Happy Birthday Sherry!
Just thought we’d embarrass you by telling the world you are 17 today!
…hard to believe I have a 17 year old daughter…
Happy Birthday Sherry!
Just thought we’d embarrass you by telling the world you are 17 today!
…hard to believe I have a 17 year old daughter…
After the proto-history of flood, fall, Babel, etc the tale of Israel’s history proper began in chapter 12 with Abram being called by God to leave Ur of the Chaldees and to go to an unknown land (this land is later identified as Canaan which today is Israel or Palestine). Abram was given several promises that ultimately promised the renewal of all nations on earth. The text states that Lot accompanied Abram in this quest.
By chapter 13 Abram and Lot had reached Canaan and Abram had gained considerable wealth. Disagreement over land and resources had lead to in v 7 “quarrelling … between Abram’s herdsmen and the herdsmen of Lot.” Abram diplomatically solved the dispute by allowing Lot to take his pick of the land, promising that his men would go elsewhere. Lot’s response was to, rather ungraciously, in v 10 “choose for himself the whole plain of the Jordan and set out toward the east,” land that the text stated was, “well watered like the garden of the LORD, like the land of Egypt, toward Zoar.”
The reference to the garden of the Lord here is an allusion to the garden of Eden. The narrator added a side comment starting in v 12, “Lot lived among the cities of the plain and pitched his tents near Sodom.13 Now the men of Sodom were wicked and were sinning greatly against the LORD.” Apparently Lot’s response to Abram’s diplomacy was to take the very best of the land for himself, thus forcing Abram to go elsewhere. Moreover, the text implies that Lot, in order to gain the economic resources that his men had been in dispute with Abram over, decided to “pitch his tent” amongst people known to be of corrupt character – he was willing to compromise himself for material gain.
In the next chapter, chapter 14, everything went to custard. Lot’s decision rebounded on him. The inhabitants of Sodom violated a vassal treaty and engaged in a violent uprising. The war that ensued was disastrous; Lot lost all his possessions and was taken hostage. In 14:13-17 Abram rescued Lot and his possessions.
I think a careful reader can detect a clear irony in this account. From the dispute in chapter 13 it seems clear that Lot wanted Abram’s resources. Abram essentially yielded them; Lot then chose to live amongst people known to be corrupt and violent to ensure he got to keep them. However, Lot lost all his resources and his freedom and had to rely on Abram’s men, the very men he had disputed with, to get them resources back. The irony here is perhaps made quite clear at the end of chapter 14,
The king of Sodom said to Abram, “Give me the people and keep the goods for yourself.” 22 But Abram said to the king of Sodom, “I have raised my hand to the LORD, God Most High, Creator of heaven and earth, and have taken an oath 23 that I will accept nothing belonging to you, not even a thread or the thong of a sandal, so that you will never be able to say, ‘I made Abram rich.’ 24 I will accept nothing but what my men have eaten and the share that belongs to the men who went with me—to Aner, Eshcol and Mamre. Let them have their share.
This kind of irony is not uncommon in Genesis. Perhaps the clearest example is that of Jacob. Jacob conned both his father and brother (the eldest son and his father’s favorite) in an attempt to secure an inheritance. He was forced to leave his home and seek shelter with Laban, who ironically tricked him into marrying Leah instead of Rachel which caused a massive amount of marital and domestic stress which reverberated into the next generations. Jacob retaliated by tricking Laban out of his flocks. He was again forced to flee. Jacob had a strange encounter with God whereby he underwent some kind of conversion symbolised by a name change. However, in his later life as a father, his sons tricked him into believing Joseph, his favorite son, is dead. The grief from this trick almost destroyed Jacob. Once again there is evident irony. A careful reading of the Pentateuch narrative shows this feature repeatedly.
