Tag: John Locke

  • The Theological Foundations of the Enlightenment Philosophers

    In my previous post, Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I, I criticised a recent post by James Valliant. I plan to put Part II of this critique online later this week (after Madeleine is clear of her exam on Tuesday to edit it). Here, I simply want to pick up on and further substantiate a point I made in Part I.

    On the SOLO discussion board, where Valliant’s article was originally posted and where I have posted some of my Part I response, Lindsay Perigo has dismissed my claims (notably without citing a single source) as “revisionist history.” I doubt very much anything I say will dissuade Perigo but for those like him, who react to this questioning of popular mythology with disbelief and scepticism, I ask them to compare the following enlightenment arguments for freedom of religion with some earlier patristic ones.

    Originally, Valliant argued,

    No, it was the horrible institution of Christian persecution, century after century, which inspired sensitive minds to first consider the idea of freedom of conscience, and, again, only with a good deal of philosophical help from those ancient, pagan sources, from Aristotle to Cicero — and from natural law to the experience of the Spartacus slave rebellion…. These are not to be found in the Bible, either. And, if they had been there, in any way, then why was this never noticed by the Councils, saints and theologians who piously taught what they thought was good Biblical policy, century after century after century?

    In response, I argued that, in fact, the defences of religious tolerance, proposed by enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Pierre Bayle and James Madison were often repetitions of the arguments offered by early Christian theologians such as Lactantius and Tertullian. Further, these pro-freedom of conscience arguments had been known to and given by Christian theologians for over a thousand years.

    These facts suggest it is mistaken to say that the idea of freedom of conscience was “first considered” after hundreds of years of Christian persecution and was developed from Pagan, as opposed to earlier Christian, sources.

    Turning to the enlightenment philosophers, let’s begin with James Madison,

    That religion or the duty we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, being under the direction of reason and conviction only, not violence or compulsion, all men are equally entitled to the full and free exercise of it accord[in]g to the dictates of conscience; and therefore that no man or class of men ought, on account of religion to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges, nor subjected to any penalties or disabilities.[1]

    Madison argues that true worship is based on conviction and therefore has to be voluntary; it is incompatible with coercion. His argument is not new, several Enlightenment defenders of freedom of religion made the same point. Below are two prominent examples. The first is John Locke,

    The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things.[2]

    The second is Pierre Bayle,

    It is evident then that the only legitimate way of inspiring religion is by producing in the soul certain judgments and certain movements of the will in relation to God. Now since threats, prisons, fines, exile, beatings, torture, and generally whatever is comprehended under the literal signification of compelling, are incapable of forming in the soul those judgments of the will in respect to God which constitute the essence of religion, it is evident that this is a mistaken way of establishing a religion and, consequently, that Jesus Christ has not commanded it.[3]

    Now compare these arguments with the following three examples from prominent, pre-Enlightenment, Christian Theologians.

    First, Aquinas, a 13th century theologian, discussed whether one should tolerate non-believers. In his discussion he summarised the following argument for an affirmative answer, which he attributed Augustine of Hippo, another theologian, who lived in the 5th century,

    Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.[4]

    Second, Lactantius, a 4th century theologian,

    I should wish to know, when they compel men to sacrifice against their will, what reasoning they have with themselves, or to whom they make that offering. If it is made to the gods, that is not worship, nor an acceptable sacrifice, which is made by those who are displeasing to them, which is extorted by injury, which is enforced by pain….These things may indeed be said with justice. But who will hear, when men of furious and unbridled spirit think that their authority is diminished if there is any freedom in the affairs of men? But it is religion alone in which freedom has placed its dwelling. For it is a matter which is voluntary above all others, nor can necessity be imposed upon any, so as to worship that which he does not wish to worship. Some one may perhaps pretend, he cannot wish it. In short, some, through fear of torments, or overcome by tortures, have assented to detestable sacrifices: they never do that voluntarily which they did from necessity;[5]

    And finally Tertullian a 2nd century theologian

    It is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man’s religion neither harms nor helps another man. It is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion— to which free-will and not force should lead us— the sacrificial victims even being required of a willing mind. You will render no real service to your gods by compelling us to sacrifice. For they can have no desire of offerings from the unwilling.[6]

    Comparing these texts, it is, I think, fairly evident that Madison, Locke and Bayle repeated the same line of argument one finds in Aquinas (Augustine), Lactantius and Tertullian. Their arguments had been formulated and known and accepted for over a thousand years before the Enlightenment.

