Tag: Glenn Peoples

  • Advance: Exploring Tough Questions About Christianity

    This blog’s Matthew Flannagan is scheduled to speak alongside Dr Glenn Peoples, Dr Chris Tucker, Sean du Toit and Jacqui Lloyd at this Friday’s one day Auckland conference Advance: Exploring Tough Questions About Christianity.

    Advance: Exploring Tough Questions About Christianity

    From the promotional material:

    Are faith and reason enemies? Should we take Christianity seriously in the world of ideas? Can we even know that Christianity is true? Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union are proud to host Christian philosopher, blogger, and popular speaker Dr Glenn Peoples to explore these questions and examine the evidence.

    Workshops sessions available:

      • Dr Chris Tucker on the ‘problem of evil’
      • Shawn Means on maths, the universe, and God
      • Sean du Toit on who wrote the books of the New Testament
      • Dr Matthew Flannagan on reading difficult Old Testament passages

    The day will conclude with a panel featuring Dr Glenn Peoples, Dr Matthew Flannagan, and Jacqui Lloyd which is open to any question.

    The location is ‘GAPS’ 17A Powell St, Avondale – slightly out of the city (and a 10 min walk from Avondale train station), this rustic location is ideal for seminars and discussion.

    Cost: $15. Lunch is included.

    Register at the Facebook event page here.

  • Philosophia Christi: Abstract Objects and Divine Command Ethics Down-Under

    In December we were told that Matt’s article “Tooley, Plantinga and the Deontological Problem of Evil”  had passed peer review and would be published in Philosophia Christi.  Issue, 13: 2  is  now out and if you look at the contents page you’ll see Matt’s article has now been published.

    The abstract to Matt’s article is as follows:

    Philosophia ChristiThis article criticises the deontological argument from evil proposed by Michael Tooley  in The Knowledge of God. I sketch Tooley’s distinction between deontological and axiological arguments from evil. Tooley rejects the axiological version because it rests  on “controversial ethical claims”, claims that are “likely to be rejected by many theists” and formulates a deontological version in its place. I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s criticism of the moral premises of this argument can be reformulated by appealing to a divine command theory of ethics. So reformulated, I argue that Tooley’s argument relies on controversial moral assumptions that many theists reject. I defend this response against potential criticisms found in the writings of Linda Zagzebski,  Tooley’s debate with William Lane Craig, and Peter Van Inwagen.

    Much of the focus of this issue is the topic of God and Abstract Objects. However, fortuitously, our good friend and fellow Kiwi, Glenn Peoples from Say Hello to My Little Friend,  has also been published in the same issue of Philosophia Christi immediately after Matt. His abstract is below:

    Of the objections to divine command ethics that still circulate in the literature, the epistemological objection is one of the two most common (the other being the objection from abhorrent commands). If morality is based on divine commands, the objection goes, then those who do not believe in God cannot know what is right or wrong. In this paper I explain the way in which this objection has been answered in the past (especially by Philip Quinn and Robert Adams) and I then look at a new attempt by Wes Morriston to resurrect and re-state the epistemological objection.  I explain the way in which this objection succumbs to responses that have already been made in the literature and is not new at all in spite of appearances, and I explain how it misconstrues the social nature of obligation in Robert Adams’ account of divine commands. In giving this explanation I flesh out the potentially difficult notion of a “sign” as an epistemic indicator of moral duty, and I argue that all the epistemological objections to divine command ethics this far fail because they have an underdeveloped concept of a “sign” as a central component of a command.

    Perhaps the theme for this issue should have been God, Abstract Objects and Divine Command ethics Down Under?

  • A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? on Video

    Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event at the University of Auckland for Jesus Week entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was essentially a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law on the topic of Religion in Public Life. It featured Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples – Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan – Legal Scholar and was moderated Patt Brittenden. If you missed it you can now watch it on video.

    httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfnCKFs9DWk&list=PLEB96E8226DC6BA8C&feature=plpp

    Each speaker has published the speeches they wrote for this event:

    Hat tip (and credit for filming and editing this video): Stuart at Thinking Matters.

  • A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? Part II Glenn Peoples – Philosophy

    A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples – Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan – Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

    Glenn Peoples – Philosophy

    Often the subject of religion and politics is alluded to by way of references to terrorism, vigilantism, totalitarianism and persecution, as though these are the only alternative to a public square stripped of religious conviction altogether. This is about as helpful and honest as the automatic association of secularism with the purges of Stalin. The truth is that the flourishing debate in the Western world over the legitimate role of religious convictions in our public decision making is set within the broad liberal democratic tradition. Within that tradition, taking for granted things like freedom of religion, freedom of speech, clear institutional separation of church and state, freedom of association and so on, we’ve seen that it is clearly possible to hold a variety of views on the proper place of religious belief in politics, policy, public lobbying, your own voting and so on. Of course, there are plenty of religious people in the world and in history who do not cherish liberty and mutual respect (as there are and have been non-religious people who do not cherish these things), but you and I do.

