Tag: Problem of Evil

  • Van Inwagen, Divine Duties and the Deontological Argument from Evil

    In Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I and Part II, I discussed Michael Tooley’s deontological argument from evil. In The Problem of Evil Peter Van Inwagen makes a reference to the type of argument I proposed. In this post I intend to make some critical commentary on Van Inwagen’s comments.

    Tooley states, “most contemporary formulations of the argument from evil … are formulated in terms of axiological concepts – specifically, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability, of states of affairs.”[1] [Emphasis original]

    Tooley then argues that axiological formulations of the argument from evil are problematic. Any attempt to argue that a perfectly good being would not fail to prevent some evil or undesirable state of affairs will rely on “controversial ethical claims” that are “within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists, and others.”[2]

    In response to this problem Tooley proposes, instead, a deontological formulation of the argument from evil; “rather than employing concepts that focus upon the value or disvalue of states of affairs, one instead uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the–rightmaking or wrongmaking–properties that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed or ought not to be performed.”[3]

    Tooley summarises, “the basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil” as follows,

    The basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil is then as follows. First, it is claimed that the world contains certain states of affairs such that any action of allowing any of those states of affairs to obtain would involve one or more known wrongmaking characteristics that would outweigh the sum total of known rightmaking characteristics that the action would have. If this is right, then any such action is prima facie wrong, relative to the total information that one presently has concerning the action’s rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. Secondly, the crucial question is then whether there is any sound inductive argument that will take one from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the further conclusion that the action is probably wrong all things considered. If there is, one will then have an ‘inductively sound’ version of the evidential argument from evil.[4] [Emphasis original]

    What is crucial for my purposes is the claim that “any action of allowing any of those states of affairs [will possess] wrongmaking characteristics.” [Emphasis added] By “any action” Tooley means to include not just actions by human beings or other creatures sufficiently like human beings but also actions performed by God. Tooley’s argument then assumes that both human and divine actions can possess wrongmaking properties, and hence, both humans and God have duties.

    I argued in Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument Part II that this assumption is questionable. I noted that, on a divine command theory of ethics, “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[5] It follows then that God’s own actions can have wrongmaking properties only if God issues commands to himself to refrain from these actions and then violates his own commands. It is dubious that God would have the kind of weakness of the will this picture suggests, and hence, if a divine command theory is true it is dubious that any of God’s actions have wrongmaking properties or that God has duties.

    I also noted that many leading theists have offered sophisticated and rigorous defences of a divine command theory so it remains a serious option for theists in ethical theory. Tooley’s own deontological argument from evil relies on “controversial ethical claims” that are, “within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists.” Given this, Tooley’s position is no better than the axiological formulation that he rejects.

    In The Problem of Evil Peter Van Inwagen makes some comments in a footnote that address this line of argument. In formulating the problem of evil Van Inwagen states, “I’m going to assume that there is an objective moral standard, that this standard applies to both God and to creatures.”[6] By objective standard here I will assume that Van Inwagen is referring to the existence of duties, and hence, is contending that God has deontological obligations to act in certain ways. Van Inwagen is aware that some theists “resist the idea that there is an objective moral standard that ‘applies to God’.”[7] In response to this position he offers two important responses, which I will address in turn under the headings God and Moral Perfection and Non-Deontological Arguments from Evil.

    God and Moral Perfection

    Van Inwagen suggest the idea that if God has no duties then “presumably, there is no such property or attribute as “moral perfection”. … If there is no such attribute as moral perfection, the aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit will not be morally perfect–and not because it will be morally imperfect, but because there will not be any such thing for it to be.”[8]

    Van Inwagen seems to hold that unless there is “an objective moral standard, that … applies to both God and to creatures” it follows that God cannot have the property of being morally perfect. On the face of it, it is unclear why Van Inwagen thinks this. Earlier in the same book he defines moral perfection as follows:

