organisations cannot register as charities;
    2. Churches do not pay rates, thus these services are covered by other people;
    3. Individuals can manipulate the system to their benefit;
    4. Charities offer fringe benefits;
    5. Charities have an unfair commercial advantage;
    6. Some religious people are morally corrupt; and
    7. Forced tithing has been important to the survival of the church.

    I think the main issue is around item 2, but I will briefly address the others.

    Item 1 is untrue. About 15% of the more than 25,000 charities in New Zealand are religious in nature. The criteria for charities are

    • the relief of poverty
    • the advancement of education
    • the advancement of religion
    • any other matters that are beneficial to the community.

    There are plenty of charities in New Zealand that are involved in scientific research. Schools can be charities. Neither is tax exemption restricted to charities: some sports groups have tax exemption and some of them can also request charity status.

    Item 3 is not unique to charities. Trusts can be misused, and some companies shift profit around the world to minimise tax. Simplifying tax law and minimising tax take are more likely to counter this problem.

    Item 4 is irrelevant. Companies do this too. Individuals can allow people to stay with them and not charge board, though other people may have to. This is an issue of envy, not justice.

    Item 5 could be a problem if true. It would need to be confirmed. Claims by business of unfair advantage may be an attempt to gain their own advantage, not necessarily because there is a legitimate unfair advantage. Offering my free services to any company, charity or not, is not an unfair commercial advantage, I am allowed to do what I want with my time.

    Item 6 is true, but completely irrelevant.

    Item 7 is irrelevant to New Zealand. It is more an issue in Europe. And I agree, forced tithing with money compulsory collected by the government and forwarded to the relevant church should not be compulsory based on your stated religion/ denomination. Preferably it should not be collected by the state at all. Some church organisations may struggle if this occurred, but that is not necessarily a bad thing.

    Returning to the main issue, item 2: churches getting services that are paid for by others. This includes services that local and national government supply, the first via rates, the latter via taxes. Ken argues,

    Churches, religious organisations, trusts, etc., are not paying their fare share of social costs – streets, rubbish, defense, health, emergency services, fire service, etc. Everything our taxes/rates are used for. The fair share my secular science and reasons organisation would have to pay.

    Now I think that many of these things should be funded by the people using them. Rubbish does not need to be run by council, nor does water supply, or sewage. However the system is that these things are provided by council currently. So I agree that it is reasonable for the charities to pay towards these things, but let’s review specifics.

    The costs should only be those that relate directly to the organisation and its property, not the people in it. This is because the individuals who are paid by the charity pay their own tax at the normal rates. So health costs for a person who works for a charity are contributed to from his personal tax. The organisation does not have any health costs. Conversely, if a church calls the police about vandalism to their property, then they are using this service as an organisation. So fire, police, water, sewage, rubbish are real costs incurred by the charity which if not paid by the charity are then covered by others. Health, defence, social welfare, retirement, education, are not costs that a church incurs and are covered by the individual tax of its workers. I have left off roading as it is mixed, though on balance is a minimal cost, and almost certainly covered by fuel taxes.

    Charities do pay rates. Yes it is reduced to a nominal amount and may not cover the full cost of amenities, but they contribute toward it.

    Charities can claim sales tax, but if they hold an event that they charge for they have to pay sales tax.

    So the legitimate costs of charities associated with their tax exempt status are small. These categories (such as water) are not significant costs to government.

    But how much do religious charities save government? The amount of food, counselling, shelter given to people in- and outside the church is enormous. It would easily dwarf any savings they make from not having to pay their contribution to say policing, and probably decreases policing costs indirectly.

    Not that I think churches shouldn’t pay for water and rubbish. Ideally these would not be managed by the council anyway, and then everyone including the church would have to pay private providers who could choose whether or not they wished to discount charities. And everyone would pay the true cost, and likely pay much less. But the situation is that the direct costs of religious charities to the state is minor, and completely offset by the savings they provide.

    RELATED POST:
    Equality or Hegemony: NZARH and Religious Trusts

  • Guest Sunday Study: Moral Perspectives on Lying

    Bethyada explores the morality of lying. (This guest post is part of open mic week(s))

    There are a range of Christian theories on the moral acceptability of lying.