    Our popular level discussion here in New Zealand over the proper role of religion in a free society – in the media, in letters to the editor, on talkback radio, in religious speeches, could have been greatly benefited by an exposure to the way that this issue has been dealt with in philosophy, specifically in political philosophy, in ethics and philosophy of religion, which are the areas that really interest me. In particular the following issues need to be seen as central: What is the specific concern that justifies people in identifying religious convictions as an area of worry over and above other convictions? Are these concerns applied consistently and fairly when not thinking in terms of religious convictions? Are they the right concerns to have about public life generally? Secondly, should these concerns really cause us to reconsider the role of religious convictions at all? If so, then how?

    Why is religion singled out?

    Conflict and Polarisation
    Why is there an issue centred specifically around religion in the public square? We don’t hear much, if anything, about the worry of acting on our political beliefs or (usually) our ethical convictions or our scientific findings – at least not because they are political beliefs, ethical convictions scientific findings, yet there is a concern about religious beliefs in the public square, and that concern exists because the beliefs in question are religious. What makes religion special?

    Perhaps the more popular reason that people might have for wanting to see religion take a back seat when it comes to public reason is that, in their view, religious beliefs unleashed in public are dangerous in certain ways. American philosopher Robert Audi is not alone in voicing the concern that “religious disagreements are likely to polarize government” leading to irresolvable disputes and political stand-offs.[1] In order to avoid strong polarisation and the associated mischiefs that come with it (lack of co-operation, social unease and mutual suspicion, perhaps even rioting and acts of violence or terrorism as in Northern Ireland), let us keep our religious beliefs well away from our political reason.

    Matt has already said a thing or two about this, so I’ll just be brief. Is this fair? For starters, is it really true that as soon as we allow people to lobby, vote or even legislate in certain ways because of their religious convictions, we will witness intractable political stand-offs and social disorder? Not at all. We can easily imagine scenarios in which one person or group lobbies for a given policy because their religious convictions motivate them to do so, and another person or group lobbies for exactly the same policy with quite different motives. I think, for example, of the government’s role in marriage. I know of religious people who maintain that the state has no role in formalising marriage since this is, in brief, “God’s business” that the government should frankly stay out of as a matter of the purity of marriage as a holy institution. I also know of libertarians committed to the doctrine of self-ownership and the priority of personal liberty who also think, without any reference to God, that marriage properly belongs entirely to the private realm. So it can’t be the case that endorsing policies because of one’s religious convictions will inevitably or always lead to social or political polarisation and conflict.

    That said, it’s true that different religious convictions (more…)

  • A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? Part I Matthew Flannagan – Theology

    A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? A few weeks ago, as part of Jesus Week at the University of Auckland, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union hosted an event entitled A Godless Public Square: Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life? This event was a conversation between Theology, Philosophy and Law and featured Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theologian, Glenn Peoples – Philosopher and Madeleine Flannagan – Legal Scholar. The video is still being edited and will be available soon but for now, this 3-part series comprises the written speeches of each speaker.

    Matthew Flannagan – Analytic Theology

    Recently, many Christian ethicists have defended the central place of God’s commands in Theological ethics. In this talk I want to discuss one important objection to appeals to God’s commands; this is the claim that, while it is perfectly appropriate for believers to appeal to purported divine commands when regulating their private conduct or the conduct of voluntary religious communities who believe in such commands, it is morally wrong to appeal to theological beliefs of this sort in any discussion of social ethics. When doing Ethics as a public enterprise i.e. engaging in debates over social policy or offering criticism of cultural and social practices, Christian Ethicists are morally bound to only appeal to secular considerations. I will argue that this position, though widely accepted inside and outside of the church, is mistaken.

    The Objection
    So what is the problem with appealing to divine commands in social ethics? Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

    Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

    It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.The problem is nicely summarised by Stephen Carter Christian theological convictions ought to impact the whole of life both in the private and public spheres; this is what is meant by the idea of an “undivided life”, where Jesus is Lord of all aspects of our lives.

    Yet this consequence of Christian faith conflicts with a pervasive contemporary attitude: the view that that religion is fundamentally a private matter. It is accepted that a Christian is free to utilise theological convictions when they make decisions about their own life but in a pluralistic society it is increasingly deemed inappropriate to bring such convictions into public discussions about morality, law, politics, economics, education, scholarship and so on. The desire to influence society with Christian ideals or to convert others to the faith is viewed by many as an intolerant desire to impose one’s private views onto others.

