Category: Theology

  • Hear Dr Matthew Flannagan speak on “In Defence of Divine Commands”

    You’re invited to a Thinking Matters Auckland, God, Morality and Society, event:

    What: Dr Matthew Flannagan speaking on “In Defence of Divine Commands”
    When: Tuesday 4th August – 7:00pm
    Where: Lecture Room 2, Laidlaw College, 80 Central Park Drive, Henderson, West Auckland
    Format: Talk followed by questions, answers and discussion.
    Cost: Free but donations are appreciated

    Are God’s commands irrelevant when we discuss moral and ethical questions? Many claim that this is the case and offer the following as an argument against Divine Commands: either an action is right because God commands it or God commands it because it is right; the latter renders God’s commands superfluous, if they are right independently of God then God is unnecessary; however, the former renders God’s commands arbitrary, if God commanding an action makes that action right then any action could conceivably be right. Given this, they conclude that God and the commands he issues, should be kept out of consideration of our ethical and moral questions.

    In this talk Matt will challenge this line of thought and will demonstrate that this attempt to dismiss God’s commands from our consideration of ethical and moral issues is flawed and will explain, in layman’s terms, why a Christian should not be intimidated by this argument.

    Matt holds a PhD in Theology, a Masters degree in Philosophy. His area of expertise is Philosophy of Religion, Theology and Applied Ethics. He is an adjunct lecturer in Philosophy for Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute and is currently re-training to be a high school Religious Studies/Philosophy teacher. He has formally debated the Abortion Law Reform Association of New Zealand’s Dr Zoe During and the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanist’s Dr Bill Cooke and his publications appear in international journals of philosophy and ethics. He writes for MandM and has nearly 15 years experience teaching, engaging and challenging secular culture both in New Zealand and internationally.

  • Religion and Science: A Response to Ken Perrott’s “Other Ways of Knowing”

    Ken Perrott, at Open Parachute, took issue with some comments I made in my recent defence of Plantinga’s stance on Evolution being taught in state schools. To gain focus let’s look at one thing I said to Ken in the comments section on that post,

    If the relevant evidence points towards a theory it does not follow that all the evidence points towards it. That’s because there might be evidence which science does not consider, such as theological claims, that are relevant.”

    I went on to say

    …on many issues the relevant scientific evidence is the only evidence, but on questions of origins that is not the case. The question of our origins is both a scientific and theological question so a correct examination of the issue will take into account both the theological and scientific evidence that is relevant to the question. To teach evolution is the true theory of origins one would have to show it is probable on all relevant evidence, and seeing science excludes relevant theological evidence from the discussion it cannot claim to have shown it’s true on all relevant evidence.

    Central to this argument is a distinction between all the relevant scientific evidence and all the relevant total evidence. The argument assumes that science, while a reliable method of gaining truth in many areas, is not the only source of reliable information we have about the world, that on certain topics we can also discover truths about the world through faith and revelation; hence, on these topics an accurate view of the world must utilise both sources of information.

    Ken was clearly displeased with this statement and labeled it the “other ways of knowing argument.” On his own site he asked me to respond to his criticisms; I will do so below.

    1. Much of Ken’s response to this appears to be based on a failure to grasp what I actually said. In the above citation I did not say that evolution was not true nor did I say evolution was not probable on all the relevant evidence. Everything I have said is entirely compatible with theistic evolution, where a person comes to a position based both on the scientific evidence and the theological reflection. I did not say, as Ken repeatedly attributes to me, that “theology trumps science” or that theological reflection is more reliable than science. What I said was that a theory which is probable on all the evidence, that is all the theological and all the scientific evidence, taken together, should be believed over a theory which is only probable on the scientific evidence alone. I also maintain the opposite is true; a theory which is probable on all relevant evidence, drawn from both theology and science should be believed over a theory which is supported by theological considerations alone.

    The issue then, is not that one discipline “trumps another,” it is that a theory is not worthy of consent unless it takes into account all the relevant information from both disciplines. I think that theological and scientific reflections are both reliable methods and our interpretation of both the theological and empirical data can be fallible.

    These clarifications address an awful lot of Ken’s argument such as his statement, “To assert today that we should revert to a pre-scientific era, that theology or philosophy should trump scientific knowledge, is to claim that mythology/logic/reason is more reliable than evidence.” Given that I never said that theology should trump science, this statement is irrelevant.

    Similarly, Ken’s claim that my position “is consistent with the Wedge strategy” is misleading. While it is true that my position is consistent with creationism, as I note above, it is also consistent with evolutionary theory. Contrary to what Ken thinks, the mere fact that two views are consistent provides no basis for linking the views together in a kind of guilt by association argument. Creationism is, after all, consistent with the view that Wellington is the capital of New Zealand; however, this does not mean that everyone who claims that Wellington is the capital believes that the world was created in six 24-hour days. Consider a less palatable example; Hitler’s belief in the superiority of the Aryan race is consistent with the claim that there is a city called Cairo this does not mean that anyone who remembers visiting Cairo is a Nazi.

    2. Ken’s response also appears marred by a failure to adequately understand the meaning of some philosophical terms I use. In the above citation I use the word “true,” Ken says, in response to my use of it, that “the word [truth] means different things to theologians, scientists and people on the street.” In fact, in the above citation I am using the standard Aristotelian concept of truth which is common to both disciplines. Aristotle stated, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” By this definition the claim that the earth is round is true if the earth is, in fact, actually round, and it is false if the earth is, in fact, not round. Similarly in theology, the claim that God created the world ex nihilo is true if there is, in fact, a God and he did, in fact, create the physical universe out of nothing a finite period of time ago.

