Author: Matt

  • Commonsense Atheism and the Canaanite Massacre

    Luke Muehlauser at Commonsense Atheism has written a review of my argument on the genocide of the Canaanites (Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I and Part II). Luke’s comments are largely positive (and I appreciate that a critic of Theism and Christianity sees merit in my position) he does, however, raise a few issues I would like to respond to.

    First, Luke summarises my conclusion as:

    Perhaps instead the most genocidal phrases in Joshua were meant as hyperbole. Imagine a basketball team speaking of how they “totally slaughtered” their opponents like their coach told them to. In the same way, maybe the Israelites wrote in hyperbolic language about how they defeated their enemies. Indeed, this kind of exaggeration and hagiography on a nation’s own behalf is common in ancient literature.

    This is not quite right; I did not state “perhaps” the passages are hyperbolic. I argued a hyperbolic reading best fits the context, as it explains why the author uses stylised phrases in some passages which, if taken literally, contradict what he affirms elsewhere in the text did literally happen. Furthermore, I did not suggest that such exaggeration and hagiography is common in ancient literature. I suggested it was common in literature of the same general time and place, which used the same literary conventions and rhetorical techniques as the Bible does in the Book of Joshua – namely Ancient Near-Eastern war and conquest accounts.   

    Second, Luke states that my position “agrees with the Biblical minimalism already espoused by most atheists, for it says that these events found in the Bible never happened.” This comment is intriguing because much of my research drew from the writings of biblical maximalists who were criticising minimalism. My repeated citation of Kenneth Kitchen is an obvious example. Minimalists point out that the archaeological record does not fit the picture of total conquest and genocide and hence conclude the Bible is inaccurate. Maximalists, such as Kenneth Kitchen and James Hoffmeier, respond by arguing that the text is not inaccurate because, having examined the literary conventions of Ancient Near-Eastern historiography, one finds it does not actually teach total conquest and genocide as it is written according to the hyperbolic and to some extent hagiographic rhetoric of Ancient Near-Eastern historiography. So I am inclined to think my position is a development of a rejoinder to minimalist challenges.  

    This is of course another area where my perspective has merit. It resolves not only some of the moral questions people have with the narrative; it also resolves the apparent contradictions within the text cited by critical scholars, answers the challenge of archaeology and fits what we know about the conventions of such literature. If we know that Joshua is written according to certain literary conventions and we know that these conventions frequently are hagiographic and hyperbolic, then to insist on a literal reading is implausible. This is particularly so when it makes the text contradictory, contrary to archaeological record and seemingly immoral.   Luke goes on to ask,

    If Matt did think these events happened literally as described in the Bible, would he then conclude that God was an evil monster to command them? Or would he, in the end, agree with Bill Craig that genocide is okay as long as God feels like it?

    I will make two points in answering Luke’s questions.

    One, it seems to me one could only conclude that Joshua actually carried out a divinely authorised Genocide if, in addition to taking Joshua literally one also accepts that the Bible is inerrant. But Joshua is not the only text in the canon, the Bible also in various other places teaches that God is good, just, and so on. So it’s hard to see how a person could coherently draw the conclusion Luke mentions. A person who concluded that God is evil, would have to conclude that much of what the Bible teaches about God is mistaken, but if this is the case then one has reason for doubting that it is accurate in its description of Genocide in the first place.

    Two, Luke asks if I “agree with Bill Craig that genocide is okay as long as God feels like it?” It is important to note is that this is not Craig’s position. Craig claims that killing non combatants in war is permissible if a loving and just God commands it. He also contends that God in fact did not command this in the biblical narratives hence his view is about a hypothetical conditional.1 Once this is realised the issues are not as simple as Luke appears to think.   Either it is possible for a just and loving omniscient person to command genocide or is not. If it is, then genocide would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person aware of all the relevant facts could endorse it, and under these circumstances its hard to see how genocide could be evil.

    On the other hand if it is impossible for a perfectly good omniscient being to ever command genocide, then the situation Luke mentions is one with an impossible antecedent. On the standard accounts of counter factual logic, conditionals with impossible antecedents are true. Of course this is a disputed point of modal logic, the debate however is technical and complex and certainly not one with an obvious answer. As I have argued elsewhere every ethical theory is such that under impossible circumstances it entails that genocide is permissible.

    Finally, Luke argues that atheists are not “‘attacking a straw man’ or ‘taking things out of context’ as Matt sometimes says” but rather, “they are responding to the way that millions of Christian fundamentalists interpret these verses.” He states,  

    Atheists are not, as Matt claims, reading the Bible as fundamentalists. Atheists don’t believe the genocide ever took place! What we atheists are saying is this: If you think these events were literally commanded by God and carried out by the Israelites, then how can you call God “perfectly good”?

    But here Luke is quoting me out of context.  The argument I responded to was developed by Ray Bradley. Ray’s conclusion was not that fundamentalist Christianity is false but that theism is false, and that all forms of theistic ethics are false. This only follows if you assume either,

    (a) that fundamentalist readings are the only defensible ones or,
    (b) all theists as a matter of fact do make such readings.

    To affirm (a) is to adopt a fundamentalist hermeneutic as correct interpretation.

    To affirm (b) is to attack a straw man.

