Tag: Natural Theology

  • Comparing the Old & New Teleological Arguments

    Robin Collins

    The “New Teleological Argument” is a theistic argument which attempts to show that theism is more probable than the postulate of an “atheistic single universe”[i]. There are number of reasons why this argument is termed the “New” teleological argument. Chief among these reasons is that its explanandum i.e. the incredible fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics have only been discovered in the past 20-30 years[ii] [iii]. By contrast, the explanandum of “Old Teleological Arguments” has long since been available to theologians and philosophers of religion. Of course the relatively recent origin of the “New” Teleological argument is not the only feature which distinguishes it from its historical counterpart. Whereas historical versions of design arguments (such as Paley’s famous watchmaker argument) rest on an argument from analogy, contemporary versions of the argument rest on what the philosopher of biology Elliot Sober calls the “Likelihood Principle”[iv] [v]. In other words, rather than relying on an analogy between the explanandum and some obviously contrived entity such as (in Paley’s case) a watch, contemporary versions of the teleological argument argue that the explanandum (the fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics) is more probable given the hypothesis of theism as opposed to the postulate of an atheistic single universe[vi].

    The Conditions of Success
    Throughout the rest of this post, I hope to argue that, on purely philosophical grounds, there is little which will allow us to say which version of the argument (be it contemporary or historical) is more or less plausible. In this respect, it seems only fair that we should assess the strength of David Hume’s critiques, since they are popularly regarded as decisive refutations of teleological arguments.[vii] [viii] It’s important to note also, that while the failure of the Humean critiques would not guarantee the conclusion that the design arguments are equally plausible, it is suggestive thereof. After all, if the joint failure of natural theological and atheological arguments should suggest that it’s impossible to arbitrate (on the evidence) between theism and atheism, then similarly, the failure of stock arguments against either of the design arguments should lead us to think that it’s impossible to arbitrate between them.  In spite of the fact that both contemporary and historical versions of the design argument are equally plausible, I will argue that the contemporary version of the argument has a number of key dialectic advantages which may warrant us in thinking that it is “dialectically speaking”, more successful than its historical counterpart. More precisely, I am saying that the relative success of the new teleological argument is a function of the fact that it does not turn on premises that are as deeply controversial as the commitments required by the historical version.

    The Contemporary Version of the Argument
    The most prolific contemporary defender of the design argument is Robin Collins who, rather than arguing from facts about biology, argues from recent discoveries in physics[ix]. As we noted earlier, this is one of the main reasons why it is termed the “New” teleological argument. Collins frames his rendition of the argument as follows:

    (1)     The existence of fine tuning is not improbable under theism[x]

    (2)     The existence of fine tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xi]

    Therefore, given the prime principle of confirmation[1] [xii],

    (3)     The existence of fine tuning is evidence for theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xiii]

    By “fine tuning”, I mean the very precise arrangement of the fundamental laws and constants of physics that must be met in order for our Universe to fall into the very narrow life permitting range.[xiv] [xv] According to contemporary physics, these conditions seem to be arranged in such a way that, were they to vary by even the tiniest amount, life (or more precisely, sentient life) would not be a physical possibility. For example, as P.C.W. Davies points out, a change in “the weak force”[2] by only 1 part in 100100 would make the Universe uninhabitable.[xvi] Similarly, if the cosmological constant[3] were just a fraction faster, matter would spread apart so quickly that even relatively small clumps of matter would have insufficient time to form[xvii].

    The Plausibility of the Premises
    Premise (1) amounts to the claim that if God exists, then it is entirely within His creative capability to create the universe finely tuned as it is. Hence the observation that there is a universe which exhibits teleo-functional properties is not surprising given the postulate of theism. Considering that the traditional conception of God holds that He is an omnipotent being, this is a fairly straightforward premise that we should accept.

    Premise (2) amounts to the claim that if God does not exist and if the single universe hypothesis is true, then the apparent fine tuning of the universe is a very surprising fact. After all, the fundamental laws and constants of physics seem to be arranged in such a way that their placement seems guided. But if God doesn’t exist, it doesn’t seem likely that there would be any intelligent, guiding mind such that it could plausibly account for this apparent fine tuning. Hence premise (2) seems (more…)