Tag: Rights and Freedoms

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. In Part I, I will look at the concept of a property right drawing from Blackstone, John Locke and Ed Feser paying particular attention to the context Blackstone wrote in.

    What is a Property Right?
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone, judge, jurist and professor of law who authored one of the most influential texts, Commentaries on the Laws of England, on the classical views of the common law and its principles, grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state. His infamous statement at the beginning of his chapter “Of Property, in General” certainly seems to bear this out,

    There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.[1]

    This theme of property rights being paramount is found in other parts of his writings. In “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[2] [Emphasis added]

    The latter part of this quote has been used by some to suggest that what Blackstone really meant to say was that one can use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land. I certainly have heard this in class from my Professors and it is prevalent enough to be left standing on Wikipedia,

    …the phrase is often presented without taking into account the greater context of Blackstone’s thought on the subject of property. Blackstone likely offered the statement as a rhetorical flourish to begin his discussion, given that even in his age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute. Property owners must rely on the enforcement powers of the state, in any event, for the realization of their rights.[3]

    Now I agree that the greater context must always be taken into account when chopping a few sentences out of a greater text, so let us do precisely this. Blackstone suggests that property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”; to ascertain what he meant by this we must read the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[4]

    So qualified, we can see that although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean ‘absolute’ in the sense of never being able to be overridden but likewise he does not have in mind the notion that the passage of any law, no matter its impact on the landowner, is compatible with property rights; what he is getting at is more limited than that.

    Blackstone suggests that property rights can be encroached for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere in the same text he suggests that necessity might be a further option. A person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[5]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,

    the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. … if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”[6]

    The author of the Wikipedia quote was not wrong when he or she said that “even in [Blackstone’s] age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute.” It is true that the landowner’s rights were traditionally, at common law, subject to the rights of others. For example, lessees, easement holders, mortgagees held rights in another’s land. Tortious liabilities such as actionable nuisance, the doctrines of support and waste, etc are examples of the ability of others to dictate what a landowner does with his or her land. These restrictions were tied up with fact that every person has the right to enjoy his or her property, hence, the exercise of enjoying one’s property (or exercising one’s property rights) was limited by the degree it prevented another from enjoying theirs.

    Blackstone did not consider property rights to simply be legal rights. As I have stated a few times thus far, he grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state,

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else. [7]

    He appealed to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[8] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government, that is, they exist whether or not the state acknowledges them. A just state will protect and recognise these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others.”[9]

    Feser has argued that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers to cannot be unjust.[10] If one mixes one’s labour with and gains ownership of, a parcel of previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it. This acquisition, in turn, gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. If one takes possession of previously unoccupied land and mixes one’s labour with it or one obtains ownership of such land via a just transaction then, prima facie, one has rights over this land. The burden then falls on the taker to justify taking,

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor![11]

    In Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II, I turn to the extent of the landowners rights, the relationship of property rights to legislative controls, looking at the CMA, RMA and recent judgments. I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property.


    [1] William Blackstone “Of Property, in General” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1.
    [2] Blackstone “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals”, above n 1, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139.
    [3] “Blackstone and Property Jurisprudence” in William Blackstone accessed at 17 February 2010.
    [4]
    Blackstone, above n 1.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6]
    Edward Feser “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21-52, 38.
    [7] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [8]
    John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [9] Ibid s 27.
    [10] Edward Feser “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) Social Philosophy and Policy 58-59.
    [11]
    Ibid 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

  • Name Suppression and the Balancing of Rights and Freedoms

    God, via the consent of the governed, gives authority to the state to administer justice against those who violate the rights and freedoms of others. Given this, it is important that the citizens can see that justice is being done. My fellow blogger WhaleOil’s very public battle with New Zealand’s name suppression laws and the wide support he’s received (if not for his actions at least for the sentiment behind them) highlights a concern that name suppression law, as practiced in New Zealand – especially with regard to celebrities – offends this notion.