    Of course someone might adopt a more qualified argument along the manner he suggests. But if he does, then it is not an argument against theism, nor is it an argument against Christianity, it is not even an argument against a form of Christianity committed to a strong view of inerrancy. It is an argument against anyone who accepts these things and also accepts an interpretation of Scripture which reads these passages as a literal description of what actually happened, as opposed to hagiographic or hyperbolic description. Now showing this combination of positions to be indefensible might be  interesting and useful, but it is extremely limited in its conclusion. Anyone appraised of such an argument can respond simply by moving to a less literalistic hermeneutic and retaining every thing else. I suspect this is much less than atheists typically want and certainly less than they typically maintain this argument shows.

    1. In Divine Command Morality and Voluntarism William Lane Craig writes “I’ve come to appreciate that the object of God’s command to the Israelis was not the slaughter of the Canaanites, as is often imagined.” The command rather was primarily to drive them out of the land.” He goes on to state “But I’m assuming a “worst case” scenario for the sake of argument.”

    RELATED POSTS:
    Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I
    Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II
    Contra Mundum: Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament? 

  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and the Moral Scepticism Objection to Divine Commands

    In responding to William Lane Craig’s advocacy of a Divine Command Theory (DCT) Walter Sinnott-Armstrong makes the objection that,“The divine command theory makes morality unknowable.”

    He makes the following argument for this:

    To see why, consider whether or not it is immoral to eat pork. If the divine command theory is correct, we cannot answer this question simply by pointing out that eating pork causes harm to pigs or to us, unless we already know that God commanded us to avoid such harm. We also cannot know wether it is immoral to eat pork on the basis of other’s testimony or our own moral intuitions if we have no reason to think their testimony or our intuitions map onto divine commands, and we cannot have any such reason without knowing what God commanded. Thus, on Craig’s theory we cannot know what is morally wrong, if we cannot know what God commanded. Unfortunately, however we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.1

    Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument here is as follows:

    [1] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action is wrong unless we know God prohibited it.

    [2] We have no sound way to determine what God has commanded or prohibited.

    From these it is concluded that

    [3] If DCT is correct we cannot know an action is wrong.

    In support of [1] he offers two premises,

    [1a] If DCT is correct then we cannot know an action a is wrong because it has property p, unless we know that God prohibits p

    [1b] If DCT is correct, then we cannot know an action a is wrong, on grounds g, unless we know that g “maps on to divine commands”.

    One serious problem with this argument is that [1] is false, as are the supporting premises [1a] and [1b]. According, to the DCT of Adams, Alston, and Evans, which Craig appropriates, the property of being wrong is constituted by the property of being contrary to Gods commands in the same way that the property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20. Sinnott-Armstrong thinks holding that moral duties are constituted by Gods commands, means, one cannot know if an action is wrong unless one knows it was forbidden by God. This seems to presuppose the following inference :

    I1: If A is constituted by B, then one cannot know if something is an A unless one knows it is a B.

    However, I1 is false. Consider the following counter example; water is constituted by H20. Yet people for thousands of years could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. This example shows people can know something is an A (water), A can be constituted by something B (H20) and people not know A is a B.

    The same is true for [1a], the DCT claims that wrongness is constituted by God’s prohibition, Armstrong seems to think this means we cannot know if an action is wrong on the basis of some feature of that action unless we know that feature is prohibited by God. This seems to presuppose a similar inference

    I2: If A is constituted by B then we cannot know something is an A on the basis of it possessing p, unless we know that B has p.

    But again there are obvious counter examples to I2. Water is constituted by H20, if I2 is true it would follow one cannot tell that the cup of liquid I am drinking is water because of its taste unless I know that H20 tastes that way. But this is clearly false. Medieval men could recognize by taste a cup of water as well as any modern person despite not knowing anything about H20.

    [1b] faces similar difficulties, here Armstrong thinks, that if our duties are constituted by divine commands, this entails that we cannot know that an action is immoral on the basis of some ground, such as intuition or testimony, unless we have reasons for thinking that ground “maps onto divine commands”. But why think this? The argument seems to rely on the following inference

    I3. If A constitutes B, then one cannot know B exists on ground g, unless one has reason for thinking g reliably tracks A.

    But this is also false. Take the example I mentioned above. There are people do not know about atomic theory and yet know on the basis of perception that the glass in front of them contains water. These people do not need to have reasons for thinking that their eyesight tracts hydrogen and oxygen atoms before they can rationally trust their senses, they know about water quite independently of any knowledge about hydrogen or oxygen.

    So [1], [1a] and [1b] are all false. The error in each instance is the same, Armstrong assumes that the metaphysical claim that our duties are constituted by God’s commands entails that we cannot recognize or know whether an action is wrong unless we know what God commanded. This however is to conflate moral ontology with moral epistemology.

    Similar problems afflict Sinnott-Armstrong’s advocacy of [2] that “we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.” Immediately after making this claim Armstrong defends it by claiming the arguments from natural theology fail, he then states

    Theists often tell us what God commands, as if they knew, and the commands they ascribe to God are often (though not always) plausible. However, what makes us and them accept that God commands those actions rather than others is that we already and independently had a reason to think that certain acts are immoral. Assuming God is good, of course God would command us not to rape. But the only way we know God would issue that command is that we already know rape is wrong. There is no way to know what God does or would command without already knowing what is right or wrong.2

    Here Sinnott-Armstrong seems to contradict [2] when he contends that it’s plausible to claim God commands us not to rape and seems to countenance the conclusion that we can know what God would command on the basis of justified moral beliefs. But if this is true then [2] is false. Of course Sinnott-Armstrong contends such knowledge is dependent on moral beliefs and not revelation or natural theology. But, that is incompatible with [2], [2] does not state that we can’t know through revelation or natural theology it states we can’t gain such knowledge at all.