    Ken seems similarly confused about the meaning of the word “logic” and goes to great lengths to assert that “logic must follow evidence.” However, this simply shows he does not understand logic; logic is the study of rules of inference, that is, logic tells one how to deduce conclusions from evidence. Once this is realised, the claim that logic should follow evidence makes no sense. One cannot deduce or infer anything from evidence without logic in the first place.

    Similarly Ken’s suggestion that science is more reliable than logic is questionable. Science utilises logic to infer its conclusions from the empirical data; logic, therefore, is a presupposition of science that science needs if science is to conclude anything. Moreover, some axioms of logic clearly are more certain and reliable than many empirical claims, the claim, for example, that Both A and Not A cannot both be true, in the same sense, at the same time is more certain that speculations about how first life arose. Similarly with the rule modus tollens, something of which we can be relatively certain, which states: if A, then B, not B, therefore, not A.

    3. Putting aside these misinterpretations and philosophical mistakes, Ken’s main objection is,

    Implicit in the “different ways of knowing” argument, and hinted at by Matt in his comments, is the desire to change the science process to include theological “evidence” and claims that are not based on, or tested by, evidence. To give theology a “free pass.”

    Elsewhere he claims,

    It’s claiming a logic or justification for the theist belief without allowing the normal checking that should go with knowledge claims.”

    Here Ken raises a fairly standard argument:

    [1] that scientific claims differ from theological claims in that the former are empirically testable and the latter are not; [2] lack of testability disqualifies theological claims from being taken into account in theorising about the world.

    This argument is problematic and has been refuted numerous times in the literature; here I can be brief. Turning to [1] Larry Laudan notes “It is now widely acknowledged that many scientific claims are not testable in isolation, but only when embedded in part of a larger system of statements, some of whose consequences can be submitted to test.”[1] Take the claim that there is at least one electron in the universe. To test the truth of this claim we would need a theory about how electrons act under various conditions, what their predicted effects upon things would be and theories about how one could detect these effects if they occur and so on. Only with this kind of background information can we can use the relevant tools to test the predictions; however, in isolation, the claim that there is at least one electron is untestable.[2]

    Second, many theological claims are testable in precisely the same way. Take the claim made by Archbishop Usher that the world was created 6000 years ago. This claim is testable; we can muster empirical evidence to assess the age of the earth. The same is true for other theological claims; take the claim, for example, that the cosmos had a beginning in time, an implication of the theological views of St Augustine or that the universe is governed by laws that can only be discovered by empirical means, an implication of the voluntarist theology of the late middle ages or the claim made by 14th-15th century theologians that, contrary to some interpretations of Aristotlian physics, God did make the universe such that the earth orbited the sun or Augustine’s claim that God created the world with seed principles, via which, the whole creation of the universe could unfound over time or Bonaventure’s theologically based contention that the cosmology of his day was mistaken in claiming that the universe was infinitely old.

    Turning to [2] the suggestion that only testable claims can be utilised in answering a question about the world is also questionable. Ethical statements, such as, “it is wrong to cause pain just for entertainment” cannot be, by themselves, empirically tested yet in answering many questions about what we ought to do it is impossible to get an answer without appealing to them. Moreover, one cannot empirically test anything without presupposing some truths that themselves cannot be empirically established. Hume showed for example that it is impossible to non- circularly justify the reliability of inductive reasoning. William Alston has argued persuasively that one cannot empirically verify the reliability of one’s senses (the reason for this is quite obvious, to empirically demonstrate anything one needs to use one’s senses, and hence, one needs to presuppose the reliability of the source one is trying to prove the reliability of). It is hard to even conceive of a situation where basic axioms of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, could be observably false. Yet science proceeds by presupposing the reliability of the senses, the reliability of inductive reasoning and the rules of logic.

    Ken’s central argument then is mistaken. His other arguments fair no better, such as his attempt to try to link my position with Stalinism;

    So what would the trumping of science by theology/philosophy be like? We have seen some disastrous examples. Such as Stalin’s promotion of Lysenko, trumping of science by Stalinist interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. This put Soviet genetic science back many years and led to the death and persecution of many scientists. In many ways the current theological/creationist/wedge attack on science is of a similar ilk to Stalinism.

    Apart from the fact that I did not espouse creationism or claim that theology trumps science, Ken here seems to think that telling state schools that they can teach a theory is true , as opposed to merely saying that it is the best scientific theory, is akin to arresting scientists, censoring their research, persecuting and executing them!

    Unfortunately, this logic can be turned on its head as the same logic would entail that refusal to teach Christian theology as the truth in state schools is akin to persecuting Christian theologians, censoring their research, persecuting them and executing them; hence, any atheist who objects to their children being taught religion at a state school is advocating some kind of quasi-Stalinist policy.

    Somewhat ironically, however, Ken makes some claims that if taken seriously suggest he is not adverse to religious persecution. Ken states that,

    He [Matt] argues that teaching evolution is actually teaching “fundamentalist children that their religious beliefs are false.” Well, of course that is a problem for fundamentalism, not science. We cannot ignore reality because some silly people are offended by it.

    Ken here implies that state schools should teach that a particular religious perspective is false if “that’s reality.” In other words, if a person’s religious beliefs really are false then it is not unjust for the state to teach this.

    Now as I stated in my original post and as I have repeated several times in correspondence with Ken, this argument is problematic. Both Ken and I agree that Islam is false, that Mohammad is not a prophet. If Ken’s claims were correct then, justice would require that the government run re-education programs for Muslim students telling them that Mohammad is not a prophet. After all, as Ken grants, “this is reality” and the religious sensibilities of other people cannot justify not teaching reality.

