The “New Teleological Argument” is a theistic argument which attempts to show that theism is more probable than the postulate of an “atheistic single universe”[i]. There are number of reasons why this argument is termed the “New” teleological argument. Chief among these reasons is that its explanandum i.e. the incredible fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics have only been discovered in the past 20-30 years[ii] [iii]. By contrast, the explanandum of “Old Teleological Arguments” has long since been available to theologians and philosophers of religion. Of course the relatively recent origin of the “New” Teleological argument is not the only feature which distinguishes it from its historical counterpart. Whereas historical versions of design arguments (such as Paley’s famous watchmaker argument) rest on an argument from analogy, contemporary versions of the argument rest on what the philosopher of biology Elliot Sober calls the “Likelihood Principle”[iv] [v]. In other words, rather than relying on an analogy between the explanandum and some obviously contrived entity such as (in Paley’s case) a watch, contemporary versions of the teleological argument argue that the explanandum (the fine tuning of the laws and constants of physics) is more probable given the hypothesis of theism as opposed to the postulate of an atheistic single universe[vi].
The Conditions of Success
Throughout the rest of this post, I hope to argue that, on purely philosophical grounds, there is little which will allow us to say which version of the argument (be it contemporary or historical) is more or less plausible. In this respect, it seems only fair that we should assess the strength of David Hume’s critiques, since they are popularly regarded as decisive refutations of teleological arguments.[vii] [viii] It’s important to note also, that while the failure of the Humean critiques would not guarantee the conclusion that the design arguments are equally plausible, it is suggestive thereof. After all, if the joint failure of natural theological and atheological arguments should suggest that it’s impossible to arbitrate (on the evidence) between theism and atheism, then similarly, the failure of stock arguments against either of the design arguments should lead us to think that it’s impossible to arbitrate between them. In spite of the fact that both contemporary and historical versions of the design argument are equally plausible, I will argue that the contemporary version of the argument has a number of key dialectic advantages which may warrant us in thinking that it is “dialectically speaking”, more successful than its historical counterpart. More precisely, I am saying that the relative success of the new teleological argument is a function of the fact that it does not turn on premises that are as deeply controversial as the commitments required by the historical version.
The Contemporary Version of the Argument
The most prolific contemporary defender of the design argument is Robin Collins who, rather than arguing from facts about biology, argues from recent discoveries in physics[ix]. As we noted earlier, this is one of the main reasons why it is termed the “New” teleological argument. Collins frames his rendition of the argument as follows:
(1) The existence of fine tuning is not improbable under theism[x]
(2) The existence of fine tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xi]
Therefore, given the prime principle of confirmation[1] [xii],
(3) The existence of fine tuning is evidence for theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis[xiii]
By “fine tuning”, I mean the very precise arrangement of the fundamental laws and constants of physics that must be met in order for our Universe to fall into the very narrow life permitting range.[xiv] [xv] According to contemporary physics, these conditions seem to be arranged in such a way that, were they to vary by even the tiniest amount, life (or more precisely, sentient life) would not be a physical possibility. For example, as P.C.W. Davies points out, a change in “the weak force”[2] by only 1 part in 100100 would make the Universe uninhabitable.[xvi] Similarly, if the cosmological constant[3] were just a fraction faster, matter would spread apart so quickly that even relatively small clumps of matter would have insufficient time to form[xvii].
The Plausibility of the Premises
Premise (1) amounts to the claim that if God exists, then it is entirely within His creative capability to create the universe finely tuned as it is. Hence the observation that there is a universe which exhibits teleo-functional properties is not surprising given the postulate of theism. Considering that the traditional conception of God holds that He is an omnipotent being, this is a fairly straightforward premise that we should accept.
Premise (2) amounts to the claim that if God does not exist and if the single universe hypothesis is true, then the apparent fine tuning of the universe is a very surprising fact. After all, the fundamental laws and constants of physics seem to be arranged in such a way that their placement seems guided. But if God doesn’t exist, it doesn’t seem likely that there would be any intelligent, guiding mind such that it could plausibly account for this apparent fine tuning. Hence premise (2) seems more plausibly true than false.
Assuming then, that something much like Sober’s likelihood principle is true, it follows that theism is more probable than the atheistic single universe hypothesis. What’s important to notice however, is that this conclusion is entirely consistent with the claim that the universe is not designed. After all, the atheist might agree that theism is more probable than the atheistic single universe hypothesis, but think that, in actual fact, we live in a multi-verse. Hence Collins’ design argument does not purport to establish that theism is probable tout court. Were this the end of the argument, we would have to say that, as a piece of natural theology, it is quite unsuccessful since it does not attempt to convince non-theists to become theists.
This of course is not the end of the argument. The multi-verse theory holds that there is an infinite number of other universes each with different fundamental laws and constants of physics. In such a situation, so the argument goes, a finely tuned universe such as the one we observe is not just probable but inevitable.[xviii] Put very simply, the invocation of multi-verse theory at this stage of the argument is an attempt to raise the probability of the fine tuning.[xix] However, there are two points that the theist can make. On the one hand, the theist can appeal to the simplicity criterion to show that there’s still reason to prefer theism over the multi-verse theory. Whereas the multi-verse hypothesis postulates an infinite number of universes, with an infinitely large number of variegated and discrete parts, theism postulates just a single entity constituted of a single substance. The upshot is that whereas God is a remarkably simple entity, the postulate of the multi-verse is, to put it lightly, ontologically un-parsimonious. Hence all else being equal, it seems that theism would be a preferable alternative over the multi-verse hypothesis. Furthermore, it is debatable as to whether the multi-verse hypotheses escape the problem of fine tuning. It has been noted by some, that the most favoured contemporary multi-verse theory, Inflationary theory, must invoke a finely tuned set of initial conditions to explain away some of the observed fine tunings such as the apparent homogeneity and flatness of the Universe.[xx]
The Historical Version of the Argument
The most prolific historical proponent of the design argument was William Paley who argued that various biological organisms exhibit what we might call “teleo-functional complexity”.[xxi] [xxii] That is, they have parts which interact in such a way as to achieve a particular purpose. More precisely, the interaction of these parts is such that were one of those parts absent, the entity would cease to function. Paley argues that it is the presence of this property which allows us to discern that an obviously contrived entity such as a watch is designed.[xxiii] Analogously, Paley argued, if teleo-functional complexity in watches is to be accounted for in terms of design, similarly we must also account for the origin of certain biological organisms in terms of design since they also exhibit this property.[xxiv] Hence by analogy, the origin of certain biological organisms is best explained in terms of design. Paley’s argument has, quite aptly, become known as “The Watch
maker Argument”. For the sake of brevity, we can schematize Paley’s argument as follows:
(1) Purposely designed instruments such as watches exhibit teleo-functional complexity[xxv]
(2) Certain biological organisms also exhibit teleo-functional complexity[xxvi]
Therefore by analogy,
(3) Certain biological organisms are purposely designed.[xxvii]
Contrasting the Arguments & Dealing with Criticisms
The first thing to note is that, unlike historical design arguments, contemporary versions are not arguments from analogy. Rather, they argue that given theism, the fine tuning we observe in the Universe is to be expected more so than it would be given the postulate of an atheistic single universe. It is precisely because the contemporary version of the argument does not rest on this argument from analogy that it is, dialectically speaking, more effective than its historical counter-part. As Hume rightly pointed out, an argument from analogy is only as good as the analogy.[xxviii] Hence Paley’s version of the argument inevitably requires its defender to engage in a protracted discussion of the relevance of various differences between a watch and some fact about the world. By contrast, in virtue of the fact that they don’t rely on this analogy, contemporary versions of the argument do not require their defenders to engage in any such discussion. Hence contemporary renditions of the design argument, remain immune to any attack on the propriety of the analogy.
Furthermore, insofar as evolution by natural selection is a well supported scientific theory, it seems that Paley’s watchmaker argument breaks down.[xxix] If grant we grant this fact, it would seem to follow that the contemporary rendition of the design argument is straightforwardly more plausible than its historical counterpart. After all, the latter version attempts only to argue to design from facts about physics rather than facts about biology. However, a discussion of the evidence for evolution by natural selection is beyond the purely philosophical scope of this paper. So let us, for the sake of charity, proceed as if evolution by natural selection is not a well established scientific theory. With that said however, there is something to be said for the dialectic success of an argument from design which does not require its defenders to run against the grain of the mainstream scientific community, and which altogether circumvent any form of Darwinian attack.
One of the most common criticisms of design arguments comes from Hume’s writing in his “Dialogues concerning Natural Religion” wherein he argues that to assert that this designer is “God”[4] is to go beyond the evidence. We must never, so Hume argues, “ascribe to any cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect”. In other words, we must ascribe to the cause only what is minimally required to produce the effect (the fine tuning of the cosmos or the teleo-functional complexity of biological organisms).[xxx] In order to help us see this point, Alvin Plantinga (in his eloquent little book “God, Freedom and Evil”) spells out what the theist believes. He states that the theistic hypothesis holds, inter alia, that:
- Some things in the universe (including the universe) were designed;[xxxi]
- Some things in the universe (including the universe) were designed by exactly one person;[xxxii]
- The Universe was created ex nihilo.[xxxiii]
Hume’s objection, Plantinga states, is that the argument from design gives us only some evidence for 1 but does not do anything to support 2 and 3.[xxxiv] However, while Hume is right to point out that the design argument does not of itself give us any evidence for 2 and 3, the proponent of the design argument is not debarred from engaging in a conceptual analysis of what a plausible designer might be like. It may be that by engaging in just such a conceptual analysis, the proponent of the design argument can recover a number of theologically significant attributes. For example, it would not do to postulate that designer was a physical being which exhibits teleo-functional complexity akin to that for which Paley demands explanation in terms of intelligent design. After all, if the designer did exhibit such teleo-functional complexity, and teleo-functional complexity demands design, then we cannot without special pleading, halt the regress at the designer. We are off on a potentially infinite regress. Indeed this serves as the basis for one of Hume’s critiques of design arguments.[xxxv] But notice that this reductio applies only to the supposition that the designer is a physical being which exhibits teleo-functional complexity. It does not refute the inference to design outright. After all, the theistic concept of God is that He is a fundamentally “simple” being, where the term “simple” is cashed out in terms of being without distinct parts that interact with one-another. God, so it is said, is an immaterial mind that is made of a single, non material substance.[xxxvi] In such a situation, it’s unclear at best, that the designer exhibits the kind of teleo-functional complexity that Paley argues requires design. Thus it’s unclear that the designer requires design. Similarly, although it is logically possible, it would not do to postulate that a multitude of intelligent designers. After all, in Hume’s own terms, it would go beyond the evidence. In Hume’s own terms, we must only postulate that which is sufficient to account for the effect. If a single designing entity is so sufficient, we should need extra reason for postulating a multitude of designing minds. Hence already, we have some suggestion (by no means an airtight guarantee) that a plausible candidate designer would be a single, non-material entity.