When the story of Lot is picked up again I think one can see similar ironies emerge. Many people read the story of Sodom and Gomorrah and note Lot’s comments to the men of Sodom in 19:7-8
“No, my friends. Don’t do this wicked thing. Look, I have two daughters who have never slept with a man. Let me bring them out to you, and you can do what you like with them. But don’t do anything to these men, for they have come under the protection of my roof”
“One day the older daughter said to the younger, “Our father is old, and there is no man around here to lie with us, as is the custom all over the earth. Let’s get our father to drink wine and then lie with him and preserve our family line through our father.” That night they got their father to drink wine, and the older daughter went in and lay with him. He was not aware of it when she lay down or when she got up. The next day the older daughter said to the younger, “Last night I lay with my father. Let’s get him to drink wine again tonight, and you go in and lie with him so we can preserve our family line through our father. So they got their father to drink wine that night also, and the younger daughter went and lay with him. Again he was not aware of it when she lay down or when she got up. So both of Lot’s daughters became pregnant by their father.”
Lot was faithful to God’s call to leave Ur and offered kindness, shelter and protection to homeless strangers in a brutal and violent town so for that reason his life was spared. But Lot had to face his own sins and failings which ricocheted back upon him imposing a severe cost. The man who was willing to associate with evil and violent people in order to wrest the economic wealth of the plains from his kinsman, found his decision left him with nothing. He ended up living in a cave in the mountains, not the plains he coveted, afraid of the people in the plains and survived only because of the intercession of his kinsman. He treated his daughters with contempt and tried to have them raped to save his own skin and then found that his daughters were willing to rape him to get children. This is how I read the tragic and insightful tale of Lot.
RELATED POSTS:
Sunday Study: Sodom and Gomorrah Part I

You’re invited to a Thinking Matters Auckland, God, Morality and Society, event:
What: Trevor Mander speaking on the Moral Cosmological Argument
When: Tuesday 26 May – 7:00pm
Where: Lecture Room 2, Laidlaw College, 80 Central Park Drive, Henderson, West Auckland
Format: Talk followed by questions, answers and discussion
Cost: Free but donations are appreciated
Trevor will argue that God holds the universe in existence. He is the ground of our very being and is the foundation for all meaning and value. As we come to know God better our understanding of the world around us also becomes clearer.
Trevor Mander holds a Masters of Divinity which he earned studying under Doctor Norman Geisler while studying at the Southern Evangelical Seminary in the United States. Trevor is one of New Zealand’s foremost Christian Apologists and has a unique ability to communicate complex concepts making them easy to understand with humour and enthusiasm.
A submission to The Christian Libertarian Blog Carnival.
Laws permitting abortion on demand are often deemed to be liberal. Political liberals are frequently ardent defenders of such laws. My contention is that support for abortion on the grounds of liberality is mistaken. I argue for this position in a two part series:
RELATED POSTS:
Sentience Part 1
Sentience Part 2
Viability
Abortion and Child Abuse
Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion
Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I
Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II
The question has importance for scholarship in general, but as a professing Christian the issue has a special importance to me because I believe that in the Scripture of the Old and New Testament we have something with a unique type of authority, so the way we interpret it is important. The issue centres on the following question: What does a piece of writing mean? To some the questions seems a bit silly. If you want to know what it means you just read it and find out. It means what it says! But strictly speaking, even someone who says this is likely to admit that not everything means exactly what it says. Writing comes in all genres: literal history, biography, poetry, parable, apocalypse and so forth. There are cases where meaning is bound to be unclear to many readers. So what, in principle, does a piece of writing mean? To the unfamiliar reader, I’m going to outline two major alternatives: an authorial intent theory of meaning and a reader response theory of meaning.
“it leads to outrageous consequences that proponents of, say, gay or feminist readings of history and literature would never accept.”Easily the most traditional theory of meaning is the authorial intent theory. Authorial intent is just the intent of the writer. According to an authorial intent theory of meaning, the actual meaning of a text is the meaning that the author of the text intended to convey. If we want to find out what a piece of writing means, we need to ask what the author meant to convey when he wrote it. In our day to day life, I submit that everyone holds to the authorial intent meaning. If we get a flier in the mailbox about all ovens being on special at a nearby department store and we want to know whether or not this includes microwave ovens, we would not feel free to decide for ourselves or we may end up being embarrassed in the store. What we do instead is ask a representative of the store whether or not the information in the flier was meant to include microwave ovens. Similarly if we are asked to write an essay for class, we put care into the way we write it because if we don’t, the person marking our essay might not realise what we actually know and understand. We assume that if we get the facts right and express them well, the marker will see that we know our stuff, because our intended meaning will be clear and it will express certain pieces of information. We assume the authorial intent theory in many other obvious settings; when reading a weather forecast, when reading an account of a significant battle at sea, when reading directions for finding somebody’s house and so forth.