    Ken’s second argument is that to fail to tell children that evolution is true is “child abuse.” As I pointed out, however, if this were true then the many Muslim, Christian and Jewish parents who home school their kids with creationist texts or send their kids to private schools where creationism is taught should be arrested, charged with child abuse and punished at law on par with child abusers; further, their children should be placed in state care and sent to state re-education centres. The logical implication of both Ken’s arguments is religious persecution.

    Now I pointed both these points out to Ken when he raised them in previous discussions. Ken’s response was to apparently ignore the response and just repeat the argument. This, however, is not a rational response at all; simply repeating the same mantra over and over does not make it true.

    [1] Larry Laudan “Science at the Bar — Causes for Concern” Science, Technology and Human Values 7: 16-19.
    [2] For example see, Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I
    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

  • Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part II

    This post is the second in my series on Christ’s exposition of the 6th Commandment, the prohibition on homicide, contained in the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5: 21-26. In Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part I, I looked at what The Torah taught about homicide, in this post I will look at Christ’s authoritative interpretation of this teaching.

    But I say to you
    After presenting the formalistic interpretation of “Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment,” Jesus responds with,

    But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judgment. Again, anyone who says to his brother, ‘Raca, ‘ is answerable to the Sanhedrin. But anyone who says, ‘You fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of hell.

    Jesus’ interpretation here goes well beyond merely making the claim that murder is wrong and should be condemned. He suggests that angrily lashing out at people and insulting them with the terms “raca” and “fool” is subject to the judgment of Gehenna. To see what Jesus is getting at, it is necessary to unpack some of these terms.

    The word raca, in Aramaic, means “empty head;” to call a person raca was to contend that they were intellectually deficient. The word translated fool moros has a different connotation, to an inhabitant of Palestine it would call to mind the Hebrew concept of a fool painted graphically Psalm 14,

    The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God.” They are corrupt, they have committed abominable deeds; There is no one who does good. The LORD has looked down from heaven upon the sons of men, To see if there are any who understand, Who seek after God.

    They have all turned aside; together they have become corrupt; There is no one who does good, not even one. Do all the workers of wickedness not know, Who eat up my people as they eat bread, And do not call upon the LORD?

    A fool here is not someone who is imprudent but someone who is positively wicked. The text speaks of those who commit “abominable deeds;” the idea is that such a person is morally corrupt, someone who rejects doing good, someone who is committed to evil.

    The word Gehenna, is a Greek word that refers to “the Valley of Hinnom,” it is usually translated “hell” in modern English. The word “hell” has all sorts of connotations due to centuries of popular imagery and cultural myth; however in Jesus’ time, the imagery was drawn from a known geographical location, the Valley of Hinnom. This place is mentioned in 2 Chronicles as a site where Ahaz and later Manasseh, sacrificed their children to Molech by burning them. The prophet Jeremiah noted that the valley was, in his day, a tophet, a place of mass infant sacrifice where people killed and burnt their children in devotion to Molech, contrary to the commands of God. Jeremiah also predicted a kind of ironic prophetic judgment, after Israel’s military defeat, the valley would no longer be used for sacrifice but instead become a place where Israel would pile their dead until there was no more room.[1] The book of Kings tells us the valley was “desecrated” during the reign of Josiah “so no one could use it to sacrifice his son or daughter in the fire to Molech.”[2] The imagery then, is of a place of great unspeakable shame, desecration, a dumping ground for dead bodies and a place where human beings are destroyed.

    When these things are put together, Christ’s words in this passage are fairly evident. The Torah does more than demand that murderers be brought to justice, it requires that people refrain from slandering the character and intellectual integrity of others out of anger and hatred. Just as The Torah required that murderers be executed and conventional legal practice allows legal suits to be brought against those who defame, so too those who treat others with contempt will ultimately be treated with similar contempt by God.

    Illustrations
    Finally we turn to Christ’s two applications of this interpretation; he states,

    Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to your brother; then come and offer your gift. “Settle matters quickly with your adversary who is taking you to court. Do it while you are still with him on the way, …”

    While these are applications to a cultural situation different to our own, I do not think it is difficult to ascertain the point being made. Christ suggests that if the kind of verbal abuse that comes from seething hatred is condemned by God then merely refraining from killing those we have grudges against enemies is not enough. We need to try to settle our disputes with others and avoid the kinds of conflicts, grudges and animosity that goes with them. Paul repeats the point in his epistle to the Romans, “Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful to do what is right in the eyes of everybody. If it is possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with everyone.” (Romans 12:17-18)

    In Christ’s reference to “leaving a gift at the altar,” the point is made vividly that settling grudges and living in peace with others should be a higher priority than worship. Here Christ picks up a theme articulated vividly by Isaiah,

    “The multitude of your sacrifices– what are they to me?” says the LORD. “I have more than enough of burnt offerings, of rams and the fat of fattened animals; I have no pleasure in the blood of bulls and lambs and goats. When you come to appear before me, who has asked this of you, this trampling of my courts? Stop bringing meaningless offerings! Your incense is detestable to me. New Moons, Sabbaths and convocations– I cannot bear your evil assemblies. Your New Moon festivals and your appointed feasts my soul hates. They have become a burden to me; I am weary of bearing them. When you spread out your hands in prayer, I will hide my eyes from you; even if you offer many prayers, I will not listen. Your hands are full of blood; wash and make yourselves clean. Take your evil deeds out of my sight! Stop doing wrong,

    God calls us to obey his commands. Without this obedience, worship, attending church, partaking in the music, and so on are hollow, meaningless and shallow things. These commands require, not just that we refrain from bloodshed but that we treat our fellow people with respect; that we avoid holding grudges and feuding and as far as is possible we should live in peace with each other. If we do that, the issue of murder should not come up.