    Some of what Sinnott-Armstrong states here suggests he may have a different argument in mind. In “Morality: Religious and Secular”, Patrick Nowell-Smith refers to an argument that is “familiar to philosophers but of which the force is not always appreciated” which Smith contends refutes a divine command theory, the argument is:

    [We] must be persuaded independently of his goodness before we admit his right to command. We must judge for ourselves whether the Bible is the inspired word of a kind and benevolent God or a curious amalgam of profound wisdom and gross superstition. To judge this is to make a moral decision, so that in the end, so far from morality being based upon religion, religion is based upon morality.3

    James Cornman and Keith Lehrer have expressed essentially the same line of critique.4 I think this critique is based on a failure to make an important distinction. Take the claim that right and wrong is independent of God’s commands. This claim is ambiguous; it could mean (a), that ones knowledge of right and wrong is independent of ones knowledge of what God commands or (b), that right and wrong exist independently of God’s commands. The first claim states that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about divine commands. The second is that the existence of moral properties such as right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands.

    Now the DCT denies (b). Divine command theorists claim that wrongness is constituted by the property of being contrary to God’s commands. Hence it postulates an ontological dependence between divine commands and moral properties such as wrongness. The arguments of Nowell-Smith above however do not refute this claim. If they show anything, they show not that (b) is the case but that (a) is the case. Nowell-Smith and Sinnott-Armstrong show that we can know what is right and wrong independently of knowing or believing in the existence of divine commands. Hence they show at most an epistemological independence.

    Showing that beliefs about right and wrong are epistemologically independent of beliefs about God’s commands does not show that right and wrong are ontologically independent of God’s commands unless epistemological independence entails ontological independence. The objector here assumes that if my knowledge of something does not depend upon my knowledge of something else then the two things can exist independently of each other.

    Again this assumption is false. The property of being water is constituted by the property of being H20; as such H20 and water are not ontologically independent. Yet, as noted, for thousands of years people could perceive water, drink it, detect it, and use it etc without knowing anything about atomic theory. Hence, our knowledge of water is independent of our knowledge of H20. Yet this fact does not mean that water is not constituted by H20. Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection therefore fails; it is hard to avoid Craig’s assessment that Sinnott-Armstrong’s critique is “pervaded by the conflation of moral ontology with moral epistemology.”5

    1. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 109.
    2. Ibid 110.
    3. Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.
    4. James W Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979) 429.
    5. William Lane Craig “This Most Gruesome Guests” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 168.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong on God, Morality and Arbitrariness
    Van Inwagen, Divine Duties and the Deontological Argument from Evil
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Infantile Religious Morality
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part I
    Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Argument from Evil Part II

    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part I
    Tooley, The Euthyphro Objection and Divine Commands: Part II
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II
    On a Common Equivocation

  • Contra Mundum: Selling Atheism

    New Zealand motorists will have noticed a new genre of advertising billboards, those attempting to sell the concept that there is probably no God. These billboards are the collective efforts of the New Zealand Atheist Campaign, The Humanist Society and the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists. Like all advertising campaigns, these billboards offer clever-sounding slogans, which are indicative of the philosophy of the seller – in this case three variants of popular ‘new-atheist’ arguments. Like any consumer, I want to read the product labelling a little deeper before I consider buying. So here I intend to unpack the slogans and take a look at the implicit reasoning behind each.

    Each billboard has the tagline “There’s probably no God. Now stop worrying and enjoy your life.” My first thought on seeing this was that authors must find atheism psychologically liberating. We do not have to worry that there is a God and that means that we can enjoy ourselves but why would the existence of God be something to worry about? Is it the moral accountability that goes with it? If God exists then we might have to worry that He has seen what we have done in secret, and being free from this worry enables us to enjoy our lives. If this is so then prima facie this suggests that guilt is a major motivation behind, at least some peoples, atheism.

    The tagline aside, let’s look at the three slogans currently affronting us as we navigate our cities. The billboard on Auckland’s Newton Rd states, “Good without God? Over One Million Kiwis Are. Source:2006 Census.”

    Good without god?

    Here we are told that one million kiwis are good without God because the census says so. Now a lot could be said about the appeal to the census here, I don’t recall a question on it asking me if I was good and even if it did I am not sure that we should take too much from self-reported assessments of people’s own integrity. Let’s assume, however, that the billboard makes a fair claim. The inference is still is fallacious. What the census shows is not that one million kiwis are good without God, rather, it shows that one million kiwis are good without believing in the existence of God. But to say that one can be good without believing in God is not the same as saying that one can be good without God. Many people throughout history have been able to live and breath without believing in the existence of hydrogen and oxygen atoms yet it does not follow that they could live without hydrogen and oxygen.

    I am still left wondering how the fact that people do not need to believe in something to do good deeds renders the belief false? For centuries people have done good deeds and lived good lives without believing in heliocentricism or quantum mechanics, should we conclude that these theories are therefore ‘probably false’? Surely we are not being asked to buy that the basis of our beliefs should be what is useful or helpful as opposed to what is true?