    The issues around lying seem difficult to fully categorise in English. The problem is a lack of simple words to express subtle differences in meaning. To illustrate this note that the concept of lying can be considered analogous to killing. With killing we have sub-terms such as murder, manslaughter, and capital punishment. We also recognise killing in a variety of situations such as warfare and self-defence. The debate about the morality of types of killing is more transparent because we agree on meaning, even if we disagree or the moral acceptability of them.

    Whereas “lying” merely means distorting the truth irrespective of the circumstances. There are terms such as deception, falsification, untruthfulness, but these are basically synonymous. There are situational terms though, such as perjury.

    So is falsehood a single conceptual category? I have long thought it meaningful that the 9th commandment is not, “You shall not lie,” but rather, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.” I have previously distinguished between reality and what one perceives as reality stating that affirming a false belief is not lying. I have also made the distinction between voluntary and forced disclosure of information which I wish to expand on here.

    The moral debate is that either:

    • lying (or specific types or lying) is objectively wrong, that is, various forms of absolutism; or
    • lying is not intrinsically wrong (for all people), (though it may be preferable to avoid in certain situations for other reasons), that is, forms of subjectivism.

    Christianity claims that morality has its source in the moral law giver, thus it views the morality of truth telling as objective: the same rules for all people at all times. Here are particular forms of such absolutism.

    1. Unqualified Absolutism

    Lying is always wrong. People should never lie ever. No matter what the situation or consequences.

    Doug Beaumont explains such unqualified absolutism.

    Unqualified Absolutism is based on the idea that most moral actions are intrinsically right or wrong, and because sin is always avoidable there can be no actual moral conflict. Given a choice between telling the truth or lying to avoid a murder, for example, one must choose telling the truth for in that instance it is not the one speaking, but the murderer who is sinning. In that case it is better to permit sin than to commit it. This view states that moral “oughts” are viable regardless of their consequences, for any moral philosophy that has exceptions results in relativism. Moral law is based on God’s unchanging nature, therefore moral law itself is unchanging. Logically, if an act is intrinsically evil, it cannot become good because of a changing situation. Finally, God can always provide a third alternative to sinful actions.

    This is how many people view lying. It is a somewhat reasonable but it lacks depth. Exceptions to rules don’t intrinsically mean relativism. True, exceptions can be special pleading or hypocrisy, but they may be legitimate (eg. age based rules). And as I note below, unqualified absolutism may conflate intrinsically different actions.

    2. Conflicting Absolutism

    Lying is wrong, but it needs to be considered within the situation. If lying conflicts with another moral commandment then one must do obey the higher moral. But lying, while required, is still sinful.

    Such a position acknowledges that we have moral conflict (at least in this age). I think this is an improvement as it notes that as bad as lying may be, it may not be the greatest evil (though lying is a bigger evil than many acknowledge). This position encourages people to do good and love their neighbour.

    It fails in that it suggests at times all options a man may have involve sin. However if we wish to do right, Scripture suggests we are able to do so (thru God). Further, how much less are we to blame when others have placed us in a dilemma, rather than our own prior choices.

    3. Graded Absolutism

    Lying is wrong unless it conflicts with a higher moral commandment. Obeying the higher moral by lying is not wrong or sinful.

    This resolves the dilemma or not being able to make a right choice. It affirms moral conflict, but it claims that the choice to do the better is good. And not sinful if a greater good is being done. There may be some support from Jesus’ words to the Pharisees. It discussing tithing garden herbs Jesus states

    “But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God. These you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.”

    While one could claim that tithing herbs and doing justice are morally equal—Jesus does say not to neglect the former—the context would suggest that doing justice is a higher moral command. Apologists for unqualified absolutism could argue Jesus commands they do both, but there is no conflict between moral obligations set up here, so unqualified absolutism cannot be proven from the passage. I am merely illustrating that moral commands are graded.