What then is the alternative? What does a reader response theory of meaning propose in place of the above?
An enthusiastic advocate of the reader response theory of meaning, Elizabeth Berg Leer explains:
Because reader-response theorists posit that each reader is actively and individually involved in the construction of meaning, they question the New Critical view that if readers attend closely enough to a text, they should come up with its “correct,” intended meaning. Reader-response critics insist that because individuals bring different backgrounds, cognitive abilities, and reading experiences with them to a given text, one “correct” response to literature cannot exist. According to Louise Rosenblatt (1978), one of the earliest reader-response theorists, objective meaning cannot be found within a given text any more than it can be found exclusively within the reader of that text. Instead, Rosenblatt argues that meaning is derived, or, in her terms, a poem is evoked from the transaction between the reader and the text during a particular act of reading, and therefore meaning is unique to an individual within a specific context and in each successive act of reading. A change in either the reader, the text, or the situation will, in Rosenblatt’s terms, result in “a different event—a different poem.” No two readers will have the exact same response to any text, and no single reader will have the exact same response to a text read multiple times.
Elizabeth Berg Leer, “Reader Response: Learning from Teacher Research,” Minnesota English Journal, 42:1 (2006), 129-130
One telling criticism of this approach (but not the main one), however, is that it leads to outrageous consequences that proponents of, say, gay or feminist readings of history and literature would never accept. One clear example would be a holocaust denier’s reading of twentieth century history. It’s no secret that there are people (including many white supremacists and Muslims) who deny that the Nazi holocaust against Jews took place, or that it was anything like the travesty that is portrayed in mainstream history. Their reading of history confirms this belief. They deconstruct mainstream accounts of Nazi treatment of European Jews as a Zionist misrepresentation in an effort to seize institutions of power and influence or to drum up support for the Zionist cause in the Middle East.
If a reader response theory of meaning really is the correct one to take, what, precisely, is wrong with this way of interpreting historical accounts? Would it be oppressive, arrogant, condescending or patriarchal to tell these people that they’ve simply got the facts wrong and they should read history as we do? Even if it is none of these things, are we factually in the right if we tell them that their reading of historical documents is just incorrect? In fact we do not. We do not regard it as a legitimate view of history just because it is a view held by a reading community. On the contrary, we are much more likely to use cases like this as clear cut cases where ideological “group think” can distort the way people in a group do read.
But over and above this I think that there is a much more fundamental flaw with the reader response theory of meaning. How, precisely, are we supposed to tell what it means? If this seems facetious, consider the following dialogue:
Ken: I hold to a reader response theory of meaning.
Barry: Oh? What’s that?
Ken: It means that I think the correct meaning of a piece of text is not fixed, but rather is created by the reader in an interaction with the text.
Barry: Wow. So you think that texts have fixed meanings as determined by the author, huh?
Ken: No, that’s not what I said. I said that texts do not have fixed meanings, but that meaning is created by the reader in an interaction with the te-
Barry (interrupting): Yes, like I said. You think that texts have fixed meanings determined by the author.
Ken: What? How could you think I said that?
Barry: Well, it’s what your statement means, isn’t it?
Ken: No! It means the opposite!
Barry: The opposite? Are you sure?
Ken (getting irate): Of course I’m sure!
Barry: Well, I’m just telling you what your words meant to me, that’s all. And to me, you reject a reader response theory of meaning. You accept authorial intent. I’m going to tell my friends that you just told me that you accept authorial intent, because that’s what you said, as I see it.
Ken: I can’t believe this! That’s dishonest! I did not say that and I did not mean that!
Barry: How do you know?
Ken: How do I know what my own words meant?
Barry: Yes, how do you know that your words really mean that texts have no fixed meaning, but that meaning is created by the reader in an interaction with the text?