However, where Hume is un-controversially correct, is in asserting that even after this conceptual analysis, we are not taken to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. However, the argument from design was never intended to prove any such thing. Indeed in some cumulative case arguments[5] for theism, the argument from design is intended only to raise the antecedent probability of theism such that the apologist can, further down the line, make a case for the truth of their particular faith tradition e.g. through appealing to alleged miracles without the antecedent probability being vanishingly small.[xxxvii] The important point to note however is just that in this context, Hume’s comments, while quite correct, are not really criticisms.
However, Hume has a number of more weighty objections to design arguments. The first of these objections claims that there exists a dis-analogy between obviously designed objects such as watches and biological organisms. This dis-analogy, so Hume argues, consists in that we have not observed the intelligent designing of the biological organisms whereas we have observed the intelligent designing of contrived objects such as watches.[xxxviii] However, in his seminal book “Natural Theology”, Paley himself has a very good response to this objection. He says:
“Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made; that we had never known an artist capable of making one; that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed; all this being no more than what is true of the remains of ancient art, of some lost arts, and, to the generality of all man-kind, of the more curious productions of modern manufacture. Does one man in a million know how an oval frame is turned? ignorance of this kind exalts our opinion of the unseen and unknown artists skill…but raises no doubt in our minds of the existence and agency of such an artist…”[xxxix]
In other words, our failure to observe the intelligent designing of biological organisms does little to undermine the inference to design. We can put Paley’s point here more forcefully, suppose we were to travel to a distant star system and on one of the (dead) planets therein, we discovered some machinery. In spite of the fact that we have, hitherto no experience with aliens intelligently designing such machinery, we would be obtuse to think that there was no analogy between the apparent design of this alien machinery, and the design present in human machinery.
But supposing we grant that Paley’s analogy is fatally flawed. There still is no in principle objection[6] that has been levied against design arguments. As we noted earlier, the contemporary version of the argument rests on the Likelihood Principle, and not on an analogy.
As of yet, we have seen little in the way of a philosophical refutation of either the historical or the contemporary version of the design argument. Hence it is hard to say if one version of the argument is more or less plausible than the other. However, insofar as the contemporary version of the argument does not rest on premises that are as controversial as those involved in the watchmaker analogy, we might say that it is, dialectically speaking, more effective than its historical counterpart. Such renditions of the argument do not require their proponents to take on the added burden of having to move against the grain of contemporary scientific orthodoxy. Nor does it require its defender to defend a potentially questionable analogy.
[1] a.k.a “The Likelihood Principle”. This stipulates that some observation O counts as evidence for some hypothesis H over some other hypothesis H* just in case O is more probable given H than H*.
[2] The force which causes radioactive decay in sub-atomic particles.
[3] The force Einstein introduced into the general theory of relativity which causes space to expand.
[4] “God” is taken to mean the Personal OmniGod of the mainstream monotheistic traditions.
[5] A “cumulative case arguments” is, roughly speaking, a particular dialectic strategy wherein a multitude of arguments are brought in to collectively support a particular hypothesis.
[6] By an “in principle” objection, I mean an objection that would, forever and always, rule out the possibility of arguing to design in natural theology.
[i] Collins, Robin. “God, Design and Fine-Tuning”. In “God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion”. Edited by Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. Pages 1-24. New York. New York: Longman Press. 2002. pp 5. Line 25-26.
[ii]Craig, William Lane. “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics”. Wheaton Illinois. Crossway Books. 2008. pp 157. Line 1-2.
[iii] Collins, Robin. “God, Design and Fine-Tuning”. In “God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion”. Edited by Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. Pages 1-24. New York. New York: Longman Press. 2002. pp. 2. Line 2-4.
[iv]Ibid. pp 6. Line 15-27.
[v]Sober, Elliot. “Philosophy of Biology”. Boulder Colorado. Westview Press. 1993. pp 31. Line 33-36.
[vi]Collins, Robin. “God, Design and Fine-Tuning”. In “God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion”. Edited by Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. Pages 1-24. New York. New York: Longman Press. 2002. pp 5 line 25-26.
[vii]Craig, William Lane. “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics”. Wheaton Illinois. Crossway Books. 2008. pp 158. Line 2-4.
[viii] Sober, Elliot. “Philosophy of Biology”. Boulder Colorado. Westview Press. 1993. pp. 30 lines 11-14/33-36.
[ix] Collins, Robin. “God, Design and Fine-Tuning”. In “God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion”. Edited by Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. Pages 1-24. New York. New York: Longman Press. 2002. pp 2. Line 11-14.
[x] Ibid. pp 7. Line 33.
[xi] Ibid. pp 8. Line 1-2.
[xii] Ibid. pp 8. Line 4.
[xiii] Ibid. pp 8. Line 4-6.
[xiv] Ibid. pp 2. Line 16-17.
[xv] Craig, William Lane. “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics”. Wheaton Illinois. Crossway Books. 2008. pp 158. Line. 13-16.
[xvi] Ibid. pp 25. Line 25-26.
[xvii] Collins, Robin. “God, Design and Fine-Tuning”. In “God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion”. Edited by Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. Pages 1-24. New York. New York: Longman Press. 2002. pp 4. Line 3-7.
[xviii] Ibid. pp 16-17.
[xix] William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland. “Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview”. Downers Grove Illinois. InterVarsity Press. 2003. pp. 487.
[xx] Meyer, Stephen C. “Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design”. New York. Harper Collins. 2009. pp 505-507.
[xxi] Davies, Brian. “Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion”. New York. Oxford University Press. 2004. pp. 75.
[xxii] Craig, William Lane. “Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics”. Wheaton Illinois. Crossway Books. 2008. pp 101.
[xxiii] Davies, Brian. “Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion”. New York. Oxford University Press. 2004. pp. 75.
[xxiv] Ibid.
[xxv] Sober, Elliot. “Philosophy of Biology”. Boulder Colorado. Westview Press. 1993. pp. 33.
[xxvi] Ibid. pp. 34.
[xxvii] Ibid.
[xxviii]Ibid.
[xxix] Ibid. pp 36.
[xxx] Davies, Brian. “Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion”. New York. Oxford University Press. 2004. pp. 77-78.
[xxxi] Plantinga, Alvin. “God, Freedom and Evil”. Grand Rapids Michigan. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 1977. pp 83-84.
[xxxii] Ibid.
[xxxiii] Ibid.
[xxxiv] Ibid.
[xxxv] Davies, Brian. “Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion”. New York. Oxford University Press. 2004. pp. 78.
[xxxvi] William Lane Craig and James Porter Moreland. “Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview”. Downers Grove Illinois. InterVarsity Press. 2003. pp. 526.
[xxxvii] Draper, Paul. “Cumulative Cases”. In “A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion: Second Edition”. Edited by: Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper and Phillip L. Quinn. Malden Massachussets. Blackwell Publishing. 2010. Page 1 of Draper’s chapter.
[xxxviii] Davies, Brian. “Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion”. New York. Oxford University Press. 2004. pp. 78.
[xxxix] Paley, William. “An Especially Famous Design Argument”. In “Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology”. Edited by Brian Davies. New York. Oxford University Press. 2000. pp 254.
Tags: Apologetics · Design Arguments · Evolution · Fine-Tuning · Natural Theology · Philosophy of Religion · Robin Collins · Teleological Arguments · The Likelihood Principle · William Paley78 Comments
A common objection to belief in the God of the Bible is that a good, kind, and loving deity would never command the wholesale slaughter of nations. In the tradition of his popular Is God a Moral Monster?, Paul Copan teams up with Matthew Flannagan to tackle some of the most confusing and uncomfortable passages of Scripture. Together they help the Christian and nonbeliever alike understand the biblical, theological, philosophical, and ethical implications of Old Testament warfare passages.
Hi,
Great post!
Would just like to point out in regards to this:
“Some things in the universe (including the universe) were designed by exactly one person;[xxxii] ”
We actually think it was created by exactly THREE persons, (one Divine being.)
Cheers,
Rosjier
If this is a good summary of the arguments for theism then I must say I expected more. While I agree that the watch analogy breaks down very quickly and must be replaced with an argument from the universe itself, the number of assumptions one must swallow for the new argument to work make quite a meal.
Fine tuning does not hold alot of water and assumes a ‘tuner’ before the argument is even made for one.
In addition the author talks about the physical makeup of the god who did the tuning as though describing known phenomena.
How could one argument be a “good summary of the arguments for theism”? Just wondering.
Sorry Glen, I suppose I mean teleological arguments.
@John
Why would you presume it is a summary and not just a comparison of two arguments?
also
How can you read this and then say you agree that the watch analogy breaks down?
also
‘a lot’ is two words.
I think Andrew’s article actually demonstrates why the scientific revolution required a fundamental break away from the grip of medieval and religious philosophy and from theology. The tone of his article is not to find out how things are, and why they are, which science does (and humanity requires) but how to opportunistically use what may or may not be known to argue for the existence of a god or gods.
A couple of points:
1: Paley’s argument from design did not suddenly become bad in 1859 when Darwin published his great book. It was bad from the start. And similarly the fine tuning argument for gods is not good now because scientifically we don’t understand why the fundamental constants have the values they have. Nor does it suddenly become bad when we do explain why they have the values they have. The argument itself is fundamentally bad because it does not have the intention of explaining any facts of reality – it purely has the purpose of trying to prop up a preconceived belief.
In the process it explains things by saying “god did it!” That is never an explanation because it is an argument from ignorance. It neither includes a structured hypothesis of the god being used, or the mechanism used by the god.
2: I have written before about the dishonesty behind a lot of the fine tuning arguments. In Fiddling with “fine-tuning” ) I showed how both Hugh Ross and William Lane Craig have disingenuously misrepresented the situation with respect to the cosmological constant and fine tuning. And Andrew persists in this distortion because he is relying on people like Craig as a source of scientific information. Craig is not scientist.
Andrew claims “if the cosmological constant[3] were just a fraction faster, matter would spread apart so quickly that even relatively small clumps of matter would have insufficient time to form[xvii].” He relies on assertions like this from Craig: “The cosmological constant is inexplicably fine-tuned to around one part in 10120. This amazing fine tuning 1 part in 10120 is very often repeated by religious apologists, theologians and philosophers of religion.
But it is just not true.
These apologists have made this mistake because of their opportunist approach. They using scientific knowledge like a drunk uses a lamppost – purely for support – not illumination.
The cosmological constant is not required to have such a precise value. Martin Rees say only “Our existence requires that [the cosmological constant] should not have been too large.”
The 10120 relates not to the sensitivity of the value it can have – but to the fact that we just don’t yet have a good explanation for what it, or dark energy, is. A reasonable explanation would have been vacuum energy but that is too big by a factor of 10120. As Lawrence Krauss says this must be the biggest discrepancy ever found in physics. (Fine tuning only comes into the frame when we try to reach a value for the cosmological constant by balancing out dark energy with other candidates).
Theologians and religious philosophers are not the only ones to make that mistake. However, they may have been responsible, through people like Craig and Ross, for getting the mistake into the literature where others can dogmatically repeat it. Andrew is doing so because it fits his argument. A common theological tactic.
And that is the problem with theology and religious philosophy. It does not have the aim of discovering what reality really is and how it works (scientific aims). It simply has the aim of justifying how they would like reality to be.
You can see why the break with that sort of philosophy enabled science to take off and becomes so useful to humanity.
Bugger – comments don’t allow the tag.
