Category: Theology

  • Some Thoughts on Human Embryonic Stem-cell Research

    Given Barack Obama’s reversal of the ban on federal funding for research on new lines of human embryonic stem-cells, I thought I might add my own thoughts on the issues around stem-cell research. My thoughts are somewhat tentative; largely because, unlike many in the media, I don’t see the issues as clear cut or as obvious as either side makes out.

    I want to address one really bad argument in favour of human embryonic stem-cell research which gets repeated ad nauseum in the media. This is the repeated claim that human embryonic stem-cell research holds “great promise;” this promise offers the hope of discovery of cures for numerous debilitating diseases. In the media this is often accompanied by stories about Hollywood stars such as Michael J. Fox and Christopher Reeves who suffer(ed) from Parkinson’s disease and spinal cord injuries respectively. We are informed that stem-cell research might hold the key to curing these kinds of conditions, the implicit assumption (not actually stated) is that: any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified.

    Barack Obama apparently agrees with this argument as he stated,

    Medical miracles do not happen simply by accident … They result from painstaking and costly research from years of lonely trial and error, much of which never bears fruit and from a government willing to support that work.

    The problem with this line of argument is that this implicit assumption is false. Two examples will help illustrate the point; the first is from a leading proponent of abortion the second comes from a defender of human embryonic stem-cell research.

    Judith Jarvis Thomson points out that if a doctor painlessly kills a group of healthy patients and harvests their organs, an even greater number of people can be saved from potentially fatal conditions via organ donation.[1] It is, in fact, conceivable that forcing people to under go various medical procedures such as kidney or bone marrow transplants would result in numerous people being saved from fatal illnesses.

    Despite the ends, neither killing people nor enforcing compulsory transplants are permissible practices. Although such procedures may save people from or promote the happiness of others and in some cases might be life saving, they do so by unjust means; namely, killing and assaulting innocent human beings.

    Don Marquis suggests a second case regarding experimenting on human beings and refers to the Tuskagee study where participants were not informed of their syphilis status and without consent were denied treatment for the purposes of medical research, the infamous Willowbrook experiments which involved experimenting upon mentally retarded children in order to ascertain information for fighting diseases such as Hepatitis and the Nazi experiments upon concentration camp inmates to learn how to combat hypothermia. Regarding these experiments Don Marquis notes

    The Tuskegee, Willowbrook and Nazi studies were wrong, not because they were bad and useless science, but because the human subjects in them were treated inhumanely … There is now a consensus, both in society and in academic bioethics that this is wrong even when the research will clearly benefit the common good. In short conformity with a respect for human subjects principle is a necessary condition of morally permissible research whatever its benefits.[2]

    I contend that Marquis is correct in these sentiments. What made such experiments wrong was not that they failed to bring about the significant results they aimed at but rather that the means they used to do so were unjust and involved disrespecting and degrading human beings. Hence, even if important advancements in understanding what syphilis does to the human body, how to combat hypothermia or hepatitis have been achieved the experiments should still be condemned.

    It seems clear the inherent assumption that, any action that promises to find a cure for horrible medical conditions is justified, is false. In assessing a method of medical research one needs to focus not just on the potential benefits of the research but also the means by which these benefits are brought about. In particular, one needs to ask whether the research involves activities such as killing human beings or subjecting them to degrading treatment without their consent.

    The problem of course is that in the human embryonic stem-cell debate this is precisely what is at issue. Human embryonic stem-cell research involves destroying human embryos. Hence, the central question must be,

    Is an embryo a human being at the point such destruction occurs?
    (Embryonic destruction occurs prior to segmentation, segmentation occurs around 14-21 days post conception).

    If it is then the fact that Christopher Reeves could have regained the ability to walk or Micheal J. Fox might find a cure for Parkinson’s disease are irrelevant. The fact that you are a Hollywood actor or the President of the United States does not mean that other people can be destroyed and killed for yours or others medical welfare.

    So, is an embryo a human being prior to segmentation?

    Let me state categorically that I know of no argument for the conclusion that an embryo is a human being at this stage. I believe there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being, which I spelt out in my PhD thesis and I have defended in my academic publications and on this blog. I think that the arguments against attributing humanity to a fetus, such things as the claim that a fetus is not viable, is not sentient, lacks brain function, lacks self-awareness, etc all fail. But the fact that there are good reasons for thinking a fetus is a human being does not entail that there are good reasons for thinking that an embryo is prior to 14 days post conception.

    However, this is not as significant as one might think, because while their may not be any argument for accepting that an embryo is a human being at conception, there may be no good argument against this either. Further, a plausible argument can be made that in the absence of any reasons one way or the other, the morally correct thing to do is to refrain from destroying embryos.

    Take this analogy, which I have adapted from James Humber,[3] suppose I am in the bush hunting deer. I am informed by radio that at some point on Friday morning a party of school children is going to be hiking along the deer trail where I am hunting. After 9:00am on Friday morning I hear rustling and see movement in the bushes. Despite careful examination I am unable to ascertain whether the movement I see is a deer, another animal, the wind or a human being. Am I justified in shooting at the target?

