Tag: Justice

  • More Mistakes: A Rejoinder to Randal Rauser

    For those who aren’t aware, there has been something of a “debate”, but what I’d prefer to refer to as an “in house discussion” between Randal Rauser (Professor of Historical Theology at Taylor Seminary) and myself.

    The discussion so far can be found here:

    My initial article was Randal Rauser’s Mistake: A Defense of Calvin’s Doctrine of Election

    Rauser’s response: Calvinism and the Arbitrary Camp Director Revisited: A Response to Andrew

    Andrew and CalvinBefore I begin, I should point out that I have been on the Kapiti coast for the last week at a TSCF (Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship, a cousin of Inter-Varsity) retreat where I was without internet. Hence it’s only in the last day that I’ve learned that Professor Rauser has kindly taken the time to respond to my initial article. So I apologize for my delayed response.

    I would also like to point out that while my intention was to provoke Rauser’s response, it was not to be rude, and I apologize if that’s the impression he has received. I have a great deal of respect for Rauser, particularly given (as I pointed out in my last article) that he is a Professor of Historical Theology with an obvious background in analytic philosophy, while I am a mere undergrad with far more ambition than actual ability. The last thing that I want is for this discussion to devolve into the kind of vitriol that plagues almost all other web based discussions of the philosophy of religion and/or theology. I say this, largely because I fear (from the tone of his response) that he has received the impression of ill intent on my part.

    Secondly, I appreciate that Rauser took the time to respond to my article, and I appreciate that he also took the time to counter my personal testimony with that of his own.

    Randal Rauser and ArminiusBut now to specifics: How does Rauser respond to my claim that the arbitrariness objection (at least if it is to be an objection) begs the question against Calvin’s doctrine of election? On the face of it, he doesn’t seem to challenge my point that God may not be acting unjustly if we are undeserving of salvation. To the contrary, Rauser seems to admit for the possibility that the tortures may be justly deserved. But if that’s the case, then, as I tried to point out in my first post, there’s no real injustice or immoral state of affairs that obtains if God so desires to instantiate those punishments. Paradoxically though, Rauser refers to my theology as “brutal” and “morally incoherent”. Both of these terms, emotionally provocative as they are, seem to suggest that there is something nasty, horrible, evil (whatever negative adjective your heart desires) about a God that selects some for salvation while selecting others for damnation. But if, as Rauser seems to allow, the tortures are justly deserved, then none of those adjectives can rightly be said to stick. After all, if the tortures are justly deserved, and God decides to carry out those tortures, then God can only be said to be doing what the demands of morality and/or justice require. So wherein does the moral incoherence obtain?

    But according to Rauser, I would still be missing the point. After all, he (Rauser) says, the Camp Director Analogy was not intended to show that God, given Calvinism, is “unjust”, but rather that He cannot be seen as “maximally loving”. I see no real reason to deny Rauser the liberty to make this distinction, but its relevance is, at best, unclear.

    Thankfully, Rauser does seem to hint at one possible way in which we could interpret this as an objection. He seems to engage in something of a pair-wise comparison between two possible scenarios that are supposed to be relevantly similar to the Arminian and Calvinist conceptions of election respectively.

    • Scenario 1: The director arbitrarily selects some children for beatings and others for loving rehabilitation.
    • Scenario 2: The director selects all children for loving rehabilitation.

    According to Rauser, were God to bring about scenario 2, we would state that He is more loving were he to bring about scenario 1. There are three things that I have to say to this (more…)

  • No Special Rights, So . . . One Law for All

    Tama ItiWe remain militantly critical of contemporary Maori ideology. We believe it excuses personal and family accountability by resorting to the fallacy of historical determinism: Maori, their leadership tells them, are victims of predatory exploitation by European or imperial powers; the significant cause of social and cultural and spiritual degradation amongst Maori stems from the unjust extortions of the Pakeha. We believe this ideology enslaves Maori and subjugates them more subtly and more potently than any European migration.

    We believe this ideology is a neo-Marxist variant. Maori represent the exploited poor, the weak, from which the hegemonic Pakeha have extracted their pound of flesh. It makes many within Maoridom sunburnt strawberries: brown on the outside, red on the inside. We have smiled at Hone Harawira’s call to arms: he wants to stand up now for poor and disadvantaged Maori, the working stiffs. He opposes exploitative Pakeha, but also (now) monied tribal interests. Maori neo-Marxism is undressing and exposing itself. This is a false Gospel and will betray those seduced by it to their destruction.