Please read 10120 as 10^120.
I have never been that impressed by the fine tuning argument. I follow the argument but do not agree with the premises. It is fine as far as you accept that the universe is fine turned, I admit that the apparent size of the sun and the moon being equivalent is suggestive, but many of the other goldilocks values are just not that impressive. There is no reason to think that c, or h, or µ couldn’t be otherwise.
I have more time for Paley’s argument. I think that the teleological and moral arguments for theism are the best.
Paley’s argument is improved when reformulated, and is thus true by induction. Design can be reformulated as information. Information can be shown empirically to require information of equal or greater content to form. By induction we formulate a law of information content. Thus if information can be demonstrated in an object we know that an originator of equal or higher information content made it.
Reformulating Paley
(1) Purposely designed instruments such as watches contain (message) information.
(2) All information containing objects derive from greater information sources [are designed].
(3) Biological organisms contain information.
Therefore
(4) Biological organisms derive from a greater information source [are (purposely) designed].
Rosjier, what I think the author was saying wasthat any argument from analogy, if taken too far, ends up becoming about the application of the analogy and therefore has limited use. I’m not saying it’s useless but it ‘breaks down ‘ at some point.
Bethyada, how is (2) empirically shown? Are you referring to only certain types of information?
Ken,
If you think that the design argument is an argument from ignorance, then you don’t understand the argument. The argument, at least as it has been formulated by philosophical defenders such as Collins, rests on a method in science referred to as “Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis”, where we consider a pairwise analysis of the probability that each hypothesis assigns to the observed facts. This is quite different from an argument from ignorance which proceeds merely by saying “well I don’t know how it happened, so Goddunnit”.
Moreover, it generally pays to assume the best about a person before assuming the worst about a person. So far as I know Ken, this is really the first time that you and I have “crossed swords” as it were. So I ask that you refrain from assuming that I am just like every other Christian apologist/theologian who is out to do only that which will benefit my argument.
Bethayada,
As far as reformulating Paley goes, I might recommend Elliot Sober’s work. He suggests that the Watchmaker argument is best thought of not as an argument from analogy, but as an Inference to the Best Explanation. More precisely, he contends that it’s best formulation comes when it makes use of the Likelihood principle which Collins’ argument uses.
Sober is an atheist/naturalist and highly critical of design arguments (and Paley’s in particular), but he is considerably more charitable that Ken and co.
@John,
Rosjier is quite correct. This is not supposed to be a summary of Teleological Arguments. It is a comparison of two versions of the argument. If this were a summary, I would have titled this essay “A Summary of Teleological Arguments”.
@Ken,
I would also point out that my theological commitments are such that I am not committed to the soundness of any argument for theism. It would entirely consistent with the truth of my theological stance that the entire Natural Theological project be a failure.
So claim that I am doing natural theology in the same way that a drunk uses a lamp-post (aside from being unnecessarily rude) is just plain false. As it is, I am not committed to the success of ANY piece of natural theology let alone the teleological argument. In truth then, my position allows me to be more open to the possibilities than atheism or various other forms of theism.
John,
“the number of assumptions one must swallow for the new argument to work make quite a meal”.
Such as? The likelihood principle? philosophers of science generally recognize that the likelihood principle is a well founded principle of bayesian reasoning.
The design argument is a reductionist argument where physical parts identify a whole that is itself not physical. Complexity is an anthropomorphic, and unnecessary elaboration on that.
But simply, the fact that parts don’t introduce the whole should knock down the design argument as a coherent strategy for both pro’s and anti’s.
Isn’t it that simple?
I’d list these as your assumptions. Happy to be corrected.
Assumptions :
1. The existence of fine tuning
2. A universe which exhibits teleo-functional properties
3. He is an omnipotent being, this is a fairly straightforward premise that we should accept.
4. The fundamental laws and constants of physics seem to be arranged in such a way that their placement seems guided.
5. Assuming then, that something much like Sober’s likelihood principle is true, it follows …
6. theism postulates just a single entity constituted of a single substance
7. let us, for the sake of charity, proceed as if evolution by natural selection is not a well established scientific theory.
@John,
Those are assumptions that I make for the sake of the essay not assumptions that the design argument itself makes. Of your list, the only assumptions relevant to the new teleological argument are, 1,4 and 5.
Moreover, of those assumptions that are relevant to the new teleological argument, the only ones that I can see as being even remotely difficult to swallow or, in your terms “make a meal of it”, are 1 and 4 (I might also add that 1 and 4 are essentially the same assumption). But even then, the existence of apparent fine tuning is a well established fact in contemporary astrophysics. I might point out that contemporary atheists don’t tend to reject the existence of fine tuning (although some might), rather the vast majority tend to try and figure out a way to explain the fine tuning within a thoroughgoing atheistic ontology.
Finally, I can’t see why the assumption that evolution by natural selection is a well established theory is an assumption that should make a meal out of swallowing the new teleological argument. The fact is, and i’m sure you’ll agree, evolution by natural selection IS a well established theory. Moreover, as i’v pointed out, objecting to the New Teleological argument on the grounds that evolution by natural selection is a well established theory is a category mistake.
I would also note, that within the grand scheme of things, the teleological argument contributes comparatively little in the natural theological project.
As Plantinga (and Hume) point out, the teleological argument provides only SOME evidence for ONE PART of the entire theistic hypothesis (assuming of course that theism is to be taken as an explanatory hypothesis).
So the success of the teleological argument is entirely consistent with the success of the natural atheistic project if the atheologian can provide sufficient outweighing evidence from other areas. The combined force of the problem of evil and the problem of “Divine Hiddenness” may overwhelm the probability conferred on theism by the existence of fine tuning. That assumes of course that there is no other theistic argument and that the natural theologian fails to appropriately dispel with the argument from evil and the problem of divine hiddenness.
Andrew – you have jumped to an unwarranrted conclusion. My reference to drunks related to Ross and Craig.
I don’t think I have at all maligned you. Please don’t take things I have said personally – I have made serious comments.
This is not “crossing swords”, far from it – its a matter of dealing with flaws in your article. Bloody hell,. I don’t get this sort of personal response from scientists. They usally welcome critiques amed at improving their ideas.
I did put up some arguemnts which you ignored. The question of distortion of the science around fine tuning, the cosmological constant, was specific. You could choose to deal with that objection – or you could ignore it and continue to use the argument of Ross and Craig. I would be interested to know how you react to such questions before judging you.
I am not satisfied by your justification by reference to “a method in science referred to as “Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis”.
In science when we talk about a hypothesis it is a concept with far more strructure (and hence possibility of testing against reality) than a mere “god did it ” argument – and that is what ID is.
(If you have a structured hypothesis please present it – you have not done so but I am all eyes.)
That is why the ID argument was bad – there was nothing there. When a scientific mechanism arose (and you must admit Darwin’s hypothesis was scientific in that it was structured and supported by emperical validation) concepts of ID collapsed. But before that it may have convinced some people by default.
Today the same default argument is used. No way is “god did it” a good hypothesis to compare against any scientific speculation.
When scientists use the term “dark energy” it is used as a place holder – not an explanatory hypothesis. We can speculate on likely hypoothesis (as I said simple vacuum energy fails) but we are happy to say we don’t know and keep looking.
The god did it argument is not a proper hypotheses. But believers use it as an explanation, not a placeholder. That is why the god did it “explanation of fine tuning is a bad argument now when science knows it has not got a hypothesis. Because it stops people from proper investigation. I
The “god did it” default assertion is why some believers (a disgustingly large proportion) actually still see intelligent design as an explanation and refuse to contemplate proper hypothetical or theoretical proven mechanisms.
@Ken,
As for the personal comments. Please don’t pretend as if you didn’t accuse me of including something in my argument merely because it benefits my argument. In this regard, you have said:
“Andrew is doing so because it fits his argument. A common theological tactic”.
In short, you are accusing me of intellectual dishonesty. If that isn’t a personal attack, i’m really not sure what is.
Moreover, you didn’t respond to my point that the teleological argument makes use of the Method of Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis, you merely asserted that you were not satisfied with it. That’s a statement of your psychological response to my claim…not an argument.
As far as actually offering an argument that is not an inference from ignorance: I defer you to the essay itself. Here I attempted to assess the probability that each hypothesis assigns to the observed facts.
In this regard, I repeated Collins’ version of the argument:
(1) The existence of fine tuning is not improbable under theism
(2) The existence of fine tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis
Therefore, given the prime principle of confirmation
(3) The existence of fine tuning is evidence for theism over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis
In other words, the theistic hypothesis assigns a higher probability to the existence of fine tuning than does the hypothesis of a single universe without a God. This is not an inference from ignorance. If it was, I would have argued something along the lines of “well scientists don’t know how this happened, so God must have done it”. Is there anywhere in my essay where I say anything of that sort?
Moreover, in science, scientists used the Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis all the time.
When you look at Darwin’s argument in the Origin of Species. You notice that Darwin draws on something rather like it in arguing that Evolution by Natural Selection makes a variety of facts, e.g. similarity in the bone morphology in a wide variety of species more probable than does special creationism. I think that Darwin’s argument in this regard is sound, and so do most scientists and philosophers of science.
This is precisely what Collins draws on when constructing a design argument from the fine tuning of the universe.
No Andrew – I don’t accuse you of intellectual dishonesty. Just of being human. We all intuitively think that way; look for evidence to support our preconceived models. We evolved to be lawyers, not scientists.
Doing science requires processes to challenge that sort of thinking – it doesn’t come naturally. The social natural of science and mapping ideas against reality are two. I have often been picked up by colleagues for using evidence in that way, and have similarly pulled up colleagues. We generally appreciate this sort of peer review. Perhaps because of this sort of social critique I often become aware these days when I find myself falling into the “drunk using a lamppost for support mode.” (By the way that is not a personal slur – just a simple explanation)
This issue becomes important when we consider the basic epistemological conflict between science and religion.
1: But first: What about the cosmological constant. Either you have used that incorrectly (and if so should appreciate someone pointing that out to you) or you believe it to be justified. If so, could you please explain? For my benefit – because I really like to know when I am wrong – and I can’t see it in this case.
2: My comments on your use of the “Method of Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis” relates to what ‘s understood by “hypothesis.” – as I thought I explained. As a scientists I have often automatically used this. But always with hypotheses that are structured – not a vague “god did it” argument. Because the word hypothesis does mean something structured it is possible to compare hypotheses by judging how they related to existing scientific knowledge and how their predictions pan out when mapped against reality.
As you point out Darwin’s hypotheses were structured – but I can not see how you think that is true of ID. Such “explanations” really just do boil down to “god did it” type arguments which are an argument from ignorance. Newton may have fallen back on that argument when he couldn’t explain the planetary plane and in terms of scientific progress his “explanation” was only a placeholder.
Excuse me if my judgement is harsh when I refer to the “god did it” explanation. I really haven’t any other way of describing it. If I am wrong please provide the actual structured hypotheses you are referring to. Or detail how Collins has explained fine tuning with a “design” hypothesis.
At this stage I just don’t see it.
And really the terms ”theistic hypothesis”, “atheistic single-universe hypothesis” or “under theism” are meaningless. They are not hypotheses.
