Tag: Justice

  • David Bain 111 Call "I Shot the Prick" – Court Decisions Available Online UPDATED AGAIN

    Did David Bain tell the 111 operator “I shot the prick” on discovering the dead bodies of his family?

    This evidence was originally suppressed “until completion of the re-trial” as, per Wilson J,

    The probative value of the disputed sounds is very modest, but the risk of prejudice resulting from their introduction into the trial is very great. There is more than a minor imbalance; the scales come down firmly on the side of exclusion of the evidence. Even if the disputed sounds were admissible under s 7, they should plainly be excluded under s 8. [of the Evidence Act 2006]

    However, as the trial is now over, David Bain had sought to have the suppression continued “until further order of the Court.” Fairfax New Zealand Limited and Television New Zealand applied to set aside the suppression orders. In a judgement issued this afternoon David Bain lost his appeal to continue the suppression (see David Cullen Bain v The Queen [2009] NZSC 59 to read the three page judgement of the Supreme Court which explains why the suppression order remains lifted; effectively there was no clear and compelling reason to continue to offend the principle of openess and the right to free expression).

    Due to this decision the original suppression case has now been made public and was also released this afternoon. Now you can read David Cullen Bain v The Queen [2009] NZSC 16 and find out why the court decided on 6 March 2009 that the disputed evidence (the alleged “I shot the prick” part of the 111 call) would be excluded and that part of the call would be excised. (Full transcripts of the various interpretations of David Bain’s 111 call are included in the reported decision.)

    Extract from the decision of Supreme Court of New Zealand on the appeal to suppress the evidence, per Elias CJ and Blanchard J at paragraphs 3, 4 and 5:

    … The presence of the disputed admission was first found by Detective Ward, when he reviewed the recording, in preparation for the retrial, in July 2007. At that time he listened to the recording at a commercial sound studio in Dunedin. Mr Dempsey, the ambulance officer who took the call, had not heard the disputed words and did not suggest their inclusion in the transcript originally prepared in 1994. In October 2007 he was asked to recheck the recording after being told of the words which had been discovered. In listening to the recording with that knowledge, he heard the words “I shot the prick I shot” and was “stunned that I hadn’t heard the words previously”.

    Because of the discovery, the recording was sent for analysis to the United Kingdom to forensic consultants, expert in analysing recordings of speech. It was also analysed by experts for the defence. There is very little difference between the experts as to their findings. The opinions constitute evidence extrinsic to the recording itself upon which the decision to admit the recording was based.

    Although it is necessary to refer to the forensic opinions at some length later in these reasons, they may be briefly summarised for present purposes. None of the experts is able to say that the sounds relied upon in the recording are words, rather than meaningless exhalation of breath. If they are words, none of the experts is able to say that they amount to the words the Crown wishes to rely upon as evidence. Some consider such words can be heard in the recording, with effort. But all experts caution as to the dangers of hearing something that may not in fact be there, because of accident in arrangements of sounds. …

    After examining further evidence in detail their honours start to hone their thinking, at para 54,

    Three reasons weighed principally with the Court of Appeal in concluding that the evidence of the disputed words on the recording should be admitted. They were the fact that the “hypothesis” was “open” on the expert evidence; the fact that the appellant spoke on an exhaled breath without vibration of the vocal folds when giving his telephone number; and the “contextual sense” of the sentence, which left it open to the jury to decline to accept that the sounds had been made by random movements of the tongue and lips in an exhaled breath. …

    Then they conclude at para 67,

    … The prejudicial effect on the proceeding could be profound. The jury would, as Mr Raftery acknowledged, be entitled to find the accused guilty simply on the basis of an inculpatory statement unable to be proved to the satisfaction of experts or, in their estimation, of lay people. …

    Finally at para 68,

    … For these reasons, we consider that the disputed sounds are not admissible. The risks of jury speculation as to the content of the sounds, and the risk of the contentions put forward being available to them, make it necessary to excise the portion of the recording.