    But, at the same time, we believe there are historical injustices wrought by our government which should be addressed. They should be addressed because it is just to do so. At a personal or communal level, our lives should not be made to depend upon the redress of past wrongs and grievances, whether real or imagined. Evil happens in our sinful world. The Christian call is to accept such without bitterness, seek to begin again under the wonderful aegis of Christ Himself, and arise to serve Him where we are, with what we have.

    But there is an obligation to restitute, where possible, those who have suffered injustices at the hands of the state. (Restitution is not always possible, but if it can be done, it ought to be. The state must at all times be under law, and held to account by the law; if not, then we are governed not by law, but despots.)

    In this regard, we were pleased (whilst saddened, and provoked) by historian Paul Moon’s piece in the NZ Herald on the injustice being perpetuated against the Tuhoe people. (For the benefit of our overseas readers, the Tuhoe is a Maori tribe located on the South Eastern part of the North Island of New Zealand.) Here is a synopsis of Moon’s account:

    At the start of May last year, all the indications were that the Crown and Tuhoe were putting the finishing touches on a deal that would see Te Urewera National Park returned to Tuhoe, with enough caveats to ensure that access and other rights for the public would remain practically unchanged.

    Tuhoe would have what all the evidence shows (more…)

  • The “Three Strikes Bill” Moves Forward

    I am cautiously optimistic at today’s announcement that the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill a.k.a. the “Three Strikes Bill” will be moving forward as part of the government’s legislative program. In my post Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection, which was published in the New Zealand Law Students Association publication LEX, I argued that the “apparent inconsistency” identified by the Attorney General, per his statutory obligation under section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the basis that the Bill affronts the proportionality doctrine, was able to be argued around on the basis that criticisms of the Bill along these lines confuse appropriate force for punishment with defensive force.

    Given this, provided the select committee does a good job on assessing submission and making recommendations and parliament carefully considers these we have the potential to finally have much tougher sentences on recidivist offenders of heinous and violent crimes. Regular readers will remember that, as documented in The Deal is Signed: New Zealand Has a New Government, part of the confidence and supply agreement that the National Party made with the ACT Party back in November 08 following New Zealand’s last general election was that National agree to introduce ACT’s “Three Strikes Bill” and support it to Select Committee, so this news was fairly inevitable.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection
    Published – Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection
    The Deal is Signed: New Zealand Has a New Government

  • The Foreshore and Seabed Repeal: The Inconvenience of Due Process

    That the state is not above the law but also subject to it is surely one of the foundational concepts of any just and free society. This notion has found its place in the writings of many influential philosophers, jurists and theologians, it can be found in the constitutions and bills of rights of most nations. Citizens trust their governments to wield their power accordingly and when our governments do not, when they abuse that trust, even if they wield their power against some small group whose cause we are not that into, we need to care about it and hold them to account.

    In 2004 the New Zealand Labour Government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act. At the time both Matt and I were absolutely opposed to its passage but we felt like lone voices in the wilderness in our own community and that saddened us. Christians will happily protest laws that affront issues like marriage, sex, drugs, alcohol and parenting but on issues like freedom and civil liberty our voice is all often too quiet.

    Part of this is that we are not as educated a culture as we once were, we don’t know our history or properly understand our theology, we don’t value our freedom or understand how it works or why it is important to defend it even when we don’t feel like it is us under attack but we need to.

    A lot of people don’t even understand Foreshore and Seabed issue; they think it was about who owns the beaches and that the law was necessary to protect our beaches, our kiwi way of life. In Any Requests? Anonymous asked, “Why should the government potentially allow access to the beach denied to all New Zealanders?” The Ministerial Review Panel found that this concern was not limited to our anonymous commenter:

    Three key issues emerge from our review of submissions to the Select Committee which considered the Bill in 2004: public ownership, access and navigation, and protection of Māori customary interests in the foreshore and seabed. In our view, these issues remain at the very heart of ongoing concerns about the legislation. [Emphasis added]

    In all the submissions the amount that focused of the real problem were so negligible the panel didn’t list them. The majority missed the fact that this Act was passed to prevent a group of New Zealand citizens from taking a case to court, instead they wrote submissions about how that would affect them. The Act was and remains, a blatant breach of due process.