    Suppression orders offend important liberal concepts; the principle of openness, transparent and public trials, is grounded in the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, for each citizen to be able to seek, receive and impart information, are both contained the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Suppression orders meant that we, the public, are unable to receive information about matters of justice and thus we cannot fully witness justice being done; the balance of power becomes too weighted in favour of the state.

    This is not to say there is no place for suppression orders, I believe there clearly is, but in granting one the interests of justice must be properly weighed against the right to expression “and only where the Court’s capacity to ensure justice is significantly imperilled will the right of citizens and the media to seek, receive and impart information be curtailed.” (Thomas J in Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 99) The court must take into consideration the effect of doing so on freedom of expression, alongside its affronts to the principle of openness, and engage in the weighing and balancing that Thomas J referred to.

    Now given the presumption of innocence, innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, one wonders why someone simply being accused of something causes the court to tip the balance in favour of the right to privacy, a right not typically contained in Bills of Rights or listed by jurists when considering the key elements of a just and liberal society? If the reason is that once accused everyone thinks you did it then why doesn’t everyone get name suppression? Do non-celebrities not also have very real risks to their careers and relationships when they are tainted by accusations?

  • Guthrie Cards as an Inchoate Genetic Database

    I just stumbled across this from Kiwipolemicist; it seems that if you were born in New Zealand from 1969 onwards, chances are that the New Zealand government is holding a sample of your blood. Some 2.1 million blood samples taken from newborns via the ‘heel-prick’ test are still on file today stored on “Guthrie cards.”

    This is basically an inchoate genetic database; if the government wanted to, it could easily tap into this info and have the means get a substantial head-start on creating a DNA profile of all its citizens. The Hon Peter Dunne is quoted in a report by the Privacy Commissioner, at para 7.4, arguing that the database has the potential to be “a powerful weapon in the fight against crime.

    But hang on a minute, this powerful weapon would be obtained without probable cause; in this instance, evidence that a reasonable person would deem sufficient to conclude that a particular person will or has committed a crime. There are strong arguments to justify the New Zealand DNA Data-Bank’s holding of two crime based DNA databases, the National DNA Database (containing DNA profiles from those convicted of serious offences) and the Crime Sample Database (containing DNA profiles from crime scene samples). However, to talk of creating one from every citizen is to consider a serious breach of civil liberties; such liberties as the right for innocent people to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures on the part of the State.

    One might argue that if the State has not made this move having had this database since 1969 it is not likely to. In addition to being, not the point, I think this is naive and KP agrees with me:

    [T]rusting the state to properly use personal information is like putting a dog and a steak in a closed room and expecting to find the steak untouched the next day.

    A Memorandum of Understanding regulating requests from the Police for access to the Guthrie Cards is already in existence and has been put to use, more than once. Further, we are all familiar with NZ governments, from both camps, being too loose with civil liberties when they have an end in mind.

    As Franklin said, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, so while I still can, I am going to apply to have mine and my children’s DNA returned.

  • A Voting Guide

    How to choose who to vote for tomorrow, from Glenn (once again – what can we say? he is brilliant and we ran out of time *ahem*)

    Extract from: So who AM I voting for? (the election blog, part 3)

    Basic Human rights/freedoms
    There are some bottom line human rights and liberties that should always be protected. They’re sometimes called “first generation” human rights. Whatever you call them, here are the big basic things that no government anywhere should neglect, and which no state has any right to diminish. These are the non-negotiables, the rejection of which means that you’re simply morally deficient and unfit to be in power.

    Right to life
    Christians believe that human life is sacred. Humanity is made in the image of God, and as such taking life is a serious matter. Prima facie, we have a duty to not kill. That is to say, if there are no other factors to consider, then killing human beings is always wrong. Some times, of course, there are other factors to consider. Sometimes people are attacked (or their families, friends etc), and in the course of defending themselves they kill the attacker. This is rare, since self defense usually does not require killing anyone, but sometimes it happens. Sometimes this happens not merely on a personal level, but a national one, where your country is attacked by another. Here too, most of us recognise that although we may not want to kill anyone, that may be an unavoidable outcome of defending our country.

