Author: Madeleine

  • Auckland Bloggers Drinks – This Thursday

    On the first Thursday of every month, Auckland bloggers gather for the B3 (Bloggers Bar Bash).

    What: Auckland Bloggers Drinks
    When:
    Thursday 4 March from 6.30pm
    Where:
    Galbraiths, 2 Mt Eden Road, Mt Eden, Auckland

    The B3, as it is coined by regulars, is open to anyone who happens to be in Auckland.

    Past blogging celebrities in attendance include bloggers and bloupies (blog groupies – those who read blogs) from Annie Fox, Beretta, Cactus Kate, Garfield Herrington, Interest.co.nz, Kiwiblog, Lolly Scramble, MandM, Night City Trader, No Minister, Not PC, Roar Prawn, SOLO, State Highway One, Stephen Franks, The Fairfacts Media Show, Whaleoil and WHOAR.

    RSVP on Facebook or just turn up… we’ll be there.

  • Has Science Disproved God? @ Auckland University

    Thinking Matters have organised some free to the public Q & A seminars at the University of Auckland.

    Has Science Disproved God?

    Have the discoveries of modern science proved that belief in God is irrational and untenable? Does faith hinder or inspire scientific research?

    In this public Q & A event, several of New Zealand’s top scientists and Christian thinkers come together to examine the claims of popular atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, and explore the the credibility of God in the context of cosmology, biology, and physics.

    The speakers are:

    Neil Broom (PhD) is Professor and Head of the Department of Chemical and Materials Engineering at the University of Auckland. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand in 2008 and is the author of the book How Blind Is the Watchmaker?: Nature’s Design & the Limits of Naturalistic Science.

    Jeff Tallon (PhD) is Distinguished Scientist at Industrial Research Ltd and a former Professor of Physics at Victoria University. He is internationally known for his research in high-temperature superconductors, is a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand and in 2002 was awarded the Rutherford Medal, New Zealand’s highest science award.

    Robert Mann (PhD) previously taught biochemistry and environmental studies at the University of Auckland and and has been on the council of the New Zealand Association of Scientists.

    Matthew Flannagan (PhD) adjunct lecturer in Philosophy at Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute and is currently teaching philosophy, ethics and religious studies at St Peters College. He specialises in applied ethics and the interface between philosophy and theology. He is a prominent New Zealand Christian commentator, debater and blogger.

    When:

    Thursday 11 March at 7pm

    Where:

    260-073 Owen G Glenn Building (OGGB 4), 12 Grafton Road, The University of Auckland

    Mark it in your diary, check out the Facebook page and tell your friends. This event is sponsored by the Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship.

  • Featuring MandM

    This week both Matt and I have been featured in some blog carnivals:

    Matt’s pieces on biblical inerrancy, Inerrancy and Biblical Authority and Two Forms of Inerrancy, were featured in the Christian Carnival CCCXV at Ancient Hebrew Poetry. John FH gives Matt the following write up:

    Matt writes exceptionally well. He makes one good point after another. Still, I think the two poles he posits, Verbal Plenary Inspiration (VPI) and Didactic Plenary Inspiration (DPI), represent a false dichotomy. I hold to both: VPI “that each and every word used in the Bible is exactly the word that God wanted used,” and DPI “the question to be asked with respect to a Biblical text is “what was it intended to teach?”; “the particular message that God wants to convey gets across.” I also hold that God superintended the transmission (SPI) of the text such that it was, over time, faithfully edited and translated, and is, for all intensive purposes, just as inerrant in the Septuagint as it is in the MT; in the Textus Receptus as in Nestle-Aland; in the NIV as in the KJV. Finally, I hold that the correct conveyance of the message that God wants to gets across depends on the present work of the Holy Spirit (HSPI). Any other position, in my view, has too dim a view of God’s providence. Since Matt likes to refer to the “originals” which we do not have, and applies the language of inerrancy to them alone, I am left to assume, which is absurd, that he considers the NIV or KJV Bible (or whatever) read and preached on in church on a given Sunday to be an errant text. Matt: you have just been hazed by a biblical blogger. Please consider it a token of respect.