    The answer is clearly no; in fact, even if the deer I am hunting has unusual shaped antlers which I could sell for millions of dollars on Trade Me, the proceeds of which I plan to donate to a local children’s hospital which will help many children be cured of diseases, it would still be wrong to shoot. This is because

    (i) I know that at some point in the morning, in that place a human being will be present;
    (ii) It is morning and I am perceiving a living object in that place; and
    (iii) I am unable to identify whether what I perceive is human or not.

    It would be an act of gross recklessness or negligence to destroy the target because these three facts are in play. Something similar seems to occur in the case of human embryo destruction.

    I know that at some point that, between conception and the fetal stage, a human being comes into existence. I know that an embryo is in existence at this period of time. Hence, unless I have reasons for thinking it is not human it is seriously immoral to destroy it.

    So the real question is whether there are any reasons for thinking that an embryo prior to segmentation is not a human being. The arguments, however, are quite tricky and deal with some interesting metaphysical questions about identity. Perhaps one of them is successful, but even if it is, the continual pontification about Christopher Reeves, Michael J. Fox or the constant reminder about the diseases that human embryonic stem-cell research may lead to cures for does not provide any reasons, at all, for thinking an embryo is not human or that research of this type is ethical. In fact Barack Obama has stated that he does not know at what point in development an embryo becomes human; when asked this questions he answered:

    Whether you are looking at it from a theological perspective or a scientific perspective, answering that question with specificity is, you know, above my pay grade.

    The fact that so many people, including the President of the United States, support destroying a human embryo without even bothering to address this central question is deeply disturbing.

    [1] Judith Jarvis Thomson “Killing Letting Die and the Trolley Problem” The Monist Vol. 59, p 205.
    [2] Don Marquis “Stem Cell Research: The Failure of the New Bioethics” Free Inquiry, Winter 2002 Vol. 23 # v1.
    [3] James Humber, “Abortion the Unavoidable Dilemma” Journal of Value Inquiry 9:2 (1975): 286.

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    Marquis, Pruss and the Twinning Argument
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1

    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    Imposing You Beliefs Onto Others: A Defence
    Published: Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criteria – A Critique
    Published: Abortion and Capital Punishment – No Contradiction

  • An Eye for an Eye and Turning the Other Cheek

    In The Autonomy of Ethics David Brink complains that “tradition and scripture may speak but in conflicting ways”;[1] in a endnote he cites a single example,

    Inconsistency is at stake, for example, when we juxtapose the Old Testament doctrine of an “eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:23, 24; Leviticus 24:19, 20; and Deuteronomy 19:21) and the New Testament doctrine of “turning the other cheek” (Matthew 5:38-42; Luke 6:27-31).[2]

    Brink contends that the “doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” (commonly called the lex talionis) and the New Testament teaching of “turning the other cheek” are contradictory. I will argue that this claim is mistaken; first I will respectively outline what the “doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” and the teaching of “turning the other cheek” are then I will ask whether Christ’s expounding of the latter is inconsistent with the former.

    What is the Lex Talionis?
    Brink refers to Exodus 21:23-25.

    If there is serious injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,25 burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.

    This passage is repeated in several other passages.[3] The Phrase expresses a legal formula which is expounded in proverbial form. The principle is that whatever punishment is imposed (in the immediate case the punishment is a fine) must be proportionate to the harm inflicted on the victim.

    Sarna notes, “[r]abbinic tradition understood the biblical formulation to mean monetary payment and not physical retaliation”[4] and he defends this interpretation. Drazin notes that the Halacah in b. B.K 84a and Sanhedrin 79a and Mek each understand the phrase to refer to a principle of commensurate compensation.[5] Plaut states that “few passages in the Torah have been so thoroughly misunderstood” and suggests the text is best understood as requiring “the value of an eye for the loss of an eye”, “the value of a limb for its loss and so on”.

    I have defended this way of interpreting talionic formulae in the Torah in a previous post, here I will add that the context makes this evident. Verses 26-27 apply the principle expounded in v 23-25 to an assault upon an ebed (ebed is often incorrectly translated with the English word slave, it actually refers to a form of indentured servitude).

    If a man hits a manservant or maidservant in the eye and destroys it, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of a manservant or maidservant, he must let the servant go free to compensate for the tooth.

    An ebed is a person working off a debt. The requirement to release his servant forces the assailant to write off the debt his/her victim owes him/her. The context clearly understands the lex talionis as the payment of commensurate monetary compensation.

    What is Turning the Other Cheek?
    Christ expounds the “teaching of turning the other cheek” as follows, “If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.” Contrary to common misconceptions, this is not referring to a serious assault. David Daube notes that in the rabbinic law of the period, a slap on the cheek was viewed as a paradigm case of an insult where there was no actual harm or damage to the victim. Moreover, the rabbinic exegesis of the period ruled that one could sue a person who insulted him or her in this fashion for damages proportionate to the shame or damage done to their pride. Something that appears borne out by Christ’s observations a few verses earlier where he states that a person who insults his brother (a fellow Jew) “is answerable to the Sanhedrin.”

