Category: Divine Command Theory

  • Published in Sophia “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument”

    My paper, “Why the Horrendous deeds objection is still a bad argument” has now been published by Sophia here.  The abstract is as follows:

    A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything. In recent discussions of DCM, this ‘essential goodness response’ has come under fire. Critics of DCM have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute six such objections: (a) the objection from counterpossibles, (b) the objection from omnipotence, (c) the objection from requirements of justice, (d) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (e) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (f) the epistemological objection. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy, the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

    A pre-published copy is available on my academia.edu page. 

  • Dawkin’s dilemma: How not to answer the question “Why Be Moral?”

    In his bestselling book, the God Delusion, Richard Dawkin’s responds to the question: “If there is no God, Why be good?”Richard Dawkins

    Posed like that, the question sounds positively ignoble. When a religious person puts it to me in this way (and many of them do), my immediate temptation is to issue the following challenge: ‘Do you really mean to tell me the only reason you try to be good is to gain God’s approval and reward or to avoid his disapproval and punishment? …If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’. If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[1]

    Dawkin’s thinks someone who asks “if there is no God, why be moral?” is assuming that the Gods approval is the only reason they to do good. He attacks this assumption with a dilemma. Either this assumption is true, or it is not true. If it is true, the questioner reveals themself to be an immoral person. He is someone who refrains from theft, murder and rape only because God will punish him. We should shun and avoid someone like this. If the questioner’s assumption is not true, then the claim that there is no reason to do good without God is undermined. The fact he would continue to do what is right, even if God did not exist shows that he does have reason to do good even if God does not exist. 

    I think each step of this response is mistaken. 

    First, is it true that this question presupposes that threat of divine punishment is the only reason anyone has to refrain from immoral behaviour? I think the answer is clearly no.

    The question “why be good?” or “why be moral?” This question has a long history in western thought question going back at least as far as Plato’s republic. John Tilly explains that according to the standard interpretation of the question, it involves: 

    A request for a justification for giving precedence to moral reasons for action when such reasons conflict with other reasons (e.g., those of self-interest). Whenever moral reasons recommend one course of action and nonmoral reasons recommend another, why should I favor the first set of reasons? What argument could persuade me to do[2]

    This simple question has proved difficult to answer. So much so that, the 19th-century Philosopher Henry Sidgwick declared it to be “The profoundest problem in ethics”. During the 17th-19th[3] centuries, several philosophers argued this recalcitrant problem posed difficultly for any purely secular understanding of morality. Thomas Reid’s (1710–1796) summary is typical.

    What about cases where concern for our happiness on the whole conflicts with a concern for duty? This is a merely imaginary conflict; there can’t actually be any such opposition between the two leading principles. While the world is under a wise and benevolent administration, it’s impossible that any man should be a loser by doing his duty. So every man who believes in God, while he is careful to do his duty, can safely leave the care of his happiness to his Maker. He realizes that his most effective way of attending to his long-run happiness is by attending to his duty. But consider the case of an atheist who wrongly thinks his virtue is contrary to his happiness on the whole. … this man’s dilemma is without remedy. It will be impossible for him to act so as not to ·seem to himself to· contradict a leading principle of his nature. He must either sacrifice his happiness to virtue, or his virtue to happiness, and he has to decide whether it is better to be a fool or to be a knave! [4]

    Reid points out that the “why be moral?” challenge presupposes the existence of a dilemma: what duty requires contradicts what my long-term happiness requires. Because the “the world is under a wise and benevolent administration” Reid thinks such dilemmas are “imaginary”. They never, in fact, occur. However, they would occur if, contrary to fact, God did not exist. So, if atheism is true, some answer to this dilemma is needed if morality’s rational authority is to be vindicated.

