Category: Series

  • Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith

    Since the 17th century one of the most common sceptical objections to the Christian faith is the claim that belief in God is irrational because his existence has never been successfully proven. For centuries theologians and philosophers have proposed a range of arguments for the existence of God; sceptics not only contend every one of these arguments fail but also that in the absence of such proof it is irrational to believe in God. The sceptic places the burden of proof squarely on the Christian; Anthony Flew’s famous presumption of atheism is a paradigmatic example of this,

    [T]he debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, … the onus of proof must lie upon the theist…What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it is up to the theist: first to introduce and to defend his proposed concept of God; and second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have an application.[1]

    John Mackie makes the same point,

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . it [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.[2]

    Both writers contend that belief in God is rationally acceptable only if there is good evidence for it. In this context it is clear that the word evidence is being used synonymously with the idea of an argument or a proof. Flew talks of a “burden of proof;” if theism cannot be proven in the manner laid down he contends it is irrational. Mackie contends that the “rational consideration” of theism, which means belief in God, depends on the arguments that can be mustered in support of theism, if belief in God cannot be proven by the kind of arguments he suggests then it is irrational.

    One way of responding to this charge is to try and meet Flew’s burden and provide cogent arguments for God’s existence. In this article I will not take that tack, instead I will call into question the assumption that underlies this objection; the objection assumes that it can only be rational to believe in God if there is a good argument for God’s existence. I am not convinced that we should assume this.

    It is important to note that not everything one believes needs to be proven in order for it to be rational for us to reasonably rely on it. I have two reasons in mind; first the claim that everything must be proven in order to be rationally believed leads to a regress problem. Roy Clouser notes,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[3]

    A second problem is that there are many things that we believe quite rationally which cannot be proved such as memory. Consider my belief that I was in Newmarket yesterday. I reflect on what I did yesterday and automatically find myself strongly inclined to accept the belief ‘I was in Newmarket.’ I believe that ‘I was in New Market’ because I remember being there yet I am unable to provide any argument or proof for this claim but for my memory. To prove my memory is reliable is difficult as any argument I might try to use is circular; to prove memory is reliable one has to rely on one’s memory to remember if one’s memory is usually accurate.

    Nevertheless, my belief that I was in Newmarket yesterday is rational. Similar problems arise with the belief that other people have thoughts and feelings, that objects we see actually exist independently of us, etc. We accept such concepts in spite of proof as we understand that not everything needs to be proven; given this, why then does belief in God need to be proven for it to be rational?

    This is not an idle question. The sceptic criticises Christians for believing certain propositions without good arguments for their truth. This criticism rests on certain premises. It is perfectly valid then to ask what arguments the sceptic has for these premises. If the sceptic asserts them without proof then the sceptic’s position is prima facie incoherent. The sceptic claims, without argument, that other people should not believe without argument. If it is acceptable for the sceptic to believe without proof, why then does the Christian need to provide proof in order to be rational?

    Kai Neilsen’s answer is typical;

    All of us can agree, at least for a large range of cases, whether somebody is in pain, whether he’s thinking, feeling anxious or the like. We do in general agree about these things. Only a madman would claim that no one is ever in pain or that no one ever knows that another person is in pain. The same is true for thinking, feeling anxious or sad and the like… Now the situation is very different in religion.[4]

    Neilsen’s point is essentially that religious beliefs are beliefs that not all people believe, whereas belief that other people have thoughts and feelings are beliefs that no sane person would doubt. Behind the seemingly innocuous claim that belief in God is irrational without proof lurks an implicit standard about what counts as a rational belief. A belief is rational only if it is accepted by all sane, intelligent people or it can be proven via some argument from premises that are acknowledged to be true by all sane people. When measured by this standard, all religious beliefs need to be proven by argument if they are to be rationally believed.

    I think something like this picture is behind much religious scepticism. I also think the picture is deeply flawed as it is self-contradictory.

    Take the standard for rational belief implicit in the above quotes and in much scepticism and turn it back on itself: not every one accepts this standard. Many sane, intelligent people reject it; they do not accept that all beliefs not accepted by everyone must be proven. So, if the standard is correct, no one should believe in it until someone offers a proof for its truth, to the best of my knowledge no one has done this, therefore no one can rationally believe in the standard itself.

    If the sceptic tries to escape this quandary he or she can only appeal to premises that are accepted by all sane, intelligent people. If some sane, intelligent people do not accept the premises then we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof, by the sceptic’s own argument. The sceptic’s position eats its own tail.

    There are, I think, two lessons to be learned here. The first is that some sceptics are inconsistent in their scepticism, they reject belief in God on the basis of certain claims or assumptions which, if true, are subject to the very objections and doubts they level against religion yet they do not question or doubt these assumptions. The second is that in any rational discussion one cannot avoid starting from presuppositions which are, in some sense, controversial; one starts with what one knows by faith and reasons from it to gain a comprehensive, coherent and accurate understanding of reality, to find answers to the fundamental and philosophical existential questions that we face. Sometimes our subsequent inquiry leads us to modify, abandon or revise the presuppositions we began with, other times our inquiry confirms it but the idea that every controversial, substantive claim one accepts needs to be proven in order to be rational is incoherent.