3: I think there is a fundamental difference in the approach you have taken in this article and the one taken by science (one of the reasons why I find your reference to a scientific use of “Method of Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis” rather weird.
Your article (and a lot of the discussions around here) are of the form of an argument for your god. Design argument, morality argument, etc. As I said above that is the lawyers approach (the natural one).
However, the scientific approach is to ask, why do organisms fit with their environment, why are we moral, how does our moral system work, why do a few cosmological and physical fundamental constants have the values they do, etc.
There is a real advantage of approaching things this way because it helps avoid (but of course doesn’t prevent) starting with preconceived notions and then only working to “prove” them).
That is why I pointed out that you article actually provided an example of this different sort of thinking and why the scientific process required overcoming the old epistemology.
4:It’s unfortunate you take my critique personally – I assure you I am not playing the man – I am interested in the science of these claims you are making. I would certainly welcome any similar criticisms you would make of my writing.
Please don’t forget the cosmological constant – it’s important.
The term “hypothesis” should be clear. And, at least in context, I have used it in its proper sense.
I take the term “hypothesis”, to mean, inter alia, a set of propositions that can make predictions. “Design”, taken in this context, is merely the claim that there exists some intelligence capable of bringing about an effect. Surely such a postulate predicts, or at least make the existence of fine tuning more probable than a universe in which no such designer exists.
Moreover, even if it’s the case that the example of the cosmological constant is misplaced there are many more instances of fine tuning that I could point to.
What exactly does the word “moreover” actually accomplish?
What does it accomplish to question the place of a single word that is not actually related to the essay itself?
Andrew, does it not concern you that I have pointed out a factual error in your article? Personally I would express gratitude and quickly make the correction.
It’s perhaps an understandable error on your part but I hardly see the need to defend it by leaving it in. As you say there are actual cases of true fine-tuning – why poison the well with the error.
And I would dearly love to know if I am mistaken. Why don’t you check it out – using scientific sources, not Craig?
There are other issues with the fine-tuning issue – not my intention to get into them here (Stenger’s recent book should be a good summary if you are interested). My advice to you though is that it is a trap for theists in the same way that the Big Bang theory was when Pope Pius started using it as a proof for his god and had to be warned by his advisors.
Hypotheses make predictions which are testable (otherwise we call it speculation). And this arises from them having structure – which I don’t see in your god idea.
To claim “fine tuning more probable than a universe in which no such designer exists.” is just an example of wishful thinking. Not prediction. Why should an intelligent manufacturer of universes insist on fine tuning? And why should not the ordinary properties of matter lead to situations where parameters are ideally suited to environments, or physical constants have values that ate possible and not values that are impossible?
You haven’t provided a mechanism for either because you don’t have a structured hypothesis. If you did someone could set about testing the predictions.
What you have written here is neither a structured hypothesis or it’s testing. It is wishful thinking.
Andrew, just an extra regarding relevant structured hypotheses:
Have a look at Lee Smolin’s cosmological evolution hypothesis. He described it in his book The Life of The Cosmos, and elsewhere.
It’s a non-theist hypothesis (actually all scientific hypotheses are as far as I can see). It provides a mechanism of evolution formation and evolution based on a critical role for black holes. And it makes a number of predictions, some of these have been tested. Such as the fine tuning of the carbon nuclear energy resonance.
If you are comparing the likelihood of hypotheses explaining observation this one is streets ahead of any theistic story.
I hasten to add it has a long way to go to be accepted as a scientific theory. I offer it just as an example of what I mean by hypotheses.
We are quite happy to say “I don’t know” at the moment – but we always add “let’s get stuck in and find out.”
Pre-existent baby Jesus: “Daddy, how many virgins do I get to impregnate when I go down to earth?
**********************************************************************
Pre-existent baby Jesus: “Oh, so you’ll be taking care of that. Well, is there any other neat stuff for me to do?”
**********************************************************************
Pre-existent baby Jesus: ” Oh, cool. And after I’m done performing miracles and spreading your message of compassion, mercy, forgiveness and most of all love, what do I do then?”
*******************************************************************
Pre-existent baby Jesus: “Daddy, are you sure that Satan is the evil one?”
Sorry no tidbits for the wee TROLL tonight.:-(
With regards to “structured hypothesises”, this would seem to entail that if a scientist came across some paintings of a bull on the inside of a cave, he cannot explain this in terms of an intelligent person doing it. Particularly if he knows nothing about the civilization in question. After all saying “a person did it” is not a structured hypothesis.
That seems quite obviously mistaken.
And then Jesus said, “Fuck this blood sacrifice shit! You morons are gonna have to die for your own goddamn sins!!”
Matt, perhaps you could explain your problem:
“That seems quite obviously mistaken”
Why. Do you not understand the concept?
After all, claiming it was done by a goblin, ghost or octopus are just as hopeless at explanation until you put in some structure.
Perhaps an octopus is responsible for the values of the fundamental physical constants.
Sorry, that’s not quite true as the concept of an octopus has infinitely more structure than the concept of a god. It Would be possible to consider predictions for testing.
Sorry again, you guys don’t do testing. That’s the last thing you want. Could get in the way.
Andrew, as long as we both agree that assumptions need to be made for this sort of argument.
I suppose you could bring 1, 2 and 4 together. Similarly you could say that assumptions 3 and 6 both fall into the same category. I’m happy to let 5 slide because as far as I know Sober’s principle is only as good as the assumptions or evidence and therefore your other assumptions cover this. Assumption 7 I think we agree on.
So the two I’m left with are the ‘fine tuning’ and the assumptions about God.
I don’t think the existence of apparent fine tuning as well established as you indicate. We can probably agree that there is a narrow band within which we live. This could apply to, say, the planet’s distance from the sun quite before you start to delve into changing the laws of physics.
However, the problem I have is not that there may be narrow bands within which we live but that it is assumed that these bands were formed or ‘tuned’ for us. It’s a very anthropocentric view, even a carbon-centric view and in my opinion, is quite an assumption. Is it not equally as valid to assume that human life has fine tuned itself to these bands instead?
More fundamentally disconnect I have, though, is the premise of the whole argument, that the universe exhibits purpose. I’m no philosopher but before you can even make these arguments do you not have to assume that the universe exhibits a purpose? If there were no purpose assumed then one would not care for the argument (like most atheists commenting here).
From the athiest’s perspective, it’s akin to arguing that there is purpose in winning the lottery. You could argue that the numbers were fine tuned for the winner. But we probably all agree that while it may provide one with a measure of happiness, it was a random draw. Sometimes, sometimes no one wins as we all know from seeing multiple draws.
If you’re an atheist, the fact that the universe contains life does not weaken the argument for atheism. If there were no life, this would not strengthen the atheist’s argument either.
I suppose what I’m putting forward is that ‘fine tuning’ can be looked at from both sides. If you have a need to see a final meaning such as God, then in hind sight, fine tuning seems like a good idea. If you don’t come to the problem assuming a final cause, it’s all wonderful stroke of luck.
Therefore, I think it all comes down to what you bring to the argument – in this case the assumption that there is a purpose or God.
PS well done with the rugby!
Matt, I guess I could have been more explicit with your question – it offered a learning situation. I guess no New Zealander was exactly sensible last night.
The situation you describes though can be used to highlight my main comment on this article. It’s a learning situation.
Here is the scenario.
Two people are tramping and go into a cave. One is a theologian, the other a scientist – a geologist, chemist or anthropologist perhaps.
They see some interesting things, marks, on the wall of cave. It looks like depiction of a human, or animal, or even a cross.
The theologian sees this as a message from his god. He declares so – saying his god did it.
He immediately leaves to spread the story. Another proof for his god. (As the article title declares – an argument for god, not an explanation of reality). He has done his job, fulfilled his job description.
The theologian leaves to spread the message. It’s his story and he’s sticking to it. In later years he “crosses swords” with the scientist because they actually present different explanations.
The scientist chooses to investigate this phenomenon further. She goes closer, looks at it from all angles, examines the details on the wall, etc.
A: One possible result – she concludes it is an optical illusion. A play of the light. The human weakness of seeing patters that aren’t there. (For an example look at the picture of jesus.
B: A second possible result. She concludes there is a pattern – probably formed through some sort of hydrological mechanism. She takes samples of the minerals outlining the pattern. Develops a working hypothesis of their nature, and identifies them unambiguously by x-ray diffraction on returning to work. She also collects information about the surrounding hydrology. Finally she proposes this explanation for the observation, maybe even discovering a new mineral or new mechanism, publishes her findings and handles the criticisms from her colleagues.
C: A third possibility. She concludes this is actually a human artefact. It is an artwork. It may be in the style of other art works in the area. In may be in a completely different style. She takes samples of the pigments involved, also searches the cave and area for other human artefacts. In the process she develops a working hypothesis. Back at the lab she compares the art work and the pigments with published records. She may confirm that it is typical of other evidence of ancient peoples in the area. She may actually conclude that it is. She may investigate further, carbon date the pigments and find they are older than possible from contemporary understanding of when the area was settled. If so she may be in for some fame, and reputation for having changed our understanding of that settlement. Of course her ideas will go through the normal scientific scrutiny and criticism of her peers.
The lesson
So there’s the difference.
The theologian has no interest in discovery what reality is or how it works. His job description is to use everything he can to argue for his god. He is arguing for a preconceived conclusion – much like the drunk uses a lamppost for support rather than illumination.
The “god did it” explanation has absolutely no structure – but none is required for theology.
The scientist does not have a preconceived model, or if she does realises that is not sufficient for science. She must actually carefully collect the evidence. Analyse her results. Develop a structured hypothesis which can be tested.
Unlike the theologian she actually discovers something about reality, she contributed to human knowledge. And that’s what science does. That’s why it is so useful to humanity.
Bethyada, how is (2) empirically shown? Are you referring to only certain types of information?
By information I mean meaning, not storage capacity.
Every (non-trivial) example where we are certain of the source there is higher information in the source than the output.
[…] the Old & New Teleological Arguments. See here. Posted in Philosophy | No Comments » Leave a […]
Bethyada, thanks for clarifying. I think meaning is subjective in this case so don’t see it as necessary myself.
Very often when “information” is used in a technical sense it is expressed as negative entropy, with the corresponding equations.
When creationists use the term it often implies the violation of the 2nd law of thermodynamics fallacy.
So long as we are thinking that our universe must be either theistic or atheistic , we are using our conceptual mind & so long as we are within the realm of concept we’ll never approach the ultimate truth. Why not consider the middle way, as buddhism suggests. God is a concept (and a valid one), but the nature of God is beyond concept. To know God is to go beyond all our ideas of it is this way or it is that way. At that point there is no God & yet there is.
Tahlia,
When you can explain to me how P and ~P can be true at the same time then maybe i’ll take what you’re saying seriously.
Andrew
Your dismissal of Tahlia’s comments seems rather glib to me.
It is surely the beginning of wisdom to recognise that our everyday propositional logic will be inadequate for grasping and dealing with the mysteries of an ultimate and eternal God!
For a thorough discussion of how Buddhist logic could help illuminate Christian theology see “The Incomprehensibility of God: A Buddhist reading of Aquinas” by James L. Fredericks, available on-line at:
http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-ADM/james.htm
A lot of information here, I think that it will probably scare off some believers a lot of the terms used have no barring on the bible directly.
