Author: Matt

  • “Telling the Big Story” (or how not to engage culture with theology)

    One thing that tends to make my eyes glaze over is the mantra, expressed so frequently by some evangelicals in New Zealand,  that we live in a post-modern society and so theology should, instead of involving the rational defense of truth, be focused on “telling the big story” or “sharing the narrative”, and we should invite others to partake and find meaning.

    William Lane Craig, expresses well some of the reservations I have with this position in the video below.

  • Open Letter to Maurice Williamson

    Dear Maurice Williamson,

    Maurice Williamson and his "big gay rainbow"I hear you are having some troubles in the media at the moment. Apparently there are moral questions swirling around you about honest disclosure, potential abuse of power, unduly influencing the police in favour of a person who donated money to you, and so on.

    Don’t let judgmental people like Prime Minister John Key discriminate against you any longer. Such people clearly believe they can make moral judgments about what is appropriate and impose them onto you. Stand up to the bigots.

    Here is my advice to you.

    Call a press conference and do the following:

    1. Point out that the moral rules about lying and bribing being an abomination come from that archaic book, The Bible. While you are at it, make a sarcastic jab about how some people think you will go to hell for doing such things, then mock this belief with silly jokes about the physics of hell.
    2. Observe that there was recently a rainbow in New Zealand somewhere and opine that this proves that God approves of your actions.

    Do this and I am certain you will be hailed as a man of great moral insight. All will agree that you have given a decisive answer to the serious moral questions raised about your conduct. Perhaps David Farrar will blog about it on Kiwiblog, you’ll get offers to stand for Governor in several states in America, and someone in Hollywood might even offer you a spot on their show to obtain your insight.

    We all know, after all, that serious moral questions can be adequately set aside by engaging in these kind of tactics, and given your well known moral insight and wisdom, that’s all you need to do. You have led the nation utilising such wisdom and discernment in the past, I am sure you can do it again.

    All the best,

    Matthew Flannagan

  • Shawn Bawulski and the Problem of Hell: Part One

    The traditional conception of hell understands the punishment of the finally impenitent to be conscious eternal torment. The punishment of hell is eternal in the sense of it being of unending duration and it involves conscious torment. Annihilationists, on the other hand, argue the traditional view is contrary to scripture. They contend that, in scripture, the punishment of hell is eternal destruction, which involves the total and irreversible destruction of the wicked. Hell is eternal in the sense that the ultimate punishment inflicted in hell, death, is permanent; one is dead forever and is never resurrected or reincarnated to live another life.

    HellMuch of the debate over this in evangelical circles is exegetical. It focuses on the meanings of biblical phrases such as “eternal fire,” “eternal destruction,” “death,” “perish,” “everlasting contempt,” “eternal punishment,” “unquenchable fire,” “second death,” “killing the body, “soul,” “lake of fire,” “the smoke of their torment rises forever,” “blackest darkness [that] has been reserved forever,” “outer darkness where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth”, and so on. Traditionalists take these passages to refer to eternal conscious torment where as annihilationists argue that, in their contexts, they signify permanent destruction of the wicked.

    In his article, “Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the problem of Hell”[1], Shawn Bawulski brackets these exegetical issues and focuses on the ability of each conception to answer an objection to the concept of hell. He dubs this objection as “the logical problem of hell”. His conclusion is that traditionalism offers a more plausible answer to this objection than annihilationism does. I think Bawulski’s arguments for this conclusion fails. Here, however, I will simply comment on the “problem of hell” as he articulates it.

    Bawulski’s elucidates the problem of hell as follows:

    (A) Justice demands that punishment for sins must be proportionate to their seriousness; it is unjust for punishment of sins to be disproportionate to their seriousness.
    (B) No human sin or lifetime of human sinning can be infinite in seriousness.
    (C ) Hell is infinite punishment.
    (D) To punish human sins with hell is to punish human sins disproportionately to their seriousness. (From (B) and (C)).
    (E) Therefore, hell is an unjust punishment for human sins.[2]

    This argument turns on the notion of “infinity.” Bawulski notes: “The language of infinitude in this discussion can be vague and slippery” and the argument “has the liability of possibly equivocating” and can, be used in at least two different senses. The first sense, is the sense Bawulski officially states (more…)

  • Nonsense on Stilts: Non-Discrimination Rights

    When the Human Rights Act was passed in 1993 I supported the writing of non-discrimination rights into law. At that time I, like many New Zealanders, believed that people had a right to not be discriminated against that the government should protect. Since then, reflecting on the issue has lead me to change my mind. I am now inclined to think that non-discrimination rights do not exist, they are “nonsense on stilts”. Laws which purport to recognise and protect them are recognising and protecting something that does not exist.