    Perhaps the sellers mean to convey something else. Some Christian thinkers such as William Lane Craig, Robert Adams, Stephen Layman, Alvin Plantinga, John Hare and Philip Quinn have argued that moral properties such as right and wrong depend on God for their existence. Atheist writers such as Paul Kurtz and Christopher Hitchens retort that this claim is falsified by the existence of morally upright atheists. I suspect something like this is meant by the slogan on the billboard, it repeats Hitchens’ and Kurtz’s retorts as though they said something insightful or clever.

    This retort misses the point. Craig, Adams, et al are not claiming that one needs to believe in God to be good – a point made several times in the literature (and particularly made so many times to Kurtz that it beggars belief that he keeps repeating it) rather, their claim is that moral properties, such as right and wrong, depend on God for their existence. This is not the same thing, we know that water depends for its existence on the existence of hydrogen and oxygen, this does not mean, however, that we need to believe in the existence of hydrogen and oxygen in order to effectively recognise and use water. Ancient and medieval people were drinking, washing in, swimming in and sailing on water centuries before the discovery of contemporary atomic theory.

    This is a fairly basic and elementary distinction in the literature. How exactly expressing a common philosophical confusion counts as reason for thinking “there probably is no God” is hard to see.

    Parnell Rise’s billboard informs us “In the Beginning Man Created God.”

    In the beginning man created god

    This one asserts that man created God. Now if one takes this statement in an absurdly literal manner (the way many sceptical organisations approach parables, hyperbole and poetry in the Bible) we find that atheists are telling us that God actually exists. I have no issue with the slogan at this juncture, however, the idea that God was created by human beings is clearly absurd. God is typically defined as an all-powerful, all-knowing, immaterial, necessarily-existent being who created the world and who sustains everything in it. Now if one is going to claim that humans actually created an all-powerful, all-knowing, immaterial, necessarily-existent who created and sustains the world, then they are contradicting themselves. Humans are part of the world and therefore cannot have created the being that created the world – otherwise humans would have to exist prior to their own existence.

    Of course to interpret this billboard in this way would be uncharitable. The authors of this billboard probably do not mean to say that humans actually created God, they do not think He exists after all. Their claim is that humans created the idea or concept of God and developed it. This is undoubtedly true. Of course, humans also invented the idea or concept of atoms as well – ancient Greek philosophers came up with the basics of this concept millennia ago – but this fact tells us nothing about whether or not the idea or concept humans developed actually corresponds to anything in reality. To assume that it tells us something about whether the idea or concept is true is a fairly obvious case of what logicians call the genetic fallacy.

    The last one is my favourite, “We Are All Atheists About Most Gods. Some of Us Just Go One God Further.”

    We are all atheistsTo see the problems with this slogan take out the term “God” in the sign and replace it with some other term such as “non-Christian perspective.” When we do this we get: “We all reject most non-Christian perspectives, some of us just reject one more.” This argument has true premises, do we now have, a knock-down argument for Christianity?

    Similarly, an analogous argument form with true premises gives us an argument for nihilism, the denial that humans have moral duties, the total denial of the existence of morality. “We are all nihilists about some conceptions of morality, some of us are just nihilistic about one more.”

    The same argument for also furnishes a refutation of secularism, “we all reject some secular perspectives on reality, some of us just reject one more.” I could go on.

    Taking a stand on any issue of philosophical substance, whether by affirming, denying or simply being sceptical of it, is to put oneself in opposition to any number of other people and groups who take a contrary stance. That’s life. Such pluralism hardly provides a reason for thinking “there probably is no God” any more than it gives us a reason to doubt any other perspective on the world.

    So what do the atheist billboards do? Well the first one tells us that some atheist groups conflate basic philosophical distinctions and do not really understand the debate they are contributing to. The second shows us that these groups think contradictions and obvious fallacies are some how savvy and smart. The last shows us that they think that invalid argument forms, forms from which you could infer the denial of anything and everything by substituting one true premise with another, are avant-garde. All in all, pretty accurate advertising for these groups.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the Sept 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to:
    editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament?
    Contra Mundum: Fairies, Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups & Spaghetti Monsters
    Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life
    Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Gary Gutting on Richard Dawkins’ Atheism

    The New York Times has an accessible and excellent critique of Richard Dawkins’ argument for the non- existence of God, written by University of Notre Dame Philosopher Gary Gutting entitled, “On Dawkins’s Atheism: A Response.”

    Enjoy.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Fairies Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups and Spaghetti Monsters
    Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness

  • Contra Mundum: Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament?

    Perhaps the most perplexing issue facing Christan believers is a series of jarring texts in the Old Testament. After liberating Israel from slavery in Egypt, the Israelites arrived on the edge of the promised land. The book of Deuteronomy records that God then commanded Israel to “destroy totally” the people occupying these regions (the Canaanites); the Israelites were to “leave alive nothing that breathes.” The book of Joshua records the carrying out of this command. In the sixth chapter it states “they devoted the city to the LORD and destroyed with the sword every living thing in it—men and women, young and old, cattle, sheep and donkeys.” In the tenth and eleventh chapters the text states that Joshua “left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded.” The text mentions city after city where Joshua, at God’s command, puts every inhabitant “to the sword” and “left no survivors.” If these passages are taken in a strict, literal fashion then it is correct to conclude that they do record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. In light of this critics of Christianity often ask how a good and loving God could command the extermination of the Canaanites?

    In response, I want to suggest that this strict, literal reading is mistaken. Reading these texts in isolation from the narrative in which they occur risks a distortion of the authors intended meaning. Consider the book of Joshua, critics are quick to point out that in chapters ten and eleven the text states that Joshua “totally destroyed all who breathed”, left “no survivors” in “the entire land”, went through the land “exterminating them without mercy”.