    Feel free to discuss this comment here. As usual, the Christian Carnival features a wide range of pieces from all over the blogosphere so click through to Ancient Hebrew Poetry to have a browse.

    My pieces on property rights jurisprudence, Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I and Part II were featured in the Philosophers’ Carnival at In Living Color. This edition of the carnival is had an animal philosophy section so there are some really interesting pieces.

    Matt picked up some work teaching philosophy, ethics and religious education to an Auckland High School this week, which may last anything from 2 weeks through the end of the term. He has to get his head around the readings and adjust to teaching 23 periods a week so researching and writing for the blog has to take a back seat. We were working on a joint project around the Medical Council’s guidelines that were the subject of an injunction last week – he taking the ethics, I tackling the rights and freedoms legal issues and jointly both of us putting together the jurisprudence but that is now on hold though I will keep doing my bit. Matt has also been writing a Sunday Study on the long ages in the Old Testament but that too has been delayed. So, having a peruse of these carnivals and the blogs on our blogroll might be a good idea for the next day or so…

    Or you could read Garfield Herrington’s review of us/this blog over at Gotcha:


    Connecting with Kevin Roberts


  • Top 10 NZ Christian Blogs – December 09

    The Top 10 New Zealand Christian Blogs for December 09 were as follows:

    1. [2.] MandM 12 (3 – 21)
    2. [1=] NZ Conservative 17.5 (8 – 27)
    3. [N.] Thinking Matters Talk* 21 (18* – 24)
    4. [1=] MacDoctor Moments 22 (21 – 23)
      [1=] Say Hello to my Little Friend (Beretta) 22 (5 – 39)
    5. [5.] The Briefing Room 26.5 (37 – 16)
    6. [3.] Something Should Go Here, Maybe Later (HalfDone) 28.5 (26 – 31)
    7. [4.] Liturgy Worship Spirituality* 37 (34 – 40*)
    8. [6.] Being Frank 39 (43 – 35)
    9. [8.] Brad Heap 40 (42 – 38)
    10. [N.] sustain:if:able kiwi 45 (33 – 57)

    Rank. [previous top 10 rank] Blog MandM (Half Done – Tumeke NZ Blogosphere)

    To obtain our stats we ran searches on HalfDone’s December 09 NZ stats and Tumeke NZ Blogosphere’s December 09 NZ stats for openly Christian blogs, which demonstrate adherence to the historic Christian tradition in their blog content, then we average those blogs scores to obtain their overall scores.

    If you think your blog should make our rankings, make sure you are listed on both Tumeke NZ Blogosphere’s and HalfDone’s rankings as an identifiably Christian blog and we’ll check you out.

    * For blogs that only feature on one set of stats a score for the other set is estimated by factoring in the discrepancy between the two sets of stats given their different ranking methods; any blogs this effects are marked with an asterisk. We suggest that any blog not featuring on both should submit their blog to the ranking they are not currently on as it is not always possible for us to simply calculate the score that blog would have obtained.

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. Here in Part II, I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument back through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property that I argued for in Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I.

    The Extent of Property Rights
    The extent of a landowner’s rights is summed up by the maxim coined by the jurist Accursius of Bologna, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (to whom belongs the soil it is his, even to heaven and to the middle of the earth). By the 16th century this maxim became accepted common law doctrine through the judgment in Bury v Pope.[1] The English Laws Act retrospectively declared that “so far as applicable to the circumstances of the Colony of New Zealand” all statute and common laws of England became “part of the laws of New Zealand.”[2] Since 1840 to the present day there have been few instances where the court has held that a statute or common law of England was not applicable to the circumstances of the colony of New Zealand.[3] Hence, in the absence of statutes overriding it, the maxim is part of New Zealand law. In the absence of legislation to the contrary and existing rights of others, a landowner owns his or her property in subsoil and airspace.

    Relationship to Legislative Controls
    Legislation such as the Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA) and the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) represents a shift away from common law property rights.

    Since the enactment of the English Laws Act, which imported the “royal prerogative” with regards the “royal metals” (state ownership of gold and silver in its natural state regardless of whose lands it is found in)[4] into New Zealand law, the state has incrementally legislated the taking of minerals in privately owned land beginning with the Goldfields Act 1858 through to the CMA. Today almost all minerals existing in their natural condition within the land, whether privately or publically owned, are vested to the crown subject only to Ngai Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997.[5] At common law, a landowner owned all the minerals in the subsoil of his land,[6] now the state does. No compensation for this change of ownership has been made on the part of the New Zealand state.