    Even in the controversial case of abortion, many conservative Christians accept that – although it is a terrible thing to have to do – there are cases where the very existence of the unborn child poses a clear and imminent threat to the life of the woman carrying the child, and removing the child at an early stage of gestation involves ending the life of that child. It’s the doctrine of double effect – you save life and prevent both mother and child from dying, but a consequence of this is that one of them dies. A more controversial example still for some Christians is the issue of capital punishment. Here, while we have a prima facie duty not to kill people, a person is deemed to have done something so terrible that they give up their right to life itself, and they are put to death.

    None of these scenarios, of course, involves rejecting the right to life, since the right to life imposes only a prima facie duty. But it is still a duty, and the fact that there are a few rare cases where we can take life should not allow us to trivialise this right or duty. For that reason, abortion should be regarded as prima facie wrong (even if there could conceivably be isolated cases where it is permissible), and not merely wrong but such an abridgment of human rights that it ought not be permitted.

    Similarly, because of the value of human life, most forms of euthanasia are likewise not permissible. I say “most forms” because there are some forms of euthanasia that are arguably not killing, or which are sufficiently indirect that they are not morally on par with killing (such as withdrawal of extraordinary means, or death as a double effect resulting from pain relief). Firstly then, I think that any party that has a permissive policy on abortion or euthanasia has a big black mark against it when it comes to being a party worth voting for. I know of only two parties in the election race who pass this hurdle, namely the two Christian parties: The Kiwi party and the Family Party.

    [Support for Abortion is illiberal; any liberal who supports it is inconsistent. Don’t agree? Then read our series and post a reasoned rebuttal.]

    Free speech
    The right to freedom of speech means that if I want to say it, and if I am able to say it, then I must be free to say it and the state should not prevent me from doing so. As with the right to life, this is a prima facie right, and there are limits on what I can and cannot say. Sellers are not allowed to mislead people about products and services they sell, for example. I am not allowed to defame somebody: Say things that are not true or reasonable to believe and which damage another person (for example, I cannot spread rumours that a local retailer is a paedophile in order to get people to come to my store instead). But the right to free speech means that it is wrong for the state to censor or inhibit the propagation of any point of view in society.

    If I want to print and distribute fliers telling people who I think they should vote for, or if I want to rent billboard space to do the same thing – no strings attached, it is something I have a right to do. Of course, nobody has a duty to promote or protect my views, so another person can refuse to use her private property to promote my views (e.g. if I leave comments on her blog she may delete them, because it’s her blog), but that’s an issue of that person’s private property rights, and it doesn’t mean I no longer have a right to free speech. What’s more, free speech doesn’t come with extra conditions.

    For example, the state can’t say “sure, you can voice your political opinion and attack our policies, but if you do then you must wear this big bullseye so that people can identify you in public,” or “OK, so tell people that you’re opposed to our regime, but you’ll have to attach this big yellow star to the front door of your house so that our goons know where to look for you.” That’s not free speech because it’s not free. All it would do is discourage people from expressing themselves via intimidation or fear of reprisal.

    Generally speaking, free speech exists in New Zealand, and few parties pose any sort of threat to it. As far as I know, none of the parties listed in this blog entry would threaten free speech. I haven’t listed the Labour Party or the minor parties on the far left, as they tend to fail just about every single criterion I present here. Free speech is no exception for Labour, who are responsible for the “electoral finance act” that I discussed recently. The act in effect does the same thing as would a law that says you can have free speech as long as you paint a bulls-eye on the door of your family home. Check out my earlier blog entry to see why.

    Property rights
    People have certain rights over their own property. What they earn belongs to them, and it cannot be taken from them without due process and given to others. The government cannot commandeer land that you own for its own projects, and if it requires land you own, you must be compensated at market value. This has implications for taxation as well. Prima facie, the government cannot tax you at all. Only after good grounds have been given for obliging you to pay tax can the government take money from you, and it must be transparently accountable to you for what it does with that money, and continually justify the level of tax taken. Remember, “thou shalt not steal.”

