Last week I was invited to be part of a discussion on divine command ethics in Google hangouts. The full discussion is now on-line as episode 22 of Ode to Dialogue: “Discussing Divine Command Theory.” Enjoy.
September 1st, 2014 by
August 20th, 2014 by
Last year I had an article Is Ethical Naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism: A reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong published in the journal Philo. In the comments section a reader asked me to comment on a response to that article published by classical historian Richard Carrier. This post will be the first of several where I do so.
In, Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism, I did two things. Firstly, I briefly explicated a conditional that has recently been proposed explicitly by William Lane Craig but which is also defended by several others, and secondly I rebutted several arguments raised against this conditional by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Carrier argues my rebuttals fail, but before he does so he offers three preliminary arguments against the positive thesis I was defending against Armstrong. It is these that I will address in this post.
The conditional I explicated as follows:
Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.” By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.
Note three things.
First, this is a conditional, if affirms that if theism is true then then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands.
Second, I define the concept of God used in this conditional as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.
Third, this conditional specifies the kind of grounding relationship I am addressing, one where the relationship between God’s commands and moral obligations is one of identity. It’s the same kind of [Read more →]
May 4th, 2014 by
One thing that tends to make my eyes glaze over is the mantra, expressed so frequently by some evangelicals in New Zealand, that we live in a post-modern society and so theology should, instead of involving the rational defense of truth, be focused on “telling the big story” or “sharing the narrative”, and we should invite others to partake and find meaning.
William Lane Craig, expresses well some of the reservations I have with this position in the video below.
April 26th, 2014 by
The traditional conception of hell understands the punishment of the finally impenitent to be conscious eternal torment. The punishment of hell is eternal in the sense of it being of unending duration and it involves conscious torment. Annihilationists, on the other hand, argue the traditional view is contrary to scripture. They contend that, in scripture, the punishment of hell is eternal destruction, which involves the total and irreversible destruction of the wicked. Hell is eternal in the sense that the ultimate punishment inflicted in hell, death, is permanent; one is dead forever and is never resurrected or reincarnated to live another life.
Much of the debate over this in evangelical circles is exegetical. It focuses on the meanings of biblical phrases such as “eternal fire,” “eternal destruction,” “death,” “perish,” “everlasting contempt,” “eternal punishment,” “unquenchable fire,” “second death,” “killing the body, “soul,” “lake of fire,” “the smoke of their torment rises forever,” “blackest darkness [that] has been reserved forever,” “outer darkness where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth”, and so on. Traditionalists take these passages to refer to eternal conscious torment where as annihilationists argue that, in their contexts, they signify permanent destruction of the wicked.
In his article, “Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the problem of Hell”, Shawn Bawulski brackets these exegetical issues and focuses on the ability of each conception to answer an objection to the concept of hell. He dubs this objection as “the logical problem of hell”. His conclusion is that traditionalism offers a more plausible answer to this objection than annihilationism does. I think Bawulski’s arguments for this conclusion fails. Here, however, I will simply comment on the “problem of hell” as he articulates it.
Bawulski’s elucidates the problem of hell as follows:
(A) Justice demands that punishment for sins must be proportionate to their seriousness; it is unjust for punishment of sins to be disproportionate to their seriousness.
(B) No human sin or lifetime of human sinning can be infinite in seriousness.
(C ) Hell is infinite punishment.
(D) To punish human sins with hell is to punish human sins disproportionately to their seriousness. (From (B) and (C)).
(E) Therefore, hell is an unjust punishment for human sins.
This argument turns on the notion of “infinity.” Bawulski notes: “The language of infinitude in this discussion can be vague and slippery” and the argument “has the liability of possibly equivocating” and can, be used in at least two different senses. The first sense, is the sense Bawulski officially states [Read more →]
March 31st, 2014 by
The paperback version of the Kindle book, True Reason: Christian Responses to the Challenges of Atheism, which Matt wrote a chapter for, recently arrived from the publishers. This release has been re-released as True Reason: Confronting the Irrationality of the New Atheism (the link takes you to the book’s official website).
True Reason is still edited by Tom Gilson and Carson Weitnauer and is still published by Kregal Publications; however, this edition has been updated and expanded and it has two additional chapters. The table of contents is as follows:
- The Party of Reason?