Ken: because they are MY words! I said them! I presented them! I gave them meaning, and you have to right to twist them to mean something else!
Barry: So you’re the author, and because of your intentions in using those words, you get to tell me what they mean, and my response is mistaken somehow if I take your words to mean something else altogether? But I thought you advocated the reader response theory of meaning. What happened?
What’s ironic is that proponents of the reader response theory of meaning invest time and care into spelling out their position so that the reader will understand precisely what it is, all the while declaring that what an author (or speaker or artist) actually mean is in the eye of the beholder. Stated differently, the problem I am identifying is that if a reader response theory of meaning is correct, then it’s not really possible to misunderstand somebody, because whatever meaning you see in the text is the one created by the reader’s experience and hence is correct. The only way for a proponent of the reader response theory, therefore, to expect that her readers will understand her theory properly is for her to presuppose that the theory is just not true.
Did you find this blog post interesting? If so, let Glenn know below; he is contemplating writing the occasional post that simply introduces the reader for the first time to an issue in any of the subjects covered in his blog and most of ours.
This two-part series criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Micheal Tooley in The Knowledge of God, the print debate between him and Alvin Plantinga.1 My critique proceeds in four parts. Initially I will sketch Tooley’s distinction between a deontological and an axiological argument from evil and will argue that Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests on “controversial ethical claims;”2 claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists.”3 Then I will outline Tooley’s deontological version and focus on the moral assumptions upon which it is based and Plantinga’s criticism of these. This will conclude Part I of the series.
In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will argue that Plantinga’s criticisms can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics and when they are it can be shown that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists do, in fact, reject. Finally I will look at two objections to this line of argument; the claim that, even on a divine command theory, God has obligations and Tooley’s critique of the divine command theory. I will argue both objections fail.
Deontological and Axiological Arguments from Evil
Tooley distinguishes axiological versions of the argument from evil from deontological versions. The former, “are formulated in terms of axiological concepts—specifically, in terms of the goodness or badness, the desirability or undesirability of states of affairs.”4 [Emphasis original] The latter, “uses concepts that focus upon the rightness and wrongness of actions, and upon the–rightmaking or wrongmaking–properties that determine whether an action is one that ought to be performed.”5
Tooley suggests that axiological versions are problematic. He takes as a paradigm the version proposed by William Rowe. Central to Rowe’s argument is the following conceptual claim about a perfectly good being.
(2) Any omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect person would prevent the existence of any state of affairs that is both (a) intrinsically bad, or undesirable, and (b) such that he could prevent its existence without either allowing an equal or greater evil, or preventing an equal or greater good.6
Rowe applies (2) to concrete evils in the world. He identifies various concrete evil states of affairs and contends that these concrete cases meet the criteria (a) and (b) specified in (2).
There are well rehearsed problems with Rowe’s attempt to do this.7 While Rowe can maintain that there are cases where we do not know of any greater good lost or greater evil prevented by the allowance of these evils, this is insufficient to show that the cases meet the specified criteria. His argument requires that we know that there are no greater goods lost or evils prevented known to an omniscient being. Tooley notes that the step from “we don’t know” to the claim that an “omniscient being does not know” is difficult to bridge and Rowe’s attempts to do so have been unsucessful.8
Tooley’s most important objection is to contest (2) itself. Tooley notes that (2) appears to rely on a,
common consquentialist claim … namely, the claim that an action is morally wrong if it fails to maximise the balance of good states of affairs over bad states of affairs. But the difficulty then is that “such a claim is, within ethical theory, deeply controversial, and likely to be rejected by many theists, and others.9
In response, Tooley develops and defends an argument from evil which does not rely on “controversial ethical claims,”10 one that focuses “upon the rightness and wrongness of actions.”