And then Jesus said, “What’s up with this Occupy Wall Street bullshit!? I’m a real retard when it comes to economics.
Is there a blood sacrifice in that bullshit, somewhere?
If there is, then I’m in!!”
The usual ignorance i see, poor little Troll, cant even get his insults right.
Christ said, no man can serve two masters, for he will love one and hate the other, you cannot serve both God and money.
Rather than being a retard, Christ understood the human relationship to money all too well.
I think you’re being overly generous in your acceptance of Premise 1 of the Contemporary Argument for Fine Tuning.
The typical argument for Premise 2 is based in probability. Instead of just saying, “oh, it SEEMS that way,” which is pretty weak as far as these things go, it attempts to make a mathematical argument. The usual strategy is to suggest that the total number of possible atheistic universes with fine tuning is very low, while the total number of atheistic universes as a whole is very high, meaning that the probability, all things being equal, of actually having a fine tuned atheistic universe is very low.
But if you apply that sort of reasoning to premise 1, it has difficulties. The total number of possible theistic universes is, if anything, significantly greater than the total number of possible atheistic universes. But the total number of possible finely tuned theistic universes doesn’t seem significantly greater than the total number of possible finely tuned atheistic universes. Which would give it quite an unfavorable ratio: in fact, if its not actually worse than the ratio for possible atheistic universes, its at least close enough to make us worry about the certainty of the probabilistic argument.
Remember, there’s a difference between “finely tuned” and “life permitting.” A prima facie assumption that a deity would create a life permitting universe does not guarantee a finely tuned one.
Andrews,
1) How do you get past the very first “if?” “If this is the only cosmos?”
No honest cosmologist these days knows whether this is the only cosmos.
2) Even if there is a Designer how can you demonstrate that such a Designer wasn’t in fact “tinkering” with other cosmoses before coming up with this one?
3) Even if there is a Designer of this cosmos and this planet, it kind of looks like the Designer shook up his Etch-I-Sketch a few times, having to extinquish countless of his carefully designed species in six major extinction events. Not to mention countless minor extinction events as well in which many species were wiped out regionally. Would you call those the actions of a Designer or a Tinkerer?
4) What about the evidence of jury-rigging in nature? Evolutionists and evo-devo folks know of plenty of examples. Would you best explain such things based on the hypothesis of a Designer or a Tinkerer?
5) How are we to distinquish exactly between a Designer who Tinkers and Nature who Tinkers naturally?
6) Based on what little we know of the cosmos at large do you beleive life is only to be found on the unstable surface of a single planet in a cosmos filled with other stars, other planets (and more water than we formerly imagined might be out there)?
What we do know is that there’s a habitable zone around stars in which water remains liquid. There are also certain regions in each galaxy that are more likely to contain stars that do not explode frequently and are of sufficient age for any planets bearing liquid water to evolve life. If we should develop the technology to visit other planets can you predict whether they are all void of life, or whether some might contain simpler forms of life, or, whether we will find other sentient beings out there with advanced intelligence, and what their metaphysical beliefs will be, or which religion they believe to the “the one true faith?”
The cosmos seems like it certainly might contain life of one sort or another, or even some planets like ours with advanced life forms. There’s certainly enough stars, probably enough planets, and certainly there’s enough galaxies out there, and water too, judging by recent astronomical observations. But we have not yet crawled off the cradle planet.
7) PASSAGES TO PONDER
Genesis 1:16 depicts the sun and moon as “two great lamps” [literal Hebrew translation]. Those “great lamps” were made to “light” the earth, to “rule” the earth’s days and nights, and, “for signs and seasons” on earth. But a couple thousand years after the Bible was written, astronomers discovered a curious thing about that “great lamp” the moon. They discovered that Mars has two moons. Yet Mars has no people who need their steps “lit” at night, or who need to know the “signs and seasons.” Even more curiously, it was discovered that Neptune has four moons, Uranus has eleven, Jupiter has sixteen, and Saturn has eighteen moons (one of them, Titan, is even larger than the planet Mercury). The earth was created with just moon, and it “rules the night” so badly that for three nights out of every twenty-eight it abdicates its rule and doesn’t light the earth at all–at which time creationists bump into each other in the dark.
E.T.B.
____________________________
THE GALACTIC HABITABLE ZONE
What fraction of stars in our Galaxy might play host to planets that can support multi-cellular life? Lineweaver and others have calculated the probable extent of hospitable space for complex life in the Galaxy, called the “Galactic habitable zone.” The criteria include distance from deadly supernovae, enough heavy elements to form terrestrial planets, and enough time for life to evolve. Based on these criteria, the Galactic habitable zone is an annular region between 7 to 9 kiloparsecs from the Galactic center and contains about 10% of the Milky Way stars with ages between 4 to 8 billion years old. [The Milky Way, like most of the 100 billion other galaxies in the cosmos, contains roughly a billion stars.]
– Science, Vol. 303, Jan. 2, 2004 http://www.sciencemag.org
Keeping in mind the above “odds,” there may be plenty of possible planets on which life might exist. But what does that imply about the Bible’s understanding of the cosmos when interpreted literally as in Genesis and the New Testament? See the following quotations to understand the questions raised by the notion of “[intelligent] life elsewhere in the galaxy.”
– E.T.B.
____________________________
“A NEW HEAVEN?”
EVEN FOR PEOPLE LIVING IN DISTANT GALAXIES?
According to the book of Revelation a “new earth” and a “new heaven” will be created after Jesus returns. Occupants of other planets throughout the hundred billion galaxies of our present “heaven” will no doubt be surprised to receive such an unearned favor, all because of what happens on our little world. Or is this simply another example of how the Hebrews viewed the earth as the flat firm foundation of creation with the heavens above created simply for the earth below?
E.T.B.
____________________________
Though it is not a direct article of the Christian faith that the planet we inhabit is the only inhabited one in the cosmos, yet it is so worked up from what is called the Mosaic account of creation, the story of Eve and the forbidden fruit, and the counterpart of that story, the death of the Son of God–that to believe otherwise renders the Christian system of faith at once little and ridiculous, and scatters it in the mind like feathers in the air.
Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason
____________________________
So long as people believed, as St. Paul himself did, in one week of creation and a past of 4,000 years–so long as people thought the stars were satellites of the earth and that animals were there to serve man–there was no difficulty in believing that a single man could have ruined everything, and that another man had saved everything.
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, “Fall, Redemption, and Geocentrism,”Christianity and Evolution
____________________________
Did Jesus die uniquely to save the sins of human beings on planet Earth, or is he being strung up somewhere in the universe on every Friday?
Michael Ruse, “Booknotes,” Biology & Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 1, Jan. 1999
Ed,
Did you read the section regarding the conceptual analysis of the designer? I think it answers the question. The basic point is that the design argument is not supposed to prove the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. So while your comments in this regard might be correct, they’re not really objections to the teleological argument.
About the single universe claim: – I wrote about this in the article itself
I can’t guarantee that there aren’t other forms life that might form under different conditions. But how is that relevant? Working within the conditions we have, the point remains. Within the conditions that govern our universe, the life permitting range is narrow. Sure, there may be other conditions elsewhere that might allow life of a different type to arise. But that doesn’t change the fact that, under the conditions of which we’re aware, the life permitting range is incredibly narrow. It’s like this, imagine that there is a solitary fly resting on a large blank section of wall. A single bullet is shot and it hits the fly. Now even if the area around the blank section of wall is covered in flies, it would still be incredibly improbable that a single bullet fired at the fly WITHIN the blank section would hit said fly.
This is not an article about biblical exegesis, so i’m not inclined to respond to that. Nevertheless, it strikes me that your exegesis leave A LOT to be desired. It strikes me as overly literalistic.
Using likelihood and probability in these sorts of arguments is almost meaningless. However the world had been – whatever its state – theists would say that there is a very high likelihood of the world being this way given there is a god… because a god can make anything. Given that you basically define the probability of the world being the way it is given god exists to be 100%, ANY OTHER theory is going to be less likely that your god hypothesis… why not just merely assert “God exists! God exists!” over and over… because that is what you are doing ultimately boils down to.
Andrew: So while your comments in this regard might be correct, they’re not really objections to the teleological argument.
I’m pretty sure this question was…
Ed: How are we to distinquish exactly between a Designer who Tinkers and Nature who Tinkers naturally?
It that a mullet on the dude in the picture or a dirty rattail? Appearance standards are slipping at this blog.
I have written in a bit more detail on the opportunist use of “fine-tuning” by religious apologists in my post Fine-tuning fallacies.
This takes a few specific examples and shows that the “fine-tuning” is far from fine after all, and that calculations supporting the fine-tuning are either out of date, erronious or naive.
I am curious about the figure for the constant itself as related by Andrew. It would seem to me that there is real mathematics being done for this fact to be true. This equation works according to the boundaries set within the structure of it, It is not an experiment involving trial and error. This works as it should. And humanity can discover the formula and how it is being used and can assess this remarkable fact.
This would beg the question from my perspective. Why this is so and how does this end up in relationship with the cosmos anyway. If maths and logic are abstract objects have no causal relationship with physical matter. Then how do they then end up dictating how some fundamental laws within the universe will behave? It would seem reasonable to then have to give an explanation for the interaction of certain mathematical ratios, statistics, equations that we see. I would agree with Andrew that ab-ductive reasoning would led one to have to the conclusion that some intelligence is being involved. God can do the maths using abstract principles and then can use the the formula that works for the cosmological constants to bring the universe to being. This would led to many other questions such as meaning and purpose for instance.
It would difficult to see under a purely naturalistic system why this is so. Maths, and the equations for the contants would have to be “just there”. Sound like the argument they use against Theists, when we say God is a reasonable explanation.
Nick – what specific “constant” are you talking about?
Ken you said:The argument itself is fundamentally bad because it does not have the intention of explaining any facts of reality
Sorry again, you guys don’t do testing. That’s the last thing you want. Could get in the way.
The scientist does not have a preconceived model,
Ken, given that we here- writing in this discussion- are all human then we have a pre-concieved model of reality. You had it and I had it way before you were a scientist or I was a Christian. Each of us approach reality with presuppositions. And these presuppositions are held at least in part because of philosophical infuences in the society in which we were raised. The philosophy of Kant amongst others throughout history has been a great influence over your interpretaton of “facts of reality”
Although Kant professed a kind of theism and an admiration for Jesus, he was clearly far from orthodox Christianity. Indeed, his major book on religion, “Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone,” has as its chief theme the thesis that the human mind can never and must never subject itself to any authority beyond itself. In other words, to Kant, the human mind must be autonomous, subject only to its own law. Kant radically rejected the idea of authoritative revelation from God (either in nature or in Scripture) and asserted, perhaps more clearly than ever before (although this had always been the view of secular philosophers), the autonomy of the human mind. The human mind, that means, is to be its own supreme authority, its own criterion of truth and right.
Kant said: what makes our experience intelligible is largely, perhaps entirely, the work of our own minds. We do not know what the world is really like, we know only how it appears to us, and how it appears to us is largely what we make to be. Thus, the mind of man not only is its own ultimate authority, but also replaces God as the intelligent planner and creator of the experienced universe.