    Turning the other cheek, then, means refusing to demand compensation for mere insults that do not do any serious damage. Christ is not talking about serious assaults here, as Daube notes, if he did “would the case of a slap in the face not have been an excessively weak illustration of his new position? [Would it not have been necessary] to give a far more serious example”?[6]

    It is also clear that “turning the other cheek” is not incompatible with standing up for oneself. In John 18:23-24 when Jesus himself is struck in the face he does not lash back and demand compensation but he does rebuke the person in question. “If I said something wrong, … testify as to what is wrong. But if I spoke the truth, why did you strike me?”

    Juxtaposing the Two Teachings
    Brink suggests that “when one juxtaposes the Old Testament doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’” and “the New Testament doctrine of ‘turning the other cheek’” there is an inconsistency. Ironically Christ himself juxtaposes both doctrines in Matt 5:38-39, a passage Brink himself cites; Christ states,

    You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth.’ But I tell you do not retaliate against an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also.”

    Brink apparently believes that Christ is here citing the Old Testament teaching and then in uttering “but I say to you” contradicting it with his own teaching.

    The problem is that this goes against the context and genre of the text. At the beginning of the sermon, in which the above juxtaposition occurs, Christ tells his readers not to interpret his comments as a rejection of Old Testament commands, he states emphatically

    Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them[7] … Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven”[8]

    The contrast Christ draws in v 20 is not between the torah and his own teaching but between faithful obedience and the obedience of the scribes and Pharisees. This suggests that Christ is contradicting, not the torah per se, but a particular interpretation.

    Daube provides confirmation of this. Daube notes the contrast in this pericope between “you have heard it said” and “I say to you”. This, Daube points out, was a common way of setting out rabbinic teaching. The rabbi would contrast an excessively formalistic interpretation of the torah that people had “heard” with a fuller correct one that the rabbi himself expounded. This observation fits precisely other parts of the Sermon on the Mount where the same formula is used.

    In v 20 Christ contrasts “You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, ‘Do not murder’” with his own teaching (“but I say to you”) to avoid unjustified angry feuds and insults. In v27 he contrasts “You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery’” with his own teaching to not look at another person’s spouse lustfully. In both cases it is evident that Christ is not rejecting the Old Testament teaching; he is clearly not saying that it is permissible to murder or commit adultery; rather he is rejecting an excessively formalistic interpretation of these commandments.

    When these factors are taken into account it is clear, I think, that Christ is not offering a teaching antithetical to the Old Testament. The original law in the Old Testament permitted a victim of assault to gain compensation from his assailant. The lex talionis existed to limit the damages that could be taken to only that which was proportional to the harm done and no more. Some rabbinic teaching of Christ’s time applied this very strictly so that even a person who had suffered an insult, but no actual tangible damage, could sue his insulter. Christ’s response was to reject this as petty and prideful and as such, a wrong application of this law; in cases of insults it was better to simply let it go rather than seeking exact recompense. Nothing in the passage whatsoever suggests that victims of serious harm are not entitled to proportionate compensation from their assailants.

    When one examines the teachings of the Old and New Testaments carefully, taking into account such things as literary and historical context of the relevant passages, it is far from obvious that the Old Testament doctrine of an ‘eye for an eye’ and the New Testament doctrine of ‘turning the other cheek’ are inconsistent. Here, as elsewhere, Brink’s objection to theological ethics is based on a superficial exegesis of the traditions he is objecting to.

    [1] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [2] Ibid, 164.
    [3] Exodus 21:23, 24; Leviticus 24:19, 20; and Deuteronomy 19:21 as cited by Brink.
    [4] Nahum Sarna J P S Commentary: Exodus (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1991) 126.
    [5] Israel Drazin, Targum Onkelos to Exodus (New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1990) 215.
    [6] David Daube The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism (London: Athlone Press, 1956) 256.
    [7] Matt 5:17.
    [8] Matt 5:19.

  • Brink on Dialectical Equilibrium

    In my last two posts, I have criticised David Brink’s appeal to scripture in order to argue against the appeal to divine commands in ethics. Brink anticpates the kind of argument I have offered and states,

    A common theistic response to these interpretative puzzles is to endorse the interpretation of tradition and scripture that yields the morally more defensible conception of divine will. This moralized approach to interpretation makes good sense for the theist … God’s omnscience and perfect goodness ensure that his will perfectly tracks all morally relevant facts. But, on this conception of interpretation, so far from our knowledge of God’s will supplying evidence about the nature of morality, it is our beliefs about the nature of morality that are supplying evidence about God’s will. The moralized interpretation of religious scripture and tradition shows religion to be dependent on morality, rather than morality dependent on religion.1

    Brink raises several issues here. First, he refers to a “moralized” interpretation of scripture. As I noted in my previous posts, however, it was not primarily moral concerns that motivated this interpretation of The Torah, it was also such things as understanding the Genre, the context, the cultural milleniu into which The Torah speaks. That said, I do agree with Brink that if one interpretation of divine commands coheres better with our moral intiutions than another then that fact constitutes evidence for the former interpretation. All else being equal, an interpretation that coheres with out pre-theoritical moral intuitions is always preferable.