- The Irony of Atheism
- Dawkins’s Delusion
William Lane Craig
- Richard Dawkins’s Illusions
- Unreason at the Head of Project Reason
- John Loftus and the “Outsider-Insider Test for Faith”
- Atheism and the Argument from Reason*
- The Explanatory Emptiness of Naturalism
- Reason in a Christian Context
- The Marriage of Faith and Reason
- Faith and Reason in Historical Perspective*
David Marshall and Timothy McGrew
- A Sun to See By—Christianity, Meaning, and Morality
Samuel J. Youngs
- Are Science and Christianity at Odds?
- God and Science Do Mix
- The Problem of Evil and Reasonable Christian Responses
- Historical Evidences for the Gospels
- Did God Command the Genocide of the Canaanites?
- Christianity and Slavery
*Chapters Seven and Eleven are new additions in the second edition, not included in the Kindle version of True Reason.
The blurb from Amazon is as follows:
Today’s New Atheists proclaim themselves our culture’s party of reason. It is a claim they cannot sustain. Reason is the New Atheists’ weakness, not their strength and in fact, the Christian faith is a far better place to look for True Reason.
In sixteen carefully constructed essays by more than a dozen Christian thinkers including William Lane Craig, Sean McDowell, and Timothy McGrew,True Reason unmasks the frequent irrationality displayed by leading atheists like Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. The authors go on to show the great extent to which the Christian faith has historically supported sound reasoning, and that Christian thinkers, past and present, have demonstrated real excellence in reasoned, rational thinking.
Making their case accessible to the first-time inquirer as well as the serious student, this top-flight team of writers presents a sound defense and a strong introduction to the true reason uniquely found in Christianity.
You can buy the paperback version of True Reason: Confronting the Irrationality of the New Atheism on Amazon here.
Tags: Amazon · Carson Weitnauer · Chuck Edwards · David Marshall · David Wood · Glenn Sunshine · John DePoe · Matthew Flannagan · New Atheists · Peter Grice · Randy Hardman · Richard Dawkins · Sam Harris · Samuel Youngs · Tim McGrew · Tom Gilson · True Reason · William Lane Craig1 Comment
March 29th, 2014 by
When the Human Rights Act was passed in 1993 I supported the writing of non-discrimination rights into law. At that time I, like many New Zealanders, believed that people had a right to not be discriminated against that the government should protect. Since then, reflecting on the issue has lead me to change my mind. I am now inclined to think that non-discrimination rights do not exist, they are “nonsense on stilts”. Laws which purport to recognise and protect them are recognising and protecting something that does not exist.
My position now is that discrimination is not wrong, it is morally neutral. It is justified and reasonable to discriminate on certain grounds in certain contexts, and it is unjustified to do so in other contexts. When it is unjustified, what makes it so are factors that have nothing to do with discrimination; these factors would be problematic if applied equally.
Before elaborating my reasons for being sceptical about such rights, let us be clear as to what denying non-discrimination rights does not mean. It does not mean I believe that it is permissible for people to refuse to serve ethnic minorities because one holds to false sterotypes and has unwarranted hatred towards those minorities. Nor does it mean I support depriving women or African Americans of the vote. Likewise I do not support racist lynchings or gay bashings.
A sceptic about anti-discrimination rights can oppose all these things and still not be committed to supporting the existence of anti-discrimination rights. All that is entailed by my scepticism is that these thing are not wrong because they violate a right to not discriminate, and its clear to me that this is true; they are wrong for other reasons.
Discriminating against minorities in the manner suggested above is wrong because we have duties to not stereotype and treat people with contempt. If we treated everyone equally in this way it would still be wrong. Similarly, racist lynchings are wrong because they involve kidnapping, assault and homicide. If people were equal-opportunity lynchers who indiscriminately lynched people of all races, sexes, lifestyles and degrees of ability, it would still be wrong for them to do so. Depriving people of the vote is wrong because people have a right to vote, the right is not attached to sex or race, and so on. The point is that the wrongness of these sorts of practices can be adequately explained, and I think is more plausibly explained, without recourse to an alleged right to not be discriminated against. An appeal to “discrimination” misdiagnoses the moral problems with the action complained of.
Why Discrimination is Not Wrong
It is not wrong to discriminate. To discriminate against one person in favour of another is to treat the former less favourably than the latter. The problem is that, so defined, discrimination is clearly not wrong. In fact, discrimination is essential to any moral thinking at all.
To make a moral judgement condemning a particular action involves adopting a less favourable stance towards those who perform that action. We condemn particular actions, and if a person doing those actions lacks an adequate excuse we blame and censure that person for what he or she did. We expect the person to feel guilty and to make appropriate apology and reparations. On the other hand to judge an action is right [Read more →]