Kant’s philosophy, therefore, does not merely assert or assume human autonomy, as did many previous philosophers; it explicitly presupposes human autonomy. It adopts human autonomy as the root idea to which every other idea must conform. That is what makes Kant unique and vastly important: he taught secular man where his epistemology must begin, his inescapable starting point for all possible reflection. So Kant is widely regarded as the most important philosopher of the modern period. He showed “modern man,” secular, would –be autonomous man, what he would have to presuppose about knowledge and the world in order to be consistent with his presumed autonomy. In other words, Kant made the modern sectarian “epistemologically self-conscious.” If modern man is not to bow to God, he must bow before himself; to that extent at least, he must be a Kantian. (John Frame or Greg Bahnsen from memory)
Obviously where truth is concerned, ethics are involved. While it is true that the scientific method has developed in a way that is designed to ensure unbiased reporting of facts, there are some presuppositions that are so basic to the human way of thinking that they are smuggled in to the scientific enterprise at such a fundamental level that they go unquestioned, unseen.
There really is no such thing as “a disinterested search for the truth” The neutrality of science may be one thing, the neutrality of scientists is quite another. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “disinterested” as:
Not influenced by considerations of personal advantage.
Scientists are human before they are scientists, and as the philosophy of science has repeatedly shown we bring our presuppositions, our baggage with us.
Take for example the idea of “brute facts”. Brute fact is defined as “a true statement about something which cannot be further reduced” and hence has not had any interpretation placed upon it.
From Wikipedia:
The term might also be used to refer generally to facts that lack explanations, or which explain themselves.
That a fact may be a “brute” fact shows a pre-commitment to a naturalistic worldview. A brute fact is supposed to be that which cannot be reduced any further But in the act of terming it a “brute” fact it is already a denial of the possibility that the fact in question may actually be already interpreted by an omniscience beyond humanity. In short there is a prior commitment and bias against a theistic worldview.
The very idea of “brute fact” presupposes that an irreducible truth about a simple entity is just hanging about in flux waiting for human intelligence to interpret it, to categorize it and to classify it into relationship with other facts. Scientists have (in the main) hastily assumed, or presupposed that facts, brute facts or otherwise, are not already interpreted by an all-knowing cause.
To use an analogy, imagine the idea of “brute facts” as individual parts of a jigsaw puzzle, which scientists in collaboration put together to form a cohesive, coherent picture of the world, of reality. First they postulate (either explicitly or implicitly) an environment of chaos and randomness, as the background to all brute facts and from which these brute facts are plucked. (Brute facts could no longer be called
“brute” facts if the universe was intelligently designed). “Chance” is the necessary corollary of a postulation which speaks of “brute” uninterpreted facts. To the secular humanist, those who espouse naturalism- chaos and randomness is properly basic and order is peripheral and accidental. This is the overarching assumption reflected in the idea of “brute fact”.To the theist, order and system is basic and chaos and entropy peripheral. Having assumed the chaotic background to reality- naturalism then starts to deal with “brute” facts as if it were possible to intelligently order them through human systematization alone. This is in direct contradiction to Einstein who admitted:
“I have deep faith that the principles of the universe will be both beautiful and simple”
and:
“The eternal mystery of the universe is its comprehensibility”
He was more sure of the ordered intelligibility of the universe than he was of his own formulas. So much so that this no doubt spurred him on to attempt to discover and formulate the systematized structure of the universe, just, as the history of science has shown, other theistic scientists had before him. Consider this- all scientific endeavor is an expression of faith in the comprehensibility found in the universe. It is not merely enough to have faith in human inquisitiveness which we accept as givens, there is also a reciprocal need for the universe to be accessible to human endeavor. Einstein was wise enough to see that- even if he did not elucidate on a reason for it, being largely content to leave it as mystery.
Sorry Ken, when it comes to facts about the material universe, science is admirably suited to do the job hence its singular success, but step outside of that realm and you have to look harder at the philosophy of science, epistemology, first principles and yes even the Bible!
Kerry – it always amuses me when theists “go nuclear” – destroy the basis for their own argument in an attempt to destroy the basis of the opposition’s argument.
Of course we all have preconceived concepts of reality. I stressed this to Andrew when he was offended by my critique. Its just human. We all do it.
The difference is that while theology does not do anything to test those concepts, and attempts instead to argue for them being correct, humanity has found better ways in the scientific approach. Its approach and it’s social nature work hard to avoid being fooled by preconceived ideas, and by reality itself. Testing against reality, and the open critique and discussion of ideas, findings and theories, help to provide a picture of reality which is viable. It’s imperfect, for sure, but constantly improving and open for revision.
This means that scientific ideas which are part of our preconceived model of reality have a lot of facts invested in them, they are structured hypotheses and they produce testable hypotheses. And we change these preconceived models when our validation against reality shows we must.
Finally, we know that this approach works. All of us benefit from the well accepted epistemic success of science. The proof of the pudding is in the eating – an important philosophical principle.
In contrast the preconceived theistic model is never detailed, never structured and always untestable. Theology never tests its ideas against reality. Quite the opposite, it attempts to distort reality to “prove” its dogma.
Kerry – you admit that “when it comes to facts about the material universe, science is admirably suited to do the job hence its singular success.” Well the values of the parameters in the physical and cosmological standard models are facts about the universe. According to your reckoning Andrew is inappropriately suggesting that he can discover those facts without recourse to science. Suggesting that somehow science is incapable of answering such questions.
Aren’t you taking on a bit much for your religion here? We are certainly not going to discover the reason why these parameters have the value they do from the bible or philosophy, now, are we?
It’s extremely arrogant to suggest that we could. It’s never worked in the past.
The “fine-tuning” argument is just one example of this.
It also amuses me the way some naive theists will continually claim Einstein as one of theirs – a theistic scientist.
Quite wrong of course.
But whose going to destroy a nice argument with a simple fact like that.
Ken: Testing against reality, and the open critique and discussion of ideas,
That is just what we are doing here is it not?
theology does not do anything to test those concepts, and attempts instead to argue for them being correct,humanity has found better ways in the scientific approach. Its approach and it’s social nature work hard to avoid being fooled by preconceived ideas, and by reality itself.
I am saying your faith in the scientific method requires work to prove that it is the best possible means (or only means) of establishing what is real. For instance the statement:
It’s imperfect, for sure, but constantly improving and open for revision That is a statement of faith Ken which needs to be substantiated, and when you attempt it you will not be using a scientific argument, but an argument from logic which is not a scientific postulate but a postulate from reason. When you reason from reason you are using a circular argument. All I have said is that in the final analysis all reasoning both scientific and theological or philosophical is based on first principles which one cannot go beyond, they are the presuppositions which cannot be reduced further. Have you looked at the problem of induction and why Hume rightly said that science has actually smuggled in an article of “faith” into the empirical method? I grant you science does an admirable job in the material realm but that is the point, we are not here (ultimately) speaking of the material realm in isolation but what (if anything) transcends it. The empirical method presupposes a closed universe, that nature is all there is, the whole show- and then having designed a system that precludes anything else proceeds to “prove” that point! Theism is a reasonable presupposition that adequately accounts for the universe, for science, you and me, things like mathematics and beauty to name but a few. To follow through on naturalistic assumptions about reality one ends up destroying a credible account for anything in so many different ways it’s not funny. For instance how can “reason” come from non -reason ? If we are merely an unhappy collocation of atoms subject to drives through our chemistry and merely dancing to our DNA, from whence comes reason? And now turn to values, science can answer some questions of what is, but not what ought to be. All attempts to link these fail or smuggle in the transcendent.
We immediately, almost without question , assume that maths is a human institution, we attribute it to a human cause, but as others (who have made maths their life’s work and they not Christian) will testify, maths is not a human invention and yet most definitely a process that only a mind can employ. (See my article Mathematics and God) What soon becomes apparent is that certain things are postulated as lacking a cause when others are quite arbitrarily given causes or just assumed. The laws of non-contradiction fall into this set, also information science (See Who Is Making a Leap of Faith?). Science itself, to which we all owe so much, is an endeavour that is full of faith in the reliability built into nature, this is not a function of logic and reason but confidence in the uniformity of nature. All facts even “brute” facts are interpreted through the lens of ones worldview whether Christian or non-Christian, there is no such thing as neutrality.
One can easily see the jigsaw analogy in the Logo for Wikipedia as shown above. Wikipedia is the collaboration of intelligent experts who work to bring the facts together. The problem for them, with this picture, is that the “facts” conspire against all those who are determined to see them as “brute” facts. You will note in the picture that the pieces- the “brute” facts- all fit neatly together to form the whole.
Question: Is it only the work of mankind that they fit together, or do they so uniformly fit together because they are part of a cohesive whole?
In the real world a jigsaw puzzle can only fit together as shown when an ordering intelligence has predetermined how they fit! Any child knows the jigsaw puzzle is the work of an intelligent being.
If the facts were plucked out of a truly random universe it would be analogous to humanity attempting to fit together an infinite number of jigsaw pieces coming from an infinite number of jigsaw puzzles. And at the same time we humans, ought (as part of the chaos) not to be able to so order the pieces anyhow. As G.K. Chesterton has hinted, there is a definite conspiracy in the facts!
Richard Tarnas provides some helpful insight into the dehumanizing effects of modern scientism:
The more modern man strove to control nature by understanding its principles, to free himself from nature’s power, to separate himself from nature’s necessity and rise above it, the more completely his science metaphysically submerged man into nature, and thus into its mechanistic and impersonal character as well. For if man lived in an impersonal universe, and if his existence was entirely grounded in and subsumed by that universe, then man too was essentially impersonal, his private experience of personhood a psychological fiction. In such a light, man was becoming little more than a genetic strategy for the continuance of his species, and as the twentieth century progressed that strategy’s success was becoming yearly more uncertain. Thus it was the irony of modern intellectual progress that man’s genius discovered successive principles of determinism — Cartesian, Newtonian, Darwinian, Marxist, Freudian, behaviorist, genetic, neurophysiological, sociobiological — that steadily attenuated belief in his own rational and volitional freedom, while eliminating his sense of being anything more than a peripheral and transient accident of material evolution.
(The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that have Shaped Our World)
‘Einstein believed that “To the Sphere of religion belongs the faith that the regulations valid for the world of science are rational , that it is comprehensible to reason. I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith. The situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind” ‘ .Norman Geisler”Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics.
I did not enlist Einstein as a theist, but that he at the very least perceived an ordering intelligence transcending the universe.
Well the values of the parameters in the physical and cosmological standard models are facts about the universe.
I think here you confuse Andrews statement, he is not arguing about facts Per Se, but the interpretation that is extrapolated from them. On the other hand I have argued that scientism. that interprets facts as “bare” facts or brute facts shows a prior commitment (read bias) to naturalism.
Kerry – for you to respond with ” “That is just what we are doing here is it not?” in response to my discussion of the fact that science (in contrast to theology) tests and validates its ideas against reality surely shows a completely false understanding of science. I suspect you must have a theological background to make such a huge mistake.
