Author: Matt

  • Jerry Coyne on Deception and the Omission of Facts

    In 2011 I wrote a criticism of Jerry Coyne’s USA Today article, “As  atheists know, you can be good without God.” My critique, “When Scientists make bad Ethicists,” attracted some attention motivating Coyne to write a response. I wrote a following up piece the next year, “Jerry Coyne on God and Morality Revisited,” my conclusions were not flattering. I wrote:

    “Nothing in Coyne’s follow up leads me to revisit my initial conclusion. Misrepresenting people’s views, calling people names, quoting from articles out of context, denigrating others’ scholarly qualifications and confidently asserting a position whilst reasoning in a circle, and ignoring objections, are not the same as actually addressing them.  I doubt such sophistry would pass muster in the scientific community when people write on scientific topics, and it does not pass muster when scientists comment on theology or philosophy.”

    Jerry CoyneRecently I discovered Coyne’s latest riposte on the issue of divine commands: “William Lane Craig answers a distressed reader: ‘If ISIS’s god were mine, should I do what he says?’”  which  has   subsequently  been posted on richarddawkins.net. Little, it seems, has changed. Coyne begins by sarcastically referring to William Lane Craig as a “sophisticated theologian” and commending him for addressing a question “not often taken up by theologians”. I am not sure which “sophisticated theologians” Coyne has read because, contrary to what he says, almost every major monograph on divine command theory (“DCT”) in the last thirty years has discussed the problem he refers to in his post, as do most articles on the subject. Undeterred by these facts, or perhaps unaware of them, Coyne suggests in closing that “sophisticated theologians” like Craig who defend DCT are like real estate salesman in Florida.

    Apart from sarcastic names and insinuations of dishonesty Coyne’s central argument purports to highlight an inconsistency in Craig’s divine command theory. The inconsistency relates to a distinction Craig (and others like Baggett and Walls) draw between a voluntaristic and a non voluntaristic DCT. According to Craig’s account of a voluntaristic DCT ,“God’s commands are based upon His free will alone”; God “arbitrarily chooses” what we are required to do.”[1] On a non-voluntaristic  account, “Our duties are determined by the commands, of a just and loving God. God is essentially compassionate, fair, kind, impartial, and so forth, and His commandments are reflections of His own character”;[2] because he has these character traits, essentially, “it is logically impossible for Him to issue certain sorts of commands”.[3]

    I think Craig’s use of the term “voluntarism” is somewhat inaccurate. Yet he is correct when he adds that most (if not all) divine command theorists are non-voluntarists, as he defines the term. Coyne thinks this “is bait and switch”. This is because “Craig himself seemed in at least one case to hold to the voluntarist view of the DCT.”  Coyne quotes from Craig:

    “But God has no such prohibition [the prohibition not to take an innocent life]. He can give and take life as He chooses.  We all recognize this when we accuse some authority who presumes to take life as “playing God.” Human authorities arrogate to themselves rights which belong only to God. God is under no obligation whatsoever to extend my life for another second.  If He wanted to strike me dead right now, that’s His prerogative …

    … On divine command theory, then, God has the right to command an act, which, in the absence of a divine command, would have been sin, but which is now morally obligatory in virtue of that command.”

    Coyne rejoins, “If that’s not voluntaristic DCT, I don’t know what is.” Coyne provides a link to the article in question, so presumably he expects his readers – good free thinkers who accept nothing blindly on authority – to check his quote and verify what he says. When one does, however, the (more…)

  • A Message from Northern Iraq

    This message was apparently received by Auckland Salvation Army. It has been published in the Western Leader and Rodney Times:

    “A friend just got a text message from her brother asking her to shower him and his parish in prayer.
    “He is part of a mission and ISIS has taken over the town they are in.
    Nazarene“He said ISIS is systematically going house to house to all the Christians and asking the children to denounce Jesus.
    “He said so far not one child has. And so far all have consequently been killed.
    “But not the parents.
    “The UN has withdrawn and the missionaries are on their own.
    “They are determined to stick it out for the sake of the families – even if it means their own deaths.
    “He is very afraid, has no idea how to even begin ministering to these families who have seen their children martyred.
    “Yet he says he knows God has called him for some reason to be his voice and hands at this place at this time.
    “Even so, he is begging prayers for his courage to live out his vocation in such dire circumstances.
    “And, like the children, accept martyrdom if he is called to do so.
    “The missionary’s sister asks everyone we know to please pray for them.
    “These brave parents instilled such a fervent faith in their children that they chose martyrdom. Please surround them in their loss with your prayers for hope and perseverance.
    “She was able to talk to her brother briefly by phone. She didn’t say, but I feel she believes it will be their last conversation.
    “Pray for her too. She said he just kept asking her to help him know what to do and do it.
    “She told him to tell the families we are praying for them and they are not alone or forgotten – no matter what.
    “Her mail broke my heart. Please keep all in your prayers. Thank you.
    “Just a few minutes ago I received a message on my phone from Sean Malone who leads Crisis Relief International (CRI).
    “We spoke briefly and I assured him that we would share this urgent prayer need with all of our contacts.
    “This was that caller’s message:
    “We have lost the city of Queragosh (Qaraqosh).
    “It fell to ISIS and they are beheading children systematically. This is the city we have been smuggling food too.
    “ISIS has pushed back Peshmerga (Kurdish forces) and is within 10 minutes of where our CRI team is working.
    “Thousands more fled into the city of Erbil last night. The UN has evacuated its staff in Erbil. Our team is unmoved and will stay. Prayer cover needed!
    “Please pray sincerely for the deliverance of the people of Northern Iraq from the terrible advancement of ISIS and its extreme Islamic goals for mass conversion or death for Christians across this region.
    “I plead with you not to ignore his email.
    “Send it to as many people as possible – especially your friends.”