    It is widely accepted that theological convictions can govern churches and the private lives of believers yet we are told that the public square – government, public policy, the courts, the academy, education, business, arts, media, etc – should be secular only.

    This event looks at this issue. The conversation will span Theology, Philosophy and Law led by a panel made up of Christian representatives from each discipline along with you the audience:

    “One good way to end a conversation – or start an argument – is to tell a group of well educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a controversial one such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by your understanding of God’s will. In the unlikely event that anyone hangs around to talk with you about it, chances are that you will be challenged on the ground that you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people. And in contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse.”[1]

    Carter cites the objection that appealing to God’s commands in public moral debate involves imposing one’s religious beliefs onto other people, and points out that such impositions are morally wrong. Note that the objection is not that such divine commands do not exist or that it is irrational to believe that they do. The objection is a specifically moral one. It is morally wrong to appeal to such beliefs; doing so violates a moral obligation people have to not impose their religious beliefs onto others. Something like this moral objection is widely held, both inside and outside the church. In response to this I will make four points. (more…)

  • This Wednesday @ Auckland Uni: A Godless Public Square – Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A common slogan in western liberal societies is that religion is a private matter; it has no place in public discussions of law, economics, public policy, education, social ethics, culture and so on. This “separationist” view is often attributed to US Founding Father, Thomas Jefferson “Wall of Separation Letter” and has become the orthodox view in liberal thought receiving important advocacy by philosophers such as John Rawls.

    This idea is often enforced in the courts with public displays or manifestations of religion being challenged on freedom of religion grounds. This has recently been seen in European countries; recent laws and cases have seen bans on religious emblems being worn in schools, employment situations and in public generally. The UK courts recently ruled that Christians could not foster children out of fear their private beliefs about homosexual conduct might be taught to the children.

    In the US, a confusing, and often contradictory, array of cases on everything from public displays of the ten commandments, home-schooling, school vouchers and so on has rendered the position in the position more and more hostile towards religion being exercised in public and the law has become more and more difficult to comply with because of increasing lack of clarity as to how it works.

    Increasingly in the West we are seeing the idea of religion being something private being accepted by Christian believers who feel that while they personally believe something it is inappropriate for them to apply or utilise these beliefs when thinking about or going about issues that may affect others.

    An increasing body of theological, philosophical and legal scholarship has called this orthodox view into question. These scholars have argued that the orthodox view is unjust, contradictory and arbitrary. It is unjust in that it places moral and social restraints on religious advocacy that are not imposed on non-religious views. It is arbitrary and contradictory in that the reasons typically offered for this view, if sound, seem to apply with equal force to any controversial view whether religious or secular and, in fact, to many doctrines central to liberal thought itself. Moreover, it suggests that even if religious beliefs are true and relevant to public issues, believers are to conduct themselves in public in a manner which ignores these beliefs or treats them as if they are not true if they cannot be justified from a secular viewpoint; in private they are free to believe what they want.

    Critics of orthodoxy contend this separation of faith and self in public is unrealistic at a psychological level and that it fails to understand how religions function in the lives of believers who believe their religion to be true and not merely just a personal private preference.

    New Zealand jurisprudence has not seen the litigation on this subject that the United States and Europe has so it is largely untested. The practice of being influenced by international precedent from the commonwealth and US jurisdictions coupled with our secular society which contains strong factions in favour of the liberal view – secular humanist groups, some politicians, scholars, media, bloggers – suggests that it will fall the way of the rest of the western world unless a robust counter-view is developed and advanced in the New Zealand across disciplines.

    Further to the issue of justice, the tendency to view religious beliefs as a merely private preference that is isolated from one’s public actions, decisions and choices is pervasive in the New Zealand evangelical church and it leads to a view of religion that ignores questions of truth and focuses instead on private benefit and piety of religious belief.

    For these reasons it is important this conversation be had across disciplines; particularly the three disciplines of theology, philosophy and law need to understand and hear each other so we can work together on this problem.

    With this backdrop in mind, Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union bring you, as part of Jesus Week, the following event:

    Godless Public Square

    A Godless Public Square:

    Do ‘Private’ Christian Beliefs Have a Place in Public Life?

    A Jesus Week Dialogue between Theology, Philosophy and Law

    7pm Wednesday 3 August
    Lib B28 (Library Basement, 5 Alfred St) University of Auckland

    Organised by: Thinking Matters and Evangelical Union
    Format: Panel Discussion followed by Q&A
    Moderated by: Patt Brittenden
    Speakers: listed in the order they will speak in: (more…)

  • Jesus: The Cold Case a Guest Post by Glenn Peoples

    Glenn Peoples shares his thoughts on TV One’s recent episode Jesus: The Cold Case.