    Second, Brink assumes that his conception makes “religion to be dependent on morality, rather then morality to be dependent on religion.” By dependent here, Brink means epistemologically dependent, adopting it that “so far from our knowledge of God’s will supplying evidence about the nature of morality, it is our beliefs about the nature of morality that are supplying evidence about God’s will.” Brink’s contention is that if I rely on my antecedant moral beliefs to test purported interpretations of God’s will then religion is (epsitemically) dependent on morality. I think Brink is mistaken. in fact this claim contradicts the very method that he advocates in constructing a secular ethical theory.

    In setting out his methodology, Brink draws a distinction between particular moral claims “as in the claim that it would be wrong for Ben to break his promise to Sam” and rules “as in the claim that one ought to keep one’s promises.”2 Brink distinguishes rules from principles which are more general still.3 Brink suggests that there may be “a plurality” of basic principles or “there might be only one master principle, such as the principle of utilitity-which demands that one ought to perform actions that promote human happiness-or Kant’s categorical imperative-which demands that one always treat rational agents as ends in themselves and never merely as means.”4 Brink goes on to note that there is an asymetrical dependence relationship between moral claims at these levels. Particular moral actions are made right or wrong in virtue of general rules, and general rules are made right and wrong in virtue of principles.

    Brink goes on to note, correctly, that this does not entail that we always gain knowledge of what is wrong in the particular case from our knowledge of what is wrong in more general cases. Brink notes that “asymetrical metaphysical dependence does not imply asymetrical epsitemic dependence” this is of course entirely correct; I made the same point in my post, On a Common Equivocation. Brink states that in some instances he is more certain that “the holocaust was wicked” than he is “about the truth of utilitarianism or Kant’s categorical imperative.” One way to determine which principles are correct is to test them against particular cases.

    Brink affirms that “this conclusion suggests a methodology for secular moral theory”5 which is that,

    We can try to resolve uncertainty or disagreement at more particular levels of moral thought by trying to find plausible or common ground at a more general level. But we can also try and resolve uncertainty or disagreement at a more general level by testing the implications of a potential moral principle for particular case against our own independent assesment of those cases.6

    Brink refers to this method as “dialectical equilibrium,”7

    If a principle has counter intuitive implications, this counts against it. But if this counter intuitive implication is fairly isolated, and the principle explains our views better than alternative principles, then this is reason to revise the particular moral judgment or moral rule that conflicted with the principle. Ideally, we modify our principle, considered moral convictions, and other views in response to conflicts, as coherence seems to require, until our ethical views are in dialectical equilibrium…. As such, we have some reasonable expectation that any acceptable theory should accommodate many of our considered moral convictions. On the other hand, dialectical equilibrium is an ideal that none of us now meets and we can at most approximate. Therefore, we should expect dialectical equilibrium to force some revisions in our moral beliefs, and its hard to say in advance just how revisionary the moral principles with the best dialectical fit would be.8 [Emphasis added]

    Note that dialectical equilibrium allows our antecedant moral judgements to test, revise and correct theoritical beliefs about the nature of morality. But it also allows theoritical beliefs to correct one’s moral judgements. Brink insists on this fact, a moral theory must accommodate many of our considered judgements but he also acknowledges that we would expect a moral theory to also force revisions of some of them. Moreover, one cannot say in advance “how revisionary the moral principles with the best dialectical fit would be.”

    Now I think something like what Brink proposes here is probably correct and something like this method is widely accepted ethical methodology. What Brink seems to not notice, however, is that this methodology is inconsistent his contention of a “moralized interpretation of religious scripture and tradition shows religion to be dependent on morality, rather than morality to be dependent on religion.” Suppose, as Brink points out, people do rely on their antecedant moral beliefs to test and revise purported interpretations of what God commands. This is quite compatible with them also using beliefs about God’s commands to “force revision” of their antecedant moral beliefs. In fact, on Brink’s account, this is compatible with substantive revision of our antecedant moral beliefs on the basis of God’s commands. In many instances then, one’s knowledge of God’s commands will be prior to and the basis for one’s knowledge of right and wrong.

    1 David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    2 Ibid 155.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid 156.
    6 Ibid.
    7 Ibid.
    8 Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

  • Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 2

    In Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1 I suggested that the capital sanctions found in The Torah in most cases were not intended to be carried out, that instead there operated an implicit assumption that a person who committed a serious crime had forfeited their life and hence was to pay a ransom as decided by the courts as a substitute. One area where this claim seems to make particular sense is in the laws governing adultery that occur in the book of Deuteronomy.