    [1] Jeremiah 7:30-34
    [2] 2 Kings 23:10

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part I
    John Loftus on Calvin, Matthew Flannagan and Psalm 14

  • See William Lane Craig and Christopher Hitchens debate: Does God Exist?

    You are invited to a Thinking Matters Auckland, God, Morality and Society, DVD screening:

    What: William Lane Craig v Christopher Hitchens debating Does God Exist?
    When: Tuesday 21 July – 7:00pm
    Where: Lecture Room 2, Laidlaw College, 80 Central Park Drive, Henderson, West Auckland
    Format: DVD followed by discussion.
    Cost: Free – donations appreciated.

    DVD ScreeningIf you were not one of the 4,000 people who got to see it live in April this year at Biola University’s Talbot School of Theology and you do not own a copy of the DVD, this is your chance.

    Atheist commentator, Christopher Hitchens, author of the best-selling God is Not Great and Christian Philosopher and Theologian, Dr William Lane Craig, author of too many things to list here, who packed Auckland University during his debate with Dr Bill Cooke last year, debate the topic: Does God Exist?

    Do not miss this screening – you cannot rent this debate at your video store and this debate is not available online so organise your friends, bring your youth group but most of all be there!

    Thinking Matters’ resident Philosopher of Religion and Theologian, Dr Matthew Flannagan, will be available for Q&A and discussion after the video.
  • Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part I

    This morning I preached a sermon at Riverhead Presbyterian Church on Christ’s exposition of the 6th Commandment, the prohibition on homicide, contained in the Sermon on the Mount. This Sunday Study series is essentially a transcript of today’s sermon.

    Christ states,

    You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, ‘Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.’ But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judgment. Again, anyone who says to his brother, ‘Raca, ‘ is answerable to the Sanhedrin. But anyone who says, ‘You fool!’ will be in danger of the fire of hell. “Therefore, if you are offering your gift at the altar and there remember that your brother has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar. First go and be reconciled to your brother; then come and offer your gift. “Settle matters quickly with your adversary who is taking you to court. Do it while you are still with him on the way, or he may hand you over to the judge, and the judge may hand you over to the officer, and you may be thrown into prison. I tell you the truth, you will not get out until you have paid the last penny. (Matthew 5: 21-26)

    This passage is the first of a series where Jesus contrasts what his listeners “have heard that it was said to the people long ago” with his own teachings. In v27 he contrasts, “You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery’” with his own teaching to not look at another person’s spouse lustfully. In v31 he contrasts, “It has been said, ‘Anyone who divorces his wife must give her a certificate of divorce,’” with his own teaching that divorce is unacceptable except for adultery. In v34 he contrasts, “you have heard that it was said to the people long ago, ‘Do not break your oath,’” with his own teaching about keeping one’s word. The rest of chapter five continues in this manner.

    One way these contrasts are commonly understood is to see Christ as repudiating and rejecting the teaching of the Old Testament and replacing it with his own teaching. The problem is that this goes against the context and genre of the text.

    In the verses immediately prior to these, Christ tells his readers not to interpret his comments as a rejection of Old Testament commands; in v17 he states emphatically “Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them.” In v19 he states, “Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.” The contrast Christ draws in v 20 is not between The Torah and his own teaching but between faithful obedience and the obedience of the scribes and Pharisees. This suggests that Christ is contradicting, not The Torah per se but a particular interpretation of it; he is correcting the interpretation.

    Daube provides confirmation of this. Daube notes the contrast in this pericope between “you have heard it said” and “I say to you”. This, Daube points out, was a common way of setting out rabbinic teaching. The rabbi would contrast an excessively formalistic interpretation of the torah that people had “heard” with a fuller correct one that the rabbi himself expounded. This observation fits precisely other parts of the Sermon on the Mount where the same formula is used.[1] The relevant pericope then can be usefully analysed in three parts. First, “You have heard that it was said,” the excessively formalistic interpretation. Second, “I say to you,” which is Christ’s authoritative interpretation. Finally, Christ draws two applications of the interpretation he has expounded. I will turn to each of these features in turn over a two-part series.

    You Have Heard That it was Said
    What Jesus’ hearers “heard said to the people long ago” was, “’Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.” The word “judgment” (greek krisis) used here refers to legal proceedings.[2] Jesus was succinctly summarising some of The Torah’s explicit teachings regarding homicide. An overview of these teachings follows.

    Then God blessed Noah and his sons, saying to them, “Be fruitful and increase in number and fill the earth. The fear and dread of you will fall upon all the beasts of the earth and all the birds of the air, upon every creature that moves along the ground, and upon all the fish of the sea; they are given into your hands. Everything that lives and moves will be food for you. Just as I gave you the green plants, I now give you everything. “But you must not eat meat that has its lifeblood still in it. And for your lifeblood I will surely demand an accounting. I will demand an accounting from every animal. And from each man, too, I will demand an accounting for the life of his fellow man. “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God has God made man. As for you, be fruitful and increase in number; multiply on the earth and increase upon it.” (Genesis 9: 1-7)

    This passage occurs at the end of the flood story in the proto-history of Genesis 1-11. It outlines a covenant God made with Noah “and his descendants” and with “every living creature … the birds, the livestock and all the wild animals.” Two things are relevant for our discussion here, murder is implicitly condemned and human beings are commanded to ensure that those who are murdered are brought to justice.

    The same teachings are expounded upon in the law of Moses. The 6th commandment of the Decalogue, which occurs in Exodus 20 and also Deuteronomy 5, states, “you shall not man-slay;” this passage teaches that the killing of one human being by another is prima facie condemned.

