Tag: John Locke

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part two)

    In my last post, I explained the position of Theological Utilitarianism as expounded in William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I pointed out The Principles was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this post, I want to look at the influence Theological Utilitarianism had in the 18th and 19th centuries. Was Paley expounding some novel idiosyncratic position? Or was he simply repeating a fairly mainstream position on the relationship between Gods law and happiness which had been around for decades?

    1. The influence of Theological Utilitarianism in the 18thand 19th centuries

    Theological Utilitarianism sounds novel to contemporary ears. But it wasn’t an innovative position in the late eighteenth century. Paley notes in the preface that he is a “compiler” of earlier writers of moral theory. Schneewind, states that the theory he proposed was in fact “an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. “[1] Some trace theological utilitarianism back to the divine command theory of John Locke[2]  However, the earliest clear exponent of this position appears to be George Berkeley’s sermons in 1712.[3]

    It is worth looking at Berkeley in some detail.  According to Berkeley, things are “denominated good or evil” as “they are fitted to augment or impair our own Happiness” Good or Evil. On the other hand, “Moral Goodness” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God.” Berkley articulates the relationship between moral and non-moral goodness as follows:

    For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legislator, in order to attain the paleyKnowledge of God’s Laws, we ought first to enquire what that end is, which he designs should be carried on by human Actions. God is a Being of Infinite Goodness. it is plain the end he proposes is Good. But God enjoying in himself all possible Perfection, it follows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelligences or reasonable Creatures: The end therefore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodness, which consisting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such Laws, and Law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore itself or general design of Providence is not determined or limited by any Respect of Persons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God designs should be procured by the concurring Actions of each individual. Having thus discover’d the great end, to which all Moral Obligations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are necessary for the obtaining that End.[4]

    When Berkeley says God is  infinitely good, he like Samuel Clarke seems to mean that God  has “an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness.”[5] [6] God’s goal in issuing the commands he does is the happiness, impartially considered of all human beings.

    Berkeley proceeds to note two ways that God could promote this happiness. One would be “without the injunction of any certain universal Rules of Morality, to to oblige “every one upon each particular Occasion, to consult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him shall seem in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it.”  The second is  “by enjoining the Observation of some determinate, established Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind” Berkeley argues that “”there lie several strong Objections.” Berkeley then anticipates the “self-effacing” objection to act utilitarianism arguing that anyone committed to promoting the happiness of others wouldn’t promulgate act utilitarianism as a decision procedure. Public endorsement and acceptance of the rule “do whatever maximises utility” would probably not maximise utility. Consequently, Berkeley concludes that God has followed the second method.

    Stephen Darwall suggests that the best way to interpret Berkeley is to distinguish between his meta-ethical theory and normative theory. His meta-ethical theory attempts “to answer metaphysical questions of what goodness and rightness themselves, respectively, are.” On the other hand, his normative theory “concerns what actions or things are good and right.” Meta-ethically Berkeley is a divine command theorist “moral goodness consists” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God”. However, Berkeley’s normative theory was rule-utilitarian, God commands “Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind”.[7]

    A position very similar to Berkeley is hinted at in Butler’s writings[8] but is expounded more clearly in the writings of, John Gay [9] John Brown, and Abraham Tucker.   It’s clear that Paley clearly draws upon this earlier tradition.  In the preface to The Principles Paley acknowledges that he is attempting to compile and articulate the positions of John Gay, and Abraham Tucker. Book II chapter 1 of The Principles proposes a line of argument that closely resembles the argument of John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”.

    Similarly, Paley’s emphasis on rules is, as we saw, found in Berkeley’s Passive obedience and performs the same function. Berkeley’s initial advancement of this distinction and advocacy of rule utilitarianism was part of a broader argument to argue against violent resistance to the state during the Jacobite agitation in Ireland. He was concerned that people were advocating the violation of certain negative rules of the law of nature such as: “do not commit adultery”, “do not steal”, “don’t rebel against the government”, whenever they perceived doing so would further the public good. Paley uses the distinction for similar purposes, to respond to the objection that utilitarianism allows people to break with impunity moral rules against theft and murder whenever they perceive it will make people happy.