  • Richard Carrier and the Abhorrent Commands Objection

    In my last post, Richard Carrier and the Arbitrariness Objection, I argued that Richard Carrier’s attempt to defend Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s arbitrariness objection failed. I also argued his defence of this argument is incoherent and engages in special pleading because the arguments he defends apply with equal cogency to his own version of ethical naturalism.

    When one turns to Carrier’s defence of the abhorrent commands objection, similar points can be made. Armstrong hadCarrier argued:

    [1] If DCT is true then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape.

    [2] It is absurd that we could be required to rape.

    [3] God could command us to rape.

    Therefore:

    [4] A DCT is absurd.[1]

    I responded that [3] and [2] cannot both be true given that God, in the discussion, is defined as an an “all powerful, all knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created the universe.” Premise [3] is true only if it is possible for an all knowing, all loving and just person to command rape, something which is unlikely to be true. Moreover, even if  it is possible for a loving and just person to command rape, this could only be in cases where the rape could be endorsed by a fully informed, loving and just person, and hence, would be a situation so different to the contexts rape normally occurs in as to make [2] no longer be obviously true.

    Carrier objects that this is an own goal he claims:

    “In challenging Armstrong’s claim that DCT can justify rape, Flannagan responds that this is true “only if it’s possible for an all knowing, loving and just person to command rape,” which Flannagan concludes “is unlikely” and even were it to occur, and if we were adequately informed, we would agree rape in that unusual case would be loving and just. I concur with Flannagan. But this rebuttal assumes rape is immoral for reasons other than that God commands it. Flannagan is therefore rebutting not Armstrong here, but his own DCT.”[2]

    Carrier’s response relies on his unargued for assertion that “this rebuttal assumes rape is immoral for reasons other than that God commands it.” This, however, is false. All my response does is assume that a person who has the character traits mentioned: being loving, just, powerful and omniscient, would not command rape. I do not need to assume these things are morally required prior to God’s commands, nor do I need to assume that a loving and just person would prohibit these things because they are morally required.

    To see this consider John Mackie’s famous argument for nihilism in The Subjectivity of Values. Mackie argued that (more…)

  • Richard Carrier and the Arbitrariness Objection

    In, “Is ethical naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism“, I criticised Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection that a divine command theory (DCT) makes morality arbitrary. Armstrong argued:

    “Let’s assume that God commanded us not to rape. Did God have any reason to command this? If not, his command was arbitrary, and then it can’t make anything morally wrong. On the other hand, if God did have a reason to command us not to rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. The command itself is superfluous. Either way, morality cannot Carrierdepend on God’s commands.”[1]

    This argument can be summarized as follows:

    [1] Either: (i) there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape.

    [2] If there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.

    [3] If there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape then, r, is what makes rape morally wrong.

    [4] If r is what makes rape morally wrong then God’s commands are superfluous.

    In response, I argued this argument commits the fallacy of equivocation because the word “makes” in premise [3] and [4] is ambiguous. I noted the word “makes” can be used in at least two different senses.

    One sense refers to constitutive explanations, such as when one affirms that what makes a cup of clear liquid a cup of water is that fact the liquid is H20. The second refers to a motivational explanation, as in, when I state that my love for my children makes me persevere in parenting. If the word makes is used in the constitutive sense, [4] is true but [3] is false. If it’s used in a motivational sense [3] is true but [4] is false. Either way the argument fails.

    Armstrong’s Dilemma
    In a footnote, Carrier dismisses this response as “hand waving” and “completely off point”:”When Armstrong says “reason [r] is what makes rape morally wrong” he simply means “r is the reason rape is morally wrong.” Thus “r is what makes rape morally wrong” simply means “rape is morally wrong when r.”[2]

    There are two problems with this response.

    First, Carrier’s assertion that Armstrong “simply means ‘r is the reason rape is morally wrong’” is not supported by the text. Two pages earlier, Armstrong explicitly states he intends (more…)

  • Video: “Discussing Divine Command Theory” Special Guest: Matthew Flannagan

    Last week I was invited to be part of a discussion on divine command ethics in Google hangouts. The full discussion is now on-line as episode 22 of Ode to Dialogue: “Discussing Divine Command Theory.” Enjoy.

  • Ethical Supernaturalism is still more Plausible than Naturalism: Carrier’s Preliminary Objections

    Last year I had an article Is Ethical Naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism: A reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong published in the journal Philo. In the comments section a reader asked me to comment on a response to that article published by classical historian Richard Carrier. This post will be the first of several where I do so.Carrier

    In, Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism, I did two things. Firstly, I briefly explicated a conditional that has recently been proposed explicitly by William Lane Craig but which is also defended by several others, and secondly I rebutted several arguments raised against this conditional by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Carrier argues my rebuttals fail, but before he does so he offers three preliminary arguments against the positive thesis I was defending against Armstrong. It is these that I will address in this post.

    The Contention

    The conditional I explicated as follows:

    Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.” By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.[1]

    Note three things.

    First, this is a conditional, if affirms that if theism is true then then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands.

    Second, I define the concept of God used in this conditional as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.

    Third, this conditional specifies the kind of grounding relationship I am addressing, one where the relationship between God’s commands and moral obligations is one of identity. It’s the same kind of (more…)