    Other sections of The Torah outline duties that the community of Israel have towards people who engage in homicide;

    Anyone who strikes a man and kills him shall surely be put to death. However, if he does not do it intentionally, but God lets it happen, he is to flee to a place I will designate. But if a man schemes and kills another man deliberately, take him away from my altar and put him to death. (Exodus 21:12-14)

    The cultural back-drop to this was the ancient near-eastern custom of blood vengeance; the cultural mores of the time dictated that the kin of anyone killed by another were honour-bound to avenge the death of their kinsman by killing the killer. In such a culture anyone who killed another would flee to an altar for sanctuary.

    In this context, the universal pre-Sinai law of Genesis 9 was given a specific application in ancient Israel. If a person killed another then the community had three responsibilities. First they were to determine whether the person’s actions were premeditated and deliberate or whether they were an accident. Second, if they were accidental, the community was to provide institutions that would protect them (the reference to “an altar” and a “place they can flee” to refer to ancient practices of sanctuary). Third, if the killing was pre-meditated they were to execute the offender, that is, bringing the offender to justice.

    After the settlement of Canaan this law was expounded on in Deuteronomy 19 and Numbers 35; the Israelites were commanded to establish a series of cities of refuge, defined as, “places of refuge from the avenger, so that a person accused of murder may not die before he stands trial before the assembly.”

    While an exposition of all the aspects of these institutions are beyond the scope of this post, behind them are the same three requirements I mentioned above. First, if a killing occurred the community was required to determine whether the killer acted with pre-meditation or whether there was some mitigation or accident. This is seen in the laws relating to trials, corroboration by witnesses, perjury, etc that are laid down in The Torah. Second, if the person was not guilty of pre-meditated homicide, the community was to provide the person with protection; this is the very basis of the cities of refuge. Third, if the person was guilty of pre-meditated homicide, they were to execute him. In fact, Numbers 35 goes so far as to state, “‘Do not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death.’”

    In common with other ancient near-eastern laws, several crimes in The Torah ostensibly called for the death penalty. JJ Finkelstein notes that the capital sanctions that occur in ancient near-eastern legal texts, “Were not meant to be complied with literally even when they were first drawn up, [But rather they] serve an admonitory function”[3] Raymond Westbrook notes that such sanctions typically, “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[4] As I argued in my series, Capital Punishment in the Old Testament, in practice such punishments were substituted for monetary compensation. Numbers 35 tells us that pre-mediated homicide constitutes an exception, in this situation the law must be applied literally.

    Interestingly, Deuteronomy suggests that failure by the leaders of the community to establish institutions that protect the innocent from being violently attacked or a failure to execute those guilty of murder, makes those communities (or at least their leaders) complicit in the crime. The reason they are to build cities of refuge is, “so that innocent blood will not be shed in your land, which the LORD your God is giving you as your inheritance, and so that you will not be guilty of bloodshed.” (Deuteronomy 19:10) Further, the murderer must be brought to justice to “purge from Israel the guilt of shedding innocent blood, so that it may go well with you.” (Deuteronomy 19: 13)

    Jesus’ summary, then, of, “Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment,” is an accurate rendition of what The Torah taught. Murder was condemned and a community that failed to respond justly to murder by protecting the innocent from it and condemning those guilty of it violated the command.

    The problem is that this is not all the Old Testament said. In the book of Leviticus it is affirmed that,

    ‘You shall not go about as a slanderer among your people, and you are not to act against the life of your neighbor; I am the LORD. ‘You shall not hate your fellow countryman in your heart; you may surely reprove your neighbor, but shall not incur sin because of him. ‘You shall not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the sons of your people, but you shall love your neighbor as yourself; I am the LORD. (Leviticus 19:16-20)

    Here there is a command to “not act against the life of your neighbour;” literally, to stand by the blood of your neighbour, that is to not refuse to protect or assist a person from danger when one is reasonably able to. Not that alongside it is a condemnation of “hating your neighbour in your heart,” bearing a grudge and lashing out with slander. In other words, The Torah requires not just that one refrain from killing and protect others from being killed, it required an absence of malice and these kinds of expression of it. In my next Sunday Study, Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part II, I will conclude this series by looking at Christ’s authoritative interpretation, “but I say to you,” and the application of the interpretation he expounded.

    [1] David Daube The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 256.
    [2] Don Carson “Matthew” in The Expositors Bible Commentary Volume 8, ed Frank E Gaebelein ( Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 1984) 148.
    [3] J. J. Finkelstein The Ox that Gored (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981) 34-35.
    [4] Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Christ on The Prohibition on Homicide Part II
    John Loftus on Calvin, Matthew Flannagan and Psalm 14

  • Sunday Study: Does the Bible Teach that a Rape Victim has to Marry her Rapist?

    In our recent discussion on the Bible’s teachings on slavery John Loftus asked Madeleine, “if you were raped you should marry your rapist? Get real. … Would you want to be treated the way the Bible says women and slaves should be treated?” Loftus then dedicated a post on Debunking Christianity to Madeleine’s “stupidity” for her answer where he elaborated on his interpretation of various verses on the treatment of women in the comments section. 

    Loftus is not alone in contending that the Bible teaches that rape victims had to marry their rapists. Michael Martin states that,

    when rape is condemned in the Old Testament the woman’s rights and her psychological welfare are ignored.[15] For example: “If a man meets a virgin who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her, and they are found, then the man who lay with her shall give to the father fifty skelels of silver, and she shall be his wife, and he may not put her away all of his days (Deut:22; 28-29).” Here the victim of rape is as treated the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The women apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.[1] [sic]

    Martin is not alone is making this claim, I often hear this claim brought up in dialogues and discussions with those skeptical of the Christian faith. Not long ago a correspondent cited that most medieval commentators taught, on the basis of Deut 22:28-29, that a woman who had been raped was commanded by God to marry her rapist. In particular he referred me to Maimonides who wrote, “by this prohibition a man is forbidden to divorce a woman whom he has raped.”[2] 

    In this post I want to address this line of argument. My response is two-fold, first I will argue that Martin’s translation of Deuteronomy is mistaken, second, I will suggest that the medieval commentators my correspondent referred to actually utilised a different definition of rape to that used today. My conclusion will be that this law does not command a woman to marry her rapist; it rather commands men who have sex with women to follow their sexual advances up with marital commitment, and teaches that failure to do so is forbidden by God.