    In addition to what we might think of as basic human rights and freedoms, there are a few other important principles of government that have in common the pursuit of justice and/or the reduction of corruption by state interference.

    Separation of powers / due process
    By “separation of powers” I mean that Parliament, while it has the authority to make laws, has absolutely no authority to enforce those laws, and no role whatsoever in the judicial process. It will respect the decision of the courts, it will not commandeer the police to do its bidding, and it will not influence the likelihood of a person facing (or not facing) charges, among other things. The Labour government and its ministers have blatantly violated each of these principles as I have noted elsewhere.

    Small government / non intervention
    This is really the broad principle underlying many of the rights and principles I’ve outlined here. In a pluralistic society, we all have our own agendas. Some will get married, others will not, some are happy with one type of school or educational method, some prefer others, some people might like one insurance company, some prefer others, some people take fewer risks, and so end up having fewer accidents and less accident related expense, some people make foolish choices and end up disadvantaging themselves and so forth. You get the idea. Small government means that the government does not intrude into private life, and it lets people make their own choices and bear responsibility for the consequences of those choices. People will save money or waste money depending on the options they choose, they will have more or fewer accidents, they will spend more or less on education, and so forth. Likewise, the government might not like the values that parents instill in their children, but it is not the job of government to raise children, that is the role of parents. Likewise again, the government might not like the fact that a court reaches a certain decision, but it is not the job of the government to settle cases, that is the role of the courts.

    In the political tradition that I am partial to, namely the Christian classical liberal tradition, the role of the state is limited by the law of nature. It should only do what the basic precepts of the law of nature (that is, minimal standards of justice and upright living) require of it, and beyond this, it usurps the role of the private sector.

    Safety net for the poor
    Why am I listing this last? Doesn’t the Bible say more about caring for the poor than it does about free trade or property rights? Yes it does. It also says more about worshipping God in song than it does about free speech, but that doesn’t mean we should only vote for a party that promises to create taxpayer funded hymn singing squads. The fact that something is encouraged in the Bible does not automatically mean that we are justified in saying that the Bible advocates it as a duty of the government. Just about every time the Bible says anything at all about caring for the poor, it is clearly speaking about the duty that we as people have, rather than describing government spending programmes. I’m also listing it last to deliberately contrast myself from some Christians who (as far as I can tell) seriously believe that social justice just is wealth redistribution to the poor. Those who think this are somewhat selective in their reading of the Bible. For some reason none of them ever seem to quote 2 Thessalonians 3:10-12:

    For even when we were with you, we would give you this command: If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat. For we hear that some among you walk in idleness, not busy at work, but busybodies. Now such persons we command and encourage in the Lord Jesus Christ to do their work quietly and to earn their own living.

    That being said, there does need to be a safety net for those who fall into genuine hardship. People who are genuinely unable to earn a living (or who are demonstrably doing all that they can to obtain work) and who have no other means of support should be assisted for as long as is necessary. Although by no means a desirable state of affairs, it’s like the Proverb says, “people do not despise a thief if he steals to satisfy his appetite when he is hungry.”

    Far from being some sort of socialism, this has always been a part of a conservative or classical liberal outlook. John Locke gives his rationale for limited welfare in his treatise on government, book 1, paragraph 42:

    But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may starve him if he please: God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his pressing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions; since it would always be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.

    Likewise in biblical law, allowance was made for those in genuine need to receive something from the surplus of those with plenty. See Leviticus 19:9-10 – “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap your field right up to its edge, neither shall you gather the gleanings after your harvest. And you shall not strip your vineyard bare, neither shall you gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard. You shall leave them for the poor and for the sojourner: I am the Lord your God.”

    This has particular relevance here because it is not simply moral instruction but law, and therefore enforceable by the authorities.

