Category: Theology

  • What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights

    In my last post, What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined, I noted the position of Nicholas Wolterstorff that, “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” I argued that as stated, this position is subject to three problems; first, that it leads to absurd consequences, entailing that I have a duty to give to every poor person I know about. Second, that it has totalitarian implications and third, that acceptance and practise of this principle would destroy any incentive people have to work.

    In a more recent article “Christianity and Social Justice,” Wolterstorff attempts to defend his thesis against the three criticisms I mention above.

    Turning to the first problem, Wolterstorff’s response is to note that “acknowledging a person’s right to some good does not imply laying on everyone else a duty to extend to that person that good.” This seems odd, if a right to sustenance on the part of the poor does not mean we are obligated to give them the means to sustenance, what bite does it have?

    Wolterstorff puts forward an interesting suggestion. Turning to the paradigm of a right to not be assaulted, Wolterstorff suggests that while we have a duty to not assault people we do not have a duty to protect every person against assault. However, he goes on to note that in addition to having a right to not be assaulted, people have a right against their society “to have practises” and “social structures” that protect them from assault. In particular, such things as a police force, courts and an army. Clearly, if the right does not just mean that members of society refrain from attacking people, it also means that these members have a duty support the police force. Further, if the police force is ineffective, people have a duty to try and improve it (through such things as voting and lobbying).

    Moreover, Wolterstorff suggests if “I see you about to get mugged when no policeman is in view – then I may be obliged to offer you my protection in a direct way.” Wolterstorff’s argument is that sustenance rights are analogous to the right to not be assaulted in this way. People have a duty to support whatever institutions or charities exist that alleviate poverty. If they are ineffective, they have a duty to reform them. Further, if one encounters a person in extreme necessity one is required to assist them in a direct way.

    Turning to the second criticism, Wolterstorff makes three points to get around the totalitarian implications sketched previously. First, he states that,

    the general idea behind having such a right to some good is that individual actions and social practices ought to be such that one enjoys that good. But the role of the government in practices which secure that right may be nil or negligible. Not all rights are enshrined by law. Sometimes in the early church the care for the poor of society was principally in the hands of the bishop.

    He goes on to note, correctly I think, that,

    Far from acknowledging that there is such a right, nothing directly follows as to what, if anything, governments should do by way of securing that right. In particular, it does not follow that the poor should be put on a dole supported by public taxation. In principle there is a wide variety of other practices which would undo the violation of this right, some of which the government would have little or no role.

    Accepting sustenance rights then, does not entail accepting massive public ownership or redistribution.

    Second, he tries to mitigate the objection by appealing again to the analogy with assault; “in our fallen world… we do not suppose that, in the face of all the aggressive impulses of human beings purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our freedom from assault.” He goes on to note, “why should we suppose that, in the face of acquisitive impulses of human beings, purely voluntary arrangements would suffice to secure our right to sustenance?” Finally he notes, “it is true, indeed that there are dangers lurking when governments try to ensure that the rights of the poor are respected. But who would be so foolish as to argue that the armies and police forces that we assemble propose no threat?”

    Wolterstorff makes some pertinent points here. However, it is worth noting that if one takes the assault analogy seriously, several things are evident. First, the police and armed forces actually do not play as big a role in protecting us from assault as it may appear.

    The Police do not patrol everyone’s houses at night, nor does it have 24/7 video surveillance cameras set up on every home, nor do we have publicly funded burglar alarms. If people want any of these things, they hire private security guards, install privately owned cameras and buy their own alarms. The police are called when these systems fail and there is immediate danger.

    It is also worth noting that the ability of the Police to catch and prosecute assailants is limited by such things as the presumption of innocence, the need for warrants, probable cause, etc. In societies with lower crime rates, police typically have more sweeping powers, powers our society rightly rejects precisely to avoid the danger of excess state intrusion and its subsequent abuses. As such, if the state is to secure our rights to sustenance similar limits should apply.