    The RMA fares no better. As Barker J affirmed in Falkner v Gisborne District Council;

    The [Resource Management Act 1991] prescribes comprehensive, interrelated system of rules, plans, policy statements and procedures, all guided by the touchstone of sustainable management of resources. The whole thrust of the regime is the regulation and control of the use of land, sea, and air. There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about this. It is a necessary implication of such a regime that common law property rights pertaining to the use of land or sea are to be subject to it.

    Where pre-existing common law rights are inconsistent with the [RMA’s] scheme, those rights will no longer be applicable. Clearly a unilateral right to protect one’s property from the sea is inconsistent with the resource consent procedure envisaged by the Act; accordingly, any protection work proposed by the residents must be subject to that procedure.[7]

    Barker J effectively re-stated the principle that statute overrides common law by alluding to the RMA’s ability to restrict common law property rights to the point where those that conflict with the Act it “will no longer be applicable”.

    However, In Coleman v Kingston Hammond J argued that the substance of property rights remained intact under the RMA,

    The Resource Management Act floats, rather like oil on water, across the top of ownership rights without affecting the underlying substance. The Resource Management Act 1991 and the Property Law Act 1952 have different objectives and do not conflict.[8]

    Peter Twist in Principles of Real Property Law elaborates, “The Property Law Act 1952 dealt with the allocation and extent of property rights, whereas the Resource Management Act imposed overriding limitations on the exercise of those rights.”[9]

    This is essentially the same argument offered by the author of the Wikipedia quote. The suggestion that the RMA is compatible with property rights because property rights are defined as, a right to use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land, turns the concept of a property right into a tautology. It is true of any and every action a person can perform that they are legally free to engage in said action unless there exists a law against it. It is also true that, by definition, whatever is not illegal one is legally allowed to do. So the statement is meaningless and those who attempt to attribute it to Blackstone have committed a criminal act of jurisprudence.

    To function as a right some degree of presumptive force is needed. A legislature must have good reasons to override a right and the burden should be placed on the person seeking to restrict the right.

    Posterior/Prior
    The traditional common law restrictions on property rights, such as rights of others, actionable torts, constitute posterior restraints whereas legislative regimes, such as the RMA, constitute prior restraints. The distinction between posterior and prior restraints can be demonstrated using the example of the right to freedom of expression. The standard restrictions at common law on freedom of the press are libels that one can seek after or posterior to, speech occurring. The press are not subject to prior restraint whereby it is necessary to apply for publication approval to a state agency before each edition goes to print. The press are free from prior restraint to publish whatever written media they wish and it is the burden of those who consider the speech pernicious to bring an action after the fact.

    Now, one might point to the equitable remedy of injunction as an example of prior restraint; however, even in this case the burden in an injunction falls on the applicant to establish that the defendant is imminently likely to engage in conduct that will adversely affect the applicant or another and in any event, injunctions are not analogous to a prior blanket legislative scheme. It would be implausible and unpersuasive to argue that because common law recognises certain limited posterior restraints that this means that legislating a prior restraint, such as a requirement to have the state vet all editions of all publications for libel before they can be published, would be compatible with freedom of speech. The same principles apply with property rights.

    At common law the standard restrictions on property rights are either consented to by the landowner, with regards the rights of others or they are posterior restraints in the form of various actionable torts. Land owners at common law are not subject to prior restraint. They do not need to ask permission from the state to use their property in a particular way, they are free to use it how they wish. Posterior to them doing so, others can seek tortious actions, such as actionable nuisance, if an applicant can demonstrate, according to the rules of evidence, on the balance of probabilities, that the landowner has violated a rule of tort. Only then is the landowner liable. The presumption at common law is clearly in favour of the landowner and the burden falls on those who wish to restrict the owner’s use of property. The default position is that a landowner can use his or her property at his or her discretion; it is those who disagree with his or her use who must get permission from the state to encroach this.