    What should be pretty obvious in all this is that having basic safety nets for those in genuine need has little (if anything) to do with enormous wealth redistribution programmes to equalise all middle class families and give them advantages over people with no children. One other reason for listing this criteria last is that it really serves no value as a means of distinguishing between political parties in this election. There is no party that stands any chance of being in Parliament that does not meet this criterion in some way. Most parties go well beyond a safety net, and end up pursuing admirable ends by immoral means.

    So how do these parties measure up?

    National
    I won’t say much about National, other than to say that they have painted themselves into a political corner. In order to attract Labour voters, they have become as much like Labour as its own supporters will let it, which is quite a lot unfortunately. Think enormous government, duplicating Labour’s massive welfare programmes, shaving tiny amounts off tax for most people, and calling it a change. There’s no principled stance on matters of human life that I can see, and little to redeem the party apart from the fact that they could be worse (e.g. they could be Labour). It does, however, have two redeeming features (I said there’s little to redeem them, not nothing). One, they aren’t Labour, and two, Stephen Franks (one of the finest politicians in this country, and a former ACT MP).

    United Future
    Ditto for United Future, but add to the mix a leader (Peter Dunne) who will literally support any other party no matter how bad, as long as it gets him leverage as a minister and coalition power broker. This is the man who was happy to prop up the minority Labour Government in exchange for a ministerial portfolio.

    The Kiwi Party
    The Kiwi party presents a strong Christian image, opposing abortion and the legal manufacturing of same sex marriage, but they are a bit of a political Frankenstein – sometimes appearing to favour a socialist state (when it comes to, for example, spending taxpayer funds on pre-marriage counselling), sometimes appearing to favour a more limited state (opposing the so-called “anti-smacking bill” as a government intrusion into the home).

    There’s a statist approach to employment (and effectively job cuts), advocating raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, which is a big nod to leftist voters, and then they’re back in the lower tax camp by advocating income splitting for couples. On the whole they certainly seem to advocate more of a limited government/personal responsibility stance than the current government (additional policies like tax rebates for private health insurance bear this out). So while I like them when it comes to a few specific issues, on the whole I just don’t see them as having a particular political vision or unifying set of principles, and they fail quite badly in some cases when it comes to the scope and power of the government. An improvement? Sure. Will I vote for them? No.

    ACT
    On the whole, the ACT party score very well in regard to the principles that I look for in government, as outlined here. It’s such a shame that they do so abysmally poor when it comes to issues of human life. As a party perceived as being fairly extreme (only because most New Zealand parties contain so many socialistic elements that any party that lacks them appears very different and therefore extreme), it attracts extreme supporters, and like Labour it has managed to capture the affections of some young voters very hostile to Christianity. There’s great potential in what the party quite self-consciously stands for; individual rights and responsibilities, personal liberty, strong policies on justice and other things, but the fly in the ointment – terrible policies that lack regard for the sanctity of life and a support base that contains some crazies – is pretty distracting.

    The Family Party
    Lastly there’s the youngest of the parties that have my interest, the Family Party. OK, least important things first: I hate their party name. It gives the unfortunate and misleading impression that they want to benefit families and forget everyone else. There are people who wouldn’t vote for a party with a name like that. Their policy statements reveal that their concern is much broader than this, so they should have a different name. But that aside, I like what I see.

    They’re the second explicitly Christian party. They have what I think are some great policies on taxation. They advocate removing sales tax on necessities like food and gasoline. Freedom of choice in education is a priority, a welfare policy designed to get people away from welfare, a clearly pro-life stance on abortion, and policies across the board that as far as I can tell line up very well with the values that I outlined at the start of this post. So what’s the drawback? Why am I not coming out in full force telling everyone that this is who I will vote for? The answer lies in a fairly embarrassing pragmatism. In order for a party to get into parliament at all in New Zealand’s electoral system, they must either have one candidate who wins an electorate seat, or they must win at least 5% of the party vote, and I’m not sure that the Family party will do this. If I knew that the party I vote for would definitely get into parliament, I would vote for them in a second. As it is, I still might do so, but my mind hasn’t been made up.

    Ask me who I’m not going to vote for, however, and I’m as clear as day (they aren’t listed here).