    Turning to the third criticism, Wolterstorff states that while people do not earn their basic human rights by merit, such as the right to be free from assault or the right to liberty, the same is true of the right to sustenance. Wolterstorff notes correctly that a person can forfeit these rights by misdeeds; if a person attacks another his right to be free from assault is forfeited and I can strike him if necessary to defend myself. Similarly, if a person commits a crime they forfeit their right to liberty and can be imprisoned.

    In the same way, Wolterstorff suggests that the right to sustenance can be forfeited if a person is capable of providing for themselves but refuses to do so; just as a needy person has a right against society to sustenance, society has a right against those it supports that they will take responsibility for themselves when they can and not pass of their responsibilities onto someone else.

    As far as I can tell, Wolterstorff’s responses enable him to accept sustenance rights without falling into the problems mentioned in my previous post. It is worth noting, however, his response makes the claim that the poor have sustenance rights significantly qualified.

    What it means is that individuals in a society have a duty to support various institutions that aid and assist those who are unable to provide for their own needs. These institutions may or may not be run by the state but if they are, the state plays a last resort role and is subject to careful checks on its power. This picture may differ from that some proposed by certain types of Libertarian, particularly those who believe we have no obligations to support the poor at all, but it is hardly the charter for statism or massive public ownership

  • What About the Poor? Sustenance Rights Examined

    When I began university I had strong socialist leanings. The reason was that I believed, as a Christian, we had a duty to help the poor. Studying at Waikato University, however, brought me face to face with socialist academics and left-wing activists and I discovered a hostile and dangerous social agenda that I could not in good conscience embrace.

    That, however, left me with a burning question. What about the poor? If the classical liberal or conservative view is correct. What about the poor?

    In the next two posts I want to discuss my thoughts on this a bit. I will do so by examining Nicholas Wolterstorff’s defence of welfare or sustenance rights. I will argue that, as initially stated, Wolterstorff’s position is subject to three problems. In my second post, What About the Poor? More on Sustenance Rights, I will suggest that while Wolterstorff’s position can escape these problems, it does so only by qualifying itself in such a way that there is no necessary link between accepting the poor’s right to sustenance and the kind of statist re-distributionary policies favoured by the left

    In, When Justice and Peace Embrace, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests that “If a rich man knows of someone who is starving and has the power to help that person, and chooses not to, then he violates that person’s rights as surely and reprehensively as if he had physically assaulted the sufferer.” Wolterstorff suggests further that this conclusion is orthodox Christian teaching. He provides citations from Basil, Ambrose, John Chrysostom and Aquinas to substantiate this claim.

    One immediate problem with this line of analysis is it ignores something of the context in which these theologians wrote. They were addressing the situation of alms-giving. A wealthy person living in a small town or village in the Roman Empire would come across destitute people in his community whom would ask for assistance in most cases a wealthy lord would be able to do so. In the age of the mass media, however, things are quite different. It is not just about the poor person down the road; I am regularly bombarded with stories of poverty and suffering of thousands of people all across the globe when I turn on the new or surf the web.

    In this context, to suggest that failure to alleviate any poverty I know about violates the person I fail to help and is analogous to assaulting them is problematic for a couple of reasons.

    First, take my duty (and corresponding right on the part of others) to not assault people. This duty applies 24-7, it is not like I can refrain from assault on Fridays but smash peoples heads in on Sunday. There are 6 billion people in the world, as I have a duty to not assault anyone I owe that duty to all these 6 billion people. Moreover, each one of them holds a right to not be assaulted against me. This is not problematic, because discharging my duty to all 6 billion is not hard, I can do so by refraining from assault.

    Discharging such a duty and its corresponding right, is unproblematic because the duty to not assault is a duty to not do something

    A claim right; a right requiring me to do or give assistance, however, is different. Clearly I cannot give assistance to all 6 billion people in the world at all times. I simply do not have the resources or the ability to do that. Hence, each individual poor person cannot hold a right to assistance against me. At best, I have a duty to help some people, some of the time, with some of my resources.