    It is important to note that this is not arguing that the end justifies the means. Yes, the end is considered, but for the sake of doing good, not for preferred result. Doing good may have unpleasant consequences.

    4. Libertarian Absolutism

    Lying is wrong if one is voluntarily giving information. One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information. I am responsible for my actions, not yours.

    This has the advantage over graded absolutism in that it recognises that voluntary information and compelled information are categorically different. It is somewhat analogous to saying that predatory killing is sinful but self-defensive killing is not.

    Interestingly Jesus’ words may shed some light on our understanding here.

    After this Jesus went about in Galilee. He would not go about in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him. Now the Jews’ Feast of Booths was at hand. So his brothers said to him, “Leave here and go to Judea, that your disciples also may see the works you are doing. For no one works in secret if he seeks to be known openly. If you do these things, show yourself to the world.” For not even his brothers believed in him. Jesus said to them, “My time has not yet come, but your time is always here. The world cannot hate you, but it hates me because I testify about it that its works are evil. You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, for my time has not yet fully come.” After saying this, he remained in Galilee.

    But after his brothers had gone up to the feast, then he also went up, not publicly but in private. The Jews were looking for him at the feast, and saying, “Where is he?” And there was much muttering about him among the people. While some said, “He is a good man,” others said, “No, he is leading the people astray.” Yet for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him.

    About the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and began teaching. (John 7, emphasis added)

    Jesus said he wasn’t going but then he did. This implies that Jesus’ answer was not true. In fact some manuscripts say, “I am not yet going up to this feast.” Which would seem to make Jesus’ answer more honest. Looking at the passage it is clear Jesus wished to go without others initially knowing he was there. He is asked if he is going, however Jesus does not wish to tell this person. Being evasive may be construed as a yes. Jesus says that he is not going to this feast. Within the libertarian absolutism view a request is made of Jesus to divulge information he does not wish to give and he is at liberty to answer in a way that does not divulge same information.

    This position is distinct from graded absolutism in that one is not weighing up morality in conflict. The distinction is in will for informing.

    Although one could think nothing one hears in conversation is reliable, the solution is listen to what people wish to tell you.

    5. Authoritative Absolutism

    Non aggressive version

    • Lying is wrong in non-aggressive situations. Self-defence against an aggressor allows for lying. Authorities are owed the truth.

    Libertarian version

    • One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information unless being compelled by a legitimate authority.

    Authoritative absolutism states the voluntary information must be true as per libertarian absolutism, or that all information must be true unless facing an aggressor. It states that, in general, compelled information does not need to be true though there can be variation on what is meant by compulsion.

    But this position does allow an appropriate authority to force information (whereas strict libertarian absolutism would not). A person following libertarian absolutism would allow one to lie in court if he did not wish to divulge the truth. Non-aggressive absolutism would mean that it is eumoral (morally good) to tell the truth in legitimate courts and immoral to withhold it. Note the caveat: obeying a lesser authority is not required if that means disobeying a higher one. Obeying a policeman, a ruler, or a court is necessary even unjust ones, or in unpleasant circumstances; unless doing so compromises a higher earthly ruler or God.

    Conclusion

    People may argue for the legitimacy of any of these options within Christian theology. Unless one recognises that the concept of lying may include more than one category, graded absolutism is as far as one can advance and this seems to be the best approach. However the knowledge of a permissible sub-categorisation based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing allows for more nuanced views.

    Moral perspectives on lying




    There are a range of Christian theories on the moral acceptability of lying.

    The issues around lying seem difficult to fully categorise in English. The problem is a lack of simple words to express subtle differences in meaning. To illustrate this note that the concept of lying can be considered analogous to killing. With killing we have sub-terms such as murder, manslaughter, and capital punishment. We also recognise killing in a variety of situations such as warfare and self-defence. The debate about the morality of types of killing is more transparent because we agree on meaning, even if we disagree or the moral acceptability of them.

    Whereas “lying” merely means distorting the truth irrespective of the circumstances. There are terms such as deception, falsification, untruthfulness, but these are basically synonymous. There are situational terms though, such as perjury.

