Category: Bloggers

  • (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum

    Given that yesterday we advertised Dr Glenn Peoples’ upcoming public lectures and because the smacking referendum begins on Saturday, I thought we’d share this article critiquing bad anti-smacking reasoning by Glenn.



    (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum


    smackingIan Harris tells us (“Honest to God,” Dominion Post, [Dominion Post. Saturday July 11, 2009. Page B5], reproduced at the YesVote website) that we should reject the “harsh views” on child rearing found in the Bible.

    Mr Harris, unfortunately, joins many of those who promote the criminalisation of good parents by muddying the waters. He notes, for example, that someone who defends the right to use physical discipline also believes that children (like adults) are sinners. He then announces that since “progressive” Christians (by which he seems to mean those who no longer accept Christian theology) realise that this is based on an antiquated view, we should likewise reject the right to use physical discipline and we should criminalise those who do.

    It is difficult to interact charitably with those who support the ban on smacking if this is the contorted way they are going to reason about the subject. Whether or not one thinks the theology held by some supporters of the right to use physical discipline is correct is quite a different matter from whether or not one thinks they ought to be made into criminals, surely!

    Unfortunately again, Mr Harris attempts to use his platform as a mouthpiece of liberal (what he calls “progressive) Christianity to give credence to scientific claims that are obviously subject to great dispute. He makes the sweeping claim that this nebulous thing called “modern research” (while he cites no actual studies) shows that although corporal punishment does help bring about short-term compliance, it does not help a child to “internalise positive values for the longer term.”

    I am constantly bemused by the way in which conservative religious spokespeople are ridiculed even when they do cite research, but obvious nonsense like this can be peddled by the liberal voices without so much as a single scholarly citation, and nobody is expected to bat an eyelid.

    But even if what Mr Harris says is correct, the implication is that corporal punishment in and of itself has short term benefits and no long term ill effects. Hardly something to be prosecuting people for! The reality is that the effects he cites are perfectly compatible with the good of corporal punishment. Such punishment usually is administered to children when they are not willing to reason or reflect on the long term consequences of their actions. It is for when children are being unruly and unwilling to listen. Circumstances in which they are willing to do so are the circumstances under which corporal punishment is less necessary (meaning that the older a child becomes, the less frequent a smack will become). None of this gives the careful reader any reason to think that the occasional smack is immoral, much less worthy of criminal prosecution.

    Bereft of compelling moral or scientifically grounded arguments, Mr Harris turns instead to arousing prejudice against the religious convictions of those who disagree with him about child discipline. Unable to find anything strong enough in what all Christians consider their holy book, he reaches into the book of Ecclesiasticus (part of the so-called “apocryphal” writings that did not make up part of the Hebrew canon) to find the claim that “he who loves his son will whip him often.”

    But not only has Mr Harris strayed into literature that the so-called “fundamentalists” (most of whom would identify as conservative Protestants) that he attacks do not even regard to be part of the Bible at all, he has clearly sought out the most extreme translation of the verse that he can find. He conjures up grizzly pictures of leering parents towering, horsewhip in hand, over the broken and bleeding bodies of little children with misleading language like this.

    But just a few minutes research would dispel this attempt. The New American translation reads, “He who loves his son chastises him often.” The Douay Rheims translation (the Catholic Bible, which does include this book as part of the canon) reads “He that loveth his son, frequently chastiseth him.” The old King James version, the one that “fundamentalists” are most likely to read if the read this book at all, reads “He that loveth his son causeth him oft to feel the rod.” Of course, because it’s a metaphor for physical discipline that’s probably still too much for Mr Harris, but needless to say, it robs him of his “whipping” bogeyman.

    After the rhetorical debris is stripped away, all that’s really left is a string of namecalling and fearful language. He calls the views of his opponents “repugnant.” He calls them “fundamentalists” with “antiquated” views that are opposed to “progressive” thought. But where’s the actual substance? Like much of the rhetorical fireworks that is being leveled at those who want the law changed to a common sense view that refuses to place thousands of good parents in the criminal category, Ian Harris offers more heat than light, and manifests just the sort of shallowness and bias that this debate could do without.