    A related problem is that unless I live just above the sustenance level and force my family to do the same, and donate every cent I earn above that level to the poor then I will be failing to discharge my duty. Hence, accepting Wolterstorff’s claim would quite literally imply that everyone has a duty to live just above the poverty line. Wealth of any sort is a sin, a conclusion at odds with scripture which commends many wealthy people (like Job and Abraham) as Godly people and not as mass murderers.

    A second problem is the quite oppressive political implications of Wolterstorff’s claim. Given what I have outlined above, if failure to give to a poor person when we can is analogous to assaulting them then every person who does not live just above sustenance level and does not donate everything they own and earn to charity is in fact a serious criminal. A just government would then be required to lock all these people up, their children would end up in foster care and all their property confiscated and given to the poor as restitution. The implications of accepting a right of the sort Wolterstorff affirms is totalitarianism; a system where everyone is poor and anyone else is arrested and detained. The state would be obligated to take almost everything.

    A third problem, which follows on from the first and second, is that if everyone must be self-frozen in their income to just above sustenance level and any falling below it grants one a right to receive what’s needed to get above the sustenance line wouldn’t this destroy all incentives to work or be productive in any shape or form?

    The problems with the idea of ‘sustenance right’ were not lost on Aquinas, whom Wolterstorff interestingly cites. In the Summa Theologica Aquinas addresses the question of whether a destitute person who steals food to avoid starvation has committed theft. Aquinas’s answer is no and he cites with approval the claim of Ambrose of Milan that the poor have a right to sustenance and any property given to those unable to maintain themselves is money they are owed.

    However, Aquinas goes on to offer some important qualifications. First, in the articles prior to this section of the Summa, Aquinas defends the concept of private property and argues that those who claim the private property of others are in sin, further, those who claim we are required to renounce property to be Christians are expounding a heretical doctrine. Second, Aquinas states that;

    Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all
    to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the
    stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of
    those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that
    it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at
    hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no
    other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by
    means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this
    properly speaking theft or robbery.

    Aquinas observations are worth noting. Because there are so many in need and I cannot give to all I am not required to give to every needy person I know of. Instead I have a duty to give some of my money to some needy people and it is my choice to decide who. It follows from this observation that giving to the poor is an imperfect duty. Unlike the duty to refrain from assault it is not a duty to be discharged to all people at all times, but rather it is a duty to give some money to some poor people. But it is at the discretion of the property owner to decide who.

    While there is a duty to give to the poor there is not a duty to give to any specific poor individual and hence no individual poor person has a right to my property (although I will be in serious dereliction of duty if I give to no-one).

    Aquinas does provide an exception; what has been called the case of extreme necessity. As Donagan puts it, if a person “encounter[s] another who then and there needs help, which only he can give without disproportionate inconvenience” then such a person has a duty to give it and the other has a right to such help.

    The medieval position Aquinas expounded is well summed up by Donagan in The Theory of Morality. Donagan suggests that all people have a duty of beneficence, “it is impermissible not to promote the well-being of others by actions in and of themselves permissible, in as much as one can do so without proportionate inconvenience.” By promoting the well-being of others, Donagan means things such as [paraphrasing Donagan] promoting the well being and up-bringing of those who are not adults, especially orphans; helping those who have duties, which owing to bereavement, injury, illness or desertion, they can’t perform without help; restoring to a condition of independence those who have been incapacitated with illness, accident, or injury and caring for those who are crippled, deaf, blind, are chronically ill, or senile.

    However, the principle of beneficence is an imperfect duty. No individual poor person has a right to my assistance except in cases of extreme necessity. Donagan draws the appropriate conclusion; apart from cases of extreme necessity,

    Duties of beneficence, seeing they are not owed to specific individuals generate
    no enforceable rights; and apart from duties of beneficence, no innocent
    person has any obligation to contribute to the wellbeing of others, except as he
    may freely undertake.

    Donagan suggests that the duty to benefit the poor is an imperfect duty to pursue a particular end and not based on a right that another may have. While one has a duty to pursue this end, it is at a person’s discretion as to how exactly they would pursue it.

