Tag: Francis Beckwith

  • Fallacy Friday: Ad Misericordiam (Appeal to Pity)

    This week I will look at the ad misericordiam fallacy, the fallacy of appealing to pity. Perhaps the best example I have come across is one used by my friend Francis Beckwith; In his book Politically Correct Death: Answering Arguments for Abortion Rights, Beckwith cites the following letter to the editor:

    Dear Sir:  As a mother of nine children I would like to speak out about the draft everyone is talking about. I am one that is very much against it. I lost a husband in Korea and if they draft from age 18 to 26 I stand to loose four sons and one daughter.  As a mother in poor health, I don’t think I could take that.  Why can’t [The President] leave well enough alone and try and find our boys missing or being held some place?  Mrs L T

    The fallacy in this letter is not difficult to spot; it is an argument that appeals to pity. The question is whether a law which would draft adults of a particular age into the military is just. To show it is not just one would need to offer arguments which appeal to facts and correct moral principles for this conclusion. The writer has not done this; instead Mrs LT has simply pointed out she is against the draft, she is a widow in poor health and if all of her children were drafted, sent to a war and killed she would not cope. Because decent humans are empathetic when we read a letter like this, we feel pity for the woman and sympathise with her, this sympathy is then mistakenly transferred to what she has said so that we accept her conclusion. Despite the fact no real reasons for accepting it were offered.

    To grasp the fallacy here consider a situation where a mother’s adult children had all conspired to commit a horrific crime and were about to be incarcerated. The fact that the mother is a widow, in ill health and would find it very emotionally difficult to cope with her children “going away” does not provide grounds for thinking it is unjust for her adult children to go be incarcerated. To establish that it would be unjust if they were incarcerated we would need some reasons for thinking either that the children were innocent or that the sentence was disproportionate or excessively degrading.

    The appeal to pity attempts to enlist support for a particular conclusion by getting people to sympathise with or pity the plight of the person making the argument rather than seeing the cogency of their argument. In this way it is a bit like the ad hominem fallacy. Just as the ad hominem fallacy seeks to persuade by using psychological or emotional transference which fools the hearer into transferring  disapproval of a person onto the person’s arguments or their conclusion, appeals to pity seek to fool the hearer to transfer their feelings of sympathy and empathy for a person onto that person’s argument or conclusion.

    Examples
    Appeals to pity are a text-book fallacies yet it is surprising where you find them – even professional philosophers offer them. When I did my first course in Ethics at the University of Waikato as an undergraduate, we studied different moral issues and read articles from both sides of the debate on each issue. When it came to the issue of homosexuality, (more…)

  • Understanding the Abortion Debate with Francis Beckwith

    Those who have been following Matt’s series Abortion and the Morality of Feticide might enjoy this video featuring Francis Beckwith of Baylor University’s Philosophy faculty speaking to the Summit Ministries Interns on the topic “Understanding the Abortion Debate“. Beckwith is arguably one of best contemporary philosophers writing from the pro-life position. He is a clear and entertaining speaker who can break his work down into a form that anyone can follow.

    In this talk Beckwith poses the question, who and what are we? He goes on to discuss current bio-ethical issues such as cloning and stem cell research as well as the nature of the fetus. He also critiques common arguments for abortion.

    Click to View "Understanding the Abortion Debate"

     

  • Abortion and the Morality of Feticide: Part I

    Is it morally permissible to commit feticide? The abortion debate swirls around this question, a lot of rhetoric, emotion and anger gets spent on debating this question or avoiding it.

    In this series I will examine this question. First I will sketch an argument against feticide: the killing of a fetus. Then I will examine three common ways of criticising this argument and respond to them.

    The Argument Against Feticide

    Implicit, if not overtly explicit, in much historic Christian moral reflection on feticide is a simple three-premise position. Firstly, that there is a divine law prohibiting homicide – the killing of a human being without adequate justification; secondly, a fetus is a human being; and thirdly, that in all or most cases of feticide, justification for homicide is not forthcoming. This argument can be summarised as follows:

    [1] It is wrong to kill a human being without justification;

    [2] A fetus is a human being;

    [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.

    This argument is formally valid. These three premises jointly entail that feticide is wrong; premises [1] and [2] entail that it is wrong to kill a fetus without justification, this conclusion, conjoined with [3], entails that feticide is wrong in at least the majority of cases. Given the argument is formally valid, any critique of this argument must call into question the truth of either of the premises. [For more on validity see Assessing Arguments]

    Avoidance Tactics
    FetusNotwithstanding this, the most common response to this argument is some tactic seeking avoidance of the issue. It is not unusual to see attempts to denounce, insult, caricature or defame the character of those who oppose feticide. If current commentary is to be believed opposition to legal abortion comes from misogynist fundamentalist fanatics who want to impose their religious mores onto others.