    In the article I cited in the previous post, David Brink, addresses Deuteronomy 22: 13-21. Brink claims this teaches “that the community can and should stone to death any women whose husband finds she was not a virgin on her wedding night.”

    I’ll start with two minor points. First, Brink assumes that this is addressed to “the community,” by which I assume he means contemporary communities. This is false; it is addressed to ancient Israel’s community as any reading of the opening chapters of Deuteronomy clearly show. How The Mosaic Law relates to contemporary Christians is a detailed and vexed topic of biblical hermenutics yet Brink ignores the issues and simply assumes that it addresses us directly.

    Second, this text deals with adultery and not pre-marital sex. As Gordon Wenham notes pre-marital sex is addressed a few lines later in Deuteronomy 22: 28-29.[1] Wenham notes that the case Brink cites (Dt 22:13-21) deals with adultery.[2] In ANE law, betrothal was considered a binding marriage; women were betrothed young and often some time before they consummated the marriage. This case deals with betrothed women who after betrothal and prior to consummation has sex with a third party. As I note in footnote 15, this is a minor point. I am sure Brink is not allayed by the fact that she is to be executed for adultery as opposed to pre-marital sex, his problem is clearly execution related; that said, it is important that one not exaggerate what the text says.

    Third, as I argued in Part I, when The Torah prescribes that a person be executed, the implict assumption is that this will not be carried out but some lesser financial penalty will be inflicted as a ransom. This seems to be borne out by an examination of this law.

    Brink refers to Deuteronomy 22:13-21, in particular “if … the charge is true and no proof of the girl’s virginity can be found … the men of her town shall stone her to death.” What Brink does not focus on is the sentence if the charges prove to be false; if the husband is simply slandering his bride. In this instance the husband suffers three penalties, first he is subjected to some unspecified punishment which would be at the discretion of the court. It is clear that this is not execution because the text assumes that he will continue to be married to the women in the future. Second the husband shall pay “100 shekels of silver” to the father and lose his right to divorce. Wenham explains the rationale for this price:

    The husband claims that by giving him a dud wife (for his 50 shekels) his father in law had in effect stolen the sum from him. Two legal principles are therefore applicable those dealing with theft and false witness. The penalty for theft of deposited property is double restitution according to Ex xii7. But according to Deut xix19 and other ancient near eastern laws false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated”[3]

    This explains the 100 shekels; the problem is that it raises an issue which Wenham is aware of. “[A]ccording to Deut xix19 false witnesses were punished with the punishment the accused would have suffered if substantiated.” If this law meant that substantiation of the husband’s accusation would actually result in the execution of his wife then the failure to substantiate his claim would mean that the husband would be executed, but he is not. Apart from the fine to the father, his other punishment is an unspecified punishment (which is not execution) and loss of his right to divorce. It appears then that the actual execution of the woman was not envisaged. Wenham suggests then a substitute must have been envisaged in this text if it was to be read as coherent and consistent with the other laws in Deuteronomy.

    This conclusion seems to be strengthened by several other passages that deal with the same topic. Two chapters later, Deuteronomy 24:1-5, The Torah deals with a case where a man divorces his wife, “who becomes displeasing to him because he finds something indecent about her.” This same passage is cited by Jesus in the synoptic gospels. David Instone-Brewer has argued, convincingly, that the reference to “something indecent” is interpreted by Christ as referring to adultery.[4] This passage then deals with the same situation as Deuteronomy 24; the text tells us she is divorced and by implication loses her mohar money but is silent on any other punishment. However, the woman is clearly not executed as she marries another man in v 2. This makes sense if the capital sanctions for adultery function as admonitory devices and in practice, a ransom was made as a substitute (possibly alongside a lesser sentence) but it does not make sense if a women who was discovered to have committed adultery by her husband was required to be executed.

    A similar picture emerges in a second passage Wenham cites. In the book of proverbs the author warns his son about adultery and refers to the judicial consequences that will ensue if he does not heed this warning.[5] It is clear that a ransom substitute is envisaged, moreover, it suggests that if the husband refuses to accept a ransom payment the adulterer will suffer blows and disgrace, note that execution is not envisaged. In fact, the discussions in Proverbs suggest the consequences will be financial loss and social ostracism. This all makes sense on the hypothesis mentioned in Part 1 but does not make sense if adultery was in fact punished by death. Wenham notes this point and draws the conclusion that in Deuteronomy 22:13-21 the law envisaged a substitute.

    In conclusion, sceptics like David Brink often cite passages like Deuteronomy 22:13-21 in horror to discredit Christianity. However, they erroneously assume superficial literalistic renditions of the passages in question. In this instance, the genre of the passage, in light of the common ANE legal practices and customs suggests that capital sanctions function as a kind of hyperbole and in practice a ransom was paid and the punishment mitigated.