    God has no moral defect whatever. It follows that he is in no way a subject of possible moral criticism. If someone says something of the form, ‘God did x and it was wrong of God to do x‘, that person must be mistaken: either God did not in fact do x or it was not wrong of God to do x.”[9]

    It is unclear why the absence of divine duties entails, according to this definition of moral perfection, that God would not be morally perfect. If there is no “moral standard that applies to God” then God will not display any moral defect by disobeying such a standard as one cannot disobey a standard that does not exist. Similarly, if God has no duties then it is impossible for him to act contrary to these duties, and hence, impossible for God to do wrong. On the face of it then, the absence of divine duties is compatible with Van Inwagen’s definition of moral perfection.

    That said, I think Van Inwagen means to assert something a bit different here. He is proposing is that a person can be morally perfect, in the sense he defines these terms, only if there is an objective moral standard that applies to that person and if they perfectly conform to that standard. This is what he means when he says, “God has no moral defect whatsoever,” God never goes against the standard of right and wrong that applies to him;  God has duties and acts in accord with them. Similarly, when he affirms, “If someone says something of the form, ‘God did x and it was wrong of God to do x‘, that person must be mistaken: either God did not in fact do x or it was not wrong of God to do x”,9 he is suggesting that God has duties and never, in any possible world, acts contrary to them. If moral perfection is understood in this deontological fashion, it follows that if God has no duties he cannot be morally perfect. Of course he cannot be morally imperfect either; to be morally imperfect there would have to be a moral standard that applies to God that God acts contrary to. On the deontological conception of moral perfection, the property of moral perfection simply does not apply to God.

    Van Inwagen is correct that, according to the deontological conception of moral perfection he sketches, the denial of divine duties entails that God is not morally perfect. However, divine command theorists have contended that this really does not amount to much of a criticism because there seems no reason as to why God’s moral perfection has to be spelled out deontologically. If God does not have duties, it does not follow that he does not or cannot have certain character traits such as being loving, truthful, benevolent, compassionate, long-suffering, just, that he cannot possess hatred of actions that are, in fact, unjust and various other attributes that are traditionally attributed to God. Van Inwagen is aware of this point,

    But no doubt anyone who felt compelled to remove “moral perfection” from the list of properties a “something” must have if it is to be something than which a greater cannot be conceived (having been convinced by some argument or other that there was no objective moral standard) would want to “replace” it with some attribute whose existence did not presuppose an objective moral standard: “benevolent in the highest possible degree”, perhaps, or “exhibiting perfect love toward all creatures.[10]

    If God is not “morally perfect” in the deontological sense that Van Inwagen defines this term, this does not preclude attributing goodness in some non-deontological sense to God in a meaningful way, hence, in the absence of any argument as to why God’s goodness must be construed in a deontological sense, it is hard to see any cogent objection here.

    Non-Deontological Arguments from Evil

    Van Inwagen’s second response to those who “resist the idea” that God has duties is to note that denying divine duties does not provide an answer to all versions of the argument from evil. Suppose that one adopts a non-deontological account of God’s goodness, such as those mentioned above, and understands God’s goodness not in terms of fulfilment of duties but in terms of certain character traits then non-deontological versions of the argument from evil are still available that do not rely on the assumption that God has duties. He states,

    No doubt, the existence of vast amounts of truly horrible evil raises problems for those who believe in an omnipotent being who is benevolent in the highest possible degree (or whose love for all creatures is perfect) that are essentially the same as the problems it raises for those who believe in an omnipotent and morally perfect being.10

    On this point Van Inwagen is correct. Denying that God has duties does not constitute a rebuttal to all forms of the argument from evil. It does, however, offer a rebuttal to the specifically deontological formulations of the argument, such as those proposed by Michael Tooley, and this is an important conclusion. Tooley formulated a deontological version precisely because he believed that other more axiological formulations of the argument are problematic. He believed that formulating it in deontological terms improved the argument and made it more plausible. If a divine command theory of ethics is a correct or defensible theistic account of obligation then this particular attempt to improve the argument fails.