    Of course, these strings of pejorative terms fail to address the argument above. Suppose everything that is said of such people is true – people who oppose feticide do have the bad character traits or motives claimed – the soundness of the argument remains untouched. A good argument does not cease to be a good argument just because someone has personal flaws or dubious motives. It is only unsound if (more…)

  • In Atlanta

    I have a few snaps of Matt in Atlanta, this first one had our kids excited when they saw it [which should tell you everything you need to know about just how much Matt is a fan of Dr Alvin Plantinga – LOL!]

    Alvin Plantinga, Matt and Rodney Lake
    Alvin Plantinga, Matt and Rodney Lake

    Fellow kiwi Rodney Lake of Thinking Matters Tauranga, also in Atlanta attending the conferences, took the above photo and wrote on Facebook of it:

    Tonight I met and chatted with simply the greatest collection of Christian thinkers the world has to offer – hands down – without a doubt – the best! You couldn’t put together a better bunch in the same room than this. There were others, but the ones I got to talk to included: Alvin Plantinga, William Lane Craig, Mike Licona, JP Moreland, Paul Copan, Craig Hazen, Frank Beckwith, Mary-Jo Sharp and of course Matthew Flannagan. Also earlier in the day shook hands with Gary Habermas and Greg Koukl. A day to remember…

    Rodney has been doing a tour around the US over the last few weeks of the various Apologetics ministries and has been meeting up with various biblical scholars and Christian philosophers. You can read about what he has been up to and who he’s been trying to talk into coming out to New Zealand on his blog.

    Jim West snapped this one, Matt the kid in the candy shop – surrounded by the worlds best in his field and their books!

    Jim West snaps Matt at the EPS

    Jim has been quite the tourist, he’s been snapping everyone and everything by the looks of his homepage.

    I just talked to Matt on Skype – we are so grateful to the kind and generous people who donated us Skype equipment – he said it is quite surreal to be wandering around, sitting in seminars and recognising all these philosophers and theologians whose works he has read and admired all around him. He said the conversations following each session are very stimulating; everyone understands the topics, it is a lot like being at a Philosophy department seminar, only everyone is coming from a Christian perspective – which is something Matt is just not used to but is really appreciating. He said that MandM is clearly more widely read than either of us realised as plenty of people recognised him and complete strangers asked after me, commented on our blog and so on. The internet clearly makes the world a small place! Anyway he is having a blast and is doing great.

  • Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2

    In my previous post, Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1, I argued that liberals who support the non-initiation of force principle can support abortion only on two grounds;

    (a) the fetus is a person but its existence inside the mother without her consent constitutes a form aggression, and hence, the mother’s action of killing it is defensive; or,
    (b) a fetus is not a person.

    I will now address each of these in turn.

    Is the Fetus an Aggressor?
    Consider first (a), the contention that a fetus can be considered an aggressor because it is intruding upon a woman’s body without her consent; an intrusion grave enough to justify the use of lethal force. In this respect then, being subject to an unplanned pregnancy would be on par with being the recipient of a serious assault such as being raped or severely beaten.

    Frank Beckwith and Steve Thomas in Consent, Sex and the Pre-Natal Rapist, have demonstrated several problems with this claim. It leads to the conclusion that, in certain circumstances abortion is justified without the consent of the woman.

    Consider the following scenario. A young woman is involved in a car accident and is rendered unconscious by her injuries. She is brought to a hospital where, still comatose, she is examined by a doctor. While performing some tests, the doctor determines that the woman has been pregnant for several weeks. Furthermore, suppose that evidence comes to light to suggest that the woman is unaware of her pregnancy, perhaps her close friends know nothing of the pregnancy, her diary shows no knowledge of being pregnant, and so on.

    Adopting McDonagh’s understanding of pregnancy as morally equivalent to rape or assault, what is the doctor’s obligation to this unconscious patient? It would seem that, under these conditions, the doctor is morally required to perform an abortion to rid his patient of the ‘massive intrusion’ being imposed upon her by her unborn offspring. After regaining consciousness, the woman would have to be told that she’s undergone an abortion for a pregnancy of which she was not aware, for there was good evidence that no consent had been given and that she was under assault.[i]

    Beckwith’s point is that if the fetus is morally or legally on par with an aggressor who intrudes upon a woman’s body without her consent, such as a assailant or rapist then it would follow that in the case sketched above the doctor would be justified (and arguably would have an obligation) to abort despite the fact that no consent from the women had been obtained.

    Consider, that if one saw a person having sex with an unconscious woman and one knew the woman had not consented, it would be absurd to wait for the woman to wake up to see if she wanted to consent to sex. One would be obligated to intervene. “[T]he doctor in the midst of the situation, aware of the pregnancy in the absence of consent, must see it as the rape-in-progress of his unconscious patient. How could he do anything else but end the assault?”[ii]

    Now I assume that liberals would oppose the idea that any woman who both does not know she is pregnant and is unconscious should be subjected to an abortion without her consent. If this is the case then it is clear that they do not think that an unconsented to pregnancy constitutes an act of serious aggression.

    If the fetus is an unjust aggressor then liberals are committed to coercive abortions. If coercive abortions are not liberal then the fetus is not an unjust aggressor.