    This practice is implicitly assumed in many of the Old Testament laws about homicide. Further, reading it this way renders the laws in Deuteronomy consistent with each other and with the reference to adultery in the book of Proverbs. I will add finally, that it also coheres better with our moral intuitions in the way a literalistic reading does not.

    [1] In “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age,” Vetus Testamentum 22 (1972) 326-348, Gordon Wenham points out that the same law is also spelled out in Exodus 22:15 and it is treated as a relatively minor offense; the penalty is simply that the man must pay the “mohar” to the bride’s father. A mohar was security money (50 shekels) that the groom paid to the bride’s father. It was held in trust for the woman in case the man later abandoned her or divorced her without just cause. See the discussion in David Instone Brewer Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
    [2] Wenham “Bethulah: A Girl of Marriageable Age.”
    [3] Ibid 332.
    [4] Brewer
    Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible.
    [5] Proverbs 6.


    RELATED POSTS:
    Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1

  • Capital Punishment in the Old Testament: 1

    In “The Autonomy of Ethics,” David Brink writes that a literal reading of the Old Testament,

    [Y]ields problematic moral claims, such as Deuteronomy’s claims that parents can and should stone to death rebellious children (21:18-21) and that the community can and should stone to death any wife whose husband discovers that she was not a virgin when he married her (22:13-21). We have more reason to accept secular scientific and moral claims than we do to accept a literal reading of these particular religious texts.[1]

    In a footnote Brink refers to several other references to capital punishment in the Old Testament for various different crimes.[2]

    I respect Brink’s stature as an ethicist, however, as an interpreter of scripture his work has left a lot to be desired. That said, I find the kind of hermeneutics he employs common in sceptical literature, so I will address what he says here.

    One principle of interpreting literature is to interpret a text according to its genre. One does not read poetry, for example as science or scientific theorems as songs or math texts as romantic fiction. The book of Deuteronomy, in terms of its structure, literary form and language, parallels the structure and language of Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) legal texts. Many of the cases given are similar to the cases and laws in these texts. As such, this raises the issue as to how references to capital punishment function in such texts.

    In a study of ANE legal corpus, Raymond Westbrook notes that seemingly harsh penalties are common in such codes. In old Babylonian law, the hand that assaults is severed; a man who kisses another’s wife has his lips cut off; a person who steals bees is to be stung by bees; a person who had thrown his victim into an oven was to be thrown into an oven; a man who raped another’s wife would be sentenced to having his own wife or daughter raped; a negligent builder whose house collapsed and killed another’s son would be sentenced to having his own son killed, and so on.[3] In fact, the Code of Hammurabi states that if a man knocks out the eye of one of the upper classes, his eye must be knocked out.[4]

    Not only are these punishments harsh but they both appear inconsistent with the legal practice that occurred in these cultures and also with themselves in some instances. Westbrook notes “[s]ome law codes impose physical punishments and others payments for the same offenses, while some codes have a mixture of the two.”[5] Westbrook notes that the contradiction is only apparent because “in highlighting one or the other alternative, the codes are making a statement as to their view of the gravity of the offence.”[6] The laws “reflect the scribal compilers’ concern for perfect symmetry and delicious irony rather than the pragmatic experience of the law courts.”[7] The method used in legal texts was “to set out principles by the use of often extreme examples.”[8]

    Westbrook points to the practice of “ransoming” as providing an explanation of how this worked in application. In ANE legal practice a person who committed a serious crime would be considered to have forfeited their life or limb, this, however, did not mean they were executed or mutilated. Instead they could ransom their life or limb by making a monetary payment and/or agreeing to some lesser penalty, usually decided by the courts. This background was implicitly accepted and understood to apply.

    Westbrook is not eccentric in this view. J J Finkelstein makes a similar point reflecting on what appears to be very harsh capital (and sometimes vicarious) sentences in the code of Hammurabi and the absurdity and impossibility of putting them into practice. As Finkelstein notes, one law which states that a physician whose patient dies in surgery or is blinded by surgery is to have his hand cut off. Finkelstein remarks that “it is inconceivable that any sane person in ancient Mesopotamia would have been willing to enter the surgeon’s profession if such a law were literally enforced.”[9] On the other hand, “if a system of ransom were assumed where the life of the builder or his son could be redeemed and the hand of the physician could be redeemed by pecuniary ransom, these laws would not only have an admonitory function (for which the more graphic statement of the penalty–execution or mutilation–is more effective), but would also be practical as law.”[10]

    He concludes that Mesopotamian penalty prescriptions,

    [W]ere not meant to be complied with literally even when they were first drawn up, [But rather they] serve an admonitory function. If one would be bold enough to restate Hammurabi’s 230 as a direct admonition it might run to this effect: “woe to the contractor who undertakes construction and in his greed cuts corners”.[11]

    Interestingly many commentators of The Torah have noted it appears to operate with the same assumption. This is particularly evident with the laws regarding homicide. Ex 21: 29-32 deals with a case where an ox gores another person to death due to negligence on the part of the owner. The penalty stated is that the negligent person shall be put to death. However, immediately preceding this, provision is made for a monetary fine to be paid instead of execution. Joe Sprinkle comments,