    In fact, the proximate source for Paley’s stress on rules appears to be Abraham Tucker. Tucker. Wrote

      As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he [the moralist] will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way.  These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of the summum bonum before described.  (Original emphasis)[10]

    Similarly, Paley’s argument that God wills the happiness of his creatures and so the commands God issues must be coextensive with promoting the happiness is ubiquitous in the tradition that preceded him. This argument is s found in Berkeley, Gay, and Brown Louden also documents the same argument occurs in Adam Smith and Joseph Butler [11]

    Finally, Paley’s exposition of this tradition was very influential. The principles became required text at Cambridge university Schneewind points out “utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley.[12] Paley, not Bentham being its most well-known exponent.  Similarly, Smith points out that Paley’s writings were once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools.[13]

    In fact, Paley’s influence is still seen clearly in John Austin’s work on Jurisprudence, in the early and late nineteenth century.  Mill himself appeals to the tradition:

    We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. …Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action.[14]

    Mill here explicitly rejects the idea that Utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will as the supreme law of morals, and uses a line of argument very similar to Paley, whose writings Mill was aware of, to argue the contrary.

    Consequently, Utilitarianism then wasn’t a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. Nor did it develop in response to or in opposition to a conception of morality based divine commands or divine laws. Divine command theorists, in fact, had been advocating Theological Utilitarianism for decades before Bentham, and the popularity of utilitarianism in Anglo-American thought had a good deal to do with the popularity of theological utilitarianism.


    [1]J B Schneewind Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002) 446.  Paley was, therefore, summarising an already existing, popular, school of thought.

    [2] See for example A. P. Brogan “John Locke and Utilitarianism” Ethics 69: 2 (1959), 79-93.

    [3] See Berkeley’s A Discourse on Passive Obedience (1712) and dialogues I-III of the   Alciphron (1732). Berkeley had included a systematic treatise on moral theory in the draft of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), but the manuscript was lost, leaving historians to piece together his theories from his occasional writings.

    [4] Passive obedience: or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated … In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel. By George Berkeley, M.A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004899015.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

    [5] Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. XII; in Works, vol. II, p. 572.

    [6] Robert Louden notes this conception of God’s goodness was common in the 18th century and similar arguments can be seen in Smith and Butler see Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [7] See Stephen Darwall “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” in, The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Kenneth Winkler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

    [8] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [9] John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” in Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 [1897] available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bigge-british-moralists-vol-2 accessed 26 Aug 2016

    [11] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280.

     [12] Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant 446.

    [13] Wilson Smith “William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 11:3 (1954) 402–424

    [14] John Stuart Mill “What is Utilitarianism” available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter2.htm

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.

     

  • Abortion and the Morality of Feticide: Part II

    In my last post, Abortion and the Morality of Feticide: Part I, I briefly sketched an argument against feticide,

    [1] It is wrong to kill a human being without justification;

    [2] A fetus is a human being;

    [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.

    I argued that defenders of feticide cannot rationally reject this argument unless they reject one of the premises. I argued further that attempts to refute [3] are successful only if one assumes that a fetus is not a human being. It follows then that defenders of abortion laws cannot rationally avoid the question of whether [2] is correct, whether a fetus is a human.

    Is the Fetus a Human Being?

    Big MacThe first thing to note is that the claim that feticide is homicide has considerable prima facie plausibility. Consider this, a hunter is in the woods and notices some rustling in the bushes. Looking through his scope he sees a six-foot high, bi-pedal being with brown hair, blue eyes, wearing a red and black swanndri. He refrains from shooting. Here, the hunter makes the sensible and reasonable judgement that in firing he would risk engaging in homicide. He bases this on what the target looks like. In the absence of reasons for thinking otherwise, he has good grounds for this claim.

    This example has application to the status of the fetus; “[there is] a general consensus that the fetus is recognisably human after six weeks, and certainly after eight”[1] This fact, conjoined with the above illustration, entails that, in the absence of good reasons to the contrary, there are good grounds for thinking that feticide is homicide.

    The second thing to note is is that good reasons for thinking the fetus does not have human status are not forthcoming. Here I will focus on four common examples: viability, sentience, birth and person-hood.

    Viability
    A common argument contends that a fetus is not a human because it is not viable. Susan Sherwin argues that feticide differs from killing children because a fetus “is wholly dependent on her [the mother’s] unique contribution to its maintenance, while a newborn is physically separate, though still in need of a lot of care”.[2]

    There are several problems with this position.

    The fact that a fetus cannot survive independently of its mother does not mean it is not a human being. Fetal viability is contingent upon the medical technology of a given culture. A fetus that is not viable in (more…)

  • Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    In my first post, Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I, I set out some basics about epistemology, I now want to turn to one particular way we know things: testimony. Nicholas Wolterstorff defines paradigmatic cases of testimony as: believing X on the say so of someone else Y. There is a highly influential tradition of epistemology which is sceptical or critical of beliefs based on testimony.

    Testimony
    In his Essay on Human Understanding John Locke argued that one had a duty to not believe any proposition merely on the authority of another person. One should trust the testimony of another only if one has:

    (a) good reasons for thinking that the testifier is reliable; or,
    (b) good reasons for believing the truth of the proposition itself.