Tooley’s Deontological Argument
Tooley summarises his argument succinctly,
The basic idea involved in a deontological formulation of the argument from evil is then as follows. First, it is claimed that the world contains certain states of affairs such that any action of allowing any of those states of affairs to obtain would involve one or more known wrongmaking characteristics that would outweigh the sum total of known rightmaking characteristics that the action would have. If this is right, then any such action is prima facie wrong, relative to the total information that one presently has concerning the action’s rightmaking and wrongmaking characteristics. Secondly, the crucial question is then whether there is any sound inductive argument that will take one from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the further conclusion that the action is probably wrong all things considered. If there is, one will then have an ‘inductively sound’ version of the evidential argument from evil.11 [Emphasis original
As Tooley notes the argument has two crucial steps. The first is the claim that an argument that allows a certain states of affairs to occur is prima facie wrong. The second is an inductive argument from the conclusion that such an action is prima facie wrong to the claim that it is ultra facie wrong; that is, wrong all things considered.
It is clear that Tooley considers the second step to be the ‘crucial question’ and he spends most of his article defending the inductive inference he draws. Tooley appears to think that the first step is fairly straight-forward and uncontroversial. His defence of it consists of a few paragraphs.
Tooley’s Argument for Step One
Tooley’s argument for the first step consists of three premises,
(12) The property of choosing not to prevent an event that will cause the death of more than 50,000 .ordinary people is a wrongmaking property of actions, and very serious one.
(13) The Lisbon earthquake killed approximately 60,000 ordinary people.
Therefore, from (12) and (13):
(14) Any action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake has a very serious wrongmaking property.
Tooley then adds as an additional premise,
(15) No rightmaking properties that we know of are such that we are justified in believing both that an action of choosing not to prevent the Lisbon earthquake would have had those rightmaking properties, and that those properties are sufficiently serious to counterbalance the relevant wrongmaking property.12
Tooley believes that (12)-(15) are uncontroversial “(12) makes a moral claim, but one that does not seem at all problematic while statement (13) makes a historical claim for which there is, I believe, very good evidence.”13 Tooley appears to think that the only potentially controversial premise is (15) but that this would be denied only by philosophers who offer a theodicy.14 Tooley maintains that (15) is,
[V]ery reasonable, given the relevant facts about the world, together with the moral knowledge that we possess. For what rightmaking properties can one point to that one has good reason to believe would be present in the case of an action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake, and that would be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the wrongmaking property of allowing more than 50,000 to be killed.15
Tooley concludes that, in the absence of a defensible theodicy, there are compelling arguments for concluding that allowing the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. This is not an insignificant conclusion. Many contemporary theists discuss the argument from evil by conceding that there are no defensible theodicies and then arguing that even in the absence of such a theodicy, belief in God is not rendered improbable by the existence of evil. If Tooley is correct, this line of argument is mistaken. The burden of proof is clearly on the theist to provide a theodicy; if he or she cannot then God’s action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake to occur is prima facie wrong. Moreover, if Tooley’s inductive arguments hold, the God’s actions will be ultra facie wrong.
Plantinga’s Response
Plantinga responds to Tooley’s argument by calling into question (15).
Christians and other theists believe that God exists and is a perfectly good being. If this is true, then any action that God has in fact performed has the property of having been performed by a perfectly good being. Furthermore, Christians and other theists believe that God performed the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake. They therefore believe that the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake has the property of having been performed by God, who is a perfectly good person. This is a rightmaking property that clearly outweighs and counterbalances any wrongmaking properties that action has.16
In this citation, Plantinga denies that only theists who offer a theodicy would contest [15]. Plantinga suggests that theists will typically believe that there is a right making property of which they know of; the property of being permitted by God. This property overrides all others and the action of allowing the Lisbon earthquake has this property. Hence, the Theist has good reasons for rejecting [15] even if he or she cannot offer an adequate theodicy.
Tooley’s response is to deny that being permitted by God is a right making property,
Suppose that God exists, and, thus permitted the Lisbon earthquake. One can ask “What property did the action of permitting the Lisbon earthquake have that made it morally permissible for God to permit it?” The response that it had the property of having been permitted by God, who is perfectly good, is not a satisfactory answer to that question: there must be some other property that made it permissible for God to permit the Lisbon earthquake. The property of having been permitted by God, while it entails that there must have been a rightmaking property, is not itself a rightmaking property.17 [Emphasis original]
The phrase “having been permitted by God” is ambiguous. In one sense it could refer to God allowing an event to occur; if he does not stop it occurring then God permits the Lisbon earthquake. In another sense, however, it can refer to God refraining from forbidding an action. God permits drinking alcohol, for example. If God refrains from issuing a command to abstain from drinking alcohol then it is clear, I think, that Plantinga means the former and Tooley seems18 correct in suggesting that in this sense it is clear that being permitted by God is not a right making property but this leaves an important question hanging; couldn’t Plantinga’s critique be reformulated in terms of the “second sense” of the phrase “having been permitted by God.”
