Year: 2009

  • John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part I

    Several Christian thinkers, most notably, C S Lewis, John Hare, Robert Adams and William Lane Craig have argued that Theism provides a superior foundation for moral obligation than Naturalism does. Most of these thinkers defend this notion by developing and defending a divine command theory.[1] John W Loftus is aware of this and in The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority, he offers a refutation of divine command theory. I will argue that Loftus is mistaken; his arguments are based on a confusion between ontological and epistemological foundations.

    Avoiding Strawmen
    Before turning to Loftus’ arguments, it is necessary to spell out exactly what a divine command theory of ethics is. It is the thesis that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[2] two things are noteworthy about this definition.

    What is a Divine Command Theory?
    First, the thesis is limited to deontological properties. Philip Quinn defines deontological properties as follows, “I mean to refer to whether it has such properties as being morally permitted, being morally forbidden or prohibited, and being morally obligatory or required.”[3] Deontological properties are contrasted with axiological properties such as goodness and badness. Evans notes, “it does not appear that the concept of obligation is identical to the concept of what it is ‘good to do’ … It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it not an act I am obliged to do.”[4]

    Despite frequently being portrayed this way in common critiques, divine command theories do not offer accounts of broader axiological properties. This is evident from the writings of those who defend such theories. Quinn, after defining deontological properties in the aforementioned way, affirms he is not offering a divine command theory of axiological properties. In this he is followed by Adams, Alston, Craig, Wierenga, Hare and Plantinga and, even to some extent, Thomas Carson. This is not something unique to modern divine command theories; older divine command theorists such as Paley, Locke, Berkley and Suarez typically limited divine command theories to accounts of deontological properties and not to broader axiological properties such as goodness in general.

    The second point is to note is that the word “because” in English is ambiguous. When a divine command theorist claims that “an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God.”[5] The theorist could mean either, that one cannot know what is right and wrong unless one believes in divine commands; or that right and wrong cannot exist independently of Gods commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically dependent on beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties, such as right and wrong, are ontologically dependent on God’s commands.

    It is important to note that epistemological dependence and ontological dependence are not the same thing. Take a straightforward example of identity; the property of being water is identical with (or constituted by) the property of being H20. As such, H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it and use it without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of the existence water is not dependent on our knowledge of H20.

    When divine command theorists state that an action or kind of action is right or wrong if and only if and because it is commanded or forbidden by God they are using “because” in an ontological sense. The locus classicus for contemporary defences of divine command theory is the work of Robert Adams who affirms that “ethical wrongness is [identical with] the property of being contrary to the commands of a loving God.”[6] Adams here states that the relationship between the property of being contrary to God’s commands and wrongness is the ontological relationship of identity.

    Elsewhere in the article he is explicit about this; he suggests that wrongness is identical with or constituted by being contrary to divine commands in the same way that water is constituted by (or identical with) H20. Other divine command theorists explicitly follow Adam’s lead on this. Stephen Evans and William Alston both affirm that divine commands are constitutive of deontological properties and note Adams’ identity claim as a paradigm of the type of relationship he is defending.[7] Craig cites Alston[8] as the inspiration for his position and contends that “commands constitute our moral duties”[9] he explains that by this he means to make divine commands an ontological foundation, and in particular, the concept of “informative identity”[10] analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H20 or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”[11] Craig is explicit that he is not offering divine commands as an epistemological foundation, “It would, indeed, be arrogant and ignorant to claim that people cannot be good without belief in God. But that was not the question.”[12]Also, “My concern here is with moral ontology not moral epistemology … to repeat, my concern is with an ontological foundation for morality, not with epistemological foundations.”[13]

    The other leading defenders of divine command theory are equally clear that they are proposing a theory of the ontological and not the epistemological foundations of moral obligation. Quinn,[14] Weirenga,[15] Hare[16] and Plantinga[17] all offer accounts of the ontological foundations of deontological properties. Janine Marie Idziak notes that, historically, divine command theories were usually understood as ontological theories and not epistemological theories about how one knows what is right and wrong.[18]

    John Loftus’ Mischaracterisation of Divine Command Theories
    These observations lead into my main criticism of Loftus’ discussion. Loftus mistakenly understands divine command theories as signifying epistemological dependence. At the beginning of his article Loftus refers to the view that “[moral] standards are grounded in the commands of a good creator God, and these commands come from God’s very nature” and infers from this that “the Christian claims to have absolute and objective ethical standards for knowing right from wrong, which is something they claim atheists don’t have” [Emphasis added] here Loftus suggests that the claim that right and wrong depend on God’s commands is the claim that knowledge of right and wrong depends on belief in divine commands.