    [1] Antony Flew The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton Publishing, 1976) 14-15.
    [2]
    John Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 4-6.
    [3]
    Roy Clouser  Knowing With the Heart (IVP: Downers Grove, 1999) 69.
    [4]
    Kai Neilsen “The Skeptics Reply” in Faith and the Philosophers Ed. John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1964) 274.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the October 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: Is God a 21st Century Western Liberal?
    Contra Mundum: In Defence of Santa
    Contra Mundum: The Number of the Beast
    Contra Mundum: Pluralism and Being Right
    Contra Mundum: Abraham and Isaac and the Killing of Innocents
    Contra Mundum: Selling Atheism
    Contra Mundum: Did God Command Genocide in the Old Testament?
    Contra Mundum: Fairies, Leprechauns, Golden Tea Cups & Spaghetti Monsters
    Contra Mundum: Secularism and Public Life
    Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness
    Contra Mundum: Slavery and the Old Testament

    Contra Mundum: Secular Smoke Screens and Plato’s Euthyphro

    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
    Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

  • Sunday Study: The Bible and Rape – A Response to Michael Martin

    A little while ago I wrote a post criticising Michael Martin’s contention that the Bible commands a rape victim to marry her rapist, Does the Bible Teach that a Rape Victim has to Marry her Rapist? To summarise briefly, Martin cited Deuteronomy 22:28-29 and interpreted it as,

    Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The woman apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1]

    In the post I noted that the word translated rape is tapas which simply means “to grab” or “hold;” the term itself is neutral as to whether this involves force. It can be used in a context where it is clear that force is involved but it also can be used in a context where no force is involved. All the text states then is that a virgin is grabbed by a man. I went on to argue that the context provided reasons for thinking that what was envisaged was actually a seduction.

    In discussing this I noted that a few verses prior to this one the text does envisage a rape. In the immediately preceding passage in Deuteronomy 22:23-27, the word chazak is used instead of tapas in reference to a bethrothed woman who screamed for help when a man attempted to have sex with her; chazak suggests a violent seizure.

    In regards to this text, Martin contends that “when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.”[2] Martin argues

    In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that both the rapist and victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because he violated his neighbor’s wife and the victim because she did not cry for help (Deut. 22: 23-25). Again the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.

    On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely different if the rape occurs in “open country.” Here the rapist should be killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the psychological harm to victim. No condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.[3]

    There are several points packed in here. First Martin contends that these passages teach that rape is an offence against a man’s property and do not condemn it out of concern for the woman’s welfare. Second, Martin suggests that the text does not condemn rapists who do not get caught. Third and perhaps most significantly, Martin suggests that the passage makes “dubious” assumptions about rape; it assumes, for example, “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued.” [Emphasis added] Martin states that this is something that fails to be sensitive to contextual factors of rape.

    This last point in particular is often emphasised by sceptics. To take a common example, suppose a rapist puts a knife to a woman’s throat and commands her not to scream. If this happens in the city she will not cry out and the passage, so the sceptics allege, will hold the woman unjustly responsible for her own rape.

    I think each of these points are mistaken.

    Turning to the first point, Martin contends that the passage teaches that rape is merely a property offence against the husband and is not concerned with the welfare of the woman. To asses the claim it is worth looking at the passage he refers to,

    If a man happens to meet in a town a virgin pledged to be married and he sleeps with her,24  you shall take both of them to the gate of that town and stone them to death–the girl because she was in a town and did not scream for help, and the man because he violated another man’s wife. You must purge the evil from among you.25  But if out in the country a man happens to meet a girl pledged to be married and rapes her, only the man who has done this shall die.26  Do nothing to the girl; she has committed no sin deserving death. This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour, for the man found the girl out in the country, and though the betrothed girl screamed, there was no one to rescue her. (Deuteronomy 22:24-27 NIV)

    Two points need to be noted here. First, the text states that people who rape should be executed (I have argued that capital sanctions like this were not always intended to be taken literally in Capital Punishment in the Old Testament). Martin suggests that the fact that adultery is a capital crime means that this is merely a property offence. He states the “assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with this life.” Actually the converse is true; Christopher Wright notes this point,

    The fact that the legal penalty for the wife who commits adultery is execution weighs strongly against the idea that wives in OT Israel are legally no more than the property of their husbands. If adultery is merely an offence against another man’s “property” why destroy the property as well as punishing the guilty man? Furthermore, it would be quite exceptional, in as much as no other property offence in the OT is punishable by death.[4]

    The second point to note is that Martin’s contention seems to be explicitly contradicted by the text in v 26. In this passage it states that rape is, “This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders his neighbour.” The text compares rape to a violent assault, a murder, not theft.

    Martin’s second point fares no better. Martin seems to argue that the text ignores the “woman’s rights and her psychological welfare” because “no condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.” It is hard, however, to see the force of this; all legal codes will only punish people who commit crimes once they are caught. Current New Zealand law on rape, for example, does not punish or condemn people who are not caught, tried and proven guilty of rape. No one thinks that this practice of observing due process is contrary to the rights of rape victims and correctly so, the fact that a woman is the victim of a heinous crime does not automatically cancel out the due process rights of anyone accused of a crime. The same is true here, the law punishes only those caught; if a person has not been caught committing a crime then the state does not know who committed the crime. To call the failure to punish the perpetrator of an unsolved crime a violation of a woman’s rights is hard to take seriously.

    Moreover even if one were to take this line of argument seriously, it proves too much. In Deuteronomy, for example, The Torah refers to a situation where a man has been murdered and the authorities, after careful investigation, cannot determine who committed the crime. The result is that the unknown perpetrator is not punished. Are we to infer from this that The Torah victimises men and treats them as property and expresses a sexist anti-male sentiment?

    This brings us to the final and perhaps most significant point. Martin notes that the law assumes “that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious and sensitive to the contextual aspects of rape.” A rhetorical question will more vividly express this point; what if a women could not cry out, what if the rapist in a city put a knife to a woman’s throat and ordered her not to scream, what if a woman was set upon suddenly and was unable to scream? In these situations the rape occurs in a city and the woman does not scream for help. The above law then seems to teach that she is should be treated as guilty of a serious crime. If this is the case then surely this is insensitive to the rape victim? To have a law that condemns a woman in this situation is to have a law that ignores the specifics of the situation; it, in Martin’s words, ignores the “contextual aspects of rape.”