    Taking another persons word for something in the absence of independent evidence is irrational. Locke hinted that such gullibility was socially dangerous, tied up with intolerance, authoritarianism and oppression.

    Something like this lurks in contemporary culture and is often encapsulated in quotes such as “think for yourself.” The problem is that a little reflection shows that this view of testimony is mistaken.

    CAJ Coady summarises the problem, if one is going to have evidence for the reliability of a testifier then this evidence will either include some other testimony or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. The first option is obviously a non-starter, any evidence based on testimony will have to, by Locke’s position, be shown to be reliable by further testimony and so on, ad infinitum, until we reach some non-testimonial source. However, if we embrace the second option and we exclude what we know by way of testimony from our evidence base then we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

    To demonstrate this consider an example from Greg Dawes in a paper he wrote on faith,

    Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[1]

    Like Locke, Dawes suggests that a non-physicist such as himself can rationally believe e=mc2 because he has reasons to believe that his sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable? Presumably, it would be because the author of the book where he read it or the person who told him the information was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does Dawes know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or have been told them by the person in person but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons, he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was claimed to be awarded in order to travel there and personally check the original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He also would have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the institution in question.

    Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information that he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first-hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on in the media could be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards that he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable in order to be warranted in believing in testimony.

    I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know, by way of being told by others, accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learned at school, university, from my parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to. The kind of critical attitude where one deplores believing things on faith or on the say so of others is un-viable. As social beings with a limited perspective in time and space, and with limited areas of speciality, we need to trust the testimony of others for most of what we know.

    Testimony Beliefs as Basic Beliefs
    For this reason the idea that one cannot accept something on the say so of testimony until it is verified is problematic. Instead I am inclined to accept a different picture of the role that testimony and faith in authorities should play in our knowledge. The picture that testimony beliefs are properly basic beliefs.

    To see what I mean by this consider the following point by Roy Clouser,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[2]

    Clouser notes that the appeal to evidence, in the form of premises from which one infers a conclusion, have to terminate somewhere if we are to avoid being sceptical about everything.

    The terminus is a set of ultimate premises called basic beliefs, which are those beliefs that form the foundation of our knowledge. We are justified in believing them independently of any argument or proof for them.

    If this seems counter-intuitive consider that there are plenty of things we believe that are not based on arguments. Our belief in the existence of the past or our belief that it is wrong to rape women or our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation so that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives. It is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against.

    Usually basic beliefs are grounded in some form of experience. We recognise these as true because we experience or see them to be true. For example, I see that the basic axioms of logic are self-evident, I remember the existence of a past event, I intuitively see that rape is wrong and think anyone who does not see this is simply morally blind. I see the chair in front of me, I hear the car outside and so on. These beliefs function as fundamental premises that we argue to other theories from.

    It is important to note that while we are justified in believing basic beliefs in the absence of evidence for them, their justified status can be defeated if we gain good reasons for rejecting these beliefs. For example, on a Tuesday evening I have a vivid experience of my brother entering my room, I form the basic belief that “my brother is in my room.” The next morning I hear that my brother was out all evening. I also discover that the medication I took the night before has hallucinatory side effects. The basic belief, grounded in my perceptual experience of observing my brother entering the room on Tuesday night is defeated. There are two ways basic beliefs can be defeated, undercutting defeaters involve a reason a person acquires which, when added to their stock of beliefs, gives them reasons for thinking that the source of the basic belief is unreliable – my discovery of the hallucinatory side effects is an example of this. Rebutting defeaters, on the other hand, are reasons one acquires for thinking the belief itself is false. My discovery that my brother was not home is a rebutting defeater, if he was not home then he was not in my room.

    The picture I want to suggest is that in many circumstances beliefs held on the basis of testimony function as basic beliefs. When a person, whom we take to be a competent authority, affirms a proposition P then in the absence of defeaters we are rational in accepting P. We do not need to prove that what the person says is true before we can accept it and nor do we have to prove that they are a reliable authority before we have to accept it. We do, however, have to take seriously any purported defeaters we are confronted with. We have to take seriously evidence we have that the authorities in question are not actually a reliable guide in the area in which they are speaking and we have to take seriously arguments given against what we accept.

    Translating this into a current context, contrary to what is often thought, most of our knowledge of scientific facts is, in fact, on the basis of testimony. As a child I ask questions, why does this happen? what caused this? and so on, my parents tell me answers and I believe them. I go to school and I am taught science and later physics and chemistry, I go to university and attend lectures, I read text books, I might do some experimental work myself but it is in the context of what I have already learned from testimonial sources. I read about studies scientists have done in journals and I believe what is written in these journals. Despite the bravado of self-professed free thinkers, our  acquisition of scientific knowledge is pervasively shot through with faith – faith in authorities, faith that others are being honest to us and are trustworthy and so on. It can be no other way. Hence, to believe some fact about the world merely because another has told you it is true is not irrational but in fact a sensible thing to do.