    The problem is that chapters fifteen to seventeen record that the Canaanites were, in fact, not literally wiped out. Over and over the text affirms that the land was still occupied by the Canaanites, who remain heavily armed and deeply entrenched in the cities. Astute readers will note that these are the same regions and the same cities that Joshua was said to have “destroyed all who breathed”, left “no survivors” in just a few chapters earlier.

    This continues through into the next book in the Old Testament. The first two chapters of the book of Judges record that the Canaanites lived in the very same regions and cities that Joshua was said to have put every inhabitant “to the sword” in and “left no survivors” in. Moreover, again we see that they occupied these cities and regions in such numbers and strength that they had to again be driven out by force, which chapter one of Judges declared was very difficult.

    Read in context then, it is difficult to see how the language of total genocide in chapters ten and eleven of the book of Joshua could have been intended to be taken literally by the authors.

    This phenomena is not limited to the books of Joshua and Judges. The book of Deuteronomy in chapters seven and twenty contain commands to the Israelites to “destroy them [the Canaanites] totally” and “not leave alive anything that breathes.” The books of Deuteronomy and Exodus, in numerous places, state that the Canaanites are to be slowly driven out and expelled from the land, which is not the same thing as killing them. In fact, legislation is cited in the texts which clearly assumes that the Canaanites will survive Joshua’s the invasion. Immediately after stating that the Israelites should “destroy them totally” the text reads, “make no treaty with them, and show them no mercy. Do not intermarry with them. Do not give your daughters to their sons or take their daughters for your sons.” If they were all supposed to be dead then why bother issuing instructions regarding treaties and intermarriage?

    When read in context, it is unlikely that the author of these texts intended the language “destroy totally”, “do not leave alive anything that breathes”, destroy “men and women, young and old”, and so on, to be taken literally. How then should these passages be understood? At a recent conference at the University of Notre Dame, Philosopher Alvin Plantinga suggested a possible solution is to take this language hyperbolically. He suggested phrases such as, “destroy with the sword … men and women … cattle, sheep and donkeys” are phrases to be understood more like we understand a person who, in the context of watching David Tua in a boxing match, yells, “Knock his block off! Hand him his head! Take him out!” or hopes that the All Blacks will “annihilate the Springboks” or “totally slaughter the Wallabies.” Now, the sports fan does not actually want David Tua to decapitate his opponent or for the All Blacks to become mass murderers. Plantinga suggests that the same could be true here; understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably mean “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.” If this is correct then the differences between the different texts is easily explained and more significantly, the texts do not teach that God commanded genocide or that Joshua carried it out.

    Interestingly, research into Ancient Near-Eastern history writings bear Plantinga’s idea out. In a comprehensive comparative study of Ancient Near-Eastern conquest accounts, Old Testament scholar, K. Lawson Younger documents stylistic and literary similarities between Joshua and reports of wars written by the some of these surrounding cultures. He concludes that the Old Testament uses the same literary conventions. He notes, “the composition and rhetoric of the Joshua narratives in chapters 9-12 are compared to the the conventions of writing about conquests in Egyptian, Hittite, Akkadian, Moabite, and Aramaic texts, they are revealed to be very similar.” He substantiates with numerous examples in his book.

    In addition, when one examines the literary conventions of such accounts it is evident that the rhetoric of total conquest, complete annihilation and destruction of the enemy, killing everyone, leaving no survivors, etc, is a common hyperbolic way of describing a victory in the manner Plantinga suggests. Renowned Egyptologist Kenneth Kitchen notes,

    [T]he type of rhetoric in question was a regular feature of military reports in the second and first millennia, as others have made very clear. … In the later fifteenth century Tuthmosis III could boast “the numerous army of Mitanni, was overthrown within the hour, annihilated totally, like those (now) non-existent” –- whereas, in fact, the forces of Mitanni lived to fight many another day, in the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some centuries later, about 840/830, Mesha king of Moab could boast that “Israel has utterly perished for always” – a rather premature judgment at that date, by over a century! And so on, ad libitum. It is in this frame of reference that the Joshua rhetoric must also be understood.

    Some examples will illustrate this. The Merneptah Stele states “Yanoam was made nonexistent; Israel is laid waste, its seed is not.” here the Egyptian Pharoh Merneptah describes a skirmish with Israel in which his armies prevailed, hyperbolically, in terms of the total annihilation of Israel. The Assyrian king Sennacherib uses similar hyperbole, “The soldiers of Hirimme, dangerous enemies, I cut down with the sword; and not one escaped.” Mursili II records making “Mt. Asharpaya empty (of humanity)” and the “mountains of Tarikarimu empty (of humanity).” Similarly, The Bulletin of Ramses II, an historical narrative of Egyptian military campaigns into Syria, narrates Egypt’s considerably less than decisive victory at the battle of Kadesh with the rhetoric, “His majesty slew the entire force of the wretched foe from Hatti, together with his great chiefs and all his brothers, as well as all the chiefs of all the countries that had come with him” [Emphasis added]. The examples could be multiplied but the point is that such language was hyperbolic and not intended to be taken literally.