    RELATED POSTS:

  • No Defences Permitted for the Accused

    In, The referendum campaign is underway, No Right Turn’s Idiot/Savant gives an excellent example of an argument we see coming up a lot in the debate around the upcoming referendum on smacking. In addition to trotting out the standard ad hominem, that everyone who supports the reinstatement of the old section 59 of the Crimes Act is a “child-beater,” I’d like to examine the emphasised part:

    Over the next month I expect to see a succession of unhinged press releases from the child-beaters claiming that the law somehow impinges on their religious freedom or has caused the widespread persecution of parents. It does nothing of the sort. What it has done is prevent parents who punch their children in the face or beat them with a soup ladle from claiming a defence of “reasonable force”. And that is unequivocally a Good Thing. The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way – and we should treat them with the contempt they deserve.

    Essentially Idiot/Savant here claims the parent in his example are guilty, apriori, and as such, when they go to trial, they should not be able to attempt to raise a defence. The problem is that the whole point of having a trial is to determine guilt or innocence. Even when it seems pretty obvious, trials are still necessary and the right to due process still applies. This right to due process includes, alongside the presumption of innocence, a right to raise a defence, no matter how stupid or implausible, and have the court assess it. The importance of this concept can be summed up by Blackstone’s Ratio, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”[1]

    Supporters of the anti-smacking law do not seem to get this. This ‘claiming a defence’ issue has been raised a lot ever since Sue Bradford first began promoting her bill to remove the old s59 defence, of reasonable force for the purposes of correction, from the Crimes Act. If you read the Vote Yes site, if you read the media releases and the articles and listen to the interviews you will hear it a lot.

    Of course what Idiot/Savant, Bradford, the Vote Yes people, et al miss is that there is a world of difference between claiming a defence and succeeding in doing so. The court is not stupid and the people making the determinations of guilt or innocence in our courts are normal, everyday people. If it is so obvious to all of us that hitting a child across the face with a soup ladle is child abuse, and it is obvious to all of us, a court, made up of people like us, is not going to rule that such an action is an example of reasonable force.

    The 34 reported cases on the old s59 are readily available in any law library and if you read them, instead of the media reports and politicians and websites and blogs, you will see time and time and time again child abusers failing in their attempts to raise the defence of reasonable force. The majority resulted in convictions and the few that did not were more often than not due to things like it not being proven who abused the child – which is terribly sad for the child, but you can’t just convict anyone so that you can chalk up a conviction! Wrongly decided cases are a fact of life. Just like doctors making mistakes on the operating table, just like us making driving errors. We should try very hard to ensure that these do not happen but to remove a defence entirely and risk the prosecution of the innocent is not the answer. Besides, some of the cases cited in the media as being wrongly decided were not even cases where s59 was raised, other defences like self-defences were in play… shall we remove self-defence as defence?

    The contempt for due process does not stop here; statements like Idiot/Savants that, “The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way,” show that he is willing to accuse anyone of being a supporter of child abuse because they support the right of an accused to a fair trial.

    Chilling. Basically once accused of something heinous, one should not be allowed to defend oneself and anyone who disagrees is morally on par with a child abuser.

    There is another patently obvious flaw in Idiot/Savant’s argument; removing the defence doesn’t just prevent people who seriously abuse children from raising the defence it also prevents the wrongly accused from being able to raise it. However, without defences there is no way of separating the two. I am not speaking here of those who can stand up in court and honestly state ‘I did not touch my child,’ such accused could plead ‘not guilty,’ I am speaking of those who end up in court for smacking their children, not hitting them with soup ladles across the face; I am speaking of those who with an open hand, lightly, smack a child on the bottom once, not out of anger or in the midst of rage but in response to disobedience on the part of child. Such people cannot plead not guilty if accused of assault, they have no legal defence if they end up before a court. To remove legal defences from people innocent of child abuse to ensure that the net catches everyone is wrong.

    Hat Tip: HalfDone

    [1] William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1760).

  • Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument

    Augustine writes,

    And therefore the following question may be very carefully inquired into and discussed by learned men, though I do not know whether it is in man’s power to resolve it: At what time the infant begins to live in the womb: whether life exists in a latent form before it manifests itself in the motions of the living being.
    Augustine of Hippo, The Enchiridion, 85.