    Consider an example, I am in my car listening to the radio and Keisha Castle-Hughes is on air talking about climate change. The media are praising her for her brave efforts to educate the public. How should I respond? In this instance I am inclined to think that I face some defeaters. I know Castle-Hughes is an actor and has no real expertise in the area in which she is talking. I also know that actors are good at being very convincing at playing a role, which is not real. I know Castle-Hughes is quite young and is unlikely to have had a very substantial science education, much less time to specialise in climatology. I know the media are notoriously unreliable, journalists tend to be very political, their deadline give them limited time to research and they are not experts in science at all. In this instance, I think that I have real reasons to be sceptical of what Castle-Hughes is saying. Even if what she is saying, in fact, is true, I should not believe it just because she says so.

    Here is another example. I read a book by Richard Dawkins. He claims that the evidence quite conclusively suggests there is no God. Now in some places Dawkins offers arguments and I can assess these using my ability to reason deductively but in other places he simply tells his readers things. He puts forward various arguments for God’s existence, which he says these are representative of the case for theism, he attributes these to Thomas Aquinas, talks of first-cause arguments and the like. This is a bona fide, scientist with a professorship at Oxford. His specialty is zoology.

    However, accurately representing Aquinas’ arguments for God requires knowledge not in zoology but in medieval philosophy. A knowledge of what arguments have been put forward for theism, which are the most representative, which are the best, requires knowledge of a discipline called philosophy of religion. Dawkins’ position as a zoologist means his knowledge is in a very different field. Hence, his being a scientist gives me no reason to accept his work on Aquinas.

    This underscores an important point. If a person has some bone fide authority in a field it means he has authority in that field, it does not mean he or she has any authority in another field. Scientists qua scientists are experts in science, not morality, public policy, law, ethics, theology and what have you. Similarly, pastors are trained in biblical exegesis and theology, their knowledge, therefore, is in those fields and not science. One of the problems with the rise of the Internet is that people can get information on any subject any where from any source. In this context it is important to examine carefully whether we have good reasons for questioning whether the source is authoritative.

    It is not a bad idea to make our starting place be that we will accept what we are told by authorities but we should not always end there.

    In my final post in this series, Part III, I will look at what we should do when authorities clash.

    [1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion (so far unpublished) 34.
    [2] Roy Clouser  Knowing With the Heart (IVP: Downers Grove, 1999) 69.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part III

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I, I set out a common law property rights argument drawing from the writings of jurists Blackstone and Locke as well as contemporary philosopher Ed Feser. I looked at what circumstances, if any, might justify the state taking of real property, looking specifically at minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property. In this post I identify and critique some of the purported justifications for the historic and current expropriation of property in New Zealand, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver.

    II.        Purported Justifications
    One of the earliest attempts to justify an inroad into property rights in sub-soil was made in The Case of Mines. Three arguments offered by counsel for the queen are recorded which I have labelled excellence, necessity and currency:

    Excellence: “because gold and silver were the most excellent products of the soil, they should, ipso facto, go to the Queen, who was the most excellent person in the realm.”[29]

    Necessity: “That the King as head of the realm needed the money to keep up the army and enforce the laws.”[30]

    Currency: “That gold was necessary or coin or commerce, and the Crown ought to have it to mint,”[31]

    Whilst “none of the reasoning of the judges is given, just the bare decision”,[32] I will assume that the reasons offered by counsel were the reasons accepted by the court and address the merits of each in turn.

    The excellence argument is clearly problematic as it is not a given that the monarch will always be the most excellent person in the realm (especially when one pauses to consider the character and conduct of some of England’s monarchs). Further, even assuming that a monarch is the most excellent person in the realm, it would not follow that this attribute confers an automatic right to the most excellent form of every conceivable thing regardless of whether those things were owned by other people. Further, the assumption that gold is the most excellent of metals suggests that ‘excellent’ is being used in an economic sense to denote gold as the most economically valuable of metals. However, if this assumption is correct then the most excellent person must be the richest, which would entail that anyone wealthier than the queen was entitled to take her gold (an argument that I am fairly confident counsel for the queen did not intend).

    The other two arguments are more plausible. They both speak to the state’s need to be able to finance the discharge of its basic functions (i.e. defence, justice, minting the currency, etc) and, as such, are arguably extensions of the necessity justification. Given the then threat of Spanish invasion, the need to raise an army in times of war and the practical uses of gold and silver in the 16th century, these arguments may have had some merit. However, in contemporary New Zealand where the core functions of government are funded by taxation, where we keep a standing army and our currency is not minted from, or based on, gold and silver, the elements of necessity that ground the reasoning within The Case of Mines are not currently present.