    Nevertheless, the passage of this Act had widespread support. Although the National party (then in opposition) voted against it, they ran a campaign promising to keep the beaches for all New Zealanders. Within the media and amongst society, debate about the Act was focused on the merits of the court case; totally missing the point that legislative denial of due process is wrong regardless of the merits of the case being brought.

    At this point a brief history is necessary due to the widespread misunderstanding about the case itself. In June 2003 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643. Public interest in this case was triggered by the reaction of the government to its decision and the way the media reported its significance.

    Eight Maori tribes claimed that the foreshore (the land between the high and low-water marks) and the seabed (the land below the low-water mark) of the Marlborough Sounds in the South Island of New Zealand, was “Maori customary land” (a Maori jurisprudence concept which is not the same concept as our western notion of fee simple ownership.) The tribes were not sure if the Maori Land Court, which is the court set up to hear historical Maori land claims against the government, had the jurisdiction to hear their case. There was dispute as to the effect of statutes regarding land and Common Law confusion over land ownership where that land is covered by water. The tribes went to the High Court to ask if they could take the case to the Maori Land Court and the case worked its way up to the Court of Appeal.

    In summary, the Court ruled that:

    • the Crown was wrong to contend that certain statutes affecting the foreshore and seabed had had the effect of extinguishing such Māori customary title as might exist; and
    • the Māori Land Court has jurisdiction, under Te Ture Whenua Māori/Māori Land Act 1993, to determine whether any part of the foreshore and seabed is still Māori customary land.

    While the decision gave rise to uncertainty regarding the “ownership” status of the foreshore and seabed, it also confirmed that this could be tested in the Māori Land Court. However, rather than let that process run its course, the government decided to legislate. The Act vested in the Crown title to all foreshore and seabed land not already in private ownership. It also made some provision for Māori customary interests to be recognised in limited circumstances.

    This case was about whether or not the Maori Land Court had the jurisdiction to hear a case. The case was not a ruling on whether the foreshore and seabed belonged to Maori or the Crown. This was a key issue that the media, the politicians and the public missed at the time.

    The ex-dean of the University of Waikato’s Law School, Margaret Wilson, was the Attorney-General at the time the Court of Appeal was deliberating. She had advised the government that there was no way the Court of Appeal would rule in favour of the appellants, she was not alone in that view, the majority in the legal profession thought that. She was wrong.

    When the government realised the error they realised there was a risk that ownership and access to the beach in the Marlborough Sounds area might be able to be handed to Ngati Apa, if the Maori Land Court heard the case and ruled that way. The political fallout from this was not something they wanted. New Zealanders love the beach. We are a small island with a lot of beautiful coastline; we all have summer memories that involve our coastline. The backlash against the government could be disastrous, the opposition could have a field-day, they may lose the next election… So they played on that fear and also on the impatience many have towards historical Maori land claims, the ‘gravy-train’ mentality, and they rammed through legislation that prevented the case ever being heard.

    The problem is that the right to due process trumps the right of the general public to enjoy the beach and the right for a government to not have negative media. If, in fact, Ngati Apa did have a legitimate claim to ownership then as much as we love the beach, the beach ain’t ours.

    Usually at this point in a discussion on the issue I am asked if I am Maori to which I throw my hands up. No, I am not Maori. It is just that I get the fact that just because I like something and enjoy it, it doesn’t make it mine and it doesn’t mean I can keep it when it is brought to my attention that it might belong to someone else. We can apply this to other spheres of life, we need to be willing to apply it even to big issues like this one.

    Another point to keep in mind is that Ngati Apa never got their day in court. It is not clear that they would have won. Many legal scholars felt they did not have a case – as we keep trying to point out in the smacking debate the mere fact someone can raise a legal issue does not mean they will always succeed – but they should have been allowed to try.

    “Public ownership, access and navigation and protection of Maori customary interests in the foreshore and seabed” are all implications of what might have been at stake had the case proceeded. Due process for Ngati Apa and the other tribes was taken by the passage of this Act.

    Fast forward to 2008. A new National government was elected, a confidence and supply agreement was drawn up between National and Maori Party (a party formed in protest to the Foreshore and Seabed Act). Policy concessions included National offering a review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act. At the time we were very pleased by this fact but less so by the detail and blogged to that effect; “It is a shame to see that National has not framed the issue in terms of the affront to due process and instead is talking about all New Zealander’s being able to access the beach, as if that is somehow more important than human rights.”