    So is falsehood a single conceptual category? I have long thought it meaningful that the 9th commandment is not, “You shall not lie,” but rather, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbour.” I have previously distinguished between reality and what one perceives as reality stating that affirming a false belief is not lying. I have also made the distinction between voluntary and forced disclosure of information which I wish to expand on here.

    The moral debate is that either:

    • lying (or specific types or lying) is objectively wrong, that is, various forms of absolutism; or
    • lying is not intrinsically wrong (for all people), (though it may be preferable to avoid in certain situations for other reasons), that is, forms of subjectivism.

    Christianity claims that morality has its source in the moral law giver, thus it views the morality of truth telling as objective: the same rules for all people at all times. Here are particular forms of such absolutism.

    1. Unqualified Absolutism

    Lying is always wrong. People should never lie ever. No matter what the situation or consequences.

    Doug Beaumont explains such unqualified absolutism.

    Unqualified Absolutism is based on the idea that most moral actions are intrinsically right or wrong, and because sin is always avoidable there can be no actual moral conflict. Given a choice between telling the truth or lying to avoid a murder, for example, one must choose telling the truth for in that instance it is not the one speaking, but the murderer who is sinning. In that case it is better to permit sin than to commit it. This view states that moral “oughts” are viable regardless of their consequences, for any moral philosophy that has exceptions results in relativism. Moral law is based on God’s unchanging nature, therefore moral law itself is unchanging. Logically, if an act is intrinsically evil, it cannot become good because of a changing situation. Finally, God can always provide a third alternative to sinful actions.

    This is how many people view lying. It is a somewhat reasonable but it lacks depth. Exceptions to rules don’t intrinsically mean relativism. True, exceptions can be special pleading or hypocrisy, but they may be legitimate (eg. age based rules). And as I note below, unqualified absolutism may conflate intrinsically different actions.

    2. Conflicting absolutism

    Lying is wrong, but it needs to be considered within the situation. If lying conflicts with another moral commandment then one must do obey the higher moral. But lying, while required, is still sinful.

    Such a position acknowledges that we have moral conflict (at least in this age). I think this is an improvement as it notes that as bad as lying may be, it may not be the greatest evil (though lying is a bigger evil than many acknowledge). This position encourages people to do good and love their neighbour.

    It fails in that it suggests at times all options a man may have involve sin. However if we wish to do right, Scripture suggests we are able to do so (thru God). Further, how much less are we to blame when others have placed us in a dilemma, rather than our own prior choices.

    3. Graded absolutism

    Lying is wrong unless it conflicts with a higher moral commandment. Obeying the higher moral by lying is not wrong or sinful.

    This resolves the dilemma or not being able to make a right choice. It affirms moral conflict, but it claims that the choice to do the better is good. And not sinful if a greater good is being done. There may be some support from Jesus’ words to the Pharisees. It discussing tithing garden herbs Jesus states

    “But woe to you Pharisees! For you tithe mint and rue and every herb, and neglect justice and the love of God. These you ought to have done, without neglecting the others.”

    While one could claim that tithing herbs and doing justice are morally equal—Jesus does say not to neglect the former—the context would suggest that doing justice is a higher moral command. Apologists for unqualified absolutism could argue Jesus commands they do both, but there is no conflict between moral obligations set up here, so unqualified absolutism cannot be proven from the passage. I am merely illustrating that moral commands are graded.

    It is important to note that this is not arguing that the end justifies the means. Yes, the end is considered, but for the sake of doing good, not for preferred result. Doing good may have unpleasant consequences.

    4. Libertarian absolutism

    Lying is wrong if one is voluntarily giving information. One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information. I am responsible for my actions, not yours.

    This has the advantage over graded absolutism in that it recognises that voluntary information and compelled information are categorically different. It is somewhat analogous to saying that predatory killing is sinful but self-defensive killing is not.

    Interestingly Jesus’ words may shed some light on our understanding here.