    [V] 29 applies the principle of [life for life], a man whose negligence has caused the loss of a life forfeits his own life. But v. 30 goes on to show that this operates within a system that permits a payment of money to take the place of the actual execution of the offender.”[12]

    Sprinkle goes on to conclude, “In sum, there is good reason to suppose that the death sentence of v. 29 is mostly hyperbole to underscore the seriousness of negligence which threatens the life of another human being.”[13]

    A second example cited by Sprinkle occurs in the book of Kings. Here an incident is mentioned where a person has committed a capital crime. The sentence is announced “a life for a life”; however, the immediate context shows what this sentence was. “It will be your life for his life or you must weigh out a talent of silver.” Sprinkle notes that here again “’life for life’ in the sense of capital punishment has an explicit alternative of monetary substitution.”[14]

    Perhaps the clearest example is on noted by Walter Kaiser. In Exodus 21:13-14 the law clearly distinguishes between accidental and premeditated homicide. If a man who has struck another and killed that person (an analogous case to a man striking a woman and killing her) seeks sanctuary, he is to be provided it unless he “lay in wait” for his victim. Jackson notes that “lay in wait” referred to premeditated homicide.[15] In Numbers 35 the same law is expounded in more detail; a homicide where a person “lay in wait” is contrasted with a homicide where the assailant “attacked him suddenly without enmity.”[16] This appears to be a reference to an intentional but not premeditated attack such as a ‘crime of passion.’

    After laying out clearly and repeatedly that the a person who kills in pre-meditation “shall surely be put to death” the text goes on to state “’Do not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death… .” Bloodshed pollutes the land, and atonement cannot be made for the land on which blood has been shed, except by the blood of the one who shed it.” Unless there was an assumed practice of “ransoming” the lives of those under a capital sentence, this comment seems superfluous. Sprinkle notes “The availability of ransom seems to have been so prevalent that when biblical law wants to exclude it, as in the case of intentional murder, it must specifically prohibit it”.[17]

    In, Towards an Old Testament Ethics, Walter Kaiser draws the same conclusion,

    The key text in this discussion is Num 35:31: “Do not accept a ransom [or substitute] for the life of a murderer, who deserves to die. He must surely be put to death.” There were some sixteen crimes that called for the death penalty in the OT…. Only in the case of premeditated murder did the text say that the officials in Israel were forbidden to take a “ransom” or a “substitute”. This has widely been interpreted to imply that in all the other fifteen cases the judges could commute the crimes deserving of capital punishment by designating a “ransom” or “substitute”. In that case the death penalty served to mark the seriousness of the crime.[18]

    In my next post I will argue that this understanding of the references to capital punishment in The Torah makes best sense of the laws regarding adultery that Brink cites (also recently raised by Mark V in the comments section).

    [1] David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, ed Michael Martin (Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [2] Ibid, note 17, 164.
    [3] See Raymond Westbrook, “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” in A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law, Vol. 1, ed. Raymond Westbrook (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003) 74.
    [4] Code of Hammurabi, 195-196, also 199.
    [5] Westbrook “The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law,” 71-78.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid.
    [9] J. J. Finkelstein The Ox that Gored (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1981) 34-35.
    [10] Joe M Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22-25 (Lex Talonis) and Abortion,” Westminster Theological Journal 55 (1993) 241
    [11] Finkelstein The Ox that Gored 35.
    [12] Sprinkle “The Interpretation of Exodus” 238.
    [13] Ibid.
    [14] Ibid, 233-53.
    [15] Bernard Jackson. “The Problems of Exodus 21:22-25 (Ius Talionis),” Vetus Testamentum 23 (1973) 288-290.
    [16] Num. 35:22.
    [17] Jackson “The Problems of Exodus” 239.
    [18] Walter Kaiser, “Gods Promise Plan and his Gracious Law,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 35:3 (1992) 293.

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  • Rest In Peace Richard Neuhaus

    It is with sadness that I have just read that Richard John Neuhaus died on Thursday the 8th of January at age 72. There are various obituaries here

    For those New Zealand readers who won’t know. Neuhaus was a Lutheran turned Catholic priest who wrote and commented extensively on issues of religion and public life. His book The Naked Public Square was an important work challenging the modern liberal notion that religion should be privatised and not be utilised in public debate. Neuhaus was was a long time civil rights activist who marched in the civil rights movement, against Vietnam, and became a leading intellectual in the Neo Conservative movement. The journal he edited First Things brought together Jewish, Catholic and Protestant scholars with a conservative bent and produced some of the some of the most thoughtful and insightful commentary on issues related to religion and public life that I have read.

    Neuhaus and his excellent and often sarcastically witty columns will be missed.

  • Mumbai, Muslims & Libertarian Su

    Like most people, Matt and I are pretty horrified at what is going on in Mumbai. We have wanted to write something on it but just now I found this piece by Susan the Libertarian, oft heard quoted on Newstalk ZB.