    As current precedent The Case of Mines can justifiably affirm the principle that in situations of necessity, such as defence or natural disaster, where the state needs a particular mineral and cannot realistically obtain it from within its own lands or by trade then it might be justified in expropriating it from private citizens for the duration of the necessity. Something like this justification was arguably present in the passage of the Petroleum Act 1937. Oil had become a mineral of strategic importance to defence as the British Royal Navy fleet had converted to oil in 1914. This proved to be critical in their sea victories during WWI. In 1919 existing regulations governing the extraction of oil were extended to private land. Driven largely by the British Navy’s need for oil, a post-war search for oil in the British Colonies began.

    In 1927 a Petroleum Bill was drafted but abandoned. At the time, the petroleum industry was growing by itself; Shell and BP were both active in New Zealand, private agreements to extract petroleum were being struck and the national urgency in the wake of WWI was waning. However, as the 1930’s progressed, issues of national defence increasingly came back into focus;[33]

    The growing strategic threat from Japan and Germany caused the New Zealand government to focus on the need to increase investment by international oil companies in the discovery and extraction of New Zealand’s oil reserves – and on the ability of those companies to deal with a single owner (the government) as being ‘in the national interest’.

    The Petroleum Act 1937 nationalised all petroleum. The justifications cited were petroleum’s strategic importance in defence, the economy, transport and the preference of the oil companies to deal with a single party.[34] Whilst the appeal to national interests found broad support within society, the passage of the act was highly controversial.[35] It was disputed that the expropriation of private property was necessary to achieve the objectives and the lack of compensation was widely objected to, particularly so by Maori.

    The Waitangi Tribunal reports that “Maori shared in the wider endorsement, and their challenge was not to the intent to nationalise the resource but to the failure to pay landowners compensation for their loss of property rights under the common law and the Treaty.”[36] The 1937 Act did not grant royalties to the landowners despite the provision to do this initially being left open;[37]

    The approach of the government in 1937 and 1938 was based on the position that, where the ‘national interest’ justified action and where the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy, no compensation for the loss of private property rights need be paid.

    The government of the day appeared to hold that property rights could be justifiably overridden without compensation on the grounds of “national interests.” Traditionally these were a mixture of strategic national security issues and economic benefits to the country as whole.

    A.        National Security Justifications
    Now earlier I suggested that the necessity justification may apply to such appeals; however, the strategic necessity arising from factors such as the threat posed by Germany, Japan, Spain or the British Navy’s need for oil is no longer present (the British navy is these days increasingly nuclear propelled and the New Zealand Navy barely has a fleet). Yet despite the change in the strategic situation, legislation asserting ownership of petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium to the state remain — in fact, post-WWII legislation has affirmed their position as state property “whether or not the land has been alienated” and has reserved additional minerals to the collection.[38] (In the case of the continued state reservation of uranium this seems rather odd given that it appears incapable of attaining the standard for military necessity given New Zealand’s nuclear free policies.)

    B.        Economic Justifications
    Peter Ackroyd suggests that taking property to acquire economic benefit was a driving justification for many of New Zealand’s past legislative acts. He cites from Hansard, “The Colony, however, could not afford to dispense with the mining industry, and every effort should be made by the Legislature to assist in maintaining its position.” [39]

    It is indisputable that a prosperous mining industry can contribute greatly to the progress of a society; however, whether the gain of this benefit, in and of itself, can justify the taking of another’s property seems rather dubious. Almost any taking of one person’s property by another will economically advantage the taker yet this does not typically justify taking (even if the taker invested the property in a way that ended up benefiting the takee). Every person has a right to retain their justly acquired property and to have the taking of it protected by law. Paternalistic justifications such as “it is economically good for you” are not normally grounds for overriding the rights of adults.

    In the event that someone does take from another, it is normal practice under the principles of restorative justice that the taker be required to compensate the takee. Likewise, when a state takes property in the name of national or economic interest it was recognised at common law that compensation must be paid. Further it is common to find this requirement in other jurisdictions. A recent survey of the constitutional legislation within 30 OECD countries showed that 28 expressly acknowledge property rights and 24 required expropriations of property rights to be adequately justified and to not occur without compensation.[40]

    In New Zealand the CMA provides compensation for the disturbance of the land caused by mining activities but not for the loss of the minerals. The situation is analogous to a judge ordering a burglar to fix the window broken during the burglary but permitting the burglar to keep the widescreen plasma TV he took from the house.