    I am inclined to agree that if the law condemned a woman in these kinds of contexts it would indeed be unjust. The question needs to be asked, however, is does it? Is it plausible to assume that the law is intended to be applied in such a rigid, a-contextual, fashion?  I think the answer is no.

    Deuteronomy is an Ancient Near Eastern Legal text; it therefore is part of a literary genre from that period of time. We are aware of other texts from the same genre such as the ancient Hittite Laws, Middle Assyrian Laws and Code of Hammurabi, and its important to note that legal codes written in this Genre differ significantly from modern legal codes.  Hiller notes,

    [T]here is no evidence that any collection of Near Eastern laws functioned as a written code that was applied by a strict method of exegesis to individual cases. As far as we can tell, these bodies of laws served educational purposes and gave expression to what was regarded as just in typical cases, but they left considerable latitude to local courts for determining the right in individual suits. They aided local courts without controlling them.[5]

    The same point is made by Raymond Westbrook in his comparative study of Ancient Near Eastern Legal Codes. He notes that such laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[6] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.” Christopher Wright calls this “paradigmatic law,” which he explains as “the detailing of specific circumstances with the view to giving judges basic principles and precedents on which to evaluate the great variety of individual cases that may come before them.”[7]

    Once the genre is understood it is not hard to see the flaw in Martin’s argument. Martin assumes that the law is a rigidly literal rule that inflexibly applies to all cases. In fact, the law probably did not function this way nor was it intended to. Instead it functioned as kind of paradigm illustrating a principle. The principle was this; women who have sex with a man are not to be considered adulterers or immoral if they do not consent. If it cannot be established whether a woman consented to a sexual act then she should be presumed innocent. Rape is not adultery, it is rather a serious assault or an attempted murder. At a more general level the case law vividly illustrates the principle that culpability entails consent.


    [1] Michael Martin “Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape” accessed 27 September 2009.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Ibid.
    [4]
    Christopher Wright International Biblical Commentary: Deuteronomy, (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996 ) 254.
    [5]
    Delbert R Hillers Covenant: the History of a Biblical Idea (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969).
    [6]
    Raymond Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law” in The History of Ancient Near Eastern Law Vol 1 ed Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
    [7]
    Christopher Wright Deuteronomy 244.

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I, I discussed some translations of the sixth commandment of the Decalogue. I began with the King James Version (KJV), “thou shall not kill.”[1] I looked at problems with this translation most famously raised by Augustine. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate the word rasah as “murder” in an attempt to avoid these problems. However, as I noted in my previous post, this translation fails to capture accurately the use of rasah in Hebrew and turns the command into an empty tautology.

    Augustine’s Interpretation
    I want to suggest that an adequate understanding or account of the sixth commandment was suggested by Augustine or at least can be constructed from his writings. In Book One of The City of God, Augustine addressed the question of whether suicide is lawful and concluded that it is not. What is interesting is how Augustine interpreted and applied the sixth commandment in doing this.

    Augustine’s argument against suicide consists of three observations. Firstly, Augustine takes the commandment fairly literally as forbidding homicide. He states, “The commandment is ‘Thou shall not kill man.’”[2] We saw in the last post that there is a sensible basis for this. The term literally means to slay and is predicated only of human beings; further, while in most instances it is used of unjustified killing, it can be used of a lawful execution. The slaying of humans is a common meaning to the different nuances that its use takes in the text.

    The obvious problem for such a reading is that elsewhere the scriptures seem to allow, even command, killing in certain instances. This does not perplex Augustine,

    However, there are some exceptions made by the divine authority to its own law, that men may not be put to death. These exceptions are of two kinds, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws, have represented in their persons the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.”[3]

    Augustine’s answer is straightforward. The universal prohibition is the general rule while the specific commands are the exceptions to this rule. The law prohibits homicide; however, the law must be read in its context and not in isolation and, when this is done, one realises that other commands and prohibitions offer qualifications or exceptions to this general rule.

    There are several reasons for accepting this way of interpreting the sixth commandment. Firstly, it is in other areas a matter of common-sense; as Bahnsen notes,

    Human communication by means of language would come to a grinding halt if it were illegitimate ever to express yourself by way of generalizations which do not explicitly acknowledge qualifications and exceptions. Lawyers may specialize in the fine print of complicated legal contracts, but even they do not speak that way in ordinary discourse. A father who asserts that his son is a fine basketball player is not guilty of falsehood or deception simply because he does not add that, of course, his son has some bad games.

    Generalizations which state an accurate summary or the prevailing principle are not, as generalizations, faulty or inaccurate.[4]

    In fact, not only is this a matter of common-sense, it is a method followed elsewhere in scripture. For example in Exodus 21:12,

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately…

    Here we see a universal principle “Any one who strikes a man and kills him shall be put to death” and then immediately this principle is qualified in the proceeding verses. Moreover, contrary to Bahnsen, this type of writing is common even in legal circles. Even contemporary, legal codes often have a general, universal principle laid down regarding homicide or assault and then add specific exceptions which one can appeal to as a defence to committing actions which fall within the broad definition of the general rule.[5]

    As Madeleine has pointed out to me, the legal maxim ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’ (specific rules override general rules) is still used in legal interpretation today. She said,

    If my lecturer said to the class, I want you to go straight to the library and get started on your assignments but then he said, Madeleine and Matt I want to see you two before you leave he would not be saying that he did not want everyone to go straight to the library and start their assignments just because he gave a specific, contradictory instruction to Matt and I and he wouldn’t be saying that we did not have to go to the library to start our assignments after he had finished speaking to us (once the exception no longer applies) because his specific instructions to us do not override the general instruction to all.[6]

    Secondly, the hermeneutical principle of the analogy of scripture supports this kind of interpretation. We have a general command prohibiting homicide; then we have more specific rules commanding or permitting homicide in certain situations. To interpret the command as absolute and unqualified would be to render the text internally incoherent.