    Consequently, if one does not read the texts in isolation and is sensitive to the genre of Ancient Near-Eastern writings then a literal reading is far from obvious. As Egyptologist James K. Hoffmeier notes, such a reading commits “the fallacy of misplaced literalism … the misconstruction of a statement-in-evidence so that it carries a literal meaning when a symbolic or hyperbolic or figurative meaning was intended.” This underscores an obvious but often neglected point, the bible is not written in accord with the conventions of 21st century English. It was written in ancient foreign languages and in the conventions that governed historical, legal, epic, etc writings of that time. To understand what it teaches accurately one needs to ask what it teaches given these factors. When one does this, it seems probable that the Old Testament does not teach that God commanded or that Israel carried out the genocide or extermination of the Canaanites.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the Aug 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to:
    editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Fairies, Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups & Spaghetti Monsters
    Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life
    Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Middleton Grange, Free Exercise and the Gay Rights Movement UPDATED

    Over at GayNZ.com’s Proclamations of the Red Queen blog, Craig Young is in a celebratory  mood. Middleton Grange, a Reformed Evangelical Christian school has been forced by law to pay reparations and have their management undergo “human rights education” because they dismissed a netball coach on the grounds that he openly engaged in homosexual conduct.

    Middleton Grange is a school based in Christchurch. The school’s aim’s, as stated on its website, show that its first aim as a educational facility is to “Help pupils know and understand God and His ways and respond to Him in obedience, love and service.” The website further states,

    The school rests on a Reformed and Evangelical interpretation of Scripture which informs all aspects of governance and management. The Christian Schools’ Trust is responsible for safeguarding the Special Character of the school.

    Now it should be no surprise to any educated person that a reformed evangelical interpretation of scripture usually includes, among other things, the contention that sex between people of the same sex violates God’s commands. Nor should it be a surprise that, given the school’s stated purpose is to inculcate these beliefs, it will not hire or retain people whose example or teaching contradicts this purpose.

    The only question that really needs to be asked then is whether it should be legal for religious groups like this to set up such schools and teach these things and engage in these sorts of hiring practices. Should reformed evangelical Christianity be a tolerated religion? The alternative is, of course, to ban such schools, force parents to send their children to schools that will teach that their parents religious beliefs are false  – essentially not allow adults to propagate these values to their children. This is known as religious persecution.

    In fact by ruling that the school must hire/retain staff whose actions are inconsistent with the schools purpose and then requiring the staff to undergo “human rights education.” the Human Rights Commission (HRC) goes one step further. It states that not only must such schools not exist but it maintains that the adults running them must undergo compulsory re-education into the secular liberal way of thinking. Am I the only one who finds this sort of thing a tad draconian?

    Mr Young, however, seems to think otherwise, he states,

    Frankly, I’m surprised that this sort of collision between lesbian and gay teachers and backward fundamentalist enclaves has taken so long to materialise. I suspect that it’s because we shun such neurotic and hermetically sealed enclaves unless there is good reason to do otherwise

    Apparently the biggest problem in all this is that this sort of religious persecution and re-education has not happened sooner. As to why such schools should be persecuted, Young gives three reasons.

    First because it is a “malignant Christchurch fundamentalist” school. In other words, Young considers this school to expound fundamentalism and he considers such a religion to be “malignant.” This really is not the issue, the issue is whether the state should persecute such religious groups and subject the people within them to compulsory re-education. There are many religious perspectives I disagree with, some I find highly offensive yet this does not mean that the state should intervene in this way.

    Young’s second reason is,

    Founded in 1964, it was host to Graham Capill, Christian Heritage Party leader. His dad Don was Vice Principal until the eighties. I was a one-time inmate there. It served as a nexus for the abortive campaign against homosexual law reform in the mid-eighties.

    There are three reasons here (a) Young attended the school and did not like it, (b) a political leader Young is known to immensely dislike and who was convicted for sexual molestation once attended the school and this man’s father was once Principal; and, (c) the school promoted political views at odds with the secular liberal mainstream on issues like abortion and homosexuality.

    It is hard to see how any of these reasons justify the HRC’s actions. Is Young saying any school he does not like should be legally punished? Is Craig suggesting that if an old boy of a school is convicted of a crime years after leaving that the whole school should be held responsible? Does Young support a return to collective and vicarious punishments perhaps?

    The last reason Young gave is perhaps the most telling; schools should be subject to legal sanction if their politics are disagreeable. Again, am I the only one who finds it odd that this sort of crap is proposed by one of the voices for “tolerance” and “respect for diversity”?

    Craig then gives the usual red herrings; he states “Should it end there? Well, no. If Middleton Grange refuses to employ lesbian and gay teachers, then what about issues like LGBT suicide prevention? Or homophobic bullying?” While I agree that bullying of any human being is wrong (it being assault) and suicide of any person is tragic, the reasoning here lacks cogency. Suppose a fundamentalist Christian was severely bullied at school, the kids picked on him because they considered him to be an intolerant bigot or suppose that his refusal to have pre-marital sex or drink alcohol made him a social outcast? I take it that Young would support fundamentalist teachers coming into this school and teaching a fundamentalist interpretation of the bible to their students so as to re-educate those bullying him? Perhaps the HRC should force the management of any secular school that does not do this to attend church…

    The only remotely sensible comment Craig makes is a rhetorical question, “Should fundamentalist private schools be penalised by withheld operational funding if they refuse to obey mainstream New Zealand anti-discrimination laws?” Indeed that is the core question. Should private religious schools be allowed to teach and freely exercise their religion? Some segments of the gay rights movement and their supporters need to be honest and just outright admit that they support religious persecution instead of talking about “tolerance” and “the celebration of diversity” – values they clearly do not believe in.

