Author: Matt

  • Ad Hominens, Special Pleading, Straw Men & Red Herrings: John Loftus’ Response to MandM

    John Loftus has written a response to my post “There Probably are no Duties. Now Stop Worrying and Enjoy Your Life!” Before turning to Loftus’ critique, let me recap my argument. While my post was satirical, it was intended to make a serious point. This being that many common and influential critiques of theism are incoherent.

    To establish this I argued three things.

    [1] That many critiques atheists offer of theism are moral critiques. Atheists argue that historically theism has been intricately linked with various forms of social oppression and/or the sacred texts of theistic religions condone oppressive practices.

    [2] That such critiques presuppose or assume the existence of moral duties. The critic has to assume that these practices are wrong even though the religious believers condone them.

    [3] That if one accepts the standard arguments atheists use against theism then the presupposition that there are moral duties is unjustifiable because precisely analogous arguments can be used to show there are no moral duties.

    Now if these three contentions are true then there is a fundamental incoherence in many common critiques of theism. If Loftus is going to provide a rebuttal of these contentions then he needs to provide reasons for thinking one of these three contentions is false.

    Unfortunately, instead of engaging the argument, Loftus ignored it and attacked a string of red herrings.

    John LoftusLoftus’ first argument in Do You Want to Be a Christian Apologist? Part 10 was to assert that I am “intellectually dishonest”, although somewhat charitably he states I am probably not aware I am dishonest – presumably I suffer from profound self-deception. Apparently the truth of this claim is blatantly obvious to “us” [by which he apparently means the atheist community].

    Unfortunately, simply stating that I am self-deceived and asserting with great confidence that I am wrong is not actually tantamout to offering a reason for questioning [1], [2] or [3] above. If it did then one could easily demonstrate that Loftus’ own work is substandard, I could just assert that it is and that everyone knows I am right and hey presto there’s my proof .

    Clearly, this is not a method by which one can reliably establish the truth or falsity of the matter.

    Loftus second argument begins with him drawing from my preamble:

    “Some atheists offer moral critiques of theism; their claim is not just that belief in God is false or unjustified, it is that such irrational beliefs are intricately linked with immoral and oppressive practices. Moral outrage often motivates the critiques offered – one only needs to read the condemnation of religious wars, religiously motivated terrorism, inquisitions, witch hunts, the suppression of science, sexism, homophobia, and so on, which is so prevalent in many free thought writings. Similarly, one needs only to read the accusations, regularly repeated in popular atheist literature, that the Bible condones slavery, or genocide, or stoning cheeky children, or rape, to observe this.

    Note that behind this critique is the presupposition that there are moral duties. People have a duty to not engage in wars or acts of terrorism, religious people who promote sexist or homophobic practices are wrong for doing so. I think this is nonsense as it assumes there is such a thing as a moral duty, it assumes things religious people do can be wrong. This is false and here is why.”

    After citing me Loftus rejoins:

    “Note the diversion here? Instead of providing answers to skeptical arguments he’s asking how anyone can have a moral critique of the Bible who doesn’t believe it’s the inspired word of God. He’s special pleading. No one else, given the rules of his game, can offer a moral critique of the Bible. Not a Hindu, nor a Muslim, nor a Buddhist, nor even liberals like the late John Hick or Thom Stark, or process theologians….. Do they? Do pantheists have a moral basis for critiquing the Bible? Flannagan would also have to reject the Natural Law Ethics (NLE) of the Catholic church, for if Natural Law Ethics obtains then even atheists have a basis for their moral critiques of the Bible. …”

    Unfortunately this rejoinder has little rational merit at all.

    First, I do address the sceptical arguments in question. By defending [3] I argue that analogues of these arguments entail an obvious false conclusion and therefore they cannot be sound. This is clear from reading the section of the original post which Loftus does not cite.

    Second, contrary to what (more…)

  • Madeleine speaking to Kerre McIvor on Newstalk ZB re Flannagan v ACC

    This morning on my way to work I turned on Newstalk ZB to find that Madeleine and her recent ACC victory were the topic of Leighton Smith’s morning show – Kerre McIvor was filling in. Madeleine ended up speaking to Kerre on air – you can listen here:

    Or download here:

    NewstalkZB have also reported on the case:

    “An Auckland lawyer has won her own legal battle against the Accident Compensation Corporation.

    Madeleine Flannagan has been fighting to get ACC to overturn its decision to stop her entitlements.

    ACC claimed her injury-related pain was due to a degenerative condition.

    Ms Flannagan says the decision was based solely on a diagnosis made by its own specialist.

    “Every doctor and specialist who’d seen me at that point and subsequently, had said it was an accident.”

    ACC overturned its decision just in time to avoid being taken to the District Court.

    It claims the “consistency and rationale of two independent specialists’ opinion” is more compelling than that of its own specialist.

    However, Ms Flannagan has her doubts over ACC’s true motives.

    “They settled about two weeks after they were served my appeal papers so I am very sceptical that it was the compelling nature of my specialist’s report.” [which they’d received copies of from Madeleine’s lawyers 1-2 years prior to offering to settle]

     

  • There Probably are no Duties. Now Stop Worrying and Enjoy Your Life!