    The same interpretation is seen elsewhere in his chapter when he defines a divine command theory Loftus states Morality is based upon what God commands. “No other reasons are needed but that God so commanded it. If God commanded it, then it is right. If God forbids it, then it is wrong.” and citing the Divine Command theory of William Lane Craig he states “Many Christians will maintain they have a superior foundation for knowing and for choosing to do what is good. They claim to have objective ethical standards for being good, based in a morally good creator God, and that the atheist has no ultimate justification for being moral.” [Emphasis added] Despite the fact that Craig and other divine command theorists have repeatedly stated they claim no such thing.

    Another problem with Loftus’ characterisation is that in several places he suggests that divine command theories claim that axiological properties such as goodness depend on God’s commands. He states, for example, that divine command theory entails that “God could’ve commanded something else, or even something contrary, or something horribly evil and simply declared it good” or that “If we think that the commands of God are good merely because he commands them, then his commands are….well….just his commands.” Examples could be multiplied; the problem is, as I have noted, divine command theorists typically do not offer their theories as foundations for axiological properties, they limit their theories to deontological properties.

    These misconstruals undermine many of the criticisms Loftus makes. As I will show, many of his objections are based on a conflation between epistemology and ontology.

    In my next post, John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II, I will address Loftus’ arguments against a divine command theory, the emptiness of God is good and his arbitrariness objection.

    [1] C S Lewis rejected a divine command theory; I believe, however, that Lewis’ dismissal is based on unsound arguments and the divine command theory coheres better with his argument in Mere Christianity as I argued in my paper “God and the Moral Law in C. S. Lewis” Theological Perspectives on C S Lewis Conference Carey Baptist College, Auckland, 1 July 2008.
    [2] W K Frankena Ethics 2nd edn (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973) 28.
    [3] Philip Quinn “An Argument for Divine Command Theory” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 291.
    [4] C Stephen Evans Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 16.
    [5] Frankena Ethics 28.
    [6] Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.
    [7] William Alston “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 303-304.
    [8] William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 186.
    [9] William Lane Craig “The Craig/Kurtz Debate: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough” Eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 30.
    [10] Mark C Murphy “Theism, Atheism and the Explanation of Moral Value” eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan King Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? A Debate on Faith Secularism and Ethics (Lanhan: Rowan and Littlefield, 2009) 127.
    [11] Ibid.
    [12] William Lane Craig “The Indefensibility of Theistic Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality” Foundations 5 (1997) 9.
    [13] Craig “This Most Gruesome of Guests” 168.
    [14] Ibid, 293.
    [15] Edward Weirenga The Nature of God: An Inquiry into the Divine Attributes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989) 215-27. See also “Utilitarianism and the Divine Command Theory” American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1984) 311-318; and “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” Nous 17 (1983) 387-408.
    [16] John Hare God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001) 49.
    [17] Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism, Theism, Obligation and Supervenience”
    www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/plantinga.pdf.
    [18] Janine Maree Idziak “In Search of Good Positive Reasons for an Ethics of Divine Commands: A Catalogue of Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 6:1 (1989) 60.

    RELATED POSTS:
    John W. Loftus on The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority Part II

  • Top 10 NZ Christian Blogs – March 09

    The MandM Top 10 New Zealand Christian Blogs for March 09, in the category of public discourse, are ranked by identifying Christian blogs then comparing Half Done’s March 09 stats with Tumeke’s March 09 stats and averaging them to obtain their overall March 09 ranking.