    It would seem then that social polices based on alleged welfare rights of the poor and the authority of the state to coercively uphold such rights are unjust. While we have a duty to aid the well-being of the poor as an end, no poor individual, outside of cases of extreme necessity, has a right to such assistance and hence one cannot justly be forced or required to give any individual such assistance.

    In my next post I will look at how Wolterstorff responds to criticisms of this sort and how he qualifies his position to do so.

  • Barack Obama and Martin Luther King’s Dream

    A generation ago Martin Luther King stated he had a dream: that people should be judged on the content of their character, not the colour of their skin. Fast-forward to the current day and thousands are celebrating the fulfilment of this dream in the election of Barack Obama as US President.

    There is an irony here; people are saying Obama’s election is great because he is black; it is good that a “black man” has taken office. The result is being evaluated on the basis of the “colour” of the president-elect’s skin. Everyone, who praises Obama’s ascendancy for these reasons, is in fact rejecting King’s dream.

    Ironically King’s dream is being upheld by those conservatives, like Robert George, who opposed Obama’s pursuit of the Presidency on the basis of his character. Such conservatives considered the kinds of values Obama holds to and the policies he supported on the basis of these values to be lacking.

    To celebrate Obama’s election because a black man has finally been elected to office without heeding the concerns about his character is exemplify the very racism that Martin Luther King was speaking against.

  • A Voting Guide

    How to choose who to vote for tomorrow, from Glenn (once again – what can we say? he is brilliant and we ran out of time *ahem*)

    Extract from: So who AM I voting for? (the election blog, part 3)

    Basic Human rights/freedoms
    There are some bottom line human rights and liberties that should always be protected. They’re sometimes called “first generation” human rights. Whatever you call them, here are the big basic things that no government anywhere should neglect, and which no state has any right to diminish. These are the non-negotiables, the rejection of which means that you’re simply morally deficient and unfit to be in power.

    Right to life
    Christians believe that human life is sacred. Humanity is made in the image of God, and as such taking life is a serious matter. Prima facie, we have a duty to not kill. That is to say, if there are no other factors to consider, then killing human beings is always wrong. Some times, of course, there are other factors to consider. Sometimes people are attacked (or their families, friends etc), and in the course of defending themselves they kill the attacker. This is rare, since self defense usually does not require killing anyone, but sometimes it happens. Sometimes this happens not merely on a personal level, but a national one, where your country is attacked by another. Here too, most of us recognise that although we may not want to kill anyone, that may be an unavoidable outcome of defending our country.

    Even in the controversial case of abortion, many conservative Christians accept that – although it is a terrible thing to have to do – there are cases where the very existence of the unborn child poses a clear and imminent threat to the life of the woman carrying the child, and removing the child at an early stage of gestation involves ending the life of that child. It’s the doctrine of double effect – you save life and prevent both mother and child from dying, but a consequence of this is that one of them dies. A more controversial example still for some Christians is the issue of capital punishment. Here, while we have a prima facie duty not to kill people, a person is deemed to have done something so terrible that they give up their right to life itself, and they are put to death.

    None of these scenarios, of course, involves rejecting the right to life, since the right to life imposes only a prima facie duty. But it is still a duty, and the fact that there are a few rare cases where we can take life should not allow us to trivialise this right or duty. For that reason, abortion should be regarded as prima facie wrong (even if there could conceivably be isolated cases where it is permissible), and not merely wrong but such an abridgment of human rights that it ought not be permitted.

    Similarly, because of the value of human life, most forms of euthanasia are likewise not permissible. I say “most forms” because there are some forms of euthanasia that are arguably not killing, or which are sufficiently indirect that they are not morally on par with killing (such as withdrawal of extraordinary means, or death as a double effect resulting from pain relief). Firstly then, I think that any party that has a permissive policy on abortion or euthanasia has a big black mark against it when it comes to being a party worth voting for. I know of only two parties in the election race who pass this hurdle, namely the two Christian parties: The Kiwi party and the Family Party.

    [Support for Abortion is illiberal; any liberal who supports it is inconsistent. Don’t agree? Then read our series and post a reasoned rebuttal.]