    Some atheists offer  moral critiques of theism; their claim is not just that belief  in God is false or unjustified, it is that such irrational beliefs are intricately linked with immoral and oppressive practices. Moral outrage often motivates the critiques offered – one only needs to read the condemnation of religious wars, religiously motivated terrorism, inquisitions, witch hunts, the suppression of science, sexism, homophobia, and so on, which is so prevalent in many free thought writings. Similarly, one needs only to read the accusations, regularly repeated in popular atheist literature, that the Bible condones slavery, or genocide, or stoning cheeky children, or rape,  to observe this.

    DutyNote that behind this critique is the presupposition that there are moral duties. People have a duty to not engage in wars or acts of terrorism, religious people who promote sexist or homophobic practices are wrong for doing so. I think this is nonsense as it assumes there is such a thing as a moral duty, it assumes things religious people do can be wrong. This is false and here is why:

    First, the burden of proof is on he who makes a claim. I am not making a claim. I am simply not affirming that moral duties exist, therefore I do not have to justify my non-belief in duties. Instead those who believe in duties have to come up with compelling proof that they exist.

    Second, no-one has ever seen a duty. Duties have no colour, shape or smell or sound, hence, they are invisible to sensory perception. One cannot empirically verify or falsify the claim that duties exist so it is meaningless incoherent nonsense to believe in duties until verification of them is given. Moreover, the inability to verify these claims shows they are unscientific and so they cannot be accepted as rational.

    Third, no one as yet has provided a proof that duties of any sort exist. Such things, if they can be decided at all, must be shown to exist by the methods of natural science. To date no one has shown that belief in moral duties is necessary to any scientific theory; physics or chemistry or biology each have no need of that hypothesis to explain the world.

    Fourth, think of all the evil done in the name of duties. Almost every war fought throughout history has been justified by those who claimed they were doing the right thing. Inquisitions, crusades and the suppression of science were all done in the name of doing the right thing and avoiding the wrong thing. While science flies us to the moon, belief in duties flies planes into buildings. (more…)

  • Marquis and Ideal Desires

    In response to my post Peter Singer Human Dignity and Infanticide, Ben Jury offers some astute comments:

    “I agree with you, that Peter Singer does not motivate his account of ideal desires. However, I think there is a way to motivate it as follows: Marquis objects to Singer’s account because he thinks there is an alternative account of ideal desires that is just as plausible as his. But I think Marquis’s account of ideal desires leads to a reductio. If his Marquis’s account is right, then it seems that spiders would have rights to life. This is because if spiders were fully informed and rational, they would desire to live and thus have a right to life. This is analogous to Marquis’s claim that if infants were fully informed and rational they would desire to live and thus have a right life on Singer’s account. But granting spiders the right to life seems absurd. Thus Marquis’s account of ideal desires seems mistaken. However, Singer’s account of ideal desires is not absurd because for Singer, spiders do not have desires at all and hence cannot have ideal desires. Hence, because Singer’s ideal desire account can avoid the reductio, his account is more plausible then Marquis’s. (Obviously this is excluding your Hamlet counterexample, but I am curious what you think about the above.)”

    Jury notes correctly that even if this objection is sound then it only addresses my argument that Singer’s account of ideal desires is unmotivated. It does not address the Hamlet counter-example or the other objections I raised.

    Nevertheless is worth asking whether  Jury’s objection is sound. I do not think it is. Let me offer two responses.

    First, even if Marquis’ account of ideal desires is subject to the kind of reduction that Jury mentions, it does not follow that Singer’s account is motivated. I noted in my paper: “Various different conceptions of ideal desires have been proposed which will get around the counter examples aforementioned and not all of them involve the modification of actual desires. Consequently, Singer’s position appears unmotivated.” Here I pointed out there were various different counter examples thatescape the counter examples Singer proposes his account to explain. So, even if one of them fails – the account proposed by Marquis – that does not get around the problem.

    Second, I am not convinced Marquis’ account is subject to the reduction Jury mentions. In my paper Boonin on the Sentience Criteria I suggested counter examples like the one suggested by Jury can be dealt with by distinguishing two questions.[1] The first is the question of what an ideally rational self would choose for itself (i.e. the ideally rational self), and what  an  ideally rational self would choose for  it actual self (i.e. his non-ideally rational self).

    SpiderIf one asks the former question then Jury is correct e.g. a spider that had all the rational cognitive capacities of a person, idealised, would not choose to die.

    The answer to the second question is not so clear. Here we ask what an ideally rational self would choose if it knew that it would in fact have a future identical with the future of a normal spider – a future existence with no conscious experience at all, where it would lack any ability to value its life or any thing at all. It is certainly not obvious that an ideally rational person would value a future made up of such circumstances.