    The RMA shifts the burden, in a great many instances of use, onto the landowner. It is the landowner, now, who must obtain permission and satisfy the state’s agent and his or her neighbours that the proposed activity is not pernicious prior to beginning the activity. The exercise of the landowner’s rights to use his or her land as he or she sees fit is abridged by the RMA. As we know, a law that prevents one from exercising a right abridges that right.

    What About the Public Good?
    Blackstone argued that property rights could legitimately be subordinated to the “public good” but only when taken by the legislature alone, when the owner was compensated or where there was a strong case for necessity. The legislative scheme confronting NZ landowners in the modern day fails to meet this standard. W. Ivor Jennings articulates the shift,

    The common law assumes the complete liberty of the land owner to use his land as he wishes, subject only to the law of nuisance … But the fundamental assumption of modern statute law is that the landowner holds his land for the public good. It may be subject to all kinds of control; it may be taken away from him altogether in a host of cases where the public needs it for other purposes.[10]

    Both the CMA and RMA permit the taking of landowner’s property without compensation. Traditional property rights under the maxim cujus est solum… and the doctrine of capture, for example, considered minerals, water and air that were on, in or above one’s property to be owned by the landowner. Under the CMA almost all minerals are now reserved to or owned by the crown with no compensation being awarded to the landowner for the loss of ownership. The RMA redefined air and water as public property, which a private landowner cannot use or discharge contaminants into, without express consent. In these examples, ownership of property has changed without the consent of the original owner and without the owner being compensated. The justifications offered are inadequate, as I argue in my paper “Can State Expropriation of Minerals Be Justified?” and I cannot see how sustainability, the concept the RMA is premised on,[11] could meet the threshold of necessity in the sense that Blackstone and Feser set out. Given this, the New Zealand legislative scheme cannot be said to be compatible with property rights.

    The CMA and RMA constitute a significant abridgment of and inroad into the traditional property rights of landowners. The analogy of the RMA being like oil floating over water is a good analogy only if property rights are analogous to a cetaceous mammal struggling to rise to the surface to breathe through the oil slick. Just as oil floating over the water is an environmental disaster for any mammal trying to swim in it so too is the RMA a property rights disaster for landowners.


    [1] (1586) 1 Cro Eliz 118; 78 ER 375.
    [2] 1858 s1. Similar legislation exists in most countries with historical ties to England.
    [3] David Williams “Gold, The Case of Mines (1568) and the Waitangi Tribunal” (2003) 7 Australian Journal of Legal History 157, 165.
    [4] R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowden 310 [75 ER 472] (Case of Mines).
    [5] CMA s 10.
    [6] “The grant of the land includes the surface and … all that is infra, i.e. mines, earth, clay etc.” Mitchell v Mosley Cozens [1914] 1 Ch 438 at 450 (CA) Per Hardy MR.
    [7]
    [1995] 3 NZLR 622 at 632. Affirmed in several later cases.
    [8] (High Court, Auckland, AP 103-SW00, 3 April 2001) at para [28].
    [9] Peter Twist “The Extent of the Landholders Rights” in GW Hinde, NR Campbell, Peter Twist (eds) Principles of Real Property Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) para 6.023.
    [10] W Ivor Jennings “Jennings” (1936) 49 Harv LR 426 at 436.
    [11]
    RMA s 5(2).

    RELATED POSTS:
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

  • Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part I

    This two part series looks at the state of property rights under the current legislative scheme in New Zealand. Particularly I address attempts to suggest that the passage of Acts such as the Crown Minerals Act and the Resource Management Act have not significantly altered the  common law concept of property rights and the claim that William Blackstone himself conceded that property rights were subject to the legislature. I argue against these theses. In Part I, I will look at the concept of a property right drawing from Blackstone, John Locke and Ed Feser paying particular attention to the context Blackstone wrote in.