    I think Augustine’s comments ring true today. Like Augustine I believe there is good reason for thinking a fetus (a formed conceptus) is a human being and like Augustine I oppose destroying the conceptus at any stage in pregnancy. I am also inclined to agree with Augustine that prior to formation, the best stance to adopt is agnosticism if we do not know when the human being begins to exist; I have argued for this elsewhere.

    Madeleine asked Alexander Pruss to either help her understand or overcome an argument advanced by Don Marquis that had given rise to my agnosticism regarding the point at which a human being comes into existence (human being is defined as an organism, the killing of which constitutes homicide).

    My agnosticism is based on three things. The first is that I know of no reason for thinking an embryo is a human being at the time of conception. The second is that two arguments against this conclusion lead me to wonder if we can know this. The first is the twinning argument. The second is Don Marquis recent track-forward argument.

    Pruss, in his post, only addresses the twinning argument. Having read Pruss’s argument I think that he and I are in fundamental agreement; moreover, I think he provides reasons for accepting an agnostic position, at least with regard to identical twins.

    First, a brief summary of the twinning argument is necessary to give my readers some clarity as to what we are talking about.

    Prior to the time when an embryo receives a primitive streak, the group of cells which indicate the basic body plan of the embryo, an embryo can twin. Occasionally monozygotic twinning occurs and a single embryo splits to form two or more separate embryos. Many Theologians and Philosophers have argued that this fact provides strong evidence that human beings do not come into existence prior to 14 days post conception.

    The argument goes as follows. Suppose a human being comes into existence at conception, let’s call this embryo Bob. Bob symmetrically splits into two forming two embryos, embryo A and embryo B. The question arises, what happened to Bob?

    There are only four possibilities.

    (a) Bob ceased to exist and two new individual human beings come into existence at twinning;
    (b) Bob continued as embryo A and embryo B came into existence at twinning;
    (c) Bob continues as embryo B and embryo A came into existence at twinning;
    (d) Bob is identical with both embryo A and embryo B.

    The objector argues that each of these options is acceptable.

    Pruss gives two main responses to this argument. The first is to deny that all of the options (a) (b) (c) and (d) are all unacceptable. The second is to call into question whether symmetric twinning actually occurs.

    Are (a) (b) (c) and (d) all Unacceptable Options?
    Pruss does not argue for the acceptability of (d) and for good reason, (d) leads to a straightforward contradiction due to the transitivity of identity. According to the transitivity of identity, if an object x is identical to another object y and y is identical to x then x is identical z.

    In (d) embryo A is identical with Bob, Bob is also identical with embryo B, hence by transitivity of identity, Embryo A should be the same organism as embryo B but clearly is not; as I noted, two separate embryos came into existence at twinning and two separate organisms cannot be the same organism.

    As I stated, Pruss does not address this but he does defends the possibility of (a) (b) and (c).

    Let’s turn first to (a); Pruss here suggests that this option is “not absurd” and gives an example of an amoeba; Pruss notes that when an amoeba splits into two we normally think the original one is destroyed and two new ones come into existence. So when the conceptus twins, the original one is destroyed and two new organisms come into existence.

    Jeff McMahan and Peter Singer have offered a response to this line of argument. McMahan suggests adopting (a) “is an embarrassment” for anyone who opposes abortion on the grounds that life begins at conception because they are committed to the claim that “it’s a terrible loss when one of us dies in utero;” hence, anyone who thinks hominisation (the coming into existence of a human being) occurs at conception is committed to viewing monozygotic twinning as bad and as tragic as the death of a newborn infant due to the demise of the original conceptus.

    Now I am not convinced by this line of reasoning entirely; if a newborn split into two and two new, genetically identical, infants were formed, it is not clear to me that we would consider this occurrence tragic, our attitudes to infants notwithstanding.

    Similarly, with Pruss’ brain splitting example, I don’t think that if we conducted a brain splitting operation on a human being and placed the two hemispheres of the brain into two genetically identical bodies we would not consider this to be on par with homicide, despite the fact that we admit that an adult human is human.

    Now, if cases like this happened we would be genuinely perplexed as these cases are extremely strange and bizarre, if they could happen we would end up with two beings that do not differ, either psychologically or physiologically, from the being of origin. So I agree with Pruss that this situation is possible and is not clearly or obviously unacceptable.