    This leaves two other options; either one understands the general prohibition as the exception to the more specific ones or the specific ones as exceptions to the general rule. The former option is problematic. If a command permitting killing in a certain context is subject to an exception that you can never kill at all then the specific command is redundant and pointless. On the other hand, a general rule that states “do not kill,” except in certain specified circumstances is not redundant. This then seems the more sensible approach.

    A third reason for Augustine’s interpretation follows from a voluntarist understanding of the moral law. In several previous posts I have defended a voluntarist (divine command theory) account of the moral law; one that states that actions are right or wrong in virtue of their being commanded by God. On this account, what is fundamentally wrong about homicide is that it violates the law of God. Now, just as homicide is wrong because it violates the law of God, when God commands or permits homicide in a certain context the very property that makes killing wrong ceases to be present and hence the law is not being broken in that instance. It follows then that the killing in question is not wrong in this instance. This voluntarist understanding of Augustine’s position has a long history and is suggested by Bernard of Clairvaux[7] and Aquinas,[8] as well as those 14th century voluntarists such as Andreas de Novo.[9] Contemporary defenders of this position are Philip Quinn[10] and William Lane Craig.[11]

    Augustine’s position then is to interpret the command as a prohibition on homicide, understanding that in its context it is subject to qualification and exceptions provided elsewhere in the other commands of the law. His basic insight is that the law lays down the general principle “thou shall not kill man;” given that this is the general norm, one is to assume that any given act of homicide is prohibited unless the law elsewhere qualifies this rule or lays down an exception.

    This means that in practice the commandment forbids killing a human being without justification, where justification is construed as an excuse or permission granted by God’s law. In the absence of any other command or permission to the contrary, one should refrain from homicide. In this respect homicide differs from an action that is permissible. One does not need a reason or justification for engaging in a permissible action as one can do it for any reason at all or even no reason. However, because God condemns homicide one needs a reason drawn from the law of God itself before one can engage in it licitly.

    This interpretation clarifies Augustine’s argument that suicide is unlawful. Augustine justifies his conclusion by defending two points. Firstly, “he who kills himself still kills nothing else than man.”[12] Secondly, “It is not without significance, that in no passage of the holy canonical books can there be found either divine precept or permission to take away our own life.”[13] He adds, “in the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ there is no limitation added nor any exception made in favor of any one, and least of all in favor of him on whom the command is laid!”[14]

    In other words suicide is homicide and the law does not qualify or grant exclusions to suicide, so suicide is unlawful. It is clear that this inference presupposes the interpretation of the commandment I have defended above. Homicide is unlawful unless the law of God provides grounds or exceptions to the general rule.

    In summation, the sixth commandment offers a general prohibition on homicide. This prohibition is binding unless a specific exception or qualification is found elsewhere in the law of God showing that a particular instance of homicide is licit. The procedure in applying the law is then as follows; first, ascertain whether the action in question is homicide and then ask whether it falls under any lawful exception. If an act is homicide then prima facie it is unlawful and a positive argument from some other command is needed to justify the action if it is to be defensible.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Ibid, 1:20.
    [3]
    Ibid, 1:21.
    [4]
    Greg L Bahnsen “Cross Examination: In Defense of Theonomy” The Counsel of Chalcedon XIV:5-6 (1992).
    [5]
    I am thankful to David Simpkin for bringing this point to my attention.
    [6]
    I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for sharing this example she developed from Paul Rishworth.
    [7]
    Bernard of Clairvaux On Precept and Dispensation III.6.
    [8]
    Aquinas Summa Theologicae I-II q 800, a. 8, ad 3.
    [9]
    Andrea de Novo Castro Primium Scripturum Sententiarium d 48, q 2, a 2 Concl. 2. I.
    [10]
    Phillip Quinn “The Recent Revival of Divine Command Ethics” Research Philosophy-and Phenomenological Research (Fall 1990) 345-365.
    [11]
    William Lane Craig & Edwin Curley “Does the Christian God Exist?” A debate held at the University of Michigan (5 February 1998).
    [12]
    Augustine City of God 1:21.
    [13]
    Ibid.
    [14]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

  • Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part I

    One of the most well known biblical commands is the sixth commandment of the Decalogue (according to protestant enumeration). This commandment occurs in the 20th chapter of the book of Exodus and the fifth chapter of the book of Deuteronomy. In its most well-known rendition, the King James Version (KJV), this commandment states “thou shalt not kill.”[1] The Hebrew term translated as ‘kill’ here is rasah. The New International Version (NIV) and New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translate it as “murder.”

    Both interpretations, kill and murder, face problems; in this post I will offer critical comments on both interpretations. Next week, in Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I will articulate and defend what I think to be the best approach to interpreting this passage, an approach advocated by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century which has been dominant in Christian ethical thought ever since.

    The King James Version: Thou Shalt not Kill
    As stated, the most known formulation of the sixth commandment is rendered “thou shall not kill.” Taken on its own (and out of its context) this faces problems, some identified as far back as at least the time of Augustine. Eating plants or harvesting food involves killing plants, living creatures. As Augustine notes, “for though this class of creatures has no sensation, yet they also are said to live, and consequently they can die; and therefore, if violence be done them, can be killed.”[2] He then asks rhetorically, “Must we therefore reckon it a breaking of this commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, to pull a flower?”[3] In fact, modern knowledge brings other perplexities. Scraping the inside of my mouth kills hundreds of living cells. Taking antibiotics kills bacteria. Understood strictly as a prohibition against all killing, the command is manifestly absurd.