Science does not, and can not, test and validate ideas against reality by participating in a debate on an apologetics blog! Come on!
On this particular question (physical and cosmological constants) billions of dollars are invested in astronomy, satellites, particle accelerators, super fast computers, etc., to make the required contact with reality. There is also a huge investment in mathematics and intellectual capacity,.
I think hell would freeze over before one saw real contact with reality here.
I entered this discussion because of mistakes made by Andrew – claiming fine tuning of the cosmological constant. This is just not true – its a complete misunderstanding – promulgated by people like Ross and Craig and repeated by their fans.
I also provide further examples in my post Fine-tuning fallacies describing other examples where claims of fine tuning are mistaken.
Of course Andrew is not arguing about facts – he hasn’t bothered to either check his “facts” or remove his mistakes when pointed out. He is not interested in the facts except to support his theological argument. In other words, his conclusion comes first and then he selects his “facts” or what he thinks are facts to support his argument. Like the way the drunk uses the lamppost.
We deplore that approach in science – even though it is a human failing. Science operates to correct such thinking – obviously theology doesn’t.
Regarding your use of the word “scientism” – I usually take that as an indication that people are not being honest.
I have with me my handy dandy copy of Roger Penrose’s “Road to Reality.” on p. 463 he does say that the cosmological constant is not very important, until you start dealing with very large figures, such as those involved in the collapsing points of stars. While Craig and Ross might use dramatic language to describe the situation if the constant were different, the point seems to be in line with observational evidence. The constant of our universe must fall with in a narrow set of values quite close to 0, if stars and things like that are going to form. That seems to be important to the existence of life as far as I can tell.
Though the Constant was thrown out after the universe was discovered to be expanding, Penrose says, “Observations of distant supernovae have led most theorists to reintroduce the Cosmological Constant, or something similar, referred to as ‘dark energy’, as a way of making these observations consistent with other perceived requirements.” Penrose doesn’t like the presence of the Constant himself, but says that “much recent cosmological evidence does seem to be pointing in this direction.”
On p. 777 he indicates that the terms ‘dark energy’ and ‘vacuum energy’ is interchangeable with the term ‘cosmological constant’.
His words, not mine, “Instead, Λ is referred to as ‘dark energy’, or ‘vacuum energy’, or sometimes ‘quintessence’, perhaps because the cold term ‘cosmological constant’ does not carry with it a sufficient air of mystery, or perhaps, a little more rationally, because the presence of the word ‘constant’ rather implies that it cannot change with time! … However, this idea, attractive as it may seem to some people, has its difficulties with the mathematics, as the term ‘cosmological constant’ was introduced with good reason.”
It seems perfectly fine to use the Cosmological Constant, even if it requires some defense itself, as part of the teleological argument, and, as Andrew says, there are plenty of other examples of finely-tuned quantities.
haha… the title of Penrose’s book takes on a certain irony in THIS discussion!
The point is matt not Flannagan the cosmological constant may have to be close to zero (or zero) but it is not fine tuned. (I think it can vary by about a factor of 5).
The claimed fine tuning of 1 part in 10^120 is just wrong. That value is actually the orders of magnitude difference between the vacuum energy and the measured cosmological constant – clearly the calculation, or assumption, is wrong. The cosmological constant is not simply the vacuum energy.
Craig and Ross have just got this one wrong – and the fanboys have been blindly repeating it. Seems to be a real problem with theology – using science like a drunk uses a lamppost.
I just can’t see how you can justify your claim that it is OK t6o use a cosmological constant which can vary by about 5 times “as part of the teleological argument” It is at least lazy, and at worst dishonest.
As for your claim “there are plenty of other examples of finely-tuned quantities.” – have a look at my post Fine-tuning fallacies – it goes into a couple of other examples where theists get the fine-tuning argument wrong.
Or have a look at Stenger’s book The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe Is Not Designed for Us. He goes through the major so-called “fine-tuned” parameters and shows the flaws in the arguments. In many cases its a simply matter of finding the particular parameter has a very restricted range only if other parameters are held constant. Not a realistic scenario.
Finally – an important point.
Andrew did not propose a theistic hypothesis for explaining fine-tuning. But there a realistic non-theistic (ie scientific) hypotheses which have no trouble explaining fine-tuning. In fact Lee Smolin’s one provides a feasible and natural explanation for the existence of elements like carbon.
So Roger Penrose is clearly wrong? I don’t understand how I’m misreading him, but I’m open to the possibility. Penrose even refers to the value as ‘finely tuned’, though he does put the term in quotes. Perhaps the number doesn’t need to be so tuned, as you say, but it needs to fall within a narrow range to allow for life permitting conditions.
No!, matt not flannagan, Penrose is not wrong at all. He only briefly refers to the cosmological constant in that book – and I think he does clearly point our where the 10^120 comes from (or 10^50 after making some assumptions).
He describes the value as small – obviously it is much smaller that the vacuum energy.
“Fine-tuning” does come into this but not in the way that Craig and Ross claim. If one tries to argue that the vacuum energy is involved but is balanced by other fields then we would have a fine-tuning question of why the balance is so precise.
But it’s best to go with accepting we don’t yet understand dark energy.
Brian Greene and Lawrence Krauss write in more detail about the value of the cosmological constant (In fact I think Ross misquotes Krauss on it). Greene’s book “The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality
“ is worth reading for information on this.
As I understand the OP, it is referring to the work of Robbin Collins. I have been quoting Roger Penrose, so whence Craig and Ross? Additionally, I simply can’t understand what is wrong with citing Penrose to justify referring to the CC, dark energy, quintessence, etc. based on what you are telling me. Perhaps you could be more clear. Why would Penrose refer to the value as ‘finely tuned’ except in reference to certain observations requiring that the value fall within a certain range. It is not that the value is actually finely tuned, as such, but that in order for there to be stars and so on, the value has to be very small. If the value could be any other number, but just happens to be right for a life permitting universe, then there doesn’t seem to be a problem with using it as an example of “fine tuning”. I also fail to see how being agnostic about what it is dark energy does means we need to just ignore that figure, when it seems to be well attested to. That seems like saying that since I’m not a mechanic I shouldn’t be so sure that my car’s fuel economy will actually save me money. Or, probably more accurately, let’s say I am very naive about cars but I am budgeting for a new vehicle, I factor in fuel economy and find I need a car that gets a specific mpg, I wouldn’t think that figure was useless to me because I knew nothing about cars. Furthermore, it would determine which car I selected for purchase later on, and if you were to see my budget and notice the car I purchased, you would hopefully see a connection. This doesn’t prove anything, mind you, but say that you were wondering whether I picked up the car on a whim or whether there was a reason the vehicle I purchased had all the features it did…
Perhaps “matt not flannagan” you could quote Penrose’s reference to the cosmological constant in terms of “fine-tuning” (I cannot find it and the :fine-tuning” concept is not in his index). That might help you see my point.
To say that the cosmological constant must be zero or very small (much smaller than the vacuum energy by a factor of 10^120) is not “fine-tuning” in the way that Craig and Ross have used it. (I don’t have Collin’s book so I can’t see if he used it exactly the same way – but I keep seeing that 10^120 figure mindlessly quoted by religious apologists).
You ask “If the value could be any other number, but just happens to be right for a life permitting universe, then there doesn’t seem to be a problem with using it as an example of “fine tuning”. ” Well, consider that the majority opinion of cosmologists is that the value is small but non-zero. It could have been zero – many cosmologists would by far have preferred that. It would have had no difference on the possibility of life. In fact the value could vary by as many as 5 times its currently accepted value and still produce a universe allowing life. (I think Lawrence Krauss refers to this in one of his papers).
No one is ignoring the cosmological constant or its value (where did you get that idea?). It’s considered to be one of the most important questions cosmologists are investigating.
All I point out to you is that the theologically common claim that the constant is fine tuned to 1 part in 10^120 is just not true. It is at least sloppy, and at worst dishonest, to use the huge mistake of assuming the constant is the same as vacuum energy as if it was a measure of fine-tuning.
I have no idea why you discuss cars. But as you talk about parameters having values that “just happens to be right for a life permitting universe” consider this. Often when these “fine-tuning” conclusions are drawn they are based on calculations where only one parameter under consideration is altered – all other parameters are held constant. This is extremely artificial.
Victor Stenger found using a model which allows variability in all the parameters under consideration he could produce universes supporting life in 37% of cases where values were chosen at random, within a 200% margin.
The problem is that theologians opportunistically grab the “fine-tuning” story; not bothering to check any of the details, because they think it proves their god did it. But they never produce a mechanism to show how their god did it. Nor do they acknowledge that such fine-tuning can be explained by scientific speculation (as in Lee Smollin’s concept of evolving universes). And scientists have no problem accepting baffling questions like this. We admit “we don’t know” and happily then get stuck in to try and find out why. Saying your “god did it” never explains anything. And it’s also a trap for theologians because they inevitably are shown to be ridiculous.
The car thing was an analogy. I was typing it from my phone, which always takes so long that I end up being a bit less coherent than I think I am. Now that I am looking at it, there is still a bit of work needed to make it a proper analogy.
Penrose’s quotes from Road to Reality are on p.463 and 777-778 (his reference to ‘fine tuning’ is on p.777)
I fail to understand, additionally, on your assessment of the situation why there is such a thing as the “cosmological constant problem”. Certainly there are plenty of other models, theories, etc. to deal with this issue, but it is not intellectually dishonest for the proponent of the teleological argument to pick a particular model that is consistent with observational evidence and use it in an argument with theological significance. Now, keep in mind that I have not identified myself as a proponent of the teleological argument! I sense a bit of assumption on your part. You also seem to be only familiar with popular versions of the argument, from Craig and Ross, which are meant to be rhetorically persuasive but not as thorough as, say, Collins’ argument is. However, from what I have seen, even Craig and Ross are aware of the contentions like those you raise, and are generally prepared to argue for the items in question on which the premises of the argument rests. I don’t think that anybody believes that the CC is a given, or that there would be no reason to have to defend it as an example of fine-tuning. That is what I been endeavoring to do here. The question at hand is whether or not there is more reason to think you or Stenger or Krauss have provided solutions that are compatible with the observational evidence available that explains things well enough without the presence of ‘fine tuning’. If this is NOT the case, then the proponent of the teleogical argument may feel safe in citing the cosmological constant in favor of the argument without need for ‘proof’ or ‘certainty’. All that is needed is for their premise to be more probable than its negation. Given this, it seems your accusation of intellectual dishonesty is false.
I am not going to say that I approve of the teleological argument or not. I would appreciate it if you dealt with what I am presenting and refrained from saying things like “your god” or making any other untoward assumptions about me, unrelated to the topic at hand, which is whether or not your accusation of intellectual dishonesty sticks at all. (I’d also like to add that your comments about Craig and Ross suggest a very cynical attitude. I doubt either fellow would be bothered by someone leaving their lecture, debate or whatever to go straight to their university library and do some fact checking. ).
Matt, you are mistaken with your reference to “fine-tuning.” Penrose is not referring to the “cosmological constant” with that – he is referring to the “extraordinarily ‘special’ Big
Bang—to at least the degree of a part in 10^10^123—which underlies the Second Law.