    JJ McGrath, Wilson and Gault’s judgments are shorter and add slightly different angles, all of them agreeing with Elias CJ and Blanchard J, that jurors may not be able to make the necessary complex and extremely important distinctions and that they should not be given the chance to get it wrong.

    Notably none of the justices appear to give any consideration to section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 as they are required to,

    Freedom of Expression – Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.

    All suppression orders offend the right to expression; the disputed tape was information, the evidence of expert witnesses were opinions, the Act does not limit what kind or form this expression comes in and the suppression order meant that we, the public, were unable to receive this order. Suppression orders offend both expression and the principle of openness which is grounded to the right to a fair trial also in the Bill of Rights.

    As such, the interests of justice must be weighed against the right to expression “and only where the Court’s capacity to ensure justice is significantly imperilled will the right of citizens and the media to seek, receive and impart information be curtailed.” (Thomas J in Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 99) In deciding to grant a suppression order the court must take into consideration the effect of doing so on freedom of expression, alongside its affronts to the principle of openness, and engage in the weighing Thomas J referred to – especially when the court is the highest court in the land, cannot be appealed from and is overturning a lower court’s decision. I cannot find where they considered it, let’s hope they thought about it even though they appear to not have recorded doing so.

    The fact that the previous courts had not allowed the appeal and the Supreme Court did, will undoubtedly open up the arguments around the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council. If you want to see the judgements and compare the reasoning of the lower courts that originally allowed the appeal – you’ll want to start with The Queen v David Cullen Bain [2009] NZCA 1 and work your way back from the Court of Appeal to the High Court [the direct link to the pdf of this case won’t work so go here and click on the ’30 January 2009′ decision entitled “CA 571/2008 (PDF)”].

    Personally I tend to lean towards the Court of Appeal’s thinking on this one, that while the nuances are complex and very important to grasp, managing this evidence would not have been impossible; starting at paragraph 256,

    … As to prejudice, the primary risk is that the jury may wrongly construe the disputed sounds as an inculpatory sentence – in other words, may simply get the facts wrong. But risks of this sort – that the trier of fact may get the facts wrong – are an inescapable part of the trial process and do not in themselves usually represent the sort of prejudicial effect which warrants evidence exclusion. It is, of course, the responsibility of the judge to guard against obvious risk (and particularly one that will be more apparent to a professional judge than lay jurors) of misunderstanding. In this case, there is an obvious risk, namely suggestibility, which must be addressed. But providing this happens, we see no reason why the evidence should not be admitted.

    As the Judge noted, it is well settled that the interpretation of an item of real evidence, such as a tape-recording, is a jury question: see for example R v Wickramasinghe (1992) 8 CRNZ 478 at 481 (CA) and R v Taylor [1993] 1 NZLR 647 at 650 – 651 (CA). The Judge took the view, with which we agree, that a transcript is not required, given the short length of the conversation (about a minute).

    We think it would be best if the jury first heard the tape without being primed, except perhaps with a request that they listen to it carefully and possibly advice (as recommended by Professor French) that they will hear some speech produced on breath. If they initially do not hear the disputed sounds as an inculpatory sentence (which we think is likely given past history [no one noticed this sentence during the first case]) but, once primed, subsequently do hear the disputed sounds in this way, this should provide a graphic indication of the power of suggestion.

    The Judge concluded that after the tape has been played to the jury “unprimed”, expert evidence should be received concerning the interpretation of the disputed sounds. We agree.

    We have no doubt that in his summing up the Judge will warn the jury of the dangers of suggestibility. …

    I have no doubt that any Judge would have taken this care and I doubt that any jury wouldn’t take their duty and their role seriously given the seriousness of the task they were faced with. I find the tone of the Supreme Court somewhat patronising and agree with the Court of Apeal at paragraph 261,

    … it would be quite extraordinary for this Court (or the Judge) to deny the jury the opportunity to listen in full to what the Crown can credibly claim is a recording of the account given by the appellant, within 25 minutes or so of the completion of his paper round, of what he found when he returned to the house.