    What is a Property Right?
    Property rights are often described as “a bundle of rights.” This bundle includes the full or limited right to access, use, assign, exclude others from and destroy property. William Blackstone, judge, jurist and professor of law who authored one of the most influential texts, Commentaries on the Laws of England, on the classical views of the common law and its principles, grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state. His infamous statement at the beginning of his chapter “Of Property, in General” certainly seems to bear this out,

    There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.[1]

    This theme of property rights being paramount is found in other parts of his writings. In “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals” Blackstone identified property rights as “The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, … which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”[2] [Emphasis added]

    The latter part of this quote has been used by some to suggest that what Blackstone really meant to say was that one can use one’s land as one see’s fit provided one does not breach any laws of the land. I certainly have heard this in class from my Professors and it is prevalent enough to be left standing on Wikipedia,

    …the phrase is often presented without taking into account the greater context of Blackstone’s thought on the subject of property. Blackstone likely offered the statement as a rhetorical flourish to begin his discussion, given that even in his age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute. Property owners must rely on the enforcement powers of the state, in any event, for the realization of their rights.[3]

    Now I agree that the greater context must always be taken into account when chopping a few sentences out of a greater text, so let us do precisely this. Blackstone suggests that property rights are limited “only by the laws of the land”; to ascertain what he meant by this we must read the very next paragraph,

    So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorise the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.[4]

    So qualified, we can see that although Blackstone describes property rights as absolute rights of people, it is clear from the context that  by ‘absolute’ he means a right a person has in the state of nature, that is, a right that exists antecedent to any state recognition. He does not mean ‘absolute’ in the sense of never being able to be overridden but likewise he does not have in mind the notion that the passage of any law, no matter its impact on the landowner, is compatible with property rights; what he is getting at is more limited than that.

    Blackstone suggests that property rights can be encroached for the public good provided that, public good is understood as “the protection of every individual’s private rights”, “the legislature alone” authorises it by law and the owner is compensated. Elsewhere in the same text he suggests that necessity might be a further option. A person in need “may demand a supply sufficient for all the necessities of life from the more opulent part of the community, by means of the several statutes enacted for the relief of the poor.”[5]

    Ed Feser elaborates on the idea of necessity or “absolute distress”,

    the starving man in the woods who takes food from a cabin, or a window washer who grabs a flagpole to break his fall from a building, or someone fleeing robbers who can only escape by running through someone else’s back yard. … if some resource (say, the only remaining source of water in an area stricken by drought) became “absolutely necessary … to save the community or part of it from extinction,” then any individual who had heretofore privately owned that resource would have an obligation in justice to relinquish it.”[6]

    The author of the Wikipedia quote was not wrong when he or she said that “even in [Blackstone’s] age, individual property rights were not sole and absolute.” It is true that the landowner’s rights were traditionally, at common law, subject to the rights of others. For example, lessees, easement holders, mortgagees held rights in another’s land. Tortious liabilities such as actionable nuisance, the doctrines of support and waste, etc are examples of the ability of others to dictate what a landowner does with his or her land. These restrictions were tied up with fact that every person has the right to enjoy his or her property, hence, the exercise of enjoying one’s property (or exercising one’s property rights) was limited by the degree it prevented another from enjoying theirs.

    Blackstone did not consider property rights to simply be legal rights. As I have stated a few times thus far, he grounded the legal right to property in a moral right that exists antecedent to the state,

    There is indeed some difference among the writers on natural law concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puffendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit and implied assent of all mankind that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title;—a dispute that savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. However, both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally gained; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else. [7]

    He appealed to John Locke’s polemic against absolute monarchy, which sets out the locus classicus for the justification of property rights.[8] Locke argued that human beings have a series of rights antecedent to the existence of civil government, that is, they exist whether or not the state acknowledges them. A just state will protect and recognise these rights. One such right is the right to property. Locke argued that people own their own bodies and as such their own labour. When one mixes one’s labour with previously unowned land one acquires a right to this land subject to the proviso that one leaves “enough and as good … for others.”[9]

    Feser has argued that Locke’s proviso is mistaken and that an initial acquisition of the sort Locke refers to cannot be unjust.[10] If one mixes one’s labour with and gains ownership of, a parcel of previously unowned land then one acquires a property right to it. This acquisition, in turn, gives one the right to assign it to others. Given this, Locke’s proviso is unnecessary. Assignees of such land acquire the property rights along with the land. Unless another can establish that the initial acquisition was unjust or there has been an unjust transfer at some point in the chain of ownership, the landowner’s property rights must be respected.