    So Randians remain free to make claims that no Christian thinkers supported freedom of religion until after the Enlightenment and that the Enlightenment thinkers did not get their ideas from Christian thinkers if they wish but supported examples, like the above, show that this is mistaken. This is not revisionist history (at least, not on my part). I would simply call it checking sources and comparing them.


    [1] James Madison Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments.
    [2] John Locke A Letter Concerning Toleration.
    [3] Pierre Bayle Pierre Bayle’s Philosophical Commentary trans AG Tannenbaum (New York: Peter Lang, 1686) 31.
    [4] Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologicae II II q. 8, obj 3.
    [5] Lactantius Epitome of the Divine Institutes 53, 54.
    [6] Tertullian To Scapula Ch 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part I
    Freedom, Science and Christianity: A Response to James Valliant Part II
    The Theology of the Declaration of Independence

  • Sunday Study: Slavery, John Locke and the Bible

    It is often affirmed, as an incontestable and obvious truth, that the Bible supports slavery. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites Leviticus 25:44 as evidence of this charge in “Why Traditional Theism is not an Adequate Foundation for Morality.”[1] Although Armstrong is not the alone in making this claim, I think the charge is mistaken; the Bible does not support slavery.

    This claim was refuted by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Civil Government, one of the founding texts of contemporary liberal political theory. Locke was a famous English philosopher, less known is that Locke was also the author of several commentaries on scripture and the First Treatise of Civil Government was essentially a class argument from scripture against the divine right of kings. In the Second Treatise, Locke argued that the law of nature, which for Locke is the law of God, forbids a person selling themselves or another into slavery.[2]

    In response to the line of argument Armstrong cites, Locke responded with

    I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other nations, that men did sell themselves; but, it is plain, this was only to drudgery, not to slavery: for, it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power: for the master could not have power to kill him, at any time, whom, at a certain time, he was obliged to let go free out of his service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life, that he could not, at pleasure, so much as maim him, but the loss of an eye, or tooth, set him free, Exod. xxi.[3]

    Locke’s argument here is as follows,

    [1] If a person is a slave then that person is “under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases.”[4]
    [2] The institution referred to in scripture that people could sell themselves into, was not one where they were “under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power.”

    The conclusion Locke draws from [1] and [2] is that the institution scripture refers to is not slavery. Locke’s response here is interesting and fundamentally correct. Here I want to simply elaborate on it in more detail so I will address each premise in turn.

    What is Slavery?
    Central to Locke’s argument is his definition of slavery and understanding of what makes slavery wrong. Locke understands the state of slavery as,

    [1] If a person is a slave then that person is “under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he pleases.”

    Rodney Stark utilises a similar definition,

    A slave is a human being who, in the eyes of the law and custom, is the possession, or chattel, of another human being or of a small group of human beings. Ownership of slaves entails absolute control, including the right to punish (often including the right to kill), to direct behaviour, and to transfer ownership.[5]

    The Oxford Dictionary gives a similar definition; a slave is defined as a “person who is the legal property of another or others and is bound to absolute obedience, human chattel.”[6] Timothy Keller notes correctly that the English word ‘slave’ carries connotations of new-world slavery as it was practiced in the British Empire, made infamous in the antebellum southern states of the US.[7] It is this paradigm that critics of scripture tend to allude to. John Loftus, for example, cites an eyewitness description of antebellum practices and then links it slavery in the Bible,