    Extraordinary is one way of putting it.

    RELATED POST:
    How to Find the Reported Judicial Decision on the David Bain Re-Trial

  • David Bain Not Guilty

    Well the verdict is in; David Bain didn’t do it.

    I will accept the ruling of the court but I am now more than ever keen to read the judicial decision which should be available in the next few days from the sites I have mentioned previously.

  • How to Find the Reported Judicial Decision on the David Bain Re-Trial

    The blogosphere has featured many posts on many blogs regarding David Bain’s guilt or innocence regarding the homicide of his family. We have refused to participate in this speculation and have made our opinions on speculating on the Bain case before the court has ruled clear. I do not intend to break this self-imposed rule here today, you will not hear my opinion as to his guilt or innocence until after the verdict is in and I have read the reported decision (or unreported as the case may be) as despite the twitter updates, the articles, the live streaming and the “in depth” takes on the evidence provided by the media, unless you have sat in the court room and seen and heard only what the jury has had presented to it you cannot know one way or the other what the correct verdict should be.

    However, when the case has been decided, I have no moral qualms about examining the court’s report on the case and seeing what I think. As a law student it is pretty easy for me to gain a copy of a decision or a report on a case but it is also easy for the public; you just have to know where to look. So, here are three methods of gaining copies of the court’s judicial report on the case online to save you having to navigate a law library or even leave your computer:

    Judicial Decisions Online publishes all New Zealand Supreme Court, Court of Appeal (post 1 January 2003) and all High Court (post August 2005) decisions, provided they are not subject to limited restrictions, following delivery to the parties but not earlier than three days after the decisions are given. Simply search for the case – Bain, High Court, Christchurch, etc..

    Courts of New Zealand publishes judicial decisions of public interest and you can enter your email address and subscribe to be notified when new decisions are added. Visit the site, click on “from the courts” click on “judicial decisions” click on “judicial decisions of public interest” – the subscription box in in the left hand column.

    The New Zealand Legal Information Institute is a joint project of the University of Otago Faculty of Law, the Victoria University of Wellington Faculty of Law and the Australasian Legal Information Institute. NZLII is not updated as quickly as the other sites but given the interest in the David Bain trial I would expect the judgement to go up pretty shortly after it becomes available.

    RELATED POST:
    David Bain 111 Call “I Shot the Prick” – Court Decisions Available Online UPDATED

  • Blackout Victory: s92a Scrapped

    The NBR reports that the controversial s92A of the Copyright Amendment Act will be scrapped.

    If you recall its implementation was to be “delayed a month while ISPs and copyright holders continued efforts to work out a voluntary agreement on how it would be enforced … if they could not agree, the clause would be suspended.” I predicted then that “in other words, as written, it’s dead.”

    TelstraClear bailed from the talks, making it pretty clear that not only was it not the job of ISP’s to be judge and jury, so also was it not their jobs to fix badly drafted legislation. Given how pear shaped things had become, today’s announcement from Prime Minister John Key that that the government would be redrafting the section was not surprising.

    Awesome victory for the blogosphere whose blackout campaign placed considerable pressure on the government to act.

  • Twitter Updates on David Bain Trial?

    MandM have just one thing to say on the David Bain trial:

    Innocent until proven guilty in a court of law.

    Do not expect any commentary or speculation on the trial at MandM until the verdict is in.

  • Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection

    The Attorney General has identified an “apparent inconsistency” with the proposed “3 strikes bill” and the New Zealand Bill of Rights. This inconsistency is around whether the punishment inflicted by the 3rd strike would be “disproportionately severe.”

    There have been various reactions to this; the most extreme I have heard came from the bill’s proponent David Garrett “So what? Alter the Bill of Rights Act. We’ve got too hung up on people’s rights.”