    [1] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 70-147, 105.

    [2] Ibid.

    [3] Ibid 106.

    [4] Ibid 116.

    [5] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.

    [6] Peter Van Inwagen The Problem of Evil: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 161.

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Ibid, aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit is Latin for “something greater than which nothing can be conceived” referring to Anselm’s famous definition of God in the Proslogion.

    [9] Inwagen, supra n 6, 26-27.

    [10] Ibid, 161.

    RELATED POSTS:

    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument Part II

  • Video of Matthew Flannagan on Apologetics: Answering Objections to the Christian Faith

    Matt spoke at the Thinking Matters Auckland Launch on 8 March 2009 on Apologetics: Answering Objections to the Christian Faith. If you missed it or wish to see it again or if you have been thinking about attending a Thinking Matters seminar or booking Matt as a speaker and you are not sure if he will go over your head then grab a cuppa and sit back and enjoy the below video.

    This talk is a great intro into the subject of apologetics and addresses some common objections such as:

    • It is irrational to believe things that cannot be proven
    • It is arbitrary to believe that one particular religion is true
    • The existence of evil disproves Christianity
    The question and answer section at the end is very good too.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Video of Matthew Flannagan Speaking on Moral Relativism

  • Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

    In my last post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I, I sketched Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and argued that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on controversial ethical claims that are likely to be rejected by many theists. I outlined Tooley’s deontological version and explored the moral assumptions it is based on and Plantinga’s criticism of these.

    “God can do wrong only if he commands himself to do something and then disobeys his own command.”In this post, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are, it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.

    To save you having to click back repeatedly to the previous post, I will first re-cite step one of Tooley’s argument,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.
    (13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.

    Therefore, from (12) and (13):

    (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.

    Tooley then adds as an additional premise,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.[1]

    Modifying Plantinga’s Response : The Divine Command Theory
    In a more recent paper, Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience, Plantinga makes a comment that suggests he could formulate his objection so that “permitted by God” was taken in the second sense mentioned above. Plantinga writes,

    Theists typically think ethical properties are intimately related to what God approves or values or commands. Thus they will often think of moral obligation as a matter of what God commands. What is obligatory are those actions God commands or wills; what is wrong are those actions God prohibits; what is permissible are those actions God does not prohibit.[2]

    Plantinga here refers to what has been called the divine command theory of ethics[3]; the position that, “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[4] According to a divine command theory of ethics, being permitted by God is a right-making property; actions are right, if and only if, and because, they are permitted by God. I am inclined to think that any theist who accepts a divine command theory of ethics will deny (15) whether or not they “offer a theodicy.” They will also have reasons for denying (12).

    This is because, if the divine command theory of ethics is true then (12) is false. Tooley affirms that, “the property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.” According to a divine command theory of ethics this is false; there is only one ultimate wrong-making property, that of being contrary to God’s commands. Given that the property of “choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000” is not the same property as “being permitted by God,” it follows that the former property is not a right-making property of actions and, as such, (12) is false.

    Even if one puts this point to one side, if a divine command theory of ethics is true, there is a further problem with (12); it is ambiguous compare:

    [12 a] The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a serious wrongmaking property of actions performed by human beings (or rational creatures relevantly like human beings).

    and

    [12b] The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a serious wrongmaking property of actions performed by (including God).

    For Tooley’s argument to be successful he must mean for (12) to be taken as [12b]. Tooley is arguing for the conclusion that if God exists then he has performed actions that it would be wrong for God to perform; which, given that God is good, is an impossible state of affairs.