    Our fears were not unfounded, in addition to the claims made by some commentators that the specially created Ministerial Review Panel was stacked and directed as to which outcome to arrive at, the terms of reference were utterly wrong:

    a) What were the nature and extent of the mana whenua and public interests in the coastal marine area prior to Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643

    b) What options were available to the government to respond to the Court of Appeal decision in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643

    c) Whether the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 effectively recognises and provides for customary or aboriginal title and public interests (including Māori, local government and business) in the coastal marine area and maintains and allows for the enhancement of mana whenua

    d) If the Panel has reservations that the Foreshore and Seabed Act does not provide for the above, outline options on what could be the most workable and efficient methods by which both customary and public interests in the coastal marine area could be recognised and provided for; and in particular, how processes of recognising and providing for such interests could be streamlined

    The Panel will also need to consider how these processes will integrate with legislation that regulates the coastal marine area.

    Effectively the panel is acting in the place of the Waitangi Tribunal, the appropriate, already existing, independant investigative tribunal that examines the evidence and makes recommendations. The government is expected by everyone to and has already indicated it probably will follow the recommendations being made by the Ministerial Review Panel as it would be ‘too costly for it to go back to court.’

    Basically the government looks set to settle this case, out of court, on our behalf, when it is not clear that the government are guilty and not that long ago they denied a case existed on the part of Ngati Apa and many legal scholars agreed with them. Historical Maori land ownership claims are very difficult to prove. There were no deeds or titles issued in pre-european New Zealand and records consist of tribal stories, songs, carvings and so on. To succeed in an historical claim, even if a tribe could establish which part of land their ancestors had used and no other tribe was prepared to offer a counter claim to the land, the land in question has to have been in continual use by the tribe making the claim from at least 1840 through to the present day (unless it was unjustly dispossessed). Not only is it very possible Ngati Apa may not have succeeded, there would not be a huge risk of floodgates because each tribe would need to be able to establish this long chain of use and ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the area their ancestors historically lived.

    Regardless of which party is in power, the New Zealand government seems to be happy to have the land of its citizens taken without due process as long as it furthers their political popularity. The former government was willing to suspend due process of one group of citizens and unilaterally declare that the land in question belonged to a second group of citizens. The current government is willing to unilaterally declare that the land in question belongs to the first group and not the second and again it seems they are not going to allow a court to hear the evidence.

    The Ministerial Review Panel said sending the case back to court would be “protracted, laborious, and expensive” and the politicians appear to agree. It’s funny how selectively that card has been played of late, it wasn’t too expensive to create a special Ministerial Review Panel that duplicated the services of the existing Waitangi Tribunal and the Maori Land Court but apparently now everyone is concerned with cost. Due process is too expensive apparently; tell that to the authors of the Magna Carta who wrote:

    “No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law.”

    Due process is a concept enshrined in constitutions around the world – the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution states, “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ….” and in New Zealand: the Treaty of Waitangi, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the body of Common Law arising from the Magna Carta itself gives us the same legal rights.

    The government does not have the right to settle land disputes, where that land is held in trust for its citizens, without due process being observed. It was wrong when Labour did it and it will be wrong if National proceeds to do it.

    Send the case back to court. Sell the state owned television company if you need to fund it – a society where I can get ‘free’ entertainment but it is too expensive to uphold justice is a society with its priorities backwards.

    Summary Report of the Ministerial Review Panel on the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 4.
    Ibid.
    Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643.
    Ibid.
  • A Counter-Point on the David Bain Re-Trial

    David Farrar links to this interesting opinion piece in The Press on the David Bain re-trial, Plenty of Doubt in Bain Jury’s Verdict. While we normally do not link to media reports of trials, because the media tend to publish selective, sensational snippets of trials removed from their context, this piece is different. It is the opinion of a reporter present for virtually every minute of the trial and in the absence of the official court report it makes for very interesting reading – particularly the actions of Jury members that the reporter observed.
  • We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question

    … we’re confused that anyone could find it confusing. The referendum question is:

    Should a smack as part of good parental correction be a criminal offence in New Zealand?