    Discussions on talkback and on the blogosphere tend to include the suggestion that criminals don’t deserve the same rights as others while others seem to be getting hung up on the apparent disproportionality the bill might cause in some instances and following Garrett’s line, suggest amending the Bill of Rights which, in turn, causes some to state that a bill that requires you to amend the Bill of Rights is evidence of a flawed bill.

    The clarity many had towards the concept of a 3-strikes bill is now muddied and confused but I don’t think it has to be.

    First, Garrett is wrong. One cannot get “too hung up on human rights”, the first generation type that is, [he has a point on second and third generation rights but then these are not rights and that’s probably a discussion for another post] and they apply equally to all including criminals.

    Second, no Bill of Rights is beyond question. This means that if the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill does, in fact, require an amendment of the Bill of Rights to be passed this is not, in and of itself, necessarily evidence that it violates human rights. It could be evidence that the Bill of Rights itself is wrong.

    I don’t see why that, in a conflict between a proposed piece of legislation and the Bill of Rights, we should always assume, a priori, that the Bill of Rights is correct. What if a piece of legislation is proposed that conflicts with the Bill of Rights and yet there are good reasons for believing the proposed legislation is just, and in fact, the fault lies with the Bill of Rights?

    Suppose that a Bill of Rights authored in one generation was legally interpreted in such a manner that it permitted slavery. A new piece of legislation was then later introduced banning slavery and this was deemed contrary to the Bill of Rights as it affronts the property rights of slave owners. One response could be that previous legal interpretations of the Bill of Rights were incorrect but it could have actually been the case that there was no interpretation error, that Bill of Rights authors and society at the time it was enacted, had no difficulty with slave ownership.

    In such a situation surely the clash between proposed legislation and the constitution cannot be dismissed simply by appealing to the fact that the new bill might conflict with the Bill of Rights? Perhaps it would be appropriate to question the action the Bill of Rights was protecting.

    That said, I am not convinced the 3-strikes bill does, in fact, conflict so badly with the Bill of Rights that the Bill of Rights would need amending for it to be passed because I don’t think that the proportionality doctrine applies to situations such as the ones identified by the Attorney General in his report on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill. I think appropriate force for punishment is being confused with defensive force.

    The proportionality doctrine is linked to retributivist understandings of punishment. A person is punished because he or she deserves it and to a degree no more than he or she deserves. However, there are times when we incarcerate those we know via due process to be innocent yet are a threat to society. For example, those found not guilty by reason of insanity are commonly deprived of their liberty despite the lack of culpability and therefore lack of dessert because of their future threat to others. This is also true of self-defence. We can use lethal force against another even if they lack culpability for their crime providing the threat is sufficiently serious and immediate etc. The force used in self-defence must be proportionate but not to the past actions but rather to the future threat (this is how self-defence differs from retributive punishment). Quarantine laws would be another example, there are others too.

    Clearly, then, there are accepted instances where it would be mistaken to apply the proportionality doctrine. Such cases seem to have common to them the fact that if the person’s liberty were not restrained then a serious and real future threat to life, liberty and the bodily integrity of others from the person being restrained exists.

    In the case of the 3-strikes policy the advocates are not claiming that a person who has committed a third crime deserves a harsher punishment, they are claiming that an habitual offender of particular serious violent crimes has shown him or herself to be a credible threat to others and should be incarcerated for this reason. If they are correct, then the proportionality doctrine does not apply.

  • Blackout Victory: s92a Stalled

    The internet blackout is at an end and the government has responded; s92a of the Copyright Act has been officially stalled and looks rather doomed. The Herald reports:

    Section 92a was to have come into force this weekend, but Mr Key said it would be delayed a month while ISPs and copyright holders continued efforts to work out a voluntary agreement on how it would be enforced.

    He said if they could not agree, the clause would be suspended.

    If they did reach an agreement, it would be reviewed in six months.

    So in other words, as written, it’s dead. Yay.