    As cited earlier, a justification commonly offered for the state’s failure to pay compensation is that “the owners of the confiscated rights could be presumed to share in the national benefits of the policy.” Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley and Kevin Counsell identify a problem with this line of reasoning;[41]

    This position will … only be justified if it can be shown that those affected by the confiscation of the private rights will receive benefits roughly equivalent in value to the share of the benefits that they would have otherwise received. In this case [the Petroleum Act], of course, no such analysis was done.

    Even if the state did undertake this analysis of costs and benefits, the justification fails to note that compensation does not actually introduce any additional cost. The following example will bear this out. A person owns a piece of property, P. P is worth a certain value, V. If the state expropriates P and fails to compensate the owner then the owner loses V. However, if the state does compensate the owner then the state loses the value of V. Either way, someone is going to pay the cost of V. The question is who should bear this cost – the private owner or the government? Both the loss and the cost remain the same regardless of who bears it.[42]

    Lewis, Evans & Quigley note that the absence of compensation increases the chance that the state will over-estimate the benefits of various takings and not accurately measure the costs.[43]

    Uncompensated confiscation is not justified by actions that are deemed by politicians to be ‘in the public interest’. It is too easy for interest groups who benefit from government actions but bear none of those costs to create the appearance of a public benefit when none in fact exists. If there is a public interest, its value must be quantified against the loss to the private property rights that would be destroyed by the action. In the absence of this accounting, government will overuse its power of eminent domain and will engage in actions that impose net costs on society as a whole.

    As shown above, compensating owners does not increase the cost to society but a policy permitting expropriation without compensation may.

    III.       Conclusion
    I have argued that there is a common law presumption in favour of property rights, which is based on a moral principle antecedent to state recognition. According to this principle, a state must justify any expropriation of property. While I granted that expropriation may be able to be justified on certain grounds, contemporary New Zealand does not currently meet such grounds. Expropriation on economic grounds is far more dubious and even if this ground could be justified, the absence of statutory provisions for compensation renders such takings unjust.


    [29] James Parcell “A Thesis on the Prerogative Right of the Crown to Royal Metals” (Government Printer, Wellington, 1960) 13.
    [30] Ibid 14.
    [31]
    Ibid.
    [32] Ibid 11. Parcell suggests that the report was a forgery or had been embellished.
    [33]
    Lewis Evans, Neil Quigley & Kevin Counsell “Protection of Private Property Rights and Just Compensation: An Economic Analysis of the Most Fundamental Human Right Not Provided in New Zealand” (2009) New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation (at 21 January 2010) 23.
    [34] Ibid 23-24.
    [35] Hansard and the national archives record fierce debate; breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi were alleged and the Petroleum Haka became part of New Zealand history.
    [36] Waitangi Tribunal The Petroleum Report – Wai 796 (2003) 29.
    [37]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [38] Key examples: Atomic Energy Act 1945; Coal Act 1948, 1949; Iron and Steel Industry Act 1959; Mining Act 1971, which were all brought under the CMA.
    [39] Peter Ackroyd “Mining Legislation and the Reservation of Mineral Resources in New Zealand” [1988] NZLJ 41, 42.
    [40]
    Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 43-48.
    [41] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 24.
    [42]
    I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this argument.
    [43] Lewis, Evans & Quigley, above n 33, 41.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

  • Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

    New Zealand, like many nations, has a long history of the state taking real property, often without compensation. In this two part series I examine one sub-set of takings, minerals from the sub-soil of privately held property (although the argument herein could apply with equal force to any state taking). Drawing from common law, the writings of jurists such as Blackstone and Locke and contemporary philosopher Ed Feser, I look at what circumstances, if any, might justify taking. I then apply this to the current practice in New Zealand and ask is the practice justified, does it meet the standard?

    Drawing from Talmudic Law, the jurist Accursius of Bologna wrote the phrase cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the middle of the earth) as a gloss on Justinian’s Digest.[1] By the 16th century this maxim had become accepted common law doctrine for determining the extent of the rights enjoyed by a tenant in fee simple (“landowner”).[2] The English Laws Act retrospectively declared that “so far as applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand,” all statute and common laws of England became “part of the laws of New Zealand.” [3] This was confirmed by the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988. Since 1840 to the present day there have been few instances where the court has held that a statute or common law of England was not applicable to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand.[4] Hence, in the absence of statutes overriding it, the maxim is part of New Zealand law.