    Whilst the right may not be absolute, a prima facie property right exists. If one takes possession of previously unoccupied land and mixes one’s labour with it or one obtains ownership of such land via a just transaction then, prima facie, one has rights over this land. The burden then falls on the taker to justify taking,

    That we do in fact, in everyday life, put the burden of proof on the denier of claims to property is evidenced by the presumption that exists in law that the possessor of a holding is the rightful owner of it. This reflects our intuitive sense of justice in holdings. It is only (egalitarian) philosophers who—bizarrely—put the burden on the possessor to prove that we shouldn’t expropriate his holdings. Such philosophers are reminiscent of the epistemological skeptic who challenges you to prove you’re not dreaming, or are not a brain in a vat, or whatever—as if it were such strange logical possibilities, rather than the commonsense belief in the external world, that had the presumption in their favor![11]

    In Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II, I turn to the extent of the landowners rights, the relationship of property rights to legislative controls, looking at the CMA, RMA and recent judgments. I critique the notion that property rights remain untouched by these controls by highlighting the shift from posterior to prior restraint, I conclude by placing the argument through the lens of Blackstone’s qualifications on the absolute right to property.


    [1] William Blackstone “Of Property, in General” in George Sharswood (ed) Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books (J.B. Lippincott Co, Philadelphia, 1893) Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1.
    [2] Blackstone “Of The Absolute Rights Of Individuals”, above n 1, Vol 1, Bk 1, Ch 1, s 139.
    [3] “Blackstone and Property Jurisprudence” in William Blackstone accessed at 17 February 2010.
    [4]
    Blackstone, above n 1.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6]
    Edward Feser “Classical Natural Law Theory, Property Rights, and Taxation” (2010) 27 Social Philosophy and Policy 21-52, 38.
    [7] William Blackstone “Chapter 1: Of Property, In General” in Sharswood, above n 6, Vol 1, Bk 2, Ch 1, s 9.
    [8]
    John Locke Two Treatises of Government (1690) Peter Laslett (ed) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967), Second Treatise, Ch 5.
    [9] Ibid s 27.
    [10] Edward Feser “There is no such thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition” (2005) Social Philosophy and Policy 58-59.
    [11]
    Ibid 11.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Property Rights: Blackstone, Locke and the Legislative Scheme Part II

    Can State Expropriation of Minerals be Justified? Part I

  • Guest Post: Tim Wikiriwhi Reviews The Great Waitangi Debate (Uncut)

    On Waitangi Day, Saturday 6 Feb, TV One aired “The Great Waitangi Debate” on their Marae Program in which Matt and I were audience members. Panelist Tim Wikiriwhi (who won the MandM award for being the most inflammatory speaker of the day) has submitted his review as a guest post. Other blogs have published bits of it, we are the first to publish it in its entirety. Neither Matt or I concur completely with Tim’s assessment of Matthew Hooten’s criticisms of Stephen Franks’ position (which Stephen documents here) nevertheless we back his call for racial equality and he alludes to some fascinating historical arguments around land confiscations which we both intend to read more on. Tim Wikiriwhi was the Maori Spokesperson for the Libertarianz Party for 10 years and is himself Maori. Tim writes:

    It was with great pleasure that I accepted TVNZs invitation to participate in this debate, and agree with Steve Franks who said it was truly a great thing for tvnz to open up this discussion in the public arena as a lack of serious debate plays a large part in perpetuating the troubles surrounding race relations and the treaty.

    I completely agreed with his argument that the real treaty was not holding us back but that the bogus treaty separatist interpretations and sexed up versions were the trouble. I did not agree with his position that it was ok for the state to treat different peoples differently or that some of the favoritism was pragmatic common sense. This was in fact picked up by Matthew Hooten when he slammed Franks for claiming the favoritism that worked was not treatyism but that the rest was!

    Hana Oreagan was nice enough in person, but the politics she espoused can only be described as flakey and hypocritical. For example she could not see that when she slammed the NZ government for being discriminatory against Maori in the 1920s ( Lower pensions for Maori was one example she used) that she her self was advocating the same type of discrimination be imposed today …favoring Maori…this completely escaped her just as she did not recognize that some of the favoritism in the 1920s was actually in favour of Maori such as exemption from rates.