    Should it or shouldn’t it? It seems pretty simple to me.
    According to TVNZ,

    Labour leader Phil Goff says the question implies that if you vote ‘yes’ that you’re in favour of criminal sanctions being taken against reasonable parents, when actually nobody believes that. [Emphasis added]

    Section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, the defence to the criminal charge of assault (“Every parent or person in place of a parent of a child is justified in using force by way of correction towards a child if that force is reasonable in the circumstances”) was part of our c r i m i n a l code. To reinstate s59 of the Crimes Act (or not) is the question.

    If Mr Goff wants anyone to believe that removing a defence from the Crimes Act will not have any bearing on criminal sanctions against those charged with assault he needs to stop being a legislator.

    Does making something a criminal offence mean that criminal sanctions should not be brought against those who commit the offence? If yes then it does not follow that giving a yes vote in the referendum means that you support criminal sanctions against those who smack their children. If the answer is no then it is already the case that criminal sanctions can be brought against offenders who smack their children because it is currently a criminal offence to do so – Goff’s claim that nobody advocates this is false because the Crimes Act does.

    The only people confused here are Goff, Key, Bradford who seem to not understand that if your action crosses the Crimes Act then your action is criminal. Twits.

    The only ambiguous, confusing thing about the law is the convoluted crap they inserted in place of s59. It reads like the sort of thing those who think they know a few things about the law write to impress their friends; read subsection (4) and see if you can work out what it means, it’s the bit that starts “to avoid doubt…” but then doesn’t (one wonders if Bradford wrote it herself, if someone with a law degree wrote it they should be up before the Bar).

    Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 No 18, Public Act

    New section 59 substituted
    Section 59 is repealed and the following section substituted:

    “59 Parental control
    “(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of—

    “(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or
    “(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or
    “(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or
    “(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting.

    “(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of correction.
    “(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1).
    “(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding with a prosecution.”

  • Defamation of the Acquitted – Some Advice

    Due to the presumption of innocence we are all supposed to accord an accused following a not guilty verdict, please do take care in suggesting and stating any disagreement you might have in regard to a court’s decision. Defamation is a real possibility in such instances and the defamed can sue the blog/site owner, in some instances the ISP, as well as the comment poster.

    Be aware that you can defame someone when you suggest or allude to your meaning as the court can imply both identity and meaning; if you have written it cryptically so people will get it without you saying it directly what makes you think that the court won’t?

    Stating it is your opinion is not a defence unless you can show your opinion is reasonably held and even then, unless you have the money to prove your defence in court it is wiser to not go there and to respect the presumption of innocence – you were not in that court room afterall. Don’t rely on a plaintiff’s broke status, that they won’t be able to afford to drag you into court; lawyers are far more willing to do pro-bono work when their client is legally famous.

    MandM do not moderate comments and allow anonymous contributors; however, as with spam, any comments posted on this blog that are defamatory will be deleted; legal defences for permitting publication of a defamatory viewpoint are much harder to succeed with. I suggest other bloggers watch their comments for this issue and be aware that even if you promptly delete it, you can still be sued even though you didn’t write it.

    From all of the above the so called “chilling effect” of defamation can be seen. Effectively what I am saying is that if you criticise the court’s finding or you claim the court got it wrong then effectively you are saying that the accused that the court ruled ‘not guilty’ is in fact guilty and you step into the realm of defamation law. Whilst I support the concept of reputation as property that one can defend at law, as reputation can directly affect the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness, I also support freedom of expression and the principle of openness and further, I strongly oppose a system that effectively renders the courts as infallible or unquestionable.

    Even though defences to defamation do exist that can, in some instances, support questioning of court and jury decisions, such as:

    • honest opinion – must be reasonably held,
    • truth – because defamation is a civil action in New Zealand, this will be held to the balance of probabilities, not reasonable doubt;
    These defences are expensive to mount, you could easily run up a legal bill of $20,000 plus and there is no guarantee you will succeed, most of us don’t have a spare 20k to throw at the things we say online so when confronted with the risk of having to we err on the side of caution and cede too much of our freedom of expression and our right to open trials; hence the chilling effect of defamation law.

    However, rather than do away with defamation law or deem reputation to not be a form of property – I think requiring people to think about not harming others before they open their mouths is not that unreasonable a limitation on freedom of expression – the problem could be solved by a revamp of how the law works. Either publicly fund access to justice so you can defend yourself when accused and protect your property when it is attacked – judges could keep a check on frivolous actions or make defamation a criminal offence, which would achieve the same thing.