    Historically the rights of the landowner included ownership of the minerals in the sub-soil. “The grant of the land includes the surface and … all that is infra, i.e. mines, earth, clay etc.”[5] The sub-soil minerals were assumed to be conveyed along with the land, unless the conveyance instrument stipulated otherwise.[6]

    Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. … whatever is in a direct line, between the surface of any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day’s experience in the mining countries. So that the word “land” includes not only the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore, if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal …

    Until the last century or so, the only minerals not subject to this doctrine were gold and silver.[7] In The Case of Mines, the court held “that by the law all mines of gold and silver within the realm, whether they be in the lands of the Queen, or of subjects, belong to the Queen by prerogative.”[8] When it came to ownership of other minerals the court held,[9]

    That if the ore or mine in the soil of a subject be of copper, tin, lead, or iron, in which there is no gold or silver, in this case the proprietor of the soil shall have the ore or mine, and not the Crown by prerogative, for in such barren base metal no prerogative is given to the Crown.

    Whilst gold and silver were the primary focus of the New Zealand government’s first legislative reservations of minerals,[10] successive legislation incrementally added all the “base” minerals (and more) mentioned in The Case of Mines into state ownership.[11]

    Initially the state only claimed the minerals contained in state land and reserved the mineral rights on alienation of its own land.[12] However, subsequent legislation saw all land subject to a retention clause on alienation that reserved, for the state, all minerals existing in their natural condition within that land.[13] Today there are still pockets of minerals that remain in private ownership, as some land has not been alienated since the passage of the relevant legislation. However, these minerals cannot be petroleum, gold, silver, and uranium as these minerals belong to the state regardless of whether or not the land has been alienated.[14] The state possesses an exclusive right to alienate (or grant a licence to alienate) the minerals it owns.[15] In many circumstances, land owners cannot refuse consent for prospecting, exploration and mining to occur on their land.[16]

    This state of affairs, with respect to the ownership of minerals, has eroded the rights of the landowner as mineral ownership has changed without the consent of the original owner. Further, this change in ownership occurred without the owner being compensated. Prima facie, this change of ownership cannot be said to be compatible with property rights.

    I.          Property Rights
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[17]

    It is important to understand this quote in context. Blackstone grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state.[18]

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.

    Blackstone appeals to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[19] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government. The state serves people by protecting and recognising these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land, subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others”[20]

    Edward Feser has suggested that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers cannot be unjust;[21]

    This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption … that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisition of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after someone has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.

    If one mixes one’s labour with, and gains ownership of, previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it, which in turn gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or that there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    The moral property rights of the landowner are not absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.[22] Although Blackstone suggests property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”, he qualifies this in the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[23]

    Blackstone suggests property rights can be overridden for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere he suggests that necessity might be a further option; a person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[24]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,[25]

    The most obvious implication is that individuals in circumstances of what Cronin calls “absolute distress” have a right to the use of the resources of others, where the paradigm examples would be the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. Someone in circumstances like these is not guilty of theft or the like, because for actions like the ones in question to count as theft, etc., the cabin owner or flagpole owner or homeowner would have to have such an absolute right to his property that he could justly refuse to allow others to use it even in the circumstances in question; and, according to natural law theory, no one could possibly have so absolute a property right. For the same reason, if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”

    Necessity can be a justifiable but limited inroad into property rights.  Feser argues that the necessity exception can extend to political situations,[26]

    It [necessity] is also what would justify the taxation required for the necessary functions of government (national defense, courts of law, etc.), since … the very existence of the community … depends on the state’s performance of these functions.

    Feser also suggests that necessity might,[27]

    justify taxation for the purposes of funding some measure of public assistance for those in absolute distress who are incapable of either finding work or getting help from family members and friends. For these circumstances would seem to be relevantly similar to those in which the starving man in the woods finds himself.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. The burden falls on the expropriator to justify takings.[28]

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor!

    In Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II, I will set out some of the purported justifications for expropriation of property, using the examples of petroleum, gold and silver. I  will then analyse and critique these.