    However, what is an “uncontroversial moral claim” that “does not seem very problematic” is [12a]. If a divine command theory of ethics is true then [12b] is false. This is because one implication of a divine command theory of ethics is that God does not have obligations and hence, strictly speaking, nothing he does can be right or wrong.[5] Craig notes “nor, plausibly, is God bound by moral duties since he does not issue commands to himself.”[6] Similarly Alston, in an article defending the claim that God has no obligations, states “we can hardly suppose that God is obliged to love his creatures because he commands himself to do so.”[7]

    Craig and Alston’s arguments seem sound. If the divine command theory of ethics is true then a person p is required to do an action a, if and only if, God commands p to do a. It follows then, that God is required to do a, if and only if, God issues commands to himself. Moreover, if divine command theory of ethics is true then a person engages in wrongdoing, if and only if, they disobey a command that God issues to them. Hence, if divine command theory of ethics is true then God can do wrong only if he commands himself to do something and then disobeys his own command.

    Neither of these conditions seems very likely. It seems unlikely that God issues commands to himself. Why would he need to? If he wanted to do something wouldn’t he just do it? Moreover, it seems absurd to suggest that even if God issues commands to himself that he would then disobey them. That would suggest that God displays some form of weakness of the will and it is not clear that weakness of the will is compatible with a supremely excellent being such as God.[8]

    The divine command theorist will take a similar stance towards (15). If a divine command theory of ethics is true then the property of “being permitted by God” is a right-making property. If God permits an action, in the sense of refraining from prohibiting it, then that makes the action morally permissible. Consider then, “[God’s] action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake.” For the reasons spelt out above, God did not forbid himself from doing this; hence, this action has a right-making property that a theist, who embraces divine command theory of ethics, knows about.

    Similarly, this right-making property outweighs any wrong-making property that the action has. As I mentioned previously, according to a divine command theory of ethics, there is only one ultimate wrong-making property, the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Given that God did not command himself to stop the Lisbon earth quake, the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur does not have any wrong-making properties and so there can be none that outweigh it.

    Consequently, if a divine command theory of ethics is true then both (12) and (15) are false. It is not just theists who offer a theodicy then who would reject (15).

    The Significance of this Conclusion
    I think this conclusion is significant for two reasons. First, a significant number of contemporary theists embrace and defend the divine command theory of ethics. Those who have defended it include, Robert Adams,[9] John Hare,[10] William Alston,[11] William Lane Craig,[12] Stephen C Evans,[13] Philip Quinn,[14] Edward Wierenga,[15] Janine Marie Idziak,[16] William Wanwright,[17] William Mann,[18] Thomas Carson[19] and more recently Alvin Plantinga.[20] These people are not obscure, marginal representatives of theism; these names include some of the leading defenders of theism in the literature today. Tooley’s argument then contains a premise that would be, and in fact is, rejected by many leading theists.

    Second, this fact introduces a significant incoherence into Tooley’s discussion of the argument from evil. In “Does God Exist?” Tooley rejects an axiological argument from evil on the grounds that it rests on a moral claim that was “within ethical theory deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists and others.” Tooley’s own argument, however, presupposes the denial of a divine command theory of ethics. This is a controversial moral claim and one that is rejected by many theists. His own deontological argument then seems to be no better than the axiological version he rejects.

    Finally, it seems in light of these conclusions that Tooley’s deontological argument from evil is incomplete. It is not enough for Tooley to simply ask “what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action allowing the Lisbon earthquake and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed?”[21] The theist can point to such a property. Tooley needs to supplement his argument with a refutation of the divine command theory; specifically, he needs to argue that even if theism is true then this theory is implausible and problematic. Until the divine command theory can be shown to be a rationally untenable option for theists, theists can avoid Tooley’s deontological argument from evil.

    Objections
    In this last section I want to anticipate and criticise two lines of argument that Tooley or a defender of Tooley, might make against the above line of critique.

    Tooley’s Critique of Divine Command Theory
    I suggested that Tooley’s argument was incomplete until he provides the theist with some reason why a divine command theory of ethics cannot be accepted then the theist can reject two crucial premises of his argument. (A defender of Tooley could object here that he has argued for this conclusion. In a debate with William Lane Craig at the University of Colorado Tooley addressed the divine command theory and offered a Euthyphro style argument against it. I agree that a complete defence of my position requires a response to this argument, regular readers, however, will note that I have addressed this argument previously in Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands.)