    Off air I did my best to show her this error and that what was needed was one equal law for all. Her claim the treaty can mean whatever we want it to mean just shows how flakey her ideas really are.

    When the time came for me to present my arguments, I attempted to give as broad a range of the troubles as I could in two minutes, hoping to fill in the details later when interviewed. Yet Shane decided it was better to attack my views on taxation instead! This worked in my favour as it gave me opportunity to slam socialist rapaciousness.

    I do want to add in here a couple of historic references to support my speech which I was unable to include in the debate. The first is Governor Grays declaration to the Waikato Chiefs about respecting the sovereignty of the queen and keeping the peace dated 11 July 1863 (as can be found in Richard Stowers book The Forest Rangers pg6) Governor Grey asked them to stop the evil acts against peaceable settlers…Grey asked for the free passage of Europeans in the Waikato district, in particular movement on the Waikato river. He also stated:

    Those who remain peaceably at their own villages in the Waikato , or move into such districts as may be pointed out by the government, will be protected in their persons, property and land.

    Those who wage war against her majesty, or remain in arms, threatening the lives of her peaceable subjects, must take the consequences of their acts and they must understand that they forfeit the right of possession of their lands guaranteed them by the treaty of Waitangi; which lands will be occupied by a population capable of protecting for the future the quiet and un-offending from violence with which they are now so constantly threatened.

    A second reference is to Sir Apirana Ngata who stated in his ‘The Treaty of Waitangi, An Explanation’ that…

    Some have said that these confiscations were wrong and they contravened the articles of the treaty of Waitangi, but the chiefs placed in the hands of the Queen of England, the Sovereignty and authority to make Laws. Some sections of the Maori people violated that authority, war arose and blood was spilled. The Law came into operation and land was taken in payment. This in itself is Maori Custom-revenge-plunder to avenge a wrong. It was their chiefs who ceded that right to the Queen. The Confiscations can not therefore be objected to in the light of the treaty…

    Finally I am happy I got a plug in against the anti freedom Nannyism and anti colonialism of Minto regarding Crime and health statistics that are used as vindication for socialist favoritism and ongoing regulation.

    “Why are we trying to manipulate fat people I said?”

    “That is not a duty of government but a matter of self responsibility!”

    (Socialists believe its their right/duty to force you to be the politically correct weight)

    I liked Matt Hootens smug grin…very amusing, but he said little worthy of note except that people will continue to use the current system to gain filthy lucre which more supported us and not them!

    I think even Hana O Regan thought she had been paired up with a wally.

    Valuable contributions from the audience came from:

    • Martin Doutre, New Zealand’s foremost expert on the history of the treaty documents when he verified Steve Franks assertion that the modern treaty used by the separatists and current government is a fraud.
    • Matt and Madeleine Flannagan both questioned the interpretations of the separatists … “How did they get their idea that the treaty obliged the state to teach and propagate Te Reo?” … “Why do they think a legal document like the treaty can be interpreted without applying the usual rules of law?”
    • Prof David Round criticised the ongoing and deepening riff caused by the separatist treaty industry.

    Most of the rest from the likes of Minto, Dalamere and co were the usual socialist rubbish that denies any responsibility of the Maori people to stand on their own two feet lumping the taxpayer with the burden of carrying them like babies.

    It was difficult to follow much of the commentary as it was so muddled up with some truth and a hell of a lot of false assumptions/propaganda.

    I was even dis-owned by my tribe for supporting equality before the Law! (Oh well, I shall continue to walk on alone if I must)

    I was happy that in the last segment I got to slam our racially divided electoral system and parliament adding that what made the election of Barack Obama great is that he was elected in a proper non-racist election competing with white men and woman, unlike our current shameful apartheid system in NZ.

    In closing I want to state for the record that…Just as the state education system is a propaganda machine of the theory of evolution…so too it propagates the lies of treaty separatism.

    This exposes the travesty of having a democracy with state control of our schools and the urgent need to divest the state of its evil encroachments and control over our children’s minds. Privatize education!

    The battle goes on…

    RELATED POSTS:
    View “Marae: The Great Waitangi Debate” Here

    Sovereignty and The Treaty of Waitangi
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi
    (Our Review of the Debate)