    Rank. [previous top 10 rank] Blog MandM (Half Done Tumeke)

    1. [1.] NZ Conservative 18 (8 – 28 )
    2. [2.] Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 19.5 (12 – 27)
    3. [5.] MandM 21 (7 – 35) [if correct uniques used on Tumeke: 2. MandM 19 (7-31)]
    3. [N] MacDoctor Moments 21 (25 – 17)
    4. [4.] Keeping Stock 29.5 (26 – 33)
    5. [6.] Being Frank 42* (39 – ??)
    6. [3.] The Briefing Room 48 (40 – 56)
    7. [8.] Samuel Dennis 49 (32 – 66)
    8. [10.] The Humanitarian Chronicle 49.5 (55 – 44)
    9. [9.] Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta Blog) 57 (53 – 61)
    10. [7.] Kiwi Polemicist 68 (63 – 73)

    * For blogs that only feature on one set of stats a score for the other set is estimated by factoring in the discrepancy between the two sets of stats given their different ranking methods; any blogs this effects are marked with an asterisk. We suggest that any blog not featuring on both should submit their blog to the ranking they are not currently on as it is not always possible for us to simply calculate the score that blog would have obtained.

    Note: This list only includes Christian blogs that openly identify as Christian blogs on Tumeke’s ranking descriptions. If you think your blog should be on the MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blogs rankings contact Tim Selwyn of Tumeke and ask him to change your blog description to include something identifiably Christian on his rankings. More here.

  • The Coming Week: Two Apologetics Forums & Bloggers Drinks

    This Thursday, 7 May, Thinking Matters Auckland Lunchtime Forum: Bringing Faith and Logic out of the Closet at Laidlaw College, 12.30 – 1.30 pm.

    This Thursday, 7 May, Auckland Blogger Drinks from 6.30pm at Galbraiths, 2 Mt Eden Road, Mt Eden, Auckland – if you are a blogger or a bloupie (blogger groupie) and you happen to be in Auckland on Thursday come and meet other bloggers.

    Next Tuesday, 12 May, Thinking Matters Auckland Dr Glenn Peoples on Religion in the Public Square at Laidlaw College at 7 pm.

    See you there 🙂

  • Christian Blog Rankings Report for March 09 – Tumeke

    Here are the top 10 NZ Christian blogs based on Tumeke’s NZ blog stats for March; these stats are used in the calculations for the MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for March 09:
    1. MandM 35 [Incorrect uniques used due to stats going down; correct rank was 31 (score 237)]

    Top 10 Tumeke. name of blog Tumeke rank

    Of Note:

    • A change in the number 1 spot – well done Scrubbone!
    • All top 10 are well within the top 100; in fact Contra Celsum, Star Studded Super Step, Blessed Economist and True Paradigm all made the top 100 despite being just outside the top 10.

    Note: This list only includes Christian blogs that openly identify as Christian blogs on Tumeke’s ranking descriptions. If you think your blog should be on the MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blogs rankings contact Tim Selwyn of Tumeke and ask him to change your blog description to include something identifiably Christian on his rankings.

    Now that Tumeke’s March stats are out we will compare them with HalfDone’s and publish the overall MandM top 10 NZ Christian Blog rankings for March 09 shortly.

  • Divine Commands and Intuitions: A Response to Ken Perrott

    Ken Perrott from Open Parachute has asked me some questions about my views on morality and divine commands. Views I have repeatedly expressed on this blog. Given that others have from time to time asked me similar questions, and given the length of my response, I have decided to turn my answers into a post. [Ken’s questions are copied and pasted from the comments section of With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality, numbered and italicised below]

    1. I think a key issue, one which should really be spelt out in detail, is the concept of “grounding moral duties in divine commands”. What does this mean?

    Basically, I think the relationship between the moral properties of being wrong and the property of being contrary to God commands is analogous to the relationship between water and H2O. Just as we explain the existence and nature of water by identifying it with H2O. I would explain the existence and nature of wrongness by identifying it with the property of being contrary to Gods commands.

    2. So what do you mean by “divine commands”? How do you get them? Do you hear voices?

    No I don’t hear voices. God is an immaterial being and hence has no vocal chords. I think it is possible for God to create an audible voice issuing a command but I think that this would be fairly atypical. In any event, I do not think that an auditory voice is necessary for issuing a command. I can communicate a command orally but I can also do it via e-mail, text, sign language, waving a flag, etc.

    In the normal and typical cases, I think divine commands are usually discerned via a person’s conscience. One intuitively sees that certain actions are right and others wrong and hence intuitively perceives certain imperatives such as “do not torture children for fun,” etc. Moreover, I think anyone whose faculties are functioning properly perceives God’s commands this way whether they believe in his existence or not.