    Whilst I would not describe the abuse Sus experienced as “feudal nonsense” (chivalry came out of the feudal period) the rest of the article is pretty much what I think.

    Extract from Mumbai, Muslims & Me:

    It could be the latest Frederick Forsyth.

    • Meticulous planning that took more than a year
    • Detailed reconnaissance training
    • Remote mountain camps in Kashmir
    • Marine commando techniques
    • Covert acquisition of ships
    • Hijacking fishing boats
    • Stockpiling weapons while holed up in the Taj Mahal hotel, itself.

    But it’s not the latest Forsyth, more’s the pity. It’s not fiction. It’s commentary from the London Telegraph via yesterday’s Sydney Morning Herald, reportedly from the sole captured Mumbai terrorist, Ajmal Amir Kasab, aged 21. “We wanted to kill 5000,” the newspaper quotes him as saying. Kasab and his cohorts fell a bit short of the mark, getting 172 as of yesterday; 172 innocent people including children, who this time last week were alive and well and planning for long and fruitful lives.


    An end-of-year prize-giving ceremony was held at a secondary school in Sydney last Thursday evening. While the Principal was addressing the large turnout, there was a disturbance in the audience. It quickly became obvious that there was a problem that didn’t look like resolving itself in a hurry. Within seconds the horrified audience watched two students – sisters – gasp with horror and turn white with shock as they were bundled out of the auditorium by weeping family and friends.


    News travels quickly and bad news the fastest of all. It transpired that the girls had just been informed that their father, in Mumbai on business, had been formally identified as one of the murdered.


    Q: Do you think Kasab feels any sorrow – the tiniest bit – for having been party to deliberately taking the life of an innocent businessman from the other side of the Indian Ocean? Of depriving an innocent family of their much-loved dad? Well, do you?


    Unless I have to be elsewhere, I routinely talk to my sister in Sydney every Friday night. We usually yak for ages, catching up with what each other’s been doing and swapping family news. We especially relish reliving old family stories guaranteed to bore all senseless, including the participants. We discuss politics, films, books and important stuff like facts about the Bay City Rollers whom we both loved with a passion 30+ years ago. (I’m not joking. You don’t joke about real love — and that’s what it was, so there). It’s the sort of female phone call that men (most men … like 99 out of 100) just don’t get.


    There was none of that last Friday. It was a sombre call and very brief. You just can’t scream with laughter over abject nonsense when your sister’s colleague is barricaded in the bathroom of his Oberoi hotel room in Mumbai and has been for two days. That the SAS has told him to push a mattress between the door and whatever heavy furniture he can drag over, as a makeshift shock absorber in the event of an explosion. That he’s had little or no food. That he doesn’t know what the hell’s going on for most of the time. That his cellphone’s almost out of battery and the power’s off. That while his Australian passport may (or not) offer some ‘protection,’ his religion, should it be discovered, is another story. You see, my sister’s colleague is Jewish.


    After I hung up, I thought about the first Muslims I ever came across. It was in London’s Paddington where I lived in a grungy place just around the corner from the famous old station. Like Kasab, I was 21. Funds were tight, and I used to walk miles to avoid tube fares. Walking down to Oxford Street involved navigating Edgeware Road, which I always dreaded, thanks to its inhabitants who seemed to consist solely of young Muslim males. These guys never seemed to do anything, except loll about the footpaths mouthing obscenities at passing women. I’ve never been good at taking crap from anybody, least of all sexist pigs, and I was determined to stop them.


    My efforts were in vain. The obscenities became so bad, so quickly, that I sought drastic action. I bought a Walkman, which I had vowed and declared I would never do (being anti-social, you see). I could then cheerfully walk past them all and not hear a thing. I can truthfully say that I detested those individuals, each and every one of them. I would have been delighted to change my mind had I met one – just one – who didn’t look upon me as nothing more than a piece of meat, but I never did. And what really disgusted me was that this feudal nonsense was occurring in one of the world’s leading western capitals.


    Earlier last Friday, Paul Holmes chatted with Mike Hosking and Wendyl Nissen. When he opened the segment by deriding the terror in Mumbai, Wendyl immediately jumped in to remind us all that “not all Muslims are terrorists” and “most Muslims are lovely people,” blah blah.


    I wonder if Wendyl would have been so quick to be so tempered had she personally known somebody trapped and terrified in the Trident-Oberoi right at that moment? Or if her children had received the horrific news of their father’s murder the night before?


    Memo to the Wendyls of this world: Most of us know that all Muslims aren’t terrorists, thanks. Most of us aren’t altogether stupid. But the cold, hard truth is that while not all Muslims are terrorists – all terrorists right now would appear to be Muslim.


    It’s been a long time since I walked down the Edgeware Road. I wonder if the next generation of young western women are being hassled by the next generation of young Muslim males. Something tells me it’d be a safe bet.