    Free speech
    The right to freedom of speech means that if I want to say it, and if I am able to say it, then I must be free to say it and the state should not prevent me from doing so. As with the right to life, this is a prima facie right, and there are limits on what I can and cannot say. Sellers are not allowed to mislead people about products and services they sell, for example. I am not allowed to defame somebody: Say things that are not true or reasonable to believe and which damage another person (for example, I cannot spread rumours that a local retailer is a paedophile in order to get people to come to my store instead). But the right to free speech means that it is wrong for the state to censor or inhibit the propagation of any point of view in society.

    If I want to print and distribute fliers telling people who I think they should vote for, or if I want to rent billboard space to do the same thing – no strings attached, it is something I have a right to do. Of course, nobody has a duty to promote or protect my views, so another person can refuse to use her private property to promote my views (e.g. if I leave comments on her blog she may delete them, because it’s her blog), but that’s an issue of that person’s private property rights, and it doesn’t mean I no longer have a right to free speech. What’s more, free speech doesn’t come with extra conditions.

    For example, the state can’t say “sure, you can voice your political opinion and attack our policies, but if you do then you must wear this big bullseye so that people can identify you in public,” or “OK, so tell people that you’re opposed to our regime, but you’ll have to attach this big yellow star to the front door of your house so that our goons know where to look for you.” That’s not free speech because it’s not free. All it would do is discourage people from expressing themselves via intimidation or fear of reprisal.

    Generally speaking, free speech exists in New Zealand, and few parties pose any sort of threat to it. As far as I know, none of the parties listed in this blog entry would threaten free speech. I haven’t listed the Labour Party or the minor parties on the far left, as they tend to fail just about every single criterion I present here. Free speech is no exception for Labour, who are responsible for the “electoral finance act” that I discussed recently. The act in effect does the same thing as would a law that says you can have free speech as long as you paint a bulls-eye on the door of your family home. Check out my earlier blog entry to see why.

    Property rights
    People have certain rights over their own property. What they earn belongs to them, and it cannot be taken from them without due process and given to others. The government cannot commandeer land that you own for its own projects, and if it requires land you own, you must be compensated at market value. This has implications for taxation as well. Prima facie, the government cannot tax you at all. Only after good grounds have been given for obliging you to pay tax can the government take money from you, and it must be transparently accountable to you for what it does with that money, and continually justify the level of tax taken. Remember, “thou shalt not steal.”

    In addition to what we might think of as basic human rights and freedoms, there are a few other important principles of government that have in common the pursuit of justice and/or the reduction of corruption by state interference.

    Separation of powers / due process
    By “separation of powers” I mean that Parliament, while it has the authority to make laws, has absolutely no authority to enforce those laws, and no role whatsoever in the judicial process. It will respect the decision of the courts, it will not commandeer the police to do its bidding, and it will not influence the likelihood of a person facing (or not facing) charges, among other things. The Labour government and its ministers have blatantly violated each of these principles as I have noted elsewhere.

    Small government / non intervention
    This is really the broad principle underlying many of the rights and principles I’ve outlined here. In a pluralistic society, we all have our own agendas. Some will get married, others will not, some are happy with one type of school or educational method, some prefer others, some people might like one insurance company, some prefer others, some people take fewer risks, and so end up having fewer accidents and less accident related expense, some people make foolish choices and end up disadvantaging themselves and so forth. You get the idea. Small government means that the government does not intrude into private life, and it lets people make their own choices and bear responsibility for the consequences of those choices. People will save money or waste money depending on the options they choose, they will have more or fewer accidents, they will spend more or less on education, and so forth. Likewise, the government might not like the values that parents instill in their children, but it is not the job of government to raise children, that is the role of parents. Likewise again, the government might not like the fact that a court reaches a certain decision, but it is not the job of the government to settle cases, that is the role of the courts.

    In the political tradition that I am partial to, namely the Christian classical liberal tradition, the role of the state is limited by the law of nature. It should only do what the basic precepts of the law of nature (that is, minimal standards of justice and upright living) require of it, and beyond this, it usurps the role of the private sector.