Here he is referring to the statistically extremely low chance that the universe could just “pop into existence” with the particular value of entropy it had (usually assumed to be very low). Nothing to do with the cosmological constant at all.
Mind you it’s one that creationists and theologians have also used opportunistically.
You must realise that Penrose is speculating on that page (the chapter is called “Speculative theories of the early universe”). Cosmologists do raise the question of the low value of entropy at the beginning as an issue to be explained. But there are a number of speculative ideas which do so (as for example Stenger’s point that the entropy of the extremely small volume was high (chaotic) but inflation/expansion produces a much lower entropy than the maximum possible).
But that is a separate issue – nothing to do with the cosmological constant.
My point about that is that it is not fine-tuned to one part in 10^120 as claimed by Craig and Ross and constantly repeated by religious apologists. I don’t think one can say it is fine-tuned at all (it can vary from 0 to about 5 times its usually accepted value). To call it fine-tuned is at least sloppy (indicating one has not checked the real situation (usually just repeating Craig or Ross) or dishonest (as you would be if you did know where the value of 10^120 did come from).
You suggest “I doubt either fellow (Craig and Ross) would be bothered by someone leaving their lecture, debate or whatever to go straight to their university library and do some fact checking.”
I could reply they should have done that checking themselves – they know their fanboys are not going to do it. But that is the problem with theology and apologetics – it sues science like a drunk uses a lamppost.
And that is not honest.
You seem to be offended by my reference to gods. Well don’t blame me – it was the whole point of the article – to naively use the concept of “fine-tuning” to claim that the god hypothesis is credible. It’s not – and I should be able to point that out without offending anyone.
Matt – by the way, Collins is also using the mistaken fine tuning argument for the cosmological constant.
He says, for example:
“The fine-tuning for life of the cosmological constant is estimated to be at least one part in 10^53, that is, one part in a one hundred million, billion, billion, billion, billion, billion. “
This 10^50 is the factor by which the cosmological constant and vacuum energy differ if certain assumptions are made.
So, in this case he is no better than Craig or Ross. He using a collosal mistake (the biggest in physics) as a measure of “:fine-tuning – which it isn’t.
I stand corrected. On p. 777 Penrose is referring to the “…. ‘special’ Big Bang – to at least the degree of a part in 10 to the 10th to the 123rd power – …” This, however, is a reference to an earlier chapter, (chapter 27), called “The Big Bang and it’s thermodynamic legacy.” So, while I erred in my understanding of Penrose, it was only in misunderstanding what he was referring to that was finely tuned.
What is does the figure 10 to the 120th, which you are so insistent about, refer to then? It is the value by which the cosmological constant was supposed to differ, given certain equations, with what observations should render it (Penrose, p. 773). This has been known as the “cosmological constant problem.” Additionally, I went over and gave a quick read to post-debate back and forth between Craig and Krauss, in which Craig addresses the cosmological constant. He does not refer to the value you mention, he merely says that the constant exhibits ‘one-sided fine tuning’, meaning that it could have fell within a large range of values, but happens to fall within that smaller range that is life-permitting (while he did mention “1 part in 10 to the 120th” at an earlier date, it would seem that he no longer holds to that – or he was referring to something else in that earlier Q and A). This doesn’t conflict with Penrose so far, at least (although Krauss and Stenger are entitled to their own interpretations of things). So, I see no reference to the value (10 to the 120th) you mention there. Additionally, the only value cited in the OP is that of the weak force. You then cite Collins, who refers to a completely different value than the one you desired to correct Andrew on. I am out of my depth as far as understanding what the figure is that Collins is referring to, but it is not the 10 to the 120th (or 60th) that Penrose is referring to.
Even if we ignore all that, though, there still seems to be fine tuning going on elsewhere. Furthermore, the fact that all of these values could have been different is exactly what gets us wondering as to why they seem to fall in a precise range (relative to the cosmic scale at least) that allows for conditions in which things like us can come about.
Of course, you can deny that there is any fine-tuning in the universe. If that were true it would pose a big problem for the argument, but it doesn’t seem to be the case.
Finally, I am not merely offended by some of your language, Ken. You have an unfortunate tendency to hyperbole, which does not advance the conversation, and accounts for a good deal of the attitude directed toward you from others, which is plain to see around this blog. Please, I brought up a very specific topic to discuss with you that is not theological or directly philosophical. You made an accusation and cited a fact, which seems to be in error with respect to the OP. It does look like Craig, Ross, etc. got some wires crossed regarding the 10 to 120th number (it would be strange coincidence that they use both 10 to the 60th and 10 to the 120th, but meant something else, I grant you), but mistake or not it does not rule out the fact that our existence does limit the values that the CC can have, within an infinite range of possible values. Once again, the OP doesn’t mention the figure anyways, it only refers to the Cosmological Constant by name, and there is no reason to think that this is at all dishonest for the purposes of the argument (it’s not a scientific argument).
I’ll leave you with the last say, as my nerdy obsession with this sort of thing has no doubt already surpassed healthy levels.
Matt, I have referred to the origins of the 10^120 several times (in this thread) and in several places. Have a look at my post Fiddling with “fine-tuning” for a bit more detail. Briefly it’s the ratio of vacuum energy to the cosmological constant (or dark energy). The assumptions is that dark energy would be something like vacuum energy but the calculation of the latter from quantum mechanical principles produces a value too big by a factor of 10^120 (or10^50 if some assumptions are made. The biggest error in physics.
This has nothing, in itself, to do with fine-tuning – that’s why I say it is dishonest, or at least lazy, for theologians and apologists to quote it as a degree of fine tuning.
The article by Collins that Andrew uses quotes a value of 10^53 and the context make it clear he is actually referring to this mistake – not to a real degree of fine tuning (although he seems to have a very mobile and vague concept of that term).
You grudgingly allow that “Krauss and Stenger are entitled to their own interpretations of things.” Very kind of you because actually Krauss has worked specifically on this issue – and funnily enough, is quoted by Ross as his source for his “fine-tuning claim. He is the “go-to” scientist on this issue (and currently this week in Dunedin, I understand).
What Krauss actually said in his paper was: “The problem with this from a fundamental perspective is that a cosmological constant associated in modern parlance with a nonzero vacuum energy density in the universe on a scale that would be cosmologically relevant and yet still allowed today would take a value that is over 120 orders of magnitude smaller than the naive value that one might expect based on considerations of quantum mechanics and gravity.”
As you can see – Ross has simply distorted the use of the 10^120 value. I find it hard to accept that was just laziness on his part (he has some early training as an astronomer) and think it must just be plain dishonesty – the opportunism of apologetics.
You say if there was no fine-tuning “it would pose a big problem for the argument.” But why. The argument actually has a huge problem – it doesn’t explain anything let alone “fine-tuning.” It can’t because it is not a structured hypothesis. No mechanism is even suggested – it is just “god did it.” We know from experience that such arguments in the end make the religious look silly. They rely on ignorance, the fact that our knowledge is always limited, and ignore the fact that knowledge is also increasing. So when we do reach an understanding of why the physical and cosmological parameters have the values they do the apologists who can only say “god did it” look like fools.
Finally, I am sorry you think I have a “tendency to hyperbole.” I don’t actually know what you mean. To be defending science against distortions is surely a point of honour – not “hyperbole.” And I have tried very hard to communicate to you the facts – which you seem finally to have accepted. I must have been doing something right.
Although I can’t leave without making this final point. You claim ” our existence does limit the values that the CC can have, within an infinite range of possible values.” Bloody hell – do you think the fact that you exist, little old you, has determined the value of the cosmological constant – or anything else in this cosmos? Really?
Come on. The fact that the universe exists and has done so for almost 14 billion years is certainly made possible by the specific values of the cosmological and physical parameters – which in itself does not say anything about fine tuning. But you have done nothing to determine, or limit, those values, nothing at all!
You should have a think about what Douglas Adams said about this sort of attitude. He imagines a sentient puddle “who wakes up one morning and thinks, “This is an interesting world I find myself in—an interesting hole I find myself in—fits me rather neatly, doesn’t it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!””
I do have difficulty understanding what exactly the 10 to the 120th refers to (mostly because I’m not a physicist), but I did a little more sleuthing around the internets and I have to correct myself yet again. Craig used the number in his debate with Krauss, and used it correctly. Krauss’ differance of opinion has to do with calling the number ‘finely tuned’, but Krauss did not take issue with the figure itself. I incorrectly understood Ken as saying that the mistake was in the figure used (when he meant the ‘use of the figure’). I won’t say anymore, in the interest of sticking to my word, but to say that there was not, in the first place, any error on the part of Craig, Ross, or Collins in the use of the figure in their arguments as far as I can tell, and I don’t want to pile misunderstanding on top of misunderstanding. So, am I understanding you properly Ken, in that you do not think that Craig, Ross et al are incorrectly CITING the science, but that they are mistaken in using the phrase ‘finely tuned’ (in addition to, as you put it, using the science to prop up a philosophical argument, which you take to be either outrightly fallacious, or else a faux pas)?
thanks, and I really don’t mean to break my word here. I’m trying my best to understand this stuff, because it interests me.
Matt – I have made extremely clear what the mistake is. I can’t see what your problem is.
Yes, Collins, Craig and Ross are mistaken to claim a fine tuning of 1 part in 10^120 (or 1 part in 10^53 of the cosmological constant. The fact is that the constant can vary between about zero and 5 times its accepted value for a universe like ours. Hardly fine-tuning – let alone 1 part in 1o^120!
These characters are incorrect (or probably more correctly dishonest) in quoting the science. Specifically look what Ross claims when he cites Krauss and then look at what Krauss actually wrote. I think Ross must be dishonest to make that distortion.
So – be clear Matt – you completely misrepresent me. You are wrong. These roosters are incorrectly citing the science and they are incorrect in describing the cosmological constant as “fine- tuning” in the way the incorrect (dishonest) citation implies.
Matt – you must have some theological training. You have managed to scoot around, misinterpret and misrepresent on this issue which, to my kind, is patently clear. That’s a theological skill.
A quick summary of the Cosmological Constant:
http://super.colorado.edu/~michaele/Lambda/phys.html
Martin Rees and Leonard Susskind on the Cosmological Constant (from a television program):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dnuxCZrtxq4&feature=youtube_gdata_player
The part of the Craig/Krauss debate in which the CC is mentioned:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpv5mMRFUgQ&feature=player_embedded
and the Craig/Krauss commentary post-debate:
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8853
ok, that’s it, for reals. Them’s my sources, in addition to Penrose. Again, I feel bad for going on, but at this point I do feel the need to defend myself. I haven’t endeavored to misrepresent you, Ken, or the nature of the situation. (I also don’t mean to assume that there is any audience for this discussion, either… but just in case). Let it not be said that I scooted, misinterpreted or misrepresented (and if the last two did happen, it was entirely without intent ).
[…] about him) claimed to be using the “Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis” in his post Comparing the Old & New Teleological Arguments. Boiled down he believes that observed “fine-tuning” of physical constants in the […]
[…] about him) claimed to be using the “Inference to the Most Favored Hypothesis” in his post Comparing the Old & New Teleological Arguments. Boiled down he believes that observed “fine-tuning” of physical constants in the […]