    However, contemporary translators have noted that “kill” is not the best English equivalent of rasah, as rasah is not the general Hebrew term for killing. Rather, it is a term that is used only of killing humans; the word literally means “to slay.” For this reason, the N.R.S.V. interprets the noun as “manslay.” However, even as a term for homicide, rasah is comparatively rare in Hebrew. It appears only 46 times in the Hebrew Bible compared with other more frequently-used terms such as harag and hemit,[4] which also refer to killing. It is also not lost on readers of the Hebrew Bible that in many surrounding passages certain forms of homicide are either permitted, such as killing a thief in the night (Ex. 22: 1-2)[5] or even commanded, such as the execution of murderers, (Ex. 21:12).

    The Modern Version: You shall not Murder
    For this reason, most modern translations translate the verb as murder, as we saw in the NRSV and NIV. However, this is inadequate. Childs notes, “it was soon recognised that the basic distinction between murder and killing, namely the factor of intentionality, cannot be sustained for the verb r.s.h.”[6] In several places the verb is used to designate  accidental or unintentional killing. Koheler suggested that it probably prohibited taking the law into one’s own hands and hence had the sense of private killing.[7] However, as Smedes points out,

    As a matter of fact, however, rasah is used at least once for capital punishment (Num. 35:30) and also for accidental manslaughter (Deut. 4:41-43; Josh. 20:3). From a textual point of view, we do not have a clear case for limiting the commandment to private killings or murder.[8]

    One of the more thorough studies is that of Stamm. After analysing several uses of rasah, Stamm concludes that rasah means “illegal killing.” He suggests that the most concise English would be “you shall not manslaughter” which would be clarified along the lines that “the life of an Israelite” was to be protected from “illegal, impermissible violence.”[9]

    Stamm’s analysis is arguably one of the best to date; however, there are a couple of problems with it. Firstly, as Stamm himself admits, rasah is used at least once of a lawful execution and hence does have a range of meaning which includes killing in a context where killing is lawful. Secondly and perhaps frequently less noted, Stamm’s analysis turns the law into a tautology. To claim, “you shall not kill when it is against the law,” is hardly informative and somewhat states the obvious; of course it is wrong to kill when it is illegal. I think that the commandment is supposed to be saying something substantive so I doubt Stamm is completely on the mark here.

    The study of Reventlow modifies Stamm’s position somewhat. Reventlow argues that the vast majority of uses of the verb rasah relate to the idea of “blood vengeance.”[10] This is an idea which has origins in Genesis 4; in some cases of killing the victim’s blood metaphorically cries out to God for vengeance, guilt and responsibility for the crime attaches to the person who committed it, and, in certain circumstances, the land and community in which it occurs. This is atoned for only by the death of the murderer, if the killing was premeditated or the natural death of the high priest, in cases where the killing was accidental or a sacrifice, only in cases where the community authorities are unable to ascertain who is guilty. Milgrom elaborates this motif,

    The most vivid examples of this belief appear in connection with unlawful homicide, where innocent blood (dam naki’; Jonah 1:14) cries out for vengeance (Gen. 4:10). Rejected by the earth (Isa. 26:21; Ezek. 24:7), it attaches itself to the slayer and his family, literally “dancing around their heads”(2 Sam. 3:28-29) for generations (2 Sam. 21:4-6 2 Kings 9:26) and even affecting his city (Deut. 21:1-9; Jer. 26:15), nation (Deut 19:10,13), and land (Num 35:33-34). The latter two citations illustrate the variant grounds that provide the rationale for homicide laws in the Deuteronomic and priestly texts. In the former, the people Israel bear bloodguilt; in the latter, it is the land that is polluted by it. The technical term for bearing bloodguilt damo bo or damo be-ro’sho, meant originally “his blood [remains] on him/on his (the murderer’s) head” (Josh. 2:19; I Kings 2:33; Ezek. 33:5), and the legal formula mot yumat damav bo (Lev 20:9-16) means that in the case of lawful execution, the blood of the guilty victim remains on his own person and does not attach itself to the executioner.[11] [Emphasis original]

    Reventlow suggests that rasah means a homicide liable for blood vengeance. The problem with this analysis is that it appears to get things backwards. A killing is liable for blood vengeance and requires punishment or atonement presumably because it is wrong or unlawful. It is not unlawful because it requires punishment. The commandment must be prior to the ground for blood vengeance not vice versa. This observation also leads to a conclusion that does not really differ from Stamm’s. After all, a killing is liable for blood vengeance only if it is wrong so a killing liable for blood vengeance and an unlawful killing are in fact co-extensive.

    By itself then neither interpretation seems entirely correct. In my next post, Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II, I want to suggest a way of interpreting the passage which avoids the above problems. It is hardly original; it was suggested by Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century.


    [1] Exodus 20:13 KJV.
    [2]
    Augustine The City of God 1:21.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4]
    Johann J. Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967) 98.
    [5]
    This passage is perhaps best illuminated by a passage in Job 24:14, “When daylight is gone, the murderer rises up and kills the poor and needy; in the night he steals forth like a thief.” This suggests that a person who broke in at night could not be distinguished from a person with murderous intent. The law also contrasts with Ancient Near Eastern case law of the same period, which allowed a person to summarily execute a thief caught on his property. The Torah states by contrast, “A thief must certainly make restitution, but if he has nothing, he must be sold to pay for his theft.” Hence, it teaches that a thief cannot be executed for theft; a thief can be killed only if he or she is perceived to be a threat to one’s life. If not, the thief must pay restitution.
    [6]
    Brevard S Childs Exodus: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1974) 419-420.
    [7]
    Ibid, 420.
    [8]
    Lewis B Smedes “’Respect for Human Life’ Thou Shall not Kill” in On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics Ed. Stephen E Lammers & Allen Verhey (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987) 144.
    [9]
    Stamm The Ten Commandments in Recent Research 99.
    [10]
    Childs Exodus 420.
    [11]
    Jacob Milgrom Numbers: The Traditional Hebrew Text with the new JPS Translation (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990) 509.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Interpreting the Sixth Commandment Part II