    However, I find it interesting that while Pruss defends this option as acceptable he backs away from endorsing it; he states that “if x in fact is going to symmetrically split in the near future, then maybe x is not identical with any far-future entity”[Emphasis added] he then refers the reader to his discussion of the other two cases. I think he is correct to do this; to show that an option is not false is not to show there are any reasons for thinking it is true.

    Turning now to (b) and (c); the standard argument against adopting either claim is that to do so is arbitrary, one cannot provide any reason for identifying Bob with embryo A that is not also a reason for identifying Bob with embryo B. Pruss response is to argue

    There might be some law specifying which of y and z gets x‘s soul, either in terms of some minor asymmetry (nobody thinks the asymmetry is total, with each half having the exact same number of molecules, in exactly the same positions) or stochastically (maybe it’s random where the soul goes), with the other output entity getting a new soul. Or it might be that God decides where x‘s soul goes.

    Now on the face of it this does not appear to address the objection; the objector argues that one can never be rational in affirming that (b) is the case without also affirming (c). Pruss provides no reason for saying you can. His position is simply that either option remains possible.

    I think something important can be ascertained from Pruss’ objection here and that is that the objector does not show; that either (b) or (c) are false. At best one can only show that that we cannot affirm either option nor can we deny either option has occurred. What the objector tells us here is that we cannot know at this stage.

    It we look at Pruss’ response then it seems what he tells us is that when we ask the question regarding a set of monozygotic twins, did they come into existence at conception? we do not know. It is possible they did not both come into existence when twinning occurred and it is possible that one of the two began at conception though we do not know whether this is the case and even if we did, we don’t know which one of the two was prior.

    Does Symmetric Twinning Occur?
    Similar conclusions apply to the other main argument Pruss provides against the twinning argument. He writes,

    last time I checked, we did not actually know that embryonic splitting is in fact symmetric. If it turns out that embryonic splitting proceeds by budding, the argument falls flat. Thus, the argument rests on an empirical hypothesis which is merely speculative. This is a problem: obviously, if the case for the lack of a right to life on the part of some organism is based on a merely speculative hypothesis, we should treat the organism as if it had a right to life until that speculative hypothesis is checked.

    Here Pruss argues that we do not know whether symmetrical twinning actually occurs and he argues that in the absence of any reason for denying that an embryo is human we should treat it as though it is. Now I don’t deny the first premise, all it does is again point out that when we are dealing with monozgotic twins, we do not know whether either or both came into existence at conception, as we do not know whether twinning is symmetric, where the above puzzles arise, or asymmetric, whereas Pruss argues they do not.

    Pruss goes on to argue that when we don’t know we should treat the embryo as though it has a right to life. While I do not endorse this claim as it is phrased, I argued for a similar claim in my post; I argued that in cases where we do not know if an embryo is a human being it would be reckless and hence, gravely wrong to kill it because it might be.

    So in conclusion, I think that the twinning argument should give us pause about claiming that human beings come into existence at conception. We do not know whether twinning is symmetric or asymmetric. If it is the latter, we do not know whether anyone who is a monozygotic twin came into existence or conception or not. Either option is a possibility but we do not have the information to know which is option is correct.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction

  • Credits and Media Tactics

    I just had a quick look at KiwiBlog and noted David’s piece on the media not properly crediting stories broken by bloggers. This has happened to us on occaision, the Labour Moron sign springs to mind (which, since he put his head above the parapet, David himself failed to hat tip us properly on – it was our image that was published everywhere) and Matt’s piece that referred to Victoria University’s marketing strategy also made the news and was only properly credited back to us by one outlet.

    Anyway, I thought of another recent occurance; we were recently asked to break a story by a fairly major news outlet in the US (it checked out, it was not a hoax). For some reason they wanted to be able to refer to a blog reporting it and they chose us. It was on a topic that we know very little about and would have required a lot of research to get right so we passed as we were too flat out – interesting, none the less, that a media outlet would take that strategy.

  • What Lefties do to Christmas

    Currently we have Say Hello to my Little Friend‘s Glenn (plus wife and kids) staying with us which is very cool because we are all old friends. They normally live in the south island so catching up since we left has been rare.

    Anyway, Glenn does a lot of podcast’s on his blog and he did a very cool one on what politically correct leftyness might do to Christmas, which he played for us last night – complete with funny voices and background sound and music effects (all done by Glenn). It is quite a departure from his usual, philosophical podcast fare but none the less it is very funny.