    He took her into the kitchen, and stripped her from neck to waist. He made her get upon the stool, and he tied her hands to a hook in the joist. After rolling up his sleeves, he commenced to lay on the heavy cow skin, and soon the warm, red blood came dripping to the floor … No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed to move his iron heart from its bloody purpose. The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing the blood clotted cowskin.
    Why didn’t the Christian God ever explicitly and clearly condemn slavery?[8]

    In the British Empire and in many US states, slavery was governed under the Code of Barbados. This code was explicitly racist and described Africans as “heathenish, brutish, and an uncertaine, dangerous kinde of people.”[9] It allowed owners to use, “unlimited force to compel labor without penalty even if this resulted in maiming or death;”[10] It denied slaves due process rights, allowed owners to, in effect, kill their slave for any cause, forbade slaves from marrying and effectively, prevented owners from setting their slaves free.[11] Keller writes that, “The African slave trade was begun and resourced through kidnapping.”[12] Stark notes that “20 to 40 percent of slaves died while being transported to the coast, another 3-10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and about 12 to 16 percent boarded on ships died during the voyage.”[13]

    Does the Old Testament Approve of Slavery?
    Armstrong argues that “the bible contains some horrible passages about slavery;”[14] to substantiate this he cites from the English Standard Version, “as for your male and female slaves whom you may have: you may buy male and female slaves from among the nations around you.” (Lev 25:44) [15]

    The ESV here uses the English word ‘slavery’ to translate the Hebrew word ebed. An important initial observation is that ebed is the noun form of the verb abad which means ‘to work’ or ‘to serve.’ Ebed does not have the same semantic range as the contemporary word ‘slave;’ Freedman notes,

    The word ebed however, denoted not only actual slaves occupied in production or in the household but also persons in subordinate positions (mainly subordinate with regard to the king and his higher officials). Thus the term ebed is sometimes translated as “servant.” Besides, the term was used as a sign of servility in reference to oneself when addressing persons of higher rank.[16]

    Locke suggests that an examination of The Torah’s references to an ebed shows that, in fact, it is not the equivalent of what in English language and culture is referred to with the word ‘slave.’ I noted above that Locke’s second premise was,

    [2] The institution referred to in scripture that people could sell themselves into, was not one where they were “under an absolute, arbitrary, despotical power.”

    I will give four examples to demonstrate why I think Locke is correct.

    First, an ebed was not acquired by kidnapping; kidnapping a human being and selling them as a slave was a capital offence in The Torah (Ex 21:16). Moreover, slave trading is implicitly condemned in the book of Revelation (Rev 18:13) and explicitly condemned by Paul as contrary to the law and sound doctrine (1 Tim 1:9-10). An ebed is used in The Torah to refer to a person who offers to work for another, free of charge, in exchange for a debt being cancelled. During service the ebed worked for and served another, lived in that person’s house and probably received free food and board.

    Second, the institution was not based on racist notions that ebed were of an inferior race. In fact, the opposite is affirmed. In the book of Job we read,

    If I have rejected the cause of my male or female slaves [Hebrew: ebed amah] when they brought a complaint against me; what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make them? And did not one fashion us in the womb? (Job 31:13-15

    Here Job refers to an ebed as having a right to go to court and sue their “owner” in pursuit of their rights. Job bases this on the idea that both he and his ebed are equal; both are created by God.

    Third, as Locke notes, an ebed was not the property of another so that they could dispose of them as they saw fit. To deliberately kill an ebed is a capital offence (Ex 21:20-21). Similarly, it was illegal to strike an ebed (Ex 21:26-27). This latter point is often denied on the basis of Exodus 21:20-21,

    If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.