    Nothing in this line of argument assumes that the only reason Reid has to do good is divine reward or punishment. Reid speaks of a dilemma between “two rational governing principles in the constitution of man.” [5]. A dilemma occurs when one has two options, both of which are problematic. We do have powerful moral reasons independent of our self-interest demanding us to do what is right. But we also have powerful prudential reasons pointing the other way. For Reid, Divine sanctions mean that prudential reasons never really point the other way. But they are not the only reasons in the equation. Reid is not atypical in this. Someone who asks, “if there is no God, why be good?” need not assume the only reason he or anyone else has for doing good is divine reward or punishment.

    However, let’s suppose for the sake of argument they did assume this. Dawkin’s attempted rebuttal of this assumption fails. Consider Dawkin’s discussion of the dilemmas first horn.

    “If you agree that, in the absence of God, you would ‘commit robbery, rape, and murder’, you reveal yourself as an immoral person, ‘and we would be well advised to steer a wide course around you’.[6]

    Dawkin objects that anyone who answers “yes” reveals themselves to be an immoral person. That may be true. But it is also irrelevant in this context. Remember what the question is: Dawkin’s interlocutor asks the question “Why we should always do what is morally right when it contradicts our self-interest?”. To answer, “because if you don’t, you are acting immorality” misses the point. Dawkin’s interlocutor knows it is immoral to act contrary to immorality. He is instead asking why he should side with morality and not self-interest in the first place.

    An illustration might help here. Imagine that a religious sceptic was asking “If God exists, why should I do what he says”? I doubt Dawkin’s would consider the response “because God tells you to and if you don’t, you aren’t following God” to be a satisfactory answer. The question is “why to obey God?”, answering “because God tells you to”  begs the very question at issue.

    The same thing is true when the question is “if there is no God, why be good”. Dawkin’s interlocutor is asking “if God does not exist, why always do what is required by morality”? The response “if you don’t you are immoral” begs the question in the same way. Just as the theist cannot cite God’s commands as a reason for obeying God’s commands, the atheist cannot cite moral requirements as a reason for obeying moral requirements.

    So Dawkin’s treatment of the first horn misses the point. What about the second horn? Dawkin’s writes.

    If, on the other hand, you admit that you would continue to be a good person even when not under divine surveillance, you have fatally undermined your claim that God is necessary for us to be good.[7]

    This confuses two separate questions. The original question was “why should you be good, without God”. The questioner doubts we always have reasons to do always what is right. However, this doubt is compatible with admitting that one would continue to do what is right without God. What you should do and what you would do are not the same thing. Dawkin’s argument here was anticipated and responded to by Henry Sidgwick :

    It was no use to say that if I was a moral hero, I should have formed a habit of willing actions beneficial to others which would remain in force, even with my own pleasure in the other scale. I knew that at any rate, I was not the kind of moral hero who does this without reason; from blind habit. Nor did I ever wish to be that kind of hero: for it seemed to me that that kind of hero, however admirable, was certainly not a philosopher. I must somehow see that it was right for me to sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part.[8]

    Sidgwick accepts that if I am a highly moral person, I will have formed a habit of doing good actions. These habits will mean I will have a strong disposition to continue doing good when I believe it is not in my self-interest. But, this does not show that I really do have a reason for doing this. I could be just acting out of blind habit and prior commitment to morality. One possible response to the question, “why be good?” is to admit there is no reason and affirm we “must simply decide between the moral life and its alternatives.” [9] People can sometimes make arbitrary non-rational leaps of faith where they commit to some form of life without reason or rational grounds. If people never did this, the whole raison d’être for writing The God Delusion is undermined. The fact that morally upright people admit that they would always do what is right in the absence of God. Doesn’t show they have reasons to do so.

    Lets recap: Someone asks a serious sceptical question about Dawkin’s beliefs. His response is first to express outrage at an “ignoble.” [10] question and claim it is a “conversation stopper.” [11]. Then he paints a very uncharitable and inaccurate picture of the person who dares ask this ignoble question. Suggesting that religious believers who raise this sceptical challenge reveal themselves to be selfish egoists, amoral people we should consider shunning. When the believer objects that he isnt, in fact, an amoralist, Dawkin’s takes that as evidence the believer doesn’t really accept the sceptical challenge. The subtext is that anyone who really harboured this doubt about secular morality is a dangerous psychopath we are well-advised to keep away from. 