    My position now is that discrimination is not wrong, it is morally neutral. It is justified and reasonable to discriminate on certain grounds in certain contexts, and it is unjustified to do so in other contexts. When it is unjustified, what makes it so are factors that have nothing to do with discrimination; these factors would be problematic if applied equally.

    Jake the muss: not a skinny asian womanBefore elaborating my reasons for being sceptical about such rights, let us be clear as to what denying non-discrimination rights does not mean. It does not mean I believe that it is permissible for people to refuse to serve ethnic minorities because one holds to false sterotypes and has unwarranted hatred towards those minorities. Nor does it mean I support depriving women or African Americans of the vote. Likewise I do not support racist lynchings or gay bashings.

    A sceptic about anti-discrimination rights can oppose all these things and still not be committed to supporting the existence of anti-discrimination rights. All that is entailed by my scepticism is that these thing are not wrong because they violate a right to not discriminate, and its clear to me that this is true; they are wrong for other reasons.

    Discriminating against minorities in the manner suggested above is wrong because we have duties to not stereotype and treat people with contempt. If we treated everyone equally in this way it would still be wrong. Similarly, racist lynchings are wrong because they involve kidnapping, assault and homicide. If people were equal-opportunity lynchers who indiscriminately lynched people of all races, sexes, lifestyles and degrees of ability, it would still be wrong for them to do so. Depriving people of the vote is wrong because people have a right to vote, the right is not attached to sex or race, and so on. The point is that the wrongness of these sorts of practices can be adequately explained, and I think is more plausibly explained, without recourse to an alleged right to not be discriminated against. An appeal to “discrimination” misdiagnoses the moral problems with the action complained of.

    Why Discrimination is Not Wrong
    It is not wrong to discriminate. To discriminate against one person in favour of another is to treat the former less favourably than the latter. The problem is that, so defined, discrimination is clearly not wrong. In fact, discrimination is essential to any moral thinking at all.

    To make a moral judgement condemning a particular action involves adopting a less favourable stance towards those who perform that action. We condemn particular actions, and if a person doing those actions lacks an adequate excuse we blame and censure that person for what he or she did. We expect the person to feel guilty and to make appropriate apology and reparations. On the other hand to judge an action is right (more…)

  • Dialogue with Randal Rauser

    When I was in Baltimore last November I caught up with fellow theologian and blogger Randal Rauser. Randal is professor of Theology at Taylor Seminary in Edmonton Canada.

    Randal and I have had some spirited but cordial exchanges in the past, including a panel discussion at the Society of Biblical Literature in 2010.While we do not always agree I find him to be a very astute critic of my work.

    Randal Rauser and Matthew Flannagan

    Randal asked to interview me in Baltimore on the topic “Matthew Flannagan on God, ethics, and divine commands” so the readers of his blog could get a take on the positions I have staked out. The interview is now available at the link above.

  • Religious Freedom and Non-Discrimination

    Currently I am working on a post on the issue of non-discrimination rights and the morality of discrimination. In the mean-time  I thought I would highlight the thoughtful commentary from James-Michael Smith in this video.

  • Talks from Baltimore Available

    For those who are interested, the Evangelical Theological Society has put recordings of all the papers presented in Baltimore online for a price of $4 each. My 2 presentations are available here. The talks include the Q&A so during the second presentation Professor Swinburne from Oxford University can be heard offering critical comments on my paper.

    I found that the website says that most people who bought recordings of my talks also bought recordings of a paper by Gordon Otese, Associate Professor of Old Testament and Hebrew at Heritage Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Ontario, who presented a paper in the old testament narrative session at the ETS, entitled “The Use of 1 Samuel 15 as a Critique of Holy War Hyperbole“. I purchased a recording of Otese’s paper and found that it discusses, critiques and expands upon some of my work on the existence of hyperbole in 1 Samuel 15.

    UPDATE: My third talk “Morality and Gods Commands: Answering Common Objections” presented at  the  Annual Apologetics Conference of the Evangelical Philosophical Society  is  now available.