    UPDATED BY MADELEINE

    In the comments below Joel, a blogger from the US, writes:

    There is no liberty in New Zealand, I take it, nor equality.

    And what about the human rights violated against the Christian school?

    I have chosen to respond this here as originally Matt and I had toyed with looking at this in this post anyway and so I don’t want it getting lost in the comments, which I anticipate will be prolific in number (just a hunch).

    New Zealand does not have an entrenched constitution, its Bill of Rights is a simple statute which is ultimately subordinate to any other statute it clashes with, see section 4:

    4.  Other enactments not affected
    No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),—

    (a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or

    (b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment—

    by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights.

    Although, to be fair, for any clash the clashing rule, law or policy must be read in the way most conducive to it being consistent with the Bill of Rights, see section 6:

    6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred
    Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.

    If a consistent reading cannot be achieved then the courts will either deem a policy inconsistent with the Bill of Rights or deem it a justified limitation,

    5. Justified limitations
    Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

    The reality is that due to the fact the courts cannot strike statutes down or refuse to apply them and that there are no penalties for Bill of Rights breaches either beyond the stigma of being in breach of it, which only works if society values the right in question, if it is an unpopular group or cause being violated who cares right?

    So that is the context freedom of religion sits in in New Zealand, which is covered in the section on democratic and civil rights:

    13. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion
    Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference.

    14. Freedom of expression
    Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form.

    15. Manifestation of religion and belief
    Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private.

    Now at a glance at these sections our US friends must be wondering how the tale Matt told above and the story in the newspaper article he linked to could happen; it appears that New Zealand requires the state to allow its citizens and private organisations the right to form any belief they like, impart it and act on it.

    The reason you are momentarily lulled into this false sense of reality is because you have not factored in the Human Rights Act. Remember earlier when I said the Bill of Rights is subject to other laws? Let’s take a look at section 22, I have highlighted the key bits to take note of in italics:

    22. Employment
    (1) Where an applicant for employment or an employee is qualified for work of any description, it shall be unlawful for an employer, or any person acting or purporting to act on behalf of an employer,—

    (a) To refuse or omit to employ the applicant on work of that description which is available; or

    (b) To offer or afford the applicant or the employee less favourable terms of employment, conditions of work, superannuation or other fringe benefits, and opportunities for training, promotion, and transfer than are made available to applicants or employees of the same or substantially similar capabilities employed in the same or substantially similar circumstances on work of that description; or

    (c) To terminate the employment of the employee, or subject the employee to any detriment, in circumstances in which the employment of other employees employed on work of that description would not be terminated, or in which other employees employed on work of that description would not be subjected to such detriment; or

    (d) To retire the employee, or to require or cause the employee to retire or resign,—

    by reason of any of the prohibited grounds of discrimination.

    Let’s take a look at the “prohibited grounds of discrimination” shall we? The definitions section states “prohibited ground of discrimination has the meaning given to it by section 21″. Section 21 is long so I have only included the relevant bits for our purposes,

    21 Prohibited grounds of discrimination

    (1) For the purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are—

    (m) Sexual orientation, which means a heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation.

    So there you have it, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression and the manifestation of those beliefs are trumped by the Human Rights Act (and the Education Act which permits private schools to educate and manage themselves along the lines of the special character of the school).

    Joel is right, New Zealand’s commitment to liberty and equality is lacking as is respect for freedom of religion.

  • Epistemology 101: Clash of Authorities Part III

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    In my first post, Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I, I set out some basics about epistemology. In Part II I looked at testimony and authority. Now I will turn to my final point, what about the clash of traditions or authorities, what should we believe then?

    Here is a fairly obvious example, suppose I am not a biologist but I hear it on authority that the scientific consensus is that evolutionary theory is the correct account of human origins. In the absence of any defeaters for this, such as the absence of compelling reasons for thinking that the biological sciences are unreliable in this area or some compelling disproof of evolution, I should accept this claim. One the other hand, I read the Bible and it looks like it states that the world was created by God in six 24-hour days and that humans and animals were created on separate days. I examine the subsequent genealogies and I discover that when added up these entail that the world is only a few thousand years old. If I accept the Bible as authoritative and as the word of God, then I have a reason for thinking that evolution is false. What should I do?

    I am using this case as a vivid example because it is such an obvious one in an evangelical setting, particularly one like this full of scientists who will have experienced the tension first hand. I want to look at two approaches that I think are mistaken. The first is exemplified by a well meaning school board member I encountered a few years ago. I was applying for a job as a curriculum developer at a Christian school. I was asked if I would teach that Genesis was true. I responded by saying that at the senior level, students should learn about the debate over how Genesis should be interpreted. They should be encouraged to ask whether it literally teaches that the world was created in six 24-hour days or whether, as some scholars believe, the days are a kind of literary device drawing out the relationship between human and divine work. The board member responded in horror,  he said “are you saying God might be wrong?” I did not get the job.

    There was some wisdom in the board member’s response. If God teaches something then it is true and what God says trumps all human opinion, including scientific opinion. The problem is that I was not questioning what God said, I was questioning an interpretation of Genesis which was the basis of the board member’s conclusions about what God said. God does not make mistakes but human interpreters do.