    [1] Yehuda Abramovitch gives a fascinating history of the origins of the maxim in “The Maxim ‘Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Caelum’ as Applied in Aviation” (1962) 8 McGill LJ 247.
    [2] Bury v Pope (1586) 1 Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.
    [3] 858 s1.
    [4] David Williams “Gold, The Case of Mines (1568) and the Waitangi Tribunal” (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 157, 165.
    [5] Mitchell v Mosley Cozens [1914] 1 Ch 438 at 450 (CA) Per Hardy MR.
    [6] William Blackstone “Chapter 2: Of Real Property; And, First, of Corporeal Hereditaments” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 2, s 19.
    [7]
    R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310 [75 ER 472] (Case of Mines). Upheld in Woolley v A-G (1877) 2 AC 163 (PC); A-G v Morgan [1891] 1 Ch 432.
    [8]
    Case of Mines 510.
    [9] Ibid 511.
    [10] Gold Fields Act 1858.
    [11] In 1991 all incremental legislation relating to the extraction of minerals was brought under Crown Minerals Act subject only to Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.
    [12]
    Land Amendment Act 1913.
    [13] For example, Land Act 1948 and Crown Minerals Act 1991 (“CMA”).
    [14] CMA s10.
    [15]
    Permits to prospect, explore and mine minerals are granted under ss23-29 of the CMA.
    [16]
    Access to land is covered under ss49-80 of the CMA. A landowner might succeed at vetoing the exercise of a mining permit on his or her land (if it is not a mining permit for petroleum) but stands little success opposing the exercise of a permit to prospect or explore as the public interest grounds referred to in s66 of the CMA are very broad.
    [17] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139. This is similar to the opening flourish of property as “sole and despotic dominion” in Blackstone’s chapter “Of Property in General” below n 18.
    [18] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [19] John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [20] Ibid s 27.
    [21] Edward Feser
    “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) 22 Social Philosophy and Policy 56, 58-59.
    [22] Although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean absolute in the sense of never being able to be overridden.
    [23]
    Feser, above n 21.
    [24] Ibid.
    [25]
    Edward Feser
    “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21, 43.
    [26]
    Ibid 47.
    [27] Ibid.
    [28] Feser, above n 21, 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part II
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. In Part I, I will look at the concept of a property right drawing from Blackstone, John Locke and Ed Feser paying particular attention to the context Blackstone wrote in.

    What is a Property Right?
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone, judge, jurist and professor of law who authored one of the most influential texts, Commentaries on the Laws of England, on the classical views of the common law and its principles, grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state. His infamous statement at the beginning of his chapter “Of Property, in General” certainly seems to bear this out,

    There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.[1]

    This theme of property rights being paramount is found in other parts of his writings. In “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[2] [Emphasis added]

    The latter part of this quote has been used by some to suggest that what Blackstone really meant to say was that one can use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land. I certainly have heard this in class from my Professors and it is prevalent enough to be left standing on Wikipedia,

    …the phrase is often presented without taking into account the greater context of Blackstone’s thought on the subject of property. Blackstone likely offered the statement as a rhetorical flourish to begin his discussion, given that even in his age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute. Property owners must rely on the enforcement powers of the state, in any event, for the realization of their rights.[3]

    Now I agree that the greater context must always be taken into account when chopping a few sentences out of a greater text, so let us do precisely this. Blackstone suggests that property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”; to ascertain what he meant by this we must read the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[4]

    So qualified, we can see that although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean ‘absolute’ in the sense of never being able to be overridden but likewise he does not have in mind the notion that the passage of any law, no matter its impact on the landowner, is compatible with property rights; what he is getting at is more limited than that.

    Blackstone suggests that property rights can be encroached for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere in the same text he suggests that necessity might be a further option. A person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[5]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,

    the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. … if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”[6]

    The author of the Wikipedia quote was not wrong when he or she said that “even in [Blackstone’s] age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute.” It is true that the landowner’s rights were traditionally, at common law, subject to the rights of others. For example, lessees, easement holders, mortgagees held rights in another’s land. Tortious liabilities such as actionable nuisance, the doctrines of support and waste, etc are examples of the ability of others to dictate what a landowner does with his or her land. These restrictions were tied up with fact that every person has the right to enjoy his or her property, hence, the exercise of enjoying one’s property (or exercising one’s property rights) was limited by the degree it prevented another from enjoying theirs.

    Blackstone did not consider property rights to simply be legal rights. As I have stated a few times thus far, he grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state,

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else. [7]

    He appealed to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[8] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government, that is, they exist whether or not the state acknowledges them. A just state will protect and recognise these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others.”[9]

    Feser has argued that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers to cannot be unjust.[10] If one mixes one’s labour with and gains ownership of, a parcel of previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it. This acquisition, in turn, gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. If one takes possession of previously unoccupied land and mixes one’s labour with it or one obtains ownership of such land via a just transaction then, prima facie, one has rights over this land. The burden then falls on the taker to justify taking,

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor![11]

    In Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II, I turn to the extent of the landowners rights, the relationship of property rights to legislative controls, looking at the CMA, RMA and recent judgments. I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property.


    [1] William Blackstone “Of Property, in General” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1.
    [2] Blackstone “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals”, above n 1, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139.
    [3] “Blackstone and Property Jurisprudence” in William Blackstone accessed at 17 February 2010.
    [4]
    Blackstone, above n 1.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6]
    Edward Feser “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21-52, 38.
    [7] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [8]
    John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [9] Ibid s 27.
    [10] Edward Feser “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) Social Philosophy and Policy 58-59.
    [11]
    Ibid 11.

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    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

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