    Jesus: The Cold Case

    Like a number of others tonight I have just watched Jesus: The Cold Case on TV One, presented by Bryan Bruce. Here are my thoughts on what I have seen. First off, who is Bryan Bruce?

    Bryan Bruce

    Bryan Bruce is an award winning producer, writer & director who lives in Wellington, New Zealand. He has a MA in Sociology, Psychology & philosophy from Canterbury University. A former musician and schoolteacher, he began his television career in 1984 as front person and writer for a TVNZ arts show. Since then has won awards for Best Director and Best Factual Writer and his work has made the finals of several international festivals, including the New York Television Festival and the prestigious Banff Awards.

    The overarching message that Bryan Bruce is gravitating towards in this documentary is that the biblical and subsequent Christian message on who killed Jesus, namely, “the Jews” in some broad sense, is false, and what’s more it is responsible for centuries of great evil.

    Something that strikes the viewer quite early on is that Bruce quite simply doesn’t believe that the Gospels accounts are true in general terms. “Many,” he says, “now believe that the Gospels contain more fiction than fact.” Throughout the documentary we hear from a number of academics who lend their credibility to the various claims Bruce makes.

    One of the immediate worries about the presentation is that although we’re led to believe that the presenter is applying rigorous criminal investigation methods to the case, to those familiar with the world of biblical scholarship, his list of authorities suggests otherwise:

    • Emeritus Prof. Geza Vermes (Oxford)
    • Emeritus Prof John Dominic Crossan ( St Pauls)
    • Prof. Elaine Paigels (Princeton)
    • Bishop John Shelby Spong (USA)
    • Prof. Lloyd Geering (New Zealand)
    • Dr Helen Bond ( Edinburgh)
    • Prof . Israel Hershkovitz (Tel Aviv)
    • Dr Shimon Gibson (London)

    Does this read like the list a careful investigator consults if he wants a decent shot at getting to the unvarnished truth, rather than a somewhat partisan perspective?

    According to Vermes, Jesus was resurrected in the hearts of his followers, but not literally from the dead.

    Crossan claims that Jesus’ followers had a kind of spiritual visionary experience
    Paigels writes that early Christians didn’t believe in physical resurrection at all, seeking instead a state of spiritual knowledge and enlightenment Spong says that Jesus’ resurrection had nothing to do with him coming back to life, but with the subjective – but real – experiences in the hearts of his followers.

    Lloyd Geering, who himself does not believe in any such being as God, claims that the body of Jesus remained buried and that the story of his resurrection was a later story concocted on the basis of a re-reading of the Old Testament.

    Now of course this isn’t a documentary on the resurrection, but the pattern is somewhat striking. It looks fairly clearly as though the presenter has intentionally stacked the witness stand with those hostile to the Christian story. It will hardly come as a surprise that, given such a uniform and narrow sample, the testimony will (rather gleefully!) point away from the traditional version of events surrounding the death of Christ. We might just as easily consult the faculty of Dallas Theological Seminary and claim that using rigorous scrutiny, we have reached the conclusion that the biblical portrait of Jesus’ death is, well, inerrant! Given that those consulted would be placed at one extreme of the spectrum on whether or not we can generally trust the Gospel accounts or the teaching of the early Christian movement, the interests of balance would surely call for less radical voices, the likes of Craig Evans, James Dunn, Luke Timothy Johnson or N. T Wright. One example – Lloyd Geering is quoted as assuring viewers – completely unchallenged – that the details of the crucifixion was no more than what people “imagined” had probably taken place. When it comes to the story of the resurrection, Geering is explicit – Jesus was probably buried by the Romans and that was that. No tomb, no stone rolled away, and no angels. Geering laughs, “the very fact that you’ve got angels [in the story] shows that we’re dealing with myth, not history.” There was not a single challenge raised. Not even an innuendo that Geering’s view isn’t the scholarly consensus. This was said just minutes after the narrator told us that the Gospel was more fiction than fact.

    This type of concern rears its head among a more sceptical audience when the evangelical likes of Lee Strobel seeks to do just what Bryan Bruce is doing: Apply critical scrutiny to the facts concerning the life of Christ. And yet we frequently hear the complaint that Strobel consults only committed and usually conservative Christians, people who are unlikely to disagree strongly with each other – or with Strobel. I would hope, then, that this same type of sceptical, professedly critical audience will likewise regard Bruce’s offering as a biased, selective survey of a very thin slice of the scholarly community. For example (more…)