In my next post, Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II, I will propose a Plantingan reformulation and address some objections.
1 Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 70-147.
2 Tooley “Does God Exist?”105.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 106.
6 William Rowe “Evil and Theodicy” Philosophical Topics 16: 119-32. I am following Rowe’s enumeration.
7 Stephen John Wykstra “Rowe’s Noseeum Arguments from Evil;” Peter van Inwagen “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence” and “Reflections on the Chapters by Draper, Russell, and Gale;” William P Alston “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition” and “Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil;” Daniel Howard-Snyder “The Argument from Inscrutable Evil” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, Indiana University Press: 1996). See also, Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
8 Tooley “Does God Exist” 104.
9 Ibid, 105.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 116.
12 Ibid, 119; I am following Tooley’s enumeration.
13 Ibid, 122.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 170-71.
17 Michael Tooley “Closing Statement and Reply to Plantinga’s Comments” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 238.
18 I say seems because Linda Zagzebski’s account of divine obligations would challenge this contention as I will argue in part IV.
RELATED POSTS:
Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II
The FC was ostensibly created to monitor legislation and policy and comment on its impact on families and make recommendations for future policy but was, soooooo predictably, captured by anti-family lefties who have refused to define a family leaving the definition wide open and who championed the anti-smacking bill and so on.
United Future Party Leader Peter Dunne, who was key architect of the FC, is apparently angry at Christine’s appointment and is calling for her to decline it, “Her taking up this role will seriously undermine the credibility of the Families Commission.” Funny, amongst most families I know it has no credibility to undermine and having the likes of Pilbrow and Rankin appointed to it has been the only bright spark in an otherwise dim history.
The Greens’ Sue Bradford, architect of the anti-smacking law, is claiming that National are “subverting the commission through political appointments” and is accusing it of “sabotage.” I sincerely hope that this is precisely what National are doing but I doubt it because both Pilbrow and Rankin have spent the past years working in NGO’s promoting family and researching real causes and child abuse and working to prevent it.
The opposition leader, Labour MP Phil Goff, former communist and a long time left-wing politician said “Ms Rankin aligned herself so exclusively with one side of the political spectrum [pot, kettle] for example attending Destiny Church and Families First rallies, that it was hard to see how she could be representative.” Mr Goff clearly is not aware that members of his party have attended and spoken at the same rallies – someone should brief him better.
Further, Christine is not a Christian, something she openly speaks about at these rallies and she does not attend only those events on that side of the political spectrum and I fail to see how this is relevant anyway – does every appointee have to share Goff’s politics or is it broader than that, anyone can be appointed but those tarnished by association with Christian groups? At least she has raised a family unlike the childless high-profile women on Mr Goff’s side of the spectrum.
I really like Christine Rankin (I really like Bruce Pilbrow too but he is not controversial for some reason). I have heard Christine speak twice now and met her briefly and I have always felt a kindred connection, like if she and I knew each other better we would seriously hit it off. She and I both have had pasts as solo mothers who toughed it out on welfare and got ourselves out of it; She and I both have a somewhat abnormal (amongst women anyway) drive to do, to change, to get involved, and both of us have been famous for having amazing legs. We have both been criticised for being polarising and divisive – something I think most women in politics, particularly right wing women, get regularly accused of *yawn*. She is not perfect, none of us are, but she is strong at spotting PC crap and standing up to it and she is not afraid to be the only one in the room talking sense. The FC won’t know what hit them and will have someone in there who will work hard and hold them to account and that can only be good.
So Christine, don’t you dare even think about turning this role down – I am sure you are not anyway!