    Divine Commands and Divine Obligations
    My argument depended on the claim, made by Craig and Alston, that if a divine command theory is true then God does not have duties. Linda Zagzebski has called this claim into question. In “More Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists,” Zagzebski proposes an account of divine obligations which is compatible with a divine command theory. Zagzebski starts by offering an account of the meaning of obligation, “What we mean by ‘obligation,’ is essentially this: there is no other option compatible with moral goodness.”[22] From this definition she argues that “the metaphysical source of divine obligation” and “the metaphysical source of human obligation are distinct.”[23]

    The metaphysical source of the property of an act of a human being which makes it the case that there is no alternative act compatible with goodness is that it is commanded by God. The metaphysical source of the property of an act of God that makes it the case that there is no alternative act compatible with goodness is that that any alternative is incompatible with Gods nature.[24]

    Hence, she concludes that it is “metaphysically necessary that an act X is an obligation for a human if and only if X is commanded by God” and “it is metaphysically necessary that an act X is an obligation for God if and only if X is compatible with Gods nature.”[25]

    While I am not convinced by Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations, even if one grants them for the sake of argument it is clear that it cannot be used to defend Tooley’s deontological argument from evil. Consider,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.[26]

    If Zagzebski’s account of divine obligation is correct then (15) is false. Plantinga’s original unreformulated response is rehabilitated. As Plantinga pointed out “God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of being performed by a perfectly good being.”[27] Moreover, “theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of performing the Lisbon earthquake has the property of being performed by God, who is a perfectly good person.”[28] But if the Lisbon earthquake was performed by a perfectly good person, performing it must be compatible with the divine nature and hence it has the very right-making property that Zagzebski identifies in her account of divine obligation.

    The same is true for (12). Tooley contends,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.

    On Zagzebski’s account (12) is false. There are only two right-making properties that exist. The property of being compatible with God’s nature, which is what makes God’s actions right, and the property of being permitted by God, which is what makes human actions right. Now the property of “choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the deaths of more than 50,000 people” is neither of these properties and hence, is not a right-making property.

    [1] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience” accessed 4 April 2009.
    [3] The position is perhaps more correctly known as ethical voluntarism as some proponents of it emphasise the divine will as opposed to divine commands. However, because of the widespread use of the term ‘divine command theory’ in the literature I will stick with the term.
    [4] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd ed (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.
    [5] It should also be noted that the claim that God does not have obligations has been defended on grounds other than a divine command theory. See, for example, William Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). Hence, even if one dismisses a divine command theory of ethics it still follows that [12a] is not the obviously uncontroversial statement Tooley thinks it is.
    [6] William Lane Craig Philosphical Foundations of a Christian World View (Downers Grover Il: Intervarsity Press, 2003) 529.
    [7] William Alston “Response to Zagzebski” Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston eds Heather D Battaly, Michael P Lynch, William P Alston, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 204.
    [8] It is worth noting the definition of God that Tooley works with in formulating his argument. For the purposes of his argument, Tooley is defining God as “an appropriate object of worship” as well as an appropriate object of other human concerns such as the desire that good will triumph over evil, and that justice will be done” etc.
    [9] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979); Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
    [10] John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001); God and Morality: A Philosophical History (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
    [11] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
    [12] William Lane Craig “This most Gruesome of Guests” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanthan: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2009) 172; also Philosphical Foundations of a Christian World View (Downers Grover Il: Intervarsity Press, 2003) 529-532.
    [13] C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
    [14] Philip L Quinn Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 289-302; “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365; “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992) 493-513; “Divine Command Theory” in Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory ed Hugh Lafollette (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 53-73; “Theological Voluntarism” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 63-90.
    [15] Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also, “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [16] Janine Marie Idziak “Divine Commands Are the Foundation of Morality” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Malden, MA:Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 290-298.
    [17] William Wrainwright Religion and Morality (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005).
    [18] William Mann “Theism and the Foundations of Ethics” in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion ed William Mann (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
    [19] Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000).
    [20] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience”available at http://www.ammonius.org/grant_topics.php#0708 accessed 4 April 2009.
    [21] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 122
    [22] Linda Zagzebski “More Suggestions for Divine Command Theories” in Perspectives on the Philosophy of William P. Alston eds Heather D Battaly, Michael P Lynch, William P Alston, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 189.
    [23] Ibid.
    [24] Ibid.
    [25] Ibid.
    [26] Tooley “Does God Exist?” 119.
    [27] Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008), 170
    [28] Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

  • Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I

    This two-part series criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Micheal Tooley in The Knowledge of God, the print debate between him and Alvin Plantinga.1 My critique proceeds in four parts. Initially I will sketch Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and will argue that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on “controversial ethical claims;”2 claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists.”3 Then I will outline Tooley’s deontological version and focus on the moral assumptions upon which it is based and Plantinga’s criticism of these. This will conclude Part I of the series.

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.

    Deontological and Axiological Arguments from Evil
    Tooley distinguishes axiological versions of the argument from evil from deontological versions. The former, “are formulated in terms of axiological concepts—specifically, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability of states of affairs.”4 [Emphasis original] The latter, “uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the–rightmaking or wrongmaking–properties that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed.”5

    Tooley suggests that axiological versions are problematic. He takes as a paradigm the version proposed by William Rowe. Central to Rowe’s argument is the following conceptual claim about a perfectly good being.

    (2) Any omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect person would prevent the existence of any state of affairs that is both (a) intrinsically bad, or undesirable, and (b) such that he could prevent its existence without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good.6

    Rowe applies (2) to concrete evils in the world. He identifies various concrete evil states of affairs and contends that these concrete cases meet the criteria (a) and (b) specified in (2).

    There are well rehearsed problems with Rowe’s attempt to do this.7 While Rowe can maintain that there are cases where we do not know of any greater good lost or greater evil prevented by the allowance of these evils, this is insufficient to show that the cases meet the specified criteria. His argument requires that we know that there are no greater goods lost or evils prevented known to an omniscient being. Tooley notes that the step from “we don’t know” to the claim that an “omniscient being does not know” is difficult to bridge and Rowe’s attempts to do so have been unsucessful.8

    Tooley’s most important objection is to contest (2) itself. Tooley notes that (2) appears to rely on a,

    common consquentialist claim … namely, the claim that an action is morally wrong if it fails to maximise the balance of good states of affairs over bad states of affairs. But the difficulty then is that “such a claim is, within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists, and others.9

    In response, Tooley develops and defends an argument from evil which does not rely on “controversial ethical claims,”10 one that focuses “upon the rightness and wrongness of actions.”

    Tooley’s Deontological Argument
    Tooley summarises his argument succinctly,

    The basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil is then as follows. First, it is claimed that the world contains certain states of affairs such that any action of allowing any of those states of affairs to obtain would involve one or more known wrongmaking characteristics that would outweigh the sum total of known rightmaking characteristics that the action would have. If this is right, then any such action is prima facie wrong, relative to the total information that one presently has concerning the action’s rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. Secondly, the crucial question is then whether there is any sound inductive argument that will take one from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the further conclusion that the action is probably wrong all things considered. If there is, one will then have an ‘inductively sound’ version of the evidential argument from evil.11 [Emphasis original

    As Tooley notes the argument has two crucial steps. The first is the claim that an argument that allows a certain states of affairs to occur is prima facie wrong. The second is an inductive argument from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the claim that it is ultra facie wrong; that is, wrong all things considered.

    It is clear that Tooley considers the second step to be the ‘crucial question’ and he spends most of his article defending the inductive inference he draws. Tooley appears to think that the first step is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial. His defence of it consists of a few paragraphs.