    It is available on his blog here (as I have no idea how to insert a podcast into blogger). Glenn does link to a script of what is basically on his podcast but reading it is nowhere near as funny so if you are able to play the podcast, don’t spoil it, just play the podcast and enjoy!

  • Moral Issues and Direct Democracy

    I have been involved in a discussion over at MacDoctor Moments on various aspects of the abortion debate, though in this post I don’t want to talk about that issue. In the course of this discussion Chuck advocated for a policy of direct democracy to decide moral issues and it is this that I want to explore.

    Before addressing direct democracy I want to look at the term “moral issue.” Which issues are moral issues and which are not? What do people mean when they say this? Every piece of legislation is a moral issue to some extent. When legislators pass laws they have the power to restrict people’s freedoms or impose obligations and they have the state to back up these expectations with force for non-compliance. The question as to whether or not they should pass such laws is always a moral one because prima facie it is wrong to coerce others by force. Of course there may be instances were the state is justified in making a particular legislative move but to say that the state is justified is to make a moral claim.

    Those who refer to some issues as moral ones and others not, tacitly assume that unless one is talking about sex or something typically associated with moral conservatism the legislation the state passes is not moral. This is a very truncated view of what a person’s moral obligations are.

    Parliament has a standing practice of not using whips and allowing conscience votes on matters of “moral legislation.” There is something almost machiavellian about this because it suggests that governing is an a-moral exercise; that on most issues either an MP’s conscience has nothing to say or that an MP has no duty to do what is right but is rather obligatied to follow their peers. Proof positive that MP’s have a lot in common with teenagers.

    The arbitrary nature of this distinction can be seen in Chuck’s examples, he cites the “anti-smacking bill” and “abortion” as moral issues. However, why is smacking a moral issue and assault not? Why is abortion a moral issue and not homicide (or appendectomies if you are pro-abortion)?

    Consider taxation, surely one of the most fundamental issues of government. How is taxation not a moral issue? It involves appropriating other people’s property, oft obtained by hours and hours of work, by force. Moreover, taxation is often used to support the poor. Surely the method and means of supporting the poor is a moral question.

    Chucks reasoning in advocating for direct democracy involves a conflation between what is popular and what is just.

    I think it is outrageous that any militant group can force legislation that is opposed by 80% of the people whether it is to do with smacking or abortion.
    …
    If we had direct democracy on moral issues instead of allowing these issues to be determined by fanatical pressure groups we would have better law.

    …

    If they [MP’s] had a conscience they would support direct democracy and not be so arrogant.

    Note the assumption that if the majority support something then it is unjust for any government to pass a law contrary to it. This is clearly false. If the majority supported looting Asian stores on Thursdays the legislature would have an obligation to refuse to legalise this. The government owes a duty to protect the property and liberty of Asian store owners, even if they are a minority, even if the majority demand it. However, Chuck says that it is arrogant for people to suggest that the majority might be wrong.

    Now Chuck may seem like a colourful example who takes the whole concept slightly further than most but I think he is a good example of the inherent flaws in the binding referendum movement and his reasoning follows from their basic line of argument. Those who support binding referenda believe that if 51% of the population vote for something then the state is obligated to pass that directive into law. Further, the fact they want it binding is evidence that they think that any legislator who does not do what the majority wants is arrogant and above the people, they just don’t phrase it like Chuck but the assumption remains.

    However, the whole point of having a legislature is to ensure that justice prevails, not popularity or mob rule. The state has an obligation to protect the rights of all citizens, even unpopular minorities.

    Democracy has its problems but it remains the best option. As Wolff argued in his adaptation of Plato’s Republic (Plato was much more familiar with direct democracy than any of us are) if you had a medical problem you would consult someone with a degree of expertise in medicine, a doctor; you would not organise a vote on what the public think the appropriate diagnosis is. Likewise, why should those without a degree of expertise, the general populace, vote on matters of state when they are as ill informed about them as they are about medicine?

    Of course power corrupts and anyone in a position of power must be subject to checks and balances. The doctor has to answer to the medical council and is ultimately answerable to the Minister of Health. In the same way the MP has to answer to the public and the public has the power to vote them out of office. However, one must be careful to not confuse the right to participate in choosing who will govern with a right to choose which specific acts of government will be passed.