    The H2O analogy may illuminate this. We know that the property of being water is the property of being H2O. However, people can know something is water immediately via perception even if they do not have any beliefs about molecules, atoms or contemporary science. Pre-European Maori, for example, knew about the existence of water and competently used water for centuries before they knew about the existence of hydrogen and oxygen.

    I think something analogous holds with divine commands. The property of being wrong is the property of being contrary to divine commands; however, people can immediately perceive via intuition what is wrong even if they do not believe in divine commands.

    Hence, on my view, atheists can know what is right and wrong. The real question is whether atheism can adequately explain the existence of right and wrong or whether, given atheism, it is likely that moral properties such as right and wrong exist. These are separate questions.

    A person can believe in the existence of something and yet be committed to beliefs, which if true, entail that what they believe is a fantasy. I suspect this is precisely the way Atheists view Christians.

    3. And if such a command tells you commit an act which conflicts with your moral intuitions and logic – which one do you follow?

    If I understand Ken correctly here, he is asking me what I would do if I believed that God had commanded an action that I intuitively considered to be wrong. This is actually a big topic, worthy of a post in and of itself, I do plan to post something more substantial on this in the future, here I can only summarise my current position.

    As I noted above, I agree with Ken that people can intuitively recognise certain principles of right and wrong. I would, however, point out that these intuitions are fallible. So, in contrast to what Ken appears to think, I would not assume that every time there was a clash between what I believed God’s commands are and my intuitions that the latter are correct. At the same time I also think our interpretations about what God commands are also fallible and so I would not assume that my interpretations of what God commanded were always correct either. In fact, given that I have already argued that one knows God’s commands intuitively through one’s conscience, intuitively perceiving an action is wrong is some evidence that God forbids it and that claims to the contrary are mistaken.

    My answer then to Ken’s question, what do you do if one’s interpretation of God’s commands conflicts with one’s moral intuitions? is that it depends on one’s epistemic situation. If the belief that God has commanded a particular action is something that, after critical reflection, seemed to me well established by the evidence and by contrast, the contrary intuition that the action was wrong was fairly weak, peripheral and less plausible then I would go against the intuition. If, on the other hand, the intuition was very clear and seemed extremely plausible while the rival interpretation of God’s commands was, by comparison, fairly weak and tentative then I would follow the intuition.

    To turn to one example Ken mentions, the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2000, I think the intuition that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings is a very strong one. Whereas I do not believe that the case from, say, scripture or theological tradition for killing innocent people in this way is very strong at all (in fact both scripture and tradition are fairly unanimously opposed to terrorism of this sort).

    On other issues my thinking is different. For example some people appear to find it self-evident that there is nothing wrong with homosexual conduct. I myself do not have this intuition, nor do most people I know, in fact, many defenders of homosexual conduct I have spoken to admit that they personally find the idea of two men having sex disgusting but defend the “liberal” view in spite of this. Moreover, for I do not think it is implausible to conclude that much of the contemporary acceptance of homosexual conduct is due to cultural conditioning rather than a sudden direct insight gained in the mid 20th century. The arguments typically given for the permissibility of homosexual sex are fairly weak and frequently consist of no more than castigating others as bigots. On the other hand, I think the theological case against homosexual conduct from scripture and tradition is fairly strong.

    I have posted a bit more about my thoughts on this in my post Brink on Dialetical Equilibrium.

    4. After all, I keep hearing of people who have committed murder as a result of “divine commands” and society usually locks them up.

    I am not sure what Ken intends to prove with this point. Ken is correct that some people who suffer from a mental disorder believe that God has commanded them to kill. I don’t think this proves much. I know of people who suffer from dementia who have had hallucinations that there is a river running through their lounge. Does it follow then that referring to the existence of rivers is somehow dubious? In fact, mental patients can also have faulty “moral intuitions” and moral logic quite independently of any theological beliefs they have.

    Despite this, Ken maintains, correctly, that people whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly can intuitively discern the presence of right and wrong. I agree with him, the difference is that I believe that what they discern is in fact the property of being in accord with or contrary to divine commands. Ken clearly does not. The question that some theistic critics of secular morality poses is not whether atheists can discern right and wrong, they can; the question is whether, if atheism is true, right and wrong actually exist.