    Martin’s Translation of Deuteronomy 22:28-29
    Martin cites Deut 22:28-29 as dealing with a situation where “a man meets a virgin who is not betrothed, and seizes her and lies with her.” He immediately states, without argument, that this refers to acts of rape. Although he does not say, it appears this conclusion is based on the verb “seizes” in the English version he cites. Martin imports into this word the connotation of violent, coercive, abduction so that the sexual intercourse that follows is a rape. There are several problems with this claim.

    First, and most obvious, the English word “seizes” is not in The Torah. The word in The Torah is tabas; in Hebrew, tabas “does not in itself indicate anything about the use of force.”[3] While the word can refer to the capture of a city,[4] it is also used for “handling” the harp and flute,[5] the sword,[6] a sickle,[7] a shield,[8] oars or a bow,[9] “taking” God’s name[10] or dealing with the law of God.[11] The word simply means to “lay hold of,” “to take hold of something” or to “grasp it in hand.” The more formal King James translation interprets the passage as, “If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her and lie with her.”

    Second, there are good reasons in this context for interpreting the word in a manner where it does not have a connotation of force or violence. Here I will mention three.

    The first reason is that the context strongly suggests it. Had the author intended to refer to rape then he would have used the word chazak which does carry the connotations Martin plays on. This is reinforced by the fact that three verses earlier the author does refer to a rape. The law immediately preceding this one begins, “But if a man finds a betrothed young woman in the countryside, and the man forces her and lies with her …” here the word used is chazak, which suggests a violent seizure is used. Bahsen notes, “Just three verses later (Deut. 25:28), the verb is changed to simply ‘take hold of’ her – indicating an action less intense and violent than the action dealt with in verse 25:25 (viz., rape).”[12]

    The second reason is that Deut 22:28-29 actually repeats a law which has already been laid down in the book of Exodus. When one examines this law it is clear it does not refer to rape. The word “Deuteronomy” in Greek means “second law;” throughout the book of Deuteronomy, Moses repeats laws already laid down in the book of Exodus, sometimes expanding on them. The Decalogue, for example, which was delivered on Sinai in Exodus 20, is repeated again in Deuteronomy 5. The laws about releasing an ebed (or indentured servant) in Exodus 21:1 are repeated and expanded on in Deuteronomy 15:12-18. The same occurs with the law under discussion. Gordon Wenham points out that that Deut 22:28-29 is a repetition of a law spelled out in Exodus 22:15, which states “If a man seduces a virgin who is not pledged to be married and sleeps with her, he must pay the bride-price, and she shall be his wife.”[13] Here, the penalty for sleeping with an unbethrothed virgin is that the man must marry the woman which is why the man must pay the mohar or “bride-price” to the bride’s father. A mohar was security money (50 shekels) that the groom paid to the bride’s father. It was held in trust for the woman in case the man later abandoned her or divorced her without just cause.[14] Such money protected women from the poverty that could occur if they were abandoned with children. What is important, however, is that we are left in no doubt that in Exodus 22:15 the case deals, not with rape, but with what was traditionally called seduction.

    The third reason is that, to interpret the law in Deut 21:28-29 as a rape is to make God the commander of a morally heinous command. Martin is correct, given what we know about the psychological harm that rape inflicts upon its victims to command that a woman marry her rapist is cruel and hence clashes with strong moral intuitions. Elsewhere I have defended the claim that if one interpretation of divine commands coheres better with our moral intuitions than another then that fact constitutes evidence for the former interpretation. All else being equal, an interpretation that coheres with our pre-theoretical moral intuitions is always preferable. This hermeneutical principle applies here.

    The passage then does not refer to a rape. The Hebrew word does not, by itself, indicate rape and interpreting it this way both ignores the context where the word chazak is used to designate a rape. It also makes the second law inconsistent with the exposition of the same law in Exodus 22:15 and also with our prior moral discernment about what is right and wrong. Seduction, however, is consistent with the meaning of tabas, the context it is used in, the original law it was derived from and it coheres with our moral intuitions. These factors, to me, provide decisive reasons for rejecting Martin’s interpretation.

    It is worth noting that the fact that this passage refers to a seduction and not rape is really not news. Bahnsen notes that, “one will find that many competent authorities in Biblical interpretation understand Deuteronomy 22:28-29 to apply to cases of seduction, not forcible rape;”[15] he lists several,

    Meredith Kline: “The seducer of an unbetrothed virgin was obliged to take her as wife, paying the customary bride price and forfeiting the right of divorce” (Treaty of the Great King: The Covenant Structure of Deuteronomy, p. 111).

    Matthew Henry: “. . . if he and the damsel did consent, he should be bound to marry her, and never to divorce her, how much soever she was below him and how unpleasing soever she might afterwards be to him” (Commentary on the Whole Bible, ad loc.).

    J. A. Thompson: “Seduction of a young girl. Where the girl was not betrothed and no legal obligations had been entered into, the man was forced to pay the normal bride-price and marry the girl. He was not allowed, subsequently, to send her away (Deuteronomy: Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Series, p. 237).
    In Israel’s Laws and legal Precedents (1907), Charles Foster Kent (professor of Biblical Literature at Yale University) clearly distinguished between the law pertaining to rape in Dt. 22:25-27 and the law pertaining to seduction in Dt. 22:28-29 (pp. 117-118).