    The question then arises as to (more…)

  • Published in Philo: Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

    Jeffery Jay Lowder  has informed me that my article “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong”  was  published in the Spring/Summer 2012 issue of Philo. The abstract is below:

    Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong“In many of his addresses and debates, William Lane Craig has defended a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation (DCT). In a recent article and subsequent monograph, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has criticized Craig’s position. Armstrong contended that a DCT is subject to several devastating objections and further contended that even if theism is true a particular form of ethical naturalism is a more plausible account of the nature of moral obligations than a DCT is. This paper critiques Armstrong’s argument. I will argue Armstrong’s objections do not refute a DCT and the ethical naturalism he defends is not more plausible than Craig’s ethical supernaturalism.”

    You can read “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” here.

  • Is a Divine Command Theory Pscyopathic? Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part II

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisIn my last post, Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part I, I criticised Sam Harris’ characterisation of divine command meta-ethics.  In this post I want to turn to his second line of criticism of a Divine Command Theory. In Harris’ debate with William Lane Craig at Notre Dame, transcript here, Harris stated:

    “I’m glad he raised the issue of psychopathy—we are being offered a psychopathic and psychotic moral attitude. It’s psychotic because this is completely delusional. There’s no reason to believe that we live in a universe ruled by an invisible monster Yahweh. But it is, it is psychopathic because this is a total detachment from the, from the well-being of human beings. It, this so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children. Ok, just think about the Muslims at this moment who are blowing themselves up, convinced that they are agents of God’s will. There is absolutely nothing that Dr. Craig can s—can say against their behavior, in moral terms, apart from his own faith-based claim that they’re praying to the wrong God. If they had the right God, what they were doing would be good, on Divine Command theory.”

    Here, Harris suggests a Divine Command Theory expresses both a psychopathic and a psychotic moral attitude. I will address the charge of a Divine Command Theory being “psychotic” in a later post. Here, I want to address what I think is Harris’ main concern: a Divine Command Theory is psychopathic. It involves a “total detachment … from the well-being of human beings” and “so easily rationalizes the slaughter of children”. Why does Harris think this? “Because, at this moment Islamic terrorists are blowing themselves up convinced they are agents of God’s will, and a divine command theory can say nothing against their behavior in moral terms except the faith based claim that they are praying to the wrong God.”

    A lot could be said about this argument. First, note that even if it were sound, it does not show the Divine Command Theory is false. Harris is, in fact, offering pragmatic arguments against the theory: it is dangerous, or is easily misused – but there are many things which are dangerous and easily misused that are nevertheless true.

    More importantly, the argument is unsound. A Divine Command Theory contends that an action is obligatory if God actually commands that action. It does not contend that an action is obligatory if someone claims, or believes that God commands it. Obviously, simply believing something is the case does not mean that it is true. Harris, as an atheist, surely recognises this; many people believe and are convinced God exists yet Harris thinks they are mistaken.

    Hence, the mere fact an Islamic terrorist believes God has commanded him or her to “blow themselves up” does not commit the divine command theorist to supporting terrorism. All a divine command theorist needs to say in response to Islamic terrorists is that (more…)

  • Sam Harris on Divine Commands: Part I

    William Lane Craig v Sam HarrisIn a previous post, Divine Commands and Pyschopathic Tendancies, I said I would look in more detail at Sam Harris’ charge that Divine Command Theories (“DCT”) of meta-ethics are psychopathic. In this, and in several forthcoming posts, I will attempt to deliver on that promise.

    In Harris’ debate with William Lane Craig at Notre Dame, transcript here, Harris offered three direct lines of argument against a DCT. (I say direct lines because many of Harris’ rebuttals did not address DCT at all; rather he engaged popular objections to Christian doctrines about exclusivism and hell.) The first direct argument was as follows:

    “According to Dr Craig’s Divine Command theory, God is not bound by moral duties; God doesn’t have to be good. Whatever he commands is good, so when he commands that the Israelites slaughter the Amalekites, that behavior becomes intrinsically good because he commanded it.”

    Here Harris makes three claims.  First he argues that according to a DCT God does not “have to be good”. Second, he infers from this that God can therefore make any action at all intrinsically good. Third, he alludes to an incident in the book of Samuel where, on the face of it, God commands the killing of the Amalekites.

    Turning to Harris’s first claim, according to DCT a person has a duty to a person to do some action only if that person is commanded by God to do it. As God does not issue commands to himself he is not bound by moral duties. Harris infers from this that “God doesn’t have to be good”.

    Whether this is inference is sound depends on what Harris means by “have to be good”. There are at least two possible things he could mean by this.

    Sometimes when we say someone does or does not “have” to do something, we mean they are not morally obligated to do it. When I tell my children they have to tell the truth, for example, I am saying they have a duty to tell the truth. In other contexts however, when we say that someone does or does not “have” to do something we mean it is possible for them to do it.

    If Harris, in saying “God does not have to be good”, means God is not under an obligation to be good then his inference is sound; if God is not bound by duties then he obviously does not have an obligation to be good. This, however, does not entail that it is logically possible for God to lack goodness.

    If, on the other hand, Harris’ claim that “God does not have to be good” carries the implication that it is possible for God to do evil then it is a a flat out straw man.

    Craig’s position is that (more…)