    Throughout history brilliant Christian theologians have disagreed as to how to interpret scripture and also which theological perspectives are correct. The fact that they disagree means that they cannot all be correct. Our theologising then is fallible and it is not given that we are always correct. It is mistaken then to assume that when the scientific consensus clashes with our theology it is always wrong and our theology is always correct.

    In a room full of scientists this is probably uncontroversial but I want to also reject an equally erroneous view. This is the view that whenever scientific consensus clashes with a theological position, the theological position is always incorrect. Often this view is based on mistaken views on history. In the 19th century an interpretation of Church history known as the conflict thesis emerged. This position taught that religion and science had been locked in conflict throughout their history and that science had flourished only by fighting off the shackles of the church, which had consistently suppressed its ideas. The picture was of a Church constantly losing ground to science. This view of the history of science has been rejected by most historians today but its legacy lingers on.

    In fact the history of science and religion is quite different. There were few conflicts of the sort this thesis puts forward and when they did occur issues were not as simple as science being right and theology wrong. In fact, in some cases the opposite was been true. The fact is that scientific consensus can be and has been, in the past, mistaken. Only a few decades ago the steady state theory of cosmology was widely accepted and it was believed the universe had no beginning, a thesis in direct contradiction to the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. Today, theology now appears to have been correct. In the 12th century a similar clash occurred between aristotlean science and that of the Church. The church was proven correct. There are other examples, such as denials that people groups such as the Hittites ever existed and claims people could not write at the time of Moses.

    Further, scientific consensuses changes over time. Alvin Plantinga notes,

    According to Bryan Appleyard, “At Harvard University in the 1880’s John Trowbridge, head of the physics department, was telling his students that it was not worthwhile to major in physics, since all the very important discoveries in the subject had now been made. All that remained was a routine tidying up of loose ends, hardly a heroic task worthy of a Harvard graduate.”4 Twenty years later the same opinion seemed dominant: for example, in 1902 Albert Michelson, of Michelson-Morley fame declared that “the most important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered and these are now so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplanted on consequences of new discoveries is remote.”5 And of course we all know of the scientific theories that once enjoyed consensus but are now discarded: caloric theories of heat, effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism, theories involving the existence of phlogiston, vital forces in physiology, theories of spontaneous generation of life, the luminiferous ether, and so on.[1]

    Scientific consensuses then can and have been mistaken. In addition to this there is an important insight in the comment of the school board member who cost me employment. Given the fallibility of humans, even as a group, if God says something and the scientific community says something else then we have good reasons for thinking the scientific community is wrong and hence we do have a viable defeater for the testimony we have heard. God, understood as a all knowing, all powerful, perfectly good being, certainly is not mistaken and it is not as if he needs some scientists to enlighten him or correct his teaching.

    I think the correct response is to allow science and theology to mutually correct each other. Take the case of evolution and the Bible. One needs to ask just how likely is it, given the evidence, that evolution occurred? One also needs to ask just how likely is it that the interpretation of Genesis underlying creationism is correct? If it is more likely that a literal interpretation of Genesis is true than it is that evolution is true then we should reject evolution despite the consensus in favour of it. On the other hand, if there are reasons for thinking our interpretation of Genesis is mistaken and that the evidence for evolution is overwhelming then we should conclude that God is not teaching us that the world is only a few thousand years old.

    My own view is that there are good reasons for rejecting a literal interpretation drawn from what we have learned about ancient near-eastern texts from the same period. Evidence suggests that ancient genealogies did not function the way the literalist picture suggests and that much of early Genesis is a polemic against ancient near-eastern mythology rather than sober history. But my views are beside the point main point.

    My point is that I think as Christians we need to say that both science and theology are valid ways of knowing and that human theorising in both fields are fallible.

    There is a view in our culture which denies this, this is a view called scientism which claims, following Bertrand Russell, that whatever is knowable is knowable by the methods of science and what science does not tell us is not knowable. This is, however, a philosophical and theological view that rejects the existence of revelation. If we accept that God has spoken to humanity then we should not assume that God has not said something that is the basis for a legitimate critique of scientific claims or culture and if he has then we should not cower from offering such a critique despite the fact that the scientific community thinks otherwise. At the same time we should not embrace the kind of naiive theologising that reads the bible in English, ignores the fact that God’s word was mediated through human texts in different languages which essentially boils down to “God said it, that settles it” type thinking. Both approaches should be repudiated.

    Let me make a final comment in this area. If we are to gain an accurate picture of the world then we need to take into account all information we know that is relevant to the question. If we bracket some information which is relevant then the picture we will only be probable on “part of the evidence” and may not be probable when everything else is factored in. If one accepts that science is the only way of knowing this does not matter much. Nor does it matter much if we think that all that is at issue is what we find in the scriptures. But if we accept, as I think we should, that both are valid sources of information then theologians and scientists needs to take others insights into account. There might be areas of reality in which both make claims. If scientists proceed ignoring information from theology that is relevant to what they study and theologians ignore what scientists are saying when it is relevant to the issue both will end up with a distorted view.

    I think this picture applies to the issue of climate change. We have scientific claims about anthropogenic global warming being affirmed and contradicted in the media, in the pulpit, on talk-back radio, in the blogosphere and so on. Those of us who are not climatologists rely on testimony and we need to start being critical about whether much of what we hear is subject to defeaters. Similarly, the issue has moved beyond science into areas of ethics, public policy, laws and even pictures of eschatology. In these areas scientists are not experts and questions of theology and ethics, among other things, come into play and we need to have a method for negotiating this.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 785.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II