    After this Jesus went about in Galilee. He would not go about in Judea, because the Jews were seeking to kill him. Now the Jews’ Feast of Booths was at hand. So his brothers said to him, “Leave here and go to Judea, that your disciples also may see the works you are doing. For no one works in secret if he seeks to be known openly. If you do these things, show yourself to the world.” For not even his brothers believed in him. Jesus said to them, “My time has not yet come, but your time is always here. The world cannot hate you, but it hates me because I testify about it that its works are evil. You go up to the feast. I am not going up to this feast, for my time has not yet fully come.” After saying this, he remained in Galilee.

    But after his brothers had gone up to the feast, then he also went up, not publicly but in private. The Jews were looking for him at the feast, and saying, “Where is he?” And there was much muttering about him among the people. While some said, “He is a good man,” others said, “No, he is leading the people astray.” Yet for fear of the Jews no one spoke openly of him.

    About the middle of the feast Jesus went up into the temple and began teaching. (John 7, emphasis added)

    Jesus said he wasn’t going but then he did. This implies that Jesus’ answer was not true. In fact some manuscripts say, “I am not yet going up to this feast.” Which would seem to make Jesus’ answer more honest. Looking at the passage it is clear Jesus wished to go without others initially knowing he was there. He is asked if he is going, however Jesus does not wish to tell this person. Being evasive may be construed as a yes. Jesus says that he is not going to this feast. Within the libertarian absolutism view a request is made of Jesus to divulge information he does not wish to give and he is at liberty to answer in a way that does not divulge same information.

    This position is distinct from graded absolutism in that one is not weighing up morality in conflict. The distinction is in will for informing.

    Although one could think nothing one hears in conversation is reliable, the solution is listen to what people wish to tell you.

    5. Authoritative absolutism

    Non aggressive version

    • Lying is wrong in non-aggressive situations. Self-defence against an aggressor allows for lying. Authorities are owed the truth.

    Libertarian version

    • One need not tell the truth if one is being compelled to divulge information unless being compelled by a legitimate authority.

    Authoritative absolutism states the voluntary information must be true as per libertarian absolutism, or that all information must be true unless facing an aggressor. It states that, in general, compelled information does not need to be true though there can be variation on what is meant by compulsion.

    But this position does allow an appropriate authority to force information (whereas strict libertarian absolutism would not). A person following libertarian absolutism would allow one to lie in court if he did not wish to divulge the truth. Non-aggressive absolutism would mean that it is eumoral (morally good) to tell the truth in legitimate courts and immoral to withhold it. Note the caveat: obeying a lesser authority is not required if that means disobeying a higher one. Obeying a policeman, a ruler, or a court is necessary even unjust ones, or in unpleasant circumstances; unless doing so compromises a higher earthly ruler or God.

    Conclusion

    People may argue for the legitimacy of any of these options within Christian theology. Unless one recognises that the concept of lying may include more than one category, graded absolutism is as far as one can advance and this seems to be the best approach. However the knowledge of a permissible sub-categorisation based on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary knowledge sharing allows for more nuanced views.

  • Mentionables

    Flat out busy as the end of semester approaches and deadlines and exams loom we thought we’d link to some blog posts we’ve recently found interesting rather than actually write anything ourselves:

    Wintery Knight has a video for which his blog post title sums up the content: MUST-SEE: Megyn Kelly of Fox News exposes the truth about ACORN

    Cactus Kate has posted one of the more sensible yet moving blog posts we’ve read on the Samoa Tsunami: It’s A Long Way Back – Alofa Samoa

    Bethyada posts a timely quote from Cicero: Random quote

    The Prosblogion’s account of a recent conference at the University of Notre Dame where leading theistic philosophers and leading sceptics discussed hard texts from the Old Testament and their relationship to theistic belief: Thoughts from the Notre Dame conference, “My Ways Are Not Your Ways”

    Kiwiblog has an excellent piece on Voluntary Student Membership responding to Jacinda Arden’s account of what happened at Waikato University when membership of the campus students association briefly ceased being compulsory. Given that Matt and I were President and Vice-President respectively of the then voluntary Waikato Students Union and helped to make it voluntary, we are very glad to see that the facts are being put straight faster than the left can invent new fantasies on blogs other than our own: Fisking Jacinda