  • Sunday Study R 13: Romans, Revelations and the Role of the State

    In a previous post, Sunday Study: 666 The Number of the Beast, I exegeted Revelation 13’s infamous reference to the mark of the beast, in that post I argued that the first beast is a reference to Rome; a world empire, built on seven hills that ruled over all the nations of the earth at the time of John’s writing. The historical context of the book was the emperor cult; the roman state, in the person of the emperor, was considered a god and was to be worshiped. The reference to 666 (616 in some early manuscripts) was probably a Jewish literary technique known as gematria applied to Nero Caesar, who was the sixth roman emperor after the “Five” [who] have fallen”; and hence; is the one “who is.” In its historical and literary context then Revelation 13 was exhorting Christians, who lived during the Neroian persecution, to resist the emperor, to refuse to worship the state as divine and to resist Christian or Jewish religious authorities who encouraged them to do so. To see my full argument for these conclusions, readers should read the linked post above; here I simply want to revisit one important point that occurs in the text;

    And the dragon stood on the shore of the sea. And I saw a beast coming out of the sea. He had ten horns and seven heads, with ten crowns on his horns, and on each head a blasphemous name. The beast I saw resembled a leopard, but had feet like those of a bear and a mouth like that of a lion. The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority.(Re 13:1-2)

    The first beast, the roman emperor, is said to get its “power,” “great authority” and “throne” from the dragon. The imagery of the dragon is explained later in Rev 20 as “that ancient serpent, who is the devil, or Satan.” The text then explicitly states that the Roman Empire and the emperor’s authority, was satanic. While space does not allow me a full treatment here, the text goes on to predict the destruction of the Roman Empire and those who support it.

    Why the excursus into apocalyptic literature? Because it is important to put in context another, more well known passage, which is widely quoted; the locus classicus passage on obedience to the state in Romans,

    Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor, then honor. (Romans 13:1-7)

    The contrast here is important, in both Revelation 13 and Romans 13 we have a reference to the roman emperor. In Romans the emperor’s authority has been established by God and he is a servant (minister) of God, Christians are called to submit, obey and to not resist the state. In Revelations 13 the Roman emperor and empire is said to gain its authority from Satan, is implicitly said to be a minister of Satan and Christians are called to not submit to or obey its demands to absolute obedience and worship.

    The contrast is fairly evidently explained by the different contexts the passages occur in. The book of Romans was written around 55-57 AD; this puts it just after the death of Claudius and during the early part of Nero’s reign. During this time, Nero was strongly influenced by Seneca the Younger and Barrus and his rule was widely considered to be competent and relatively enlightened. Revelation 13 is written later, after the great fire of Rome in 64 AD where Nero had transformed into the infamous persecuting, brutal, power-hungry tyrant he is immortalised as.

    Similarly, the specific literary context makes the differences clear. In Romans 13, after commanding Christians to submit to authority, the text goes on to give reasons as to why Christians are to do this, “He [the state] is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience.” The reason we submit out of conscience i.e due to a moral requirement, is because the state is God’s servant and this is explicated as “an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” The context makes this clear when after spelling out that governments are God’s servants the text explicates this as “he [the state] is God’s servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God’s servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer.” In other words, the government acts as an agent of God in its function of commending good and punishing evil.

    Revelation 13, however, is not talking about the emperor punishing wrongdoing and commending good;

    The dragon gave the beast his power and his throne and great authority…. Men worshiped the dragon because he had given authority to the beast, and they also worshiped the beast and asked, “Who is like the beast? Who can make war against him?” The beast was given a mouth to utter proud words and blasphemies and to exercise his authority for forty-two months. He opened his mouth to blaspheme God, and to slander his name and his dwelling place and those who live in heaven. He was given power to make war against the saints and to conquer them. And he was given authority over every tribe, people, language and nation. All inhabitants of the earth will worship the beast–all whose names have not been written in the book of life belonging to the Lamb that was slain from the creation of the world. (Rev 13)

    Here the context is quite different; rome is a world empire, which makes war against other nations and through violence gains dominion over every tribe, nation and language. It is a state that demands worship and absolute obedience and which persecutes and murders innocent people. In this context, Christians are called to resist it and its authority is said to be from the dragon.

    This is vitally important because some people apparently misinterpret Romans 13 to support absolute dictatorship. A correspondent of Madeleine’s once wrote the following,

    “Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established.” To be blunt the above makes me feel sick. I don’t think the Nazi regime, or fascist Italy can be compared to the individualism that occurred in the birth of the United States. How can you hold these in the same regard under the excuse that they’re established by God? The only bromidial, evasive and ludicrous comeback that the victims under those totalitarian regimes got was “its God’s purpose and plan” even if you don’t understand it just have faith and follow Christ.

    Madeleine’s correspondent here interprets Romans 13 to teach that dictatorships and totalitarian regimes are instituted by God and are morally on par with limited governments. He also seemed to think that throughout history Christian theologians have never addressed this issue but have just told people to “have faith and follow Christ” in the face of being governed by dictators and tyrants.

    Apart from the flawed understanding of the history of theology, the author here misunderstands the passage. Romans 13 needs to be read next to Revelation 13. When one does this one sees that the picture is quite different. Romans 13 says that states that use force, “the sword,” to punish the guilty and to defend the innocent act as Gods agents and hence, have legitimate authority which must be respected. Revelation 13 states that when states grossly exceed their mandate like the Nazi unjust conquest of other nations, persecution of the innocent and Hitler’s deification of the state are not exercising a legitimate, God given, authority but rather are portrayed as something satanic.

  • Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?

    The assumption that ‘it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others’ is almost unilaterally accepted in society. Everyone knows this, only zealous religious types seem to believe that it is acceptable to try to foist their morality onto others; the concept of respecting other people’s beliefs seems to be lost on the religious.