    Some interpret this passage to mean that because a slave is the property of another they can severely beat the slave and providing the beating is not fatal, there is no punishment. This fails to deal adequately with the context and the Hebrew text; the word translated as ‘property’ here is actually ‘silver’ (a reference to money) and the word translated ‘punishment’ here is not the usual word for punishment. Christopher Wright notes that the word implies “the shedding of the blood of the master of the slave”[17] and so refers to capital punishment. It is used in direct contrast with the same word in the previous verse where it is stated that deliberately killing an ebed is to be avenged. Therefore it does not say the person will not be punished for beating a slave, it says he will not be executed for it unless he kills the slave. For further evidence that the passage is not a licence to beat, a couple of verses later even causing a minor injury on an ebed, such as a bruise, is explicitly condemned.

    The same contrast occurs in the passage immediately preceding where a free man who struck and killed another was to be “held responsible” but not if the person survives. It is clear from v 19, however, that the person was in fact to be punished; hence, again, the ‘held responsible’ is referring only to being held responsible for murder and is not speaking to the lesser charges. What Ex 21:20-21 says then, is that if a person deliberately kills their ebed then they are to be held responsible for murder and executed. If the slave if the slave “gets up after a day or two,” they are not to be held responsible for murder because the ebed is their “silver.”

    This makes sense when a few verses later, in Ex 21:26-27, striking a slave is explicitly prohibited and the legal punishment is for the ebed to go free. In The Torah, the penalty for assault was for the assailant to provide monetary compensation to the victim.[18] This would create a quandary in this case as an ebed is in a position of servitude because he or she is in debt to the person they work for. In such a case the assailant would owe money to a person who owes him money. The Torah resolves the issue by declaring that even a trivial strike (such as the causing a bruise 21:25) resulted in an immediate cancelation of the ebed’s entire debt, which would often result in a financial loss to the assailant.

    Third, unlike new world slavery which was life long and where, under the Barbados code, emancipation was effectively prohibited, an ebed could not be held in service for more than six years (Exodus 21:2).[19] Upon release, their employer was morally required to give them sufficient resources for them to be set up on their own feet (Deut 15:12-18) and the community left resources for them to live on for a year (Ex 23:10-11, Lev 25:2-7). In fact, The Torah encouraged people to prevent family members from becoming an ebed by paying their debts for them (Lev 25:48). Paul, after writing to the Corinthians and encouraging them to “retain the place in life that the Lord assigned,” encourages slaves to purchase their freedom and not to remain in this position (1 Cor 7:21-22).

    Finally, if an ebed fled from an oppressive employer it was illegal to return him or her to “his master,” instead he or she was to live, “wherever he likes and in whatever town he chooses” (Deut 23:15-16). It was forbidden to send him or her back to his owner. This law stood in stark contrast the Ancient Near Eastern legal customs of the day.[20] The code of Hammurabi, for example, proscribed the death penalty for receiving a runaway slave.[21] In the antebellum south, the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 required the return of run-away slaves at penalty of law.