    For the reasons spelt out above, none of this count as a good answer to the question: why be moral without God” There may, or may not, be a good answer to this question. But if there is Dawkin’s doesn’t provide it. This seems to be more a case of passive-aggressive rhetorical bullying than substance. He responds to a sceptical question, not by answering it. But with sarcastic outrage, an insinuation the questioner is dangerous, evil, and should be shunned for asking the question. These are the kind of tactics one expects from cult leaders or so-called religious fundamentalists. One doesn’t expect it from someone who is supposed to be a proponent of rational scientific free inquiry. 


    [1] Richard Dawkin’s, The God Delusion (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006) 226-227

    [2] John Tilley, “Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21 

    [3] Examples include Rene Descartes, John Locke, George Berkeley, John Gay, John Brown, Edmund Law William Paley, Thomas Reid, and Immanuel Kant, perhaps most famous for pressing this difficulty is Henry’s Sidgwick.

    [4] Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 see http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [5] See, Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, III iii. viii, 4 seehttp://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/reid1788essay3part3.pdf accessed 12 January 2020

    [6] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [7] Dawkins, God Delusion, 227

    [8] See, Henry Sidgwick “Method of Ethics” Preface to the sixth edition.

    [9] See Tilley, Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of Amoralism” available at https://www.pdcnet.org/wcp20-paideia/content/wcp20-paideia_1998_0044_0248_0253 accessed 26/1/21

    [10] Dawkins, God Delusion, 226

    [11] Dawkins, God Delusion, he has no answer to the question and hence nothing to say. 

  • The question “Why Be Moral?” and the book of Proverbs.

    I gave a brief talk at Orewa Community Church on 10 January 2020. The talk was part of a short series OCC are doing on the book of proverbs. It is available here. 

  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Presentation

    Last year, I presented a talk entitled “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Reply to Erik Wielenberg” to the New Zealand Association of Philosophers conference in Auckland. This was a follow up to interaction I have had with the work of Erik Wielenberg.

    In 2017 I wrote a critical response to Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Some, of my criticisms, were discussed in the dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg at  North Carolina State University in 2018 which was subsequently published by Routledge . Wielenberg has since responded to these criticisms. The talk at the NZAP was my thoughts on his latest paper.

    Over 2020, I have revised the substance of this talk substantially, and a version of the paper will be published in The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion next year. In November has the opportunity to present the revised paper at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, which was held online in November. Below is a video of that paper.

    Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command metaethics (DCM). The objection is that DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible”. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Section 1 expounds Wielenberg’s new “psychopath argument” in the context of the recent debate over the Reasonable Nonbelievers Objection. Section 2 discusses two ambiguities in the argument: in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous as to whether Wielenberg uses the word “obligation” in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 argues that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that psychopaths “have no moral obligations”. By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that divine command theorists are committed to denying that psychopaths have obligations.

  • Problems in Value Theory An Introduction to Contemporary Debates: My Chapter with Graham Oppy is finally published

    Yesterday, I was informed that the book Problems in Value Theory An Introduction to Contemporary Debates has finally been published. The book is now available both on amazon on Bloomsbury’s website. Chapter 3 of this book “Does Morality Depend on God?” is co-authored by myself and Graham Oppy (Monash University). Both Graham and I each wrote an article (around 5000 words) spelling out our respective answers to the question, and then wrote a shorter piece (1500 words) where we responded to the others original essay. 