    Safety net for the poor
    Why am I listing this last? Doesn’t the Bible say more about caring for the poor than it does about free trade or property rights? Yes it does. It also says more about worshipping God in song than it does about free speech, but that doesn’t mean we should only vote for a party that promises to create taxpayer funded hymn singing squads. The fact that something is encouraged in the Bible does not automatically mean that we are justified in saying that the Bible advocates it as a duty of the government. Just about every time the Bible says anything at all about caring for the poor, it is clearly speaking about the duty that we as people have, rather than describing government spending programmes. I’m also listing it last to deliberately contrast myself from some Christians who (as far as I can tell) seriously believe that social justice just is wealth redistribution to the poor. Those who think this are somewhat selective in their reading of the Bible. For some reason none of them ever seem to quote 2 Thessalonians 3:10-12:

    For even when we were with you, we would give you this command: If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat. For we hear that some among you walk in idleness, not busy at work, but busybodies. Now such persons we command and encourage in the Lord Jesus Christ to do their work quietly and to earn their own living.

    That being said, there does need to be a safety net for those who fall into genuine hardship. People who are genuinely unable to earn a living (or who are demonstrably doing all that they can to obtain work) and who have no other means of support should be assisted for as long as is necessary. Although by no means a desirable state of affairs, it’s like the Proverb says, “people do not despise a thief if he steals to satisfy his appetite when he is hungry.”

    Far from being some sort of socialism, this has always been a part of a conservative or classical liberal outlook. John Locke gives his rationale for limited welfare in his treatise on government, book 1, paragraph 42:

    But we know God hath not left one man so to the mercy of another, that he may starve him if he please: God, the Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world, but that he has given his needy brother a right to the surplusage of his goods; so that it cannot justly be denied him, when his pressing wants call for it: and therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions; since it would always be a sin, in any man of estate, to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him; so charity gives every man a title to so much out of another’s plenty as will keep him from extreme want, where he has no means to subsist otherwise.

    Likewise in biblical law, allowance was made for those in genuine need to receive something from the surplus of those with plenty. See Leviticus 19:9-10 – “When you reap the harvest of your land, you shall not reap your field right up to its edge, neither shall you gather the gleanings after your harvest. And you shall not strip your vineyard bare, neither shall you gather the fallen grapes of your vineyard. You shall leave them for the poor and for the sojourner: I am the Lord your God.”

    This has particular relevance here because it is not simply moral instruction but law, and therefore enforceable by the authorities.

    What should be pretty obvious in all this is that having basic safety nets for those in genuine need has little (if anything) to do with enormous wealth redistribution programmes to equalise all middle class families and give them advantages over people with no children. One other reason for listing this criteria last is that it really serves no value as a means of distinguishing between political parties in this election. There is no party that stands any chance of being in Parliament that does not meet this criterion in some way. Most parties go well beyond a safety net, and end up pursuing admirable ends by immoral means.

    So how do these parties measure up?

    National
    I won’t say much about National, other than to say that they have painted themselves into a political corner. In order to attract Labour voters, they have become as much like Labour as its own supporters will let it, which is quite a lot unfortunately. Think enormous government, duplicating Labour’s massive welfare programmes, shaving tiny amounts off tax for most people, and calling it a change. There’s no principled stance on matters of human life that I can see, and little to redeem the party apart from the fact that they could be worse (e.g. they could be Labour). It does, however, have two redeeming features (I said there’s little to redeem them, not nothing). One, they aren’t Labour, and two, Stephen Franks (one of the finest politicians in this country, and a former ACT MP).

    United Future
    Ditto for United Future, but add to the mix a leader (Peter Dunne) who will literally support any other party no matter how bad, as long as it gets him leverage as a minister and coalition power broker. This is the man who was happy to prop up the minority Labour Government in exchange for a ministerial portfolio.