    Keil and Delitzsch classify Deuteronomy 22:28-29 under the category of “Seduction of a virgin,” comment that the crime involved was ‘their deed” – implying consent of the part of both parties – and liken this law to that found in Exodus 22:16-17 (Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament, vol. 3, p. 412).

    John Calvin: “The remedy is, that he who has corrupted the girl should be compelled to marry her, and also to give her a dowry from his own property, lest, if he should afterwards cast her off, she should go away from her bed penniless” (Commentaries on the Four Last Books of Moses Arranged in the Form of a Harmony, vol. 3, pp. 83-84.

    J. C. Connell: “Although she consented, it was still his responsibility to protect her from lifelong shame resulting from the sin of the moment by marrying her, not without payment of the regular dowry” (“Exodus,” New bible Commentary, ed. F. Davidson, p. 122).

    Adam Clarke: “This was an exceedingly wise and humane law, and must have operated powerfully against seduction and fornication; because the person who might feel inclined to take advantage of a young woman knew that he must marry her, and give her a dowry, if her parents consented” (The Holy Bible . . . with a Commentary and Critical Notes, vol. 1, p. 414).

    Alan Cole: “If a man seduces a virgin: . . . he must acknowledge her as his wife, unless her father refuses” (Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary, Tyndale Series, p. 173).

    James Jordan: “the punishment for the seducer is that he must marry the girl, unless her father objects, and that he may never divorce her (according to Dt. 22:29)” (The Law of the Covenant, p. 148).

    Walter C. Kaiser, Jr.: “Exodus 22:16-17 takes up the problem of the seduction of a maiden who was not engaged . . .. Here the seducer must pay the ‘bride-price’ and agree to marry her” (Toward Old Testament Ethics, p. 107).[16]

    Hence a skeptic who was interested in what the passage actually says could easily have discovered what I have noted by consulting a commentary. 

    Medieval Commentators
    If many post enlightenment and modern commentators realise that this passage is about a seduction and not a rape how does one explain the fact, alluded to above, that many medieval commentators apparently interpreted the passage to refer to rape? Here one needs to be attentive to the fact that words change their meaning over time. Medieval writers utilised a wider definition of rape than modern people do. In the middle ages the word ‘rape’ could include not only what we call rape today but also what was called “seduction,” where a man seduces a virgin he is not married to with her consent.

    Isidore De Seville, for example, stated “seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer.”[17] Similarly, Thomas Aquinas wrote,

    They [rape and seduction] coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed.[18]

    Hence it is not entirely accurate to read the word “rape” in Medieval commentaries as we understand it today.

     

    In conclusion then, it is very doubtful that Deut 22:28-29 commands women who have been raped to marry their rapists.

    [1] Michael Martin “Theism, Atheism and Rape.”
    [2] Moses Maimonides The Negative Commandments 358 translated by Charles B Chavel 324.
    [3] Greg Bahnsen “Pre-Marital Sexual Relations: What is the Moral Obligation When Repeated Incidents are Confessed?”
    [4] Deut 20:19.
    [5] Gen 4:21.
    [6] Ezek 21:11; 30:21.
    [7] Jer 50:16.
    [8] Jer 46:9.
    [9] Amos 2:15.
    [10] Prov 30:9.
    [11] Jer 2:8.
    [12] Bahnsen “Pre-Marital Sexual Relations.”
    [13] Gordon Wenham “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age” Vetus Testamentum 22 (1972) 326-348.
    [14] See the discussion in David Instone Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
    [15] Bahnsen “Pre-Marital Sexual Relations.”
    [16] Ibid.
    [17] Quoted in Summa Theologica II-II Question 15, Article 7, Objection 1.
    [18] Summa Theologica II-II Question 15, Article 7, Objection 4.

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

    In Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I, I articulated and defended Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In this post I will address what should be taught in state schools and look at Robert Pennock’s objections to this argument.

    Part II. Plantinga’s Proposal: What should be taught in State Schools?
    After drawing the above conclusion, Plantinga asks what should be taught regarding origins in state schools? He suggests two answers; the first is to teach nothing on matters of origins,

    One answer is to say: in a pluralistic society like ours, there is no fair way to teach anything about origins; hence public schools ought not to teach anything on that subject. They should instead stick to subjects where there isn’t disagreement at the level of religious or comprehensive beliefs. This would be just a reflection of a more general difficulty in having public schools of our sort in a pluralistic society. Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.[1]

    The second, and perhaps more interesting answer, is to teach both evolution and creationism “conditionally,” Plantinga labels this as his “modest proposal.”[2] To explain this idea of teaching conditionally Plantinga introduces the technical notion of an epistemic base, “for each person P there is an epistemic base, EBP, with respect to which the probability or acceptability of proposed beliefs is to be evaluated.”[3] A person’s epistemic base contains at least four things. First it contains their “current beliefs;”[4] second, as “some beliefs are held more strongly than others,” it includes, “an index of degree of belief.”[5] Third, an epistemic base will include, “prescriptions as to how to conduct inquiry,” how to learn about world, revise beliefs, etc.[6] Fourth, it will include their comprehensive beliefs.[7] Plantinga emphasises that a persons epistemic base is not set in stone but revisable in light of argument.