    It seems then that Locke’s response is fundamentally correct. While it is true that many English translations of the bible use the word slavery to translate the word ebed it is mistaken to see the two institutions as the same. Slavery refers to the state of being the property or chattel of another; regardless of what connotations various words in English translations have, the institution referred to in scripture did not permit, condone or allow this.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 101-116.
    [2] John Locke Second Treatise on Civil Government Ch IV.
    [3] Ibid, sec 24.
    [4] Ibid, sec 23.
    [5] Rodney Stark For the Glory of God: How Monotheism led to Reformations, Science, Witch-hunts and the end of Slavery (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) 292.
    [6] The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon University Press, 1974 ) 5th Edition, 1199.
    [7] Timothy Keller Reasons for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (New York: Dutton books) 110.
    [8] John Loftus Why I Became an Atheist: A Former Preacher Rejects Christianity (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008) 231. Many thanks to Dean Mischewski for gifting us a copy of Loftus’s book.
    [9] Stark For the Glory of God: 312-313.
    [10] Ibid, 313.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] Keller Reasons for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism 111.
    [13] Stark For the Glory of God: 303.
    [14] Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 110.
    [15] Armstrong omits to mention the previous passage which forbids any Israelite taking another Israelite as a ‘slave’ on the grounds that they are a “slave of God” whom God has redeemed. Paul applies the same teaching to Christians in 1 Corinthians 7:23 prohibiting Christians from being sold as ‘slaves.’ This teaching led many early and medieval theologians to forbid the enslavement of Christians resulting in slavery all but disappearing from Christian Europe in the early Middle Ages; Stark documents this in For the Glory of God: 329-330.
    [16] D N Freedman Anchor Bible Dictionary (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,1992).
    [17] Christopher Wright God’s People in Gods Land: Family, Land and Property in the Old Testament (Grand Rapids Mi: Paternoster Press, 1990) 242.
    [18] See Exodus 21:19.
    [19] There is an apparent discrepancy between Exodus 21:1-6 and the release laws of Leviticus 25:39-43; Christopher Wright in God’s People in Gods Land: 253, noted that the law in Exodus 21:6 refers to Hebrew slaves. Wright notes that in its original context the word ibri designated a social class, not an ethnic group. This was the class of people who did not own land, who survived by hiring themselves out to land owners. Lev 25, on the other hand, deals with an Israelite landowner who has been forced into poverty by mortgaging his land and then selling himself and his family into the service of another land owner.
    [20] Wright God’s People in Gods Land: 249.
    [21] Code of Hammurabi 16.

    LINKS TO THIS POST:
    John W. Loftus Nitpickers Have Started to Attack
    Glenn Peoples Skeptics and the annoyance of the little things…. like facts.
    John W. Loftus Madeleine Flannagan is Happy to be Treated as Women Were in the Bible!
    Wintery Knight Does the Bible condone slavery?


  • Democracy and Legitimacy

    The founding statement of liberal political theory, John Locke’s Two Treaties of Civil Government, opens with the following statement:

    Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin.

    Locke states his purpose in writing is to defend a military coup. Locke goes on to argue that a government derives its powers from the consent of the government for the purpose of protecting the rights of its citizens. Specifically a citizen’s right to life, liberty and property. He argues that if a government turns against these rights the people can justly overthrow it.

    The US declaration of independence reiterates this claim.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from
    the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

    Two of the founding documents for liberal democracy maintain that a government can be legitimately overthrown if it uses its powers to infringe, as opposed to protect, the rights of its citizens. In some instances, the military have a duty to do this; often the military have sworn duty to defend the rights of its citizens with force. If the government begins to threaten these rights then this duty means the military have a duty to resist the government with force. This is not some crackpot, novel idea, it is part of our liberal heritage, it is also incidentally part of our Christian heritage. Aquinas argued in a similar vein, as did numerous Puritan writers such as Mornay, Rutherford, Milton, Buchanan.

    I say this because at 7:30 PM tonight on Campbell live a military coup was announced in Fiji. The immediate reaction from every commentator I saw was one of disgust because a democratically elected government had been overthrown. Now I am not saying I agree with the coup, I am quite willing to concede that the Military are acting unjustly. However, the mere fact that the government of Fiji was democratically elected does not mean its wrong to over throw them with a coup. If the government uses its power to punish the guilty with proportionate and humane punishments and they defend the rights of the innocent against aggression then I agree it is unjust to over throw them. But if the government of Fiji has used its power to deprive innocent people of there rights and to acquit those guilty of crimes then in certain circumstances the military are within their rights in staging a coup. The fact that the government was lawfully elected is irrelevant.

    When commentators in the media claim that a coup is wrong because the government is elected. They are in essence promoting the tyranny of the majority. They are suggesting that we have a duty of unqualified obedience to any leader which 51% of our peers support on election day, regardless of what this government does or orders us to do. They are deifying the majority and placing a democratic government in the place of God.

    A state’s legitimacy depends on what it does, not on how many people support it or how popular it is the year of an election. If upholds the law of God and the rights this law confers upon us it is worthy of support. If it turns against these, it is not. God and God alone is the only person worthy of unqualified obedience.