    RELATED POSTS:
    With God Anything can be Permitted: Another Bad Argument against Theistic Morality
    See labels:
    Divine Command Theory
    Euthyphro

  • Bullying (Again) and Coming Posts

    Matt and I have not written much of late for MandM due to the bullying problem having arisen again. Christian was assaulted/bullied on four separate occasions at school last week. Twice during class and in both instances the teachers failed to address the matter adequately. In addition, despite the most serious incident happening at lunchtime, he was knocked to the ground and kicked by a pack of boys, the first we heard of it was after school when he came home as he was sent back to class despite repeatedly asking for us to be phoned; when he went back to class another boy punched him three times.

    We have not sent him to school since all this happened, we have been seeking legal advice and are trying to decide what to do going forward as he has Aspergers so does not want any change on top of everything else, the mere thought of another school or being home-schooled with his siblings makes him panic but neither he or us has any doubt that he will get hit again if he returns to school and none of us have any faith in the school to be able to keep him safe or have their teachers act properly against the perpetrators if it happens in class – our complaint that we are drafting to the board of trustees names 4 of his 6 teachers. Writing it takes precedence over drafting new blog posts, at least the sort of posts that require our heads to be focused and require several hours of research and writing.

    So as you can imagine our heads are not really on MandM – please chat amongst yourselves, if anyone has guest posts they want to submit that would be cool.

    Coming up though, we do have some posts in the pipeline:

    Matt has a two part response to John W. Loftus’ The Christian Illusion of Moral Superiority – it is about 1/3 edited and needs a couple of quotes checked so it is not far away; he has a response to Ken on Divine Commands and Intuitions that I think he said if I could edit today is ready to go – I will have to have a look; he has something on Tooley’s deontological argument from evil and Plantinga’s response that apparently just needs editing and a footnote to be chased up and he is writing a guest post for Debunking Christianity that we will cross post here and he still owes me the piece on Sodom and Gomorrah he promised me and Anna last weekend. There are a handful of other things on his I-must-get-to-that list too – Kaiwai posted something on our Is Abortion Liberal series on his blog that he should respond to and he has some other stuff in his head as well.

    I have been working on some of the reader requests and I have a half-written post of the foreshore and seabed legislation with a jurisprudential spin – my lecturer told me yesterday that someone is submitting a shadow report to the UN on Thursday regarding a human rights complaint on this issue and it is available online currently so I need to read that first. I have in my head the why we have the Colosseum on our banner post and have gotten as far as some research on it, I also have a domestic violence post rattling around my head as well that I should be able to bring together easily enough by hacking up an old law paper and adding some thoughts from my recent reading on the matter. There will be something turning up in the next month or so on human rights, what are they are they not and a specific examination of both ‘property rights’ and ‘health rights’ (because I have to produce a 4,000 word essay on the subject to pass one of my papers so I may as well turn it into a blog post). Oh and of course Tumeke’s March rankings finally came out on Sunday so I need to do the report and run the top 10 NZ Christian blogs for March – no sign of HalfDone’s April rankings so I have a breather there for that report.

    So please bear with us and we will work on getting something online soon.

  • Lunchtime Forum: Bringing Faith and Logic out of the Closet

    You’re invited to a lunchtime forum to get a taste of what happens at Thinking Matters’ Tuesday seminars:

    What: Dr Glenn Peoples and Dr Matthew Flannagan speaking on Bringing Faith and Logic out of the Closet
    When: Thursday 7 May 12:30-1.30 pm
    Where: Lecture Room 2, Laidlaw College, 80 Central Park Drive, Henderson, West Auckland
    Format: Brief talk followed by questions, answers and discussion
    Cost: Free but donations are appreciated

    Dr Flannagan will speak on faith and logic, their compatibility and relationship to each other and why Christians should not fear them as secular, humanistic tools. Dr Peoples will speak on how to use these tools to defend Christianity’s place in public life and provide a sample of his coming Tuesday talk.

    Drs Peoples and Flannagan both have years of experience defending the faith and dialoguing with sceptics, so bring a friend and bring your questions!

    Thinking Matters