    Tooley’s Argument for Step One
    Tooley’s argument for the first step consists of three premises,

    (12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 .ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.

    (13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.

    Therefore, from (12) and (13):

    (14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.

    Tooley then adds as an additional premise,

    (15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.12

    Tooley believes that (12)-(15) are uncontroversial “(12) makes a moral claim, but one that does not seem at all problematic while statement (13) makes a historical claim for which there is, I believe, very good evidence.”13 Tooley appears to think that the only potentially controversial premise is (15) but that this would be denied only by philosophers who offer a theodicy.14 Tooley maintains that (15) is,

    [V]ery reasonable, given the relevant facts about the world, together with the moral knowledge that we possess. For what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake, and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the wrongmaking property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed.15

    Tooley concludes that, in the absence of a defensible theodicy, there are compelling arguments for concluding that allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. This is not an insignificant conclusion. Many contemporary theists discuss the argument from evil by conceding that there are no defensible theodicies and then arguing that even in the absence of such a theodicy, belief in God is not rendered improbable by the existence of evil. If Tooley is correct, this line of argument is mistaken. The burden of proof is clearly on the theist to provide a theodicy; if he or she cannot then God’s action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. Moreover, if Tooley’s inductive arguments hold, the God’s actions will be ultra facie wrong.

    Plantinga’s Response
    Plantinga responds to Tooley’s argument by calling into question (15).

    Christians and other theists believe that God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of having been performed by a perfectly good being. Furthermore, Christians and other theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake has the property of having been performed by God, who is a perfectly good person. This is a rightmaking property that clearly outweighs and counterbalances any wrongmaking properties that action has.16

    In this citation, Plantinga denies that only theists who offer a theodicy would contest [15]. Plantinga suggests that theists will typically believe that there is a right making property of which they know of; the property of being permitted by God. This property overrides all others and the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake has this property. Hence, the Theist has good reasons for rejecting [15] even if he or she cannot offer an adequate theodicy.

    Tooley’s response is to deny that being permitted by God is a right making property,

    Suppose that God exists, and, thus permitted the Lisbon earthquake. One can ask “What property did the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake have that made it morally permissible for God to permit it?” The response that it had the property of having been permitted by God, who is perfectly good, is not a satisfactory answer to that question: there must be some other property that made it permissible for God to permit the Lisbon earthquake. The property of having been permitted by God, while it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, is not itself a rightmaking property.17 [Emphasis original]

    The phrase “having been permitted by God” is ambiguous. In one sense it could refer to God allowing an event to occur; if he does not stop it occurring then God permits the Lisbon earthquake. In another sense, however, it can refer to God refraining from forbidding an action. God permits drinking alcohol, for example. If God refrains from issuing a command to abstain from drinking alcohol then it is clear, I think, that Plantinga means the former and Tooley seems18 correct in suggesting that in this sense it is clear that being permitted by God is not a right making property but this leaves an important question hanging; couldn’t Plantinga’s critique be reformulated in terms of the “second sense” of the phrase “having been permitted by God.”

    In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will propose a Plantingan reformulation and address some objections.

    1 Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 70-147.
    2 Tooley “Does God Exist?”105.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid, 106.
    6 William Rowe “Evil and Theodicy” Philosophical Topics 16: 119-32. I am following Rowe’s enumeration.
    7 Stephen John Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil;” Peter van Inwagen “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” and “Reflections on the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale;” William P Alston “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition” and “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil;” Daniel Howard-Snyder “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 1996). See also, Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
    8 Tooley “Does God Exist” 104.
    9 Ibid, 105.
    10 Ibid.
    11 Ibid, 116.
    12 Ibid, 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
    13 Ibid, 122.
    14 Ibid.
    15 Ibid.
    16 Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 170-71.
    17 Michael Tooley “Closing Statement and Reply to Plantinga’s Comments” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 238.
    18 I say seems because Linda Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations would challenge this contention as I will argue in part IV.

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    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II