    Is the Fetus a Person?
    If the fetus is not an unjust aggressor then a liberal defense of abortion must be based upon (b), the idea that a fetus is not a person, a being that possesses the rights to life, liberty and property that liberals believe the state exists to protect.

    Now a fetus is clearly a human organism. After 14 days at least, it is an individual living being that is a member of the species homo sapiens. To justify abortion via (b), the liberal needs to tell us what property a human being possesses that grounds the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed. Further a liberal must also be able to plausibly maintain that a human organism does not acquire this property until after the fetal stage.

    Peter Cresswell takes the view,

    [T]he foetus is not yet a human being, but a part of a human being – the mother – who has rights over it. To be an actual, rather than merely potential, human being is, among other things, to be physically separate, which a foetus is not.

    This claim is erroneous. First the “parts of” relationship is transitive; if a brick is part of a wall and the wall part of a house then the brick is part of the house. If a fetus is part of a woman’s body it follows then that any organ that is part of the fetus will be part of the mother. A woman pregnant at eight weeks then possesses four arms, four legs and two brains. If the fetus is male, she will have both a vagina and a penis and be both male and female. Conclusions that are even more bizarre follow if the woman is pregnant with twins. She could have three faces, three brains, six arms, two penises and a vagina, three hearts, six kidneys and so on.[iv]

    Moreover, PC’s contention that “to be an actual human” one must be “physically separate” entails that conjoined twins are not human. Consider conjoined twins Bob and Scott. If Bob is a human being then since Scott cannot live independently of Bob, Scott must not be a human person (the converse is equally true).

    Yet it is difficult to see what property Bob has that Scott lacks which would justify considering one of them human and the other not simply because neither is dependant of the other. It appears then, that one would be forced to conclude that they both are and are not, human. Perhaps PC is simply giving a poorly worded defence of the viability criteria, which I have previously critiqued here.

    However, the usual liberal response is to ground the right to not be subjected to the initiation of force, to not be killed, in certain psychological capacities that human beings typically display; such things as sentience, rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, etc.

    Despite the pervasive appeal of this approach, it faces serious problems. Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the amount of brain development an organism has face a dilemma. “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”[v]

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of abortion who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks or more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[vi] Suppose, then, one takes the first horn and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”[vii] Suppose, then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future;”[viii] Boonin notes that this will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.”[ix]

    A couple of examples will illustrate this. Suppose the liberal appeals to sentience, the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. This criterion will mean abortion is permissible up to 24 weeks.[x] The problem is that this criterion also catches cats, dogs, cows, and chickens as well all. All of which are as sentient if not more sentient than new born infants and post-24 week fetuses.

    If the liberal draws the line at sentience, he/she will have to hold that farming, butchers shops, McDonald’s restaurants, Kentucky fried Chicken restaurants all engage in unjustified aggression against people because they kill sentient beings without their consent. Further, to remain consistent, the liberal will have to maintain a policy of outlawing all these industries and prosecuting those who engage in them for murder and cannibalism.

    Suppose the liberal appeals to more advanced psychological states such as self-awareness, rationality or autonomy. Such accounts of the grounding of rights will exclude the animals mentioned above and will exclude human fetuses. The problem is, according to this account, newborn infants are not persons either.

    In a definitive study of infanticide, Michael Tooley compiles an impressive array of neurological and physiological data that demonstrates that infants are not persons in this sense until some time after birth.[xi] The price of this line of inference is the reduction of newborn infants to the ethical level of cows. A newborn cow, and certainly a mature cow, is more person-like than an infant is. It is difficult to understand by this view why killing and eating infants is any more problematic than consuming a Big Mac.

    Of course the liberal can avoid this by claiming that it is the potential to acquire properties such as rationality, self-awareness, autonomy, not their actuality that matters. This will enable one to claim infants are protected by the non-initiation of force principle and will exclude animals. But the problem of course is that foetuses will also be protected by the non-initiation of force principle because fetuses also have the potential to possess these properties.

    In summation, liberal proponents of the non-initiation of force principle can only support abortion if they are willing to be inconsistent and arbitrary in their application of the principle or if they are willing to endorse not just infanticide but the eating of newborn infants or state mandated vegetarianism or coercive abortions. These policies are an anathema to most liberals; as such, abortion is not liberal.

    UPDATE: In response to comments below see Sentience Part 1 and Sentience Part 2.

    [i] Francis J. Beckwith & Stephen Thomas, “Consent, Sex, and the Prenatal Rapist; A Brief Reply to McDonagh’s Suggested Revision of Roe v Wade,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 17: 3 (2003): 4.
    [ii] Ibid, 6.
    [iii] Peter Creswell, “Not PC: Cue Card Libertarianism – Abortion”.
    [iv] Here I am influenced by Peter Kreeft, The Unaborted Socrates (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983), 45-47 and Francis J Beckwith, Politically Correct Death, 124.
    [v] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 125.
    [vi] Ibid, 121.
    [vii] Ibid.
    [viii] Ibid.
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] It is generally accepted that sentience occurs around 24 week’s gestation. There is some dispute over this and some scientists date sentience in the first 10 weeks of gestation.
    [xi] Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.