    One does not have to look far to see this assumption at work; in the Aotearoa Ethnic Network Journal atheist commentator, Ken Perrott, writes,

    Non-religious people have the right to be free from interference by religious people and organisations, freedom from proselytising, and freedom from imposition of values, morality and practice. I don’t think religious people should see this as in any way violating their rights. If anything, it helps preserve the sacredness of their beliefs –imposition on others degrades a belief.

    Perrott is clear; those with religious beliefs should not demand that others comply with their views on morality. This criticism is not new, we see it regularly in the media and it is equally prevalent in academia. In her book, The Abortion Myth, bio-ethicist Leslie Cannold writes,

    In the United States, the feminist rejection of the moral had a strong connection to the anti-choice religious right’s promotion of itself as the “moral” voice of the Republican movement. The agenda of the Christian right is, to put it rather baldly, to make the Bible (rather than the secular U.S Constitution) the supreme law of the land. The United States religious right, like most religious extremists, believe their political beliefs are actually God’s will. … [Feminism is opposed] to one religious group’s imposition of its rather narrow version of morality on a pluralistic society.

    Cannold states that any appeals to Gods will, as laid down in the Bible, constitute an imposition of moral views onto others. Feminists such as her, she assures us, oppose such things.

    I find the claim, that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others, strange. Despite widespread acceptance to the contrary, I see nothing objectionable in imposing moral beliefs onto others.

    While this comment may strike many as absurd, I assure you it is not for the following reasons. First of all, to claim that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is self-defeating. Second, the contention is subject to serious counter-examples. I’ll explain what I mean.

    If it is wrong to impose one’s beliefs onto others then it follows that one is required to refrain from such impositions; further, any attempt to impose moral beliefs should be prevented. However, this claim is itself a moral belief and as we’ve just established, it is being imposed on others. Therefore the claim is self-defeating, those who defend it are attempting to impose a moral belief about not-imposing moral beliefs onto others.

    As for the counter examples, consider acts such as rape, assault or infanticide. I personally believe each of these practices is wrong for me to engage in. Further, I think it is wrong for others to do these things. In fact, I even support the commission of these acts being considered a crime punishable by the state. I am sure most would agree with me. However, if it were wrong to impose moral beliefs onto others then our position on rape, assault or infanticide would be unacceptable. We would have to leave others free to choose whether they wished to rape, assault or kill children – to do otherwise would be to impose our moral beliefs onto others.

    Perhaps I am being uncharitable; Perrott and Cannold and others who advocate the claim, do not object to such impositions in an unqualified manner and certainly do not intend to promote anarchy. Their objection is that it is inappropriate to impose certain kinds of moral principles upon others.

    The types of principles Cannold means to catch are those she labels “narrow”. What is meant by this spatial metaphor is unclear; however, I presume she means that this is a minority religious view, held by only a small segment of society.

    Implicit in this argument is the claim that a necessary condition for any principle to be advocated as a basis for rules binding on all people is that the majority accepts the principle. However, this majoritarianism modification to the claim that it is wrong to impose your moral beliefs onto others is equally flawed.

    Consider a culture where the majority believes that a husband has the right to beat his wife. Would Cannold contend that in such a society criticism by a Christian-feminist minority of this practice and their advocacy of norms forbidding spousal abuse is an unacceptable imposition of a narrow religious perspective in a pluralistic society? Would it be true that in such a society public policy could not be based on the moral principle that it is wrong for a man to beat his wife?

    The objection to imposing one’s “narrow” moral beliefs onto others is flawed. What is wrong is not the imposition of someone’s values but the imposition of values that are incorrect, irrational, unethical, oppressive or unjust. If the principles expounded are correct and accurately reflect justice then there is nothing wrong with imposing them onto others, even if they are religious beliefs.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the September 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

  • Sunday Study: Does the Bible Teach that Children Should be Executed for Swearing?

    One command in the Old Testament which is frequently lampooned by sceptical readers is Leviticus 20:9,

    If anyone curses his father or mother, he must be put to death. He has cursed his father or his mother, and his blood will be on his own head.

    Some contend that that this passage commands the courts to execute small children who swear at their parents. Given such a command would be harsh and disproportionate, it is inferred the Old Testament here teaches something unjust and absurd.

    There are several assumptions behind this reading of the Old Testament. First, it assumes the text is referring to the actions of children. Second, it assumes that the word “curse” refers to “swearing” at someone. Third, it assumes that the text constitutes a command to the courts to execute those who do this, which it is intended that the courts will carry out.

    In a previous series, Capital Punishment in the Old Testament, I have addressed the third assumption; I noted that capital sanctions in the Old Testament were probably not intended to be carried out by the courts, rather they served an admonitory function and in practice the courts substituted capital punishment for a monetary fine to be paid to the victim. I also think the first assumption is questionable, though in this post I will not pursue this line of argument, instead I want to address the assumption at hand, the idea that “cursing,” when this word is used in the Old Testament, refers to swearing at someone.

    The Hebrew word translated “curse” here is qalal which basically means to “despise or treat with contempt.” By itself this is somewhat vague and context is needed to determine what exactly it refers to. In their commentary on Exodus, Jonathan Walton and Victor Matthews note, “Contrary to the NIV translation, studies have shown that the infraction here is not cursing but treating with contempt. This is a more general category and would certainly include the prohibition of 21:15 which forbids striking a parent.” They go on to note that the commandment is intended to ensure, “that each subsequent generation provide their parents with the respect, food and protection they deserve.” The studies Walton and Matthews refer to are comparative studies of the Pentateuch with other ancient near eastern legal codes, which provide interesting information about the cultural and legal context into which the Old Testament spoke. Walton and Matthews note how “contempt for parents” was understood in ancient near eastern codes such as the Code of Hammurabi and various Sumerian laws. According to the case law of the time, contempt for one’s parents involved such things as disowning them when they were old and physically assaulting them; it was considered a serious legal matter.