    The Kiwi Party
    The Kiwi party presents a strong Christian image, opposing abortion and the legal manufacturing of same sex marriage, but they are a bit of a political Frankenstein – sometimes appearing to favour a socialist state (when it comes to, for example, spending taxpayer funds on pre-marriage counselling), sometimes appearing to favour a more limited state (opposing the so-called “anti-smacking bill” as a government intrusion into the home).

    There’s a statist approach to employment (and effectively job cuts), advocating raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, which is a big nod to leftist voters, and then they’re back in the lower tax camp by advocating income splitting for couples. On the whole they certainly seem to advocate more of a limited government/personal responsibility stance than the current government (additional policies like tax rebates for private health insurance bear this out). So while I like them when it comes to a few specific issues, on the whole I just don’t see them as having a particular political vision or unifying set of principles, and they fail quite badly in some cases when it comes to the scope and power of the government. An improvement? Sure. Will I vote for them? No.

    ACT
    On the whole, the ACT party score very well in regard to the principles that I look for in government, as outlined here. It’s such a shame that they do so abysmally poor when it comes to issues of human life. As a party perceived as being fairly extreme (only because most New Zealand parties contain so many socialistic elements that any party that lacks them appears very different and therefore extreme), it attracts extreme supporters, and like Labour it has managed to capture the affections of some young voters very hostile to Christianity. There’s great potential in what the party quite self-consciously stands for; individual rights and responsibilities, personal liberty, strong policies on justice and other things, but the fly in the ointment – terrible policies that lack regard for the sanctity of life and a support base that contains some crazies – is pretty distracting.

    The Family Party
    Lastly there’s the youngest of the parties that have my interest, the Family Party. OK, least important things first: I hate their party name. It gives the unfortunate and misleading impression that they want to benefit families and forget everyone else. There are people who wouldn’t vote for a party with a name like that. Their policy statements reveal that their concern is much broader than this, so they should have a different name. But that aside, I like what I see.

    They’re the second explicitly Christian party. They have what I think are some great policies on taxation. They advocate removing sales tax on necessities like food and gasoline. Freedom of choice in education is a priority, a welfare policy designed to get people away from welfare, a clearly pro-life stance on abortion, and policies across the board that as far as I can tell line up very well with the values that I outlined at the start of this post. So what’s the drawback? Why am I not coming out in full force telling everyone that this is who I will vote for? The answer lies in a fairly embarrassing pragmatism. In order for a party to get into parliament at all in New Zealand’s electoral system, they must either have one candidate who wins an electorate seat, or they must win at least 5% of the party vote, and I’m not sure that the Family party will do this. If I knew that the party I vote for would definitely get into parliament, I would vote for them in a second. As it is, I still might do so, but my mind hasn’t been made up.

    Ask me who I’m not going to vote for, however, and I’m as clear as day (they aren’t listed here).

  • Some Autobiographical Remarks: How I Discovered Christian Philosophy

    Increasingly so of late, I find myself in conversations, in the receipt of email requests or blog comments asking where to begin and how to expand one’s Christian philosophical understanding. I have been asked to recommend books and places to study and to share my own journey in this area.

    I started my studies at Waikato University in 1993. I was advised by the leadership at the church I attended, a church with some 300 student members I might add, to not study philosophy. I was told that this subject was one Christians should avoid or risk being led astray. However, for the reasons of timetabling, I was left with no option but to study Introduction to Philosophy.

    At that time the only apologists I was familiar with were Josh McDowell and Steve Kumar, who had spoken to our youth group. In Kumar’s book, Christian Apologetics: Think Why You Believe, there was a bibliography and for some reason I decided to go to the University library and follow these books up. I did not end up following the bibliography exactly as the first book that stood out on the shelf when I went into philosophy of religion section of the library was a book called God, Freedom and Evil by Alvin Plantinga and something prompted me to pick it up. I had never heard of Alvin Plantinga and had no idea that I had just picked up the definitive discussion of the logical problem of evil. As a first year student, with no background in philosophy, I actually managed to read it from cover to cover.

    This is not where I recommend people to start, as Plantinga is