    Plantinga notes that science, as currently practiced, respects a procedure known as methodological naturalism, “the policy of avoiding hypotheses that mention or refer to God or special acts on the part of God, or other supernatural phenomena, or hypotheses whose only support is the Bible, or some other alleged divine revelation.”[8] While there is dispute over whether science should do this, as currently practised, science does involve commitment to methodological naturalism.[9] This means that science operates with a particular epistemic base; while the epistemic base of science will include things such as logic, mathematics, various common-sense beliefs, there will be certain beliefs that will not go into the epistemic base for science (EBS) at least as currently practised, “Among these would be the belief that there is such a person as God, that God has created the world, and that God has created certain forms of life specially–human beings, perhaps, or the original forms of life, or for that matter sparrows and horses.”[10]

    Plantinga’s claim that evolution be taught conditionally then amounts to this: Evolution can be taught as the most probable theory relative to the current scientific epistemic base. This, he thinks, is uncontroversial and not likely to contradict anyone’s comprehensive beliefs; even a creationist, for example, can grant that, if one brackets various theological claims and operates on methodological naturalism then evolution is likely. What schools cannot do is teach that any particular epistemic base is the correct one to start from or that what follows from a particular epistemic base is true. Plantinga thinks that creationism could be taught in a similar conditional way in state schools.

    Pennock’s Critique of Plantinga
    Robert Pennock offers a critique of Plantinga’s position. Pennock contends that a rational person would not grant parents do not have the sort of prima facie rights Plantinga attributes to them. Instead, a rational person would advocate that evolution be taught as true and creationism or any other theological view be excluded from being taught in state schools.[11] He offers two arguments for this conclusion; the first is that,

    we all know parents who are bigots or ideologues and others who are simply narrow-minded or ignorant. … A good education may be a child’s only window to a clear picture of the world and to an open future. To agree to a basic right would be to close that window. This would be a serious harm for the children of such parents.[12]

    This is a bad argument; it is true that some parents are narrow minded. It is also true that some parents do not feed their children or neglect to clothe them or give them poor medical care; however, it would be grossly unjust to infer from this that no parent has even a prima facie right to clothe and feed their child or make medical decisions for them. Moreover, a parallel line of argument would entail that teachers, schools and governments cannot make education choices either. We are all familiar with teachers and government officials who are bigoted, corrupt and abuse their power. Taken consistently, Pennock’s views would entail that no one could make educational choices for children.

    The second and more substantial argument is that accepting parental rights would “gut the curriculum of state schools.”[13]Pennock notes,

    … there are thousands of special interests groups that would use such a right to prohibit the teaching of specific facts or even whole subjects they objected to. One does not have to look far to find parents who would object to teaching about racial equality, the facts of reproductive health, or that even that the earth is round. Only the utterly trivial could have a chance of escaping the gag of basic rights. No rational person would agree to such a policy.[14]

    Pennock here suggests Plantinga’s position would prevent anything being taught at state schools and he takes this as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that parents have the kind of rights Plantinga contends they do. Three points can be made in response to this.[15]

    First, Pennock misconstrues Plantinga’s position. Plantinga’s view is that, “it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.” [Emphasis added][16] Consequently, it applies locally not globally. In a Native Indian reserve, for example, it would be unjust for state teaching of things that were contrary to the comprehensive beliefs of Native Indians.[17] It would not follow, however, that one could not teach these things in a school in New York, for example, where there are hardly any Native Indians who continue to believe these cultural practices.[18] Hence, the fact that almost everything is incompatible with someone’s comprehensive beliefs is irrelevant. Schools do not have to accommodate the views of everyone; they only need to accommodate the views in their area.

    Second, Plantinga stresses that parental rights are prima facie rights not absolute rights; they can be overridden in certain circumstances. Interestingly Plantinga alludes to one such circumstance in the very paper Pennock critiques,

    Of course a basic right is a prima facie right… The majority might also insist on teaching the denial of certain comprehensive views, Nazism, for example, in which case the fair thing to do would be to exclude the Nazis from the contract (and also exclude them from the tax liability).[19]

    Here Plantinga considers the very examples Pennock raised; situations where a minority has bizarre or repugnant views which the majority feel compelled to warn their own children about and it is clear that in such situations one does not need to adopt a gag rule for all state schools. One simply establishes a state school based on the views of the majority in the area in question and grants the minority freedom to opt out of these schools and an exemption from education taxation.

    Third, suppose that Pennock is correct and there is too much disagreement over comprehensive views to have a state school system and also respect the rights Plantinga attributes to parents, does it follow that we should not respect parental rights? Not at all, an alternative is to not have state schools; Plantinga notes, “Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.”[20] An alternative could be to establish a network of private schools where parents could choose which school meets the needs of their children, basing their decisions in part on their comprehensive beliefs.[21] Some private schools could teach evolution and others could choose not to and parents could choose which ones to send their children to.

    In other words, if it is true that it is impossible to have a centralised state education system and accord parents prima facie rights of the sort Plantinga suggests, then that is an argument against having a centralised state education system. It is not, as Pennock suggests, a compelling argument against parental rights.

    Conclusion
    I conclude then that Plantinga’s position is defensible. Regardless of whether evolution is true or empirically founded it is unjust to teach the children of parents who have theological objections to evolution that it is true. State schools which have a sizeable clientele who hold such views should teach it only conditionally or not at all. Alternatively, the government should allow these people to opt out of state education and grant them a tax rebate.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 787.
    [2] Ibid 789.
    [3] Ibid 787.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 788.
    [9] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism?” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith49 (1997) 143-154; M Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24(1)(2005) 44-60.
    [10] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 788.
    [11] Robert Pennock “Should Creationism Be Taught in Public Schools?” Science & Education 11(2) (2002) 111-133.
    [12] Ibid 129.
    [13] Ibid 128.
    [14] Ibid 127.
    [15] I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his helpful comments here.
    [16] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 786.
    [17] Ibid 782.
    [18] Alvin Plantinga suggested this example in correspondence
    [19] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 782.
    [20] Ibid 787.
    [21] Here again I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for confirming this suggestion.

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    Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I