    This understanding of the word “curse” is borne out by its use elsewhere in scripture. In the proto-history flood story God states, “I will never again curse the ground for man’s sake, although the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth; nor will I again destroy every living thing as I have done.” Here “curse” is clearly not God swearing at the ground; the idea is that God treated the land with contempt by flooding it.

    In Gen 12, God tells Abram, “I will bless those who bless you, And I will curse him who curses you; And in you all the families of the earth shall be blessed.” Here again the issue is not merely swearing; the word curse is antithetical to the word bless and the context tells us that Abram will bless all nations, this blessing involves bring salvation to the Gentiles. When the word “curse” is being used here then the idea is of people who express contempt for Israel by trying to harm them.

    Perhaps the clearest example is seen in a similar context which occurs only a few verses before the one in Leviticus 20:4, this is the use of the word “curse” in Lev 19:14, “You shall not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling block before the blind, but shall fear your God: I am the LORD.” Here cursing the deaf is condemned; the word translated “curse” is the same word used in Leviticus 20:4 and the context, grammar and genre are sufficiently similar to suggest the word is being used the same way. Yet it is evident, I think, that the word “curse” here does not mean swearing; the reason for this conclusion is that the command to “not curse the deaf” occurs alongside another command to not “put a stumbling block in front of the blind.” Given a blind person cannot see, putting a stumbling block in front of them could cause them to trip, fall and injure themselves. Hence, what is being condemned is an attempt to cause a person an injury. Hence, the command to “not curse the deaf” occurs alongside a command to not attempt to injure the blind.

    What makes this significant is that, frequently in Hebrew literature, writers will use a method of parallelism whereby two clauses are placed side by side that have a similar meaning. It is clear from an examination of Leviticus 19 that a type of parallelism is being utilised in this chapter, consider the following examples from the immediate context,

    10 Do not go over your vineyard a second time or pick up the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and the alien. I am the LORD your God.

    12 Do not swear falsely by my name and so profane the name of your God. I am the LORD.

    13 Do not defraud your neighbor or rob him. Do not hold back the wages of a hired man overnight.

    15 Do not pervert justice; do not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly.

    16 Do not go about spreading slander among your people. Do not do anything that endangers your neighbor’s life. I am the LORD.

    18 Do not seek revenge or bear a grudge against one of your people, but love your neighbor as yourself. I am the LORD.

    In each instance above what is prohibited in the first half of the verse is the same type of action which is prohibited in the second half. In fact, in most cases what comes in the second half explains and illuminates what is forbidden in the first half. In v 10 what occurs side by side are gleaning and taking all the grapes from ones field leaving none for the poor. In v 13 defrauding is a kind of robbing and it is evident that the issue is withholding pay. In v 15 showing partiality to the poor is condemned then favouring the wealthy is too. In v 16 spreading slander is condemned alongside endangering a neighbours life (the concern with slander relates to the bearing false witness in a capital crime, which allows us to see the parallel here). In v 18 bearing a grudge and taking revenge are juxtaposted. The immediate context then suggests that when two commands occur side by side in the manner they do in v 14 that the commands address the same basic fundamental issue. Treating the disabled with contempt (cursing them) involves actions such as attempting to injure or harm them.

    Two other lines of evidence suggest this; the first is the command in Leviticus 20:9, which is a repetition of the same command in Exodus 21, “If anyone curses his father or mother, he must be put to death. He has cursed his father or his mother, and his blood will be on his own head.” It is interesting to see the context that this law occurs in,

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately, take him away from my altar and put him to death. Anyone who attacks his father or his mother must be put to death. Anyone who kidnaps another and either sells him or still has him when he is caught must be put to death. Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death. “If men quarrel and one hits the other with a stone or with his fist and he does not die but is confined to bed, the one who struck the blow will not be held responsible if the other gets up and walks around outside with his staff; however, he must pay the injured man for the loss of his time and see that he is completely healed. “If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his silver.” If men who are fighting hit a pregnant woman and she gives birth prematurely but there is no serious injury, the offender must be fined whatever the woman’s husband demands and the court allows. But if there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.” If a man hits a manservant or maidservant in the eye and destroys it, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the eye. (Ex 21:12-26)

    The command to, “put to death” a person “who curses his father or mother,” occurs in the midst of a series of commandments that all deal with violent assaults on other people. All the immediate verses deal with contempt expressed in violence in the form of assault, kidnapping or homicide. Clearly, the kind of contempt being expressed here is, if one takes the context seriously, more than simply a verbal insult.

    The second and perhaps for Christians, more important line of evidence is that Christ himself cites this passage. In Matthew 15 Christ is challenged by the Pharisees as to why he does not follow certain oral traditions about washing. His response is to go on the counter attack,

    Jesus replied, “And why do you break the command of God for the sake of your tradition? For God said, ‘Honor your father and mother’ and ‘Anyone who curses his father or mother must be put to death.’But you say that if a man says to his father or mother, ‘Whatever help you might otherwise have received from me is a gift devoted to God,’ he is not to ‘honor his father ‘ with it. Thus you nullify the word of God for the sake of your tradition. (Matthew 15:3-6)

    Here Jesus cites the command about not cursing one’s parents and applies it not to swearing but to attempts to escape the duty to provide for one’s aged parents by devoting the money to the temple. Jesus contends that traditions that sanction such subterfuge violate the command to not curse one’s parents. He clearly understands the command in terms of contempt and in terms of the kind of case law Walton and Matthews refer to. It is worth bearing in mind that in an ancient society like this, with no state superannuation, failure to provide for one’s parents in their old age could have terrible results. Hence, far from being unjust or absurd the commandment is quite understandable.

    [1] Jonathan Walton and Victor Matthews “The IVP Bible Background Commentary: Genesis Deuteronomy” (Downers Grove Il: Intervarsity Press) 112.
    [2] Ibid 113.