    Problems in Value Theory is edited by Steve Cowan (Lincoln Memorial University). The table of contents is as follows:

      Introduction, Steven B. Cowan

      Part I: Problems in Ethics and Aesthetics

     Introduction to Part I, Steven B. Cowan

      1. Is Morality Relative?

     Morality Is Relative, Michael Ruse

     Morality Is Objective, Francis J. Beckwith

     Responses:

     Beckwith’s Response to Ruse

     Ruse’s Response to Beckwith

      2. What Makes Actions Right or Wrong?

     Consequences Make Actions Right, Alastair Norcross

     Respect for Persons Makes Actions Right, Mark Linville

     Responses:

     Linville’s Response to Norcross

     Norcross’s Response to Linville

      3. Does Morality Depend on God?

     Morality Depends on God, Matthew Flannagan

     Morality Does Not Depend on God, Graham Oppy

     Responses:

     Oppy’s Response to Flannagan

     Flannagan’s Response to Oppy

      4. Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder?

     Beauty is Relative, James Mock

     Beauty is Objective, Carol S. Gould

     Responses:

     Gould’s Response to Mock

     Mock’s Response to Gould

      5. What Is the Meaning of Life?

     The Meaning of Life Is Found in God, Douglas Groothuis

     The Meaning of Life Can Be Found without God, Christine Vitrano

     Responses:

     Vitrano’s Response to Groothuis

     Groothuis” s Response to Vitrano

      Essay Suggestions

     For Further Reading

      Part II: Problems in Political Philosophy

     Introduction to Part II, Steven B. Cowan

      6. Do We Need Government?

     We Do Not Need Government, Roderick T. Long

     We Need Some Government, Alex Tuckness

     Responses:

     Tuckness’s Response to Long

     Long’s Response to Tuckness

      7. Should Wealth Be Redistributed?

     Wealth Should Be Redistributed, Jon Mandle

     Wealth Should Not Be Redistributed, Jan Narveson

     Responses:

     Narveson’s Response to Mandle

     Mandle’s Response to Narveson

     8. When May the Government Wage War?

     The Government Should Never Wage War, Andrew Alexandra

     The Government May Sometimes Wage War, Nathan L. Cartagena

     Responses:

     Cartagena’s Response to Alexandra

     Alexandra’s Response to Cartagena

      Essay Suggestions

     For Further Reading

     Index

     The blurb from Bloomberry is as follows:

    Problems in Value Theory takes a pro and con approach to central topics in aesthetics, ethics and political theory.

     Each chapter begins with a question: What Makes Actions Right or Wrong? Does Morality Depend on God? Do We Need Government? Contemporary philosophers with opposing viewpoints are then paired together to argue their position and raise problems with conflicting standpoints. Alongside an up-to-date introduction to a core philosophical stance, each contributor provides a critical response to their opponent and clear explanation of their view.

     Discussion questions are included at the end of each chapter to guide further discussion.

     With chapters ranging from why the government should never wage war to what is art and does morality depend on God, this introduction covers questions lying at the heart of debates about what does and does not have value.

    Get your copy now, read it, and let me know what you think both here and on Amazon. I am sure there is much more both Graham and I could say on this topic. Graham Oppy is one the best Philosophers of Religion in the world, and it was a real privilege being part of this project with him.  

  • Divine Command Theory: answering classic and contemporary objections

    Last week Jordan Hampton from Crash Course Apologetics interviewed me about chapters 12-13 of my book Did God Really Command Genocide. In this is the section of the book, I discuss divine command metaethics and critique some of the most important objections raised against divine command theories. The interview is nearly two and a half hours long. We go over every objection I respond to in the book. Enjoy


  • The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Response to Erik Wielenberg (Part three)

    In Part One, I expounded the Psychopath objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) that has recently been defended by Erik Wielenberg. Wielenberg argues as follows:

    R1) If God commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued no divine commands. (from 1 and R)

    [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4] But there are no psychopaths who have no moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    In my last post, I contended this argument is crucially ambiguous; the word “obligation” occurs in both R1 and [3] and [4]. However, one can use the word “obligation” in an objective and a subjective sense. Objective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status that an action has in virtue of its actual circumstances and consequences” By contrast, “Subjective obligatoriness (or rightness or wrongness) is the deontic status an action has in virtue of the agent’s beliefs about its morally relevant circumstances and consequences” (Smith (2010), 4)

    I contend that the distinction between objective and subjective obligation makes trouble for the Psychopath Objection. For the argument to be logically valid, and avoid committing the fallacy of equivocation, the word “obligation must be used the same way in both premise [R] and premise [4]. When one examines Wielenberg’s argument; however, we find this is not the case. If we interpret the word obligation in the “subjective sense” premise [4] is not justified by the evidence Wielenberg offers. By contrast, if we interpret obligation in the objective sense, then [R] is unjustified.

     The Subjectivist Interpretation

    Let us begin first by interpreting [R] and [4] in the subjective sense:

     (R1 Subjective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes a subjective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force.

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2*] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no subjective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3*] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4S] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

    If we interpret [4] in terms of [4S], then Wielenberg must contend not just that Psychopaths have objective obligations’ but also that they are subjectively obligated to refrain from immoral activity. He must hold that Psychopath’s act contrary to their own non-culpable recognition of what morality requires. The data he cites, however, does not support this. Consider the following examples, which Wielenberg cites to support premise [1] 

    The mainstream view of psychopaths in contemporary psychology and philosophy has it that they have significant neurological deficits that leave them with an absent or significantly diminished capacity for love, compassion, and guilt. They are often described as lacking conscience and are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands…(emphasis added) (Wielenberg (2018), 5)

    ‘Since their dysfunctional conscience does not stimulate moral feelings, psychopaths do not become aware of the constraints required to understand that they have obligations. Their conscience does not make them responsive to the constraining power of morality’..(Emphasis added) (Ibid., 6)

    About one in twenty-five individuals are sociopathic, meaning, essentially, that they do not have a conscience … The intellectual difference between right and wrong does not bring on the emotional sirens and flashing blue lights, or the fear of God, that it does for the rest of us. … ‘[Psychopaths] do not appear… to be aware of the need to justify actions which infringe moral rules … [and] do not really understand the concept of morality’… ‘Psychopaths do not merely behave contrary to moral standards . . . but seem in some sense not even to understand the notion of a moral standard in any “serious” sense. (Emphasis added) (Ibid., 5-6)

     

     Even more, telling is the conclusion Wielenberg draws from this data.

    Notice that the problem here is not that DCT implies that psychopaths are not responsible for their immoral actions. There are robust philosophical debates about the extent to which psychopaths are legally or morally responsible for their actions (see, e.g. Malatesti & McMillan (2010) ). ….However, as far as I can tell, all parties to these debates would accept the claim about psychopaths upon which the argument of this article depends: psychopaths cannot grasp the authority and force of moral demands. As Erick Ramirez puts it, ‘psychopaths are said to suffer from moral blindness. Philosophers disagree on whether this moral blindness exempts them from responsibility for their bad behavior’ (Ramirez (2013), 244). As this remark suggests, the moral blindness of psychopaths is widely taken for granted – and that moral blindness of psychopaths is the foundation of the central argument of this article. Accordingly, the problem for DCT that I have advanced here is not that it implies that psychopaths violate moral obligations but are not (legally or morally) responsible for doing so; rather, the problem is that DCT implies that psychopaths have no moral obligations to violate in the first place. (Wielenberg (2018), 8)

    This data, if accurate, undermines the claim that Psychopaths have subjective obligations. The evidence does not-unequivocally support the idea that they do what is wrong, given what they non-culpably believe about the situation. Wielenberg concedes Psychopaths are “morally blind” may “lack a conscience” “do not understand the concept of morality” and “lack the constraints necessary constraints required to understand that they have obligations.” His claim they have obligations carries no implications that they are culpable of their actions or culpably act contrary to what they discern to be obligatory. Consequently, [4S] is unjustified. [4] is only justified if Wielenberg is using obligation in the objective sense. 

    Objectivist Interpretation

    This leads us to consider next an “objectivist” interpretation of the argument.

      (R1 Objective) If God’s commands a person S to do act A, this command imposes an objective obligation on S to do A, only if S is capable of recognising the requirement to do A as being extremely authoritative and as having imperative force. 

     

    [1] There are some psychopaths who are incapable of grasping the authority and force of moral demands. (empirical premise) 

    [2**] So, there are some psychopaths to whom God has issued commands that generate no objective obligations. (from 1 and R) .

     [3] So, if DCT is true, then there are some psychopaths who have no objective moral obligations. (from 2 and DCT). 

    [4O] But there are no psychopaths who have no subjective moral obligations. 

    [5.] Therefore, DCT is false. (from 3 and 4)

     

    If [4] is interpreted in terms of [4O], then [4] is plausible. Even if Pscyopath’s suffer from “a moral blindness” which prevents them from recognising their objective obligations, it is implausible to think Psychopaths lack objective moral requirements. 

    The problem is that now (R1 Objective) is no longer plausible. We saw above that Wielenberg argues for R by contending that standard responses to the promulgation objection rely on it. Wielenberg argued:

    A distinctive feature of DCT is that a given human being has moral obligations only if a divine command is somehow communicated to that human being. This aspect of the theory is emphasised by many proponents of the theory. For example, Adams writes: ‘A command does not exist or have any force unless it is issued – that is, unless, it is in some way communicated’ (R. Adams (1999), 263). In defence of this position, Adams memorably remarks that ‘[g]ames in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them’ (ibid., 261) (Wielenberg (2018), 2)

    He immediately continues:

    Stephen Evans similarly emphasises the importance of divine communication in this passage:

    A law that was passed in secret and never revealed to anyone would hardly be binding on the citizens of a state. It is true that it is often said that ignorance of the law is not a valid excuse for not obeying the law, but this principle surely assumes that the law in question is a matter of public record and that the individual who should obey the law could have known about it. Something similar must hold for moral laws as well. (Evans (2013), 37) 

    In accordance with Adams’s view that ‘[i]n order to exist, a command… .must be communicated to those who are subject to it’ (R. Adams (1999), 263), I shall henceforth use ‘command’ to mean obligation-bestowing command. On this usage, no divine command is issued unless it imposes some moral obligation on those to whom it is issued (Ibid.)

    This argument does not, however, seem plausible if by R we mean (R1 objective). On the face of it, Adam’s and Evan’s are using the word “obligation” in the subjective sense in these paragraphs. 

    Consider Adam’s first, Adam’s repudiates a “picture of divine-human relations, one in which the wish of God’s heart imposes binding obligations without even being communicated, much less issuing in a command.” This is because “Games in which one party incurs guilt for failing to guess the unexpressed wishes of the other party are not nice games. They are no nicer if God is thought of as a party to them.” In this passage, the phrase “binding obligation” is being used synonymously with “incurring guilt”. The problem he is addressing is that that one cannot incur guilt unless one non-culpably knows what is required. This best fits the concept of a subjective obligation. 

    We can say similar things about Evan’s. Evans states that a law “passed in secret” would not be “is binding” on citizens. However, he explains what he means next sentence; it is about whether someone has a valid excuse due to non-culpable ignorance. Evans is talking about an obligation of which one is not culpably ignorant and so incurs guilt for violating. So, Evan’s is plausibly talking about a subjective obligation. 

    Conclusion

    My conclusion, therefore, is that Wielenberg’s latest round in the dialectic on divine command meta-ethics is unsuccessful. His new Psychopathy objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. When he claims that God’s commands, do not impose an obligation unless the commandee is capable of recognising the requirement as both authoritative and as having imperative force he uses the word objective either in a subjective or objective sense. If he has in mind the former, then the very data he cites does not support his claim that Psychopaths have moral obligations. If he uses the word in an objective sense, then divine command theorists are not committed to denying Psychopaths have moral obligations.


    Adams Robert Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1999.

    Evans C Stephen God and Moral Obligation [Book]. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.


    Smith Holly
    The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs [Book Section] // Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics / book auth. Timmons Mark. – Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010. – Vol. 1.

    Wielenberg Erik Divine command theory and psychopathy [Journal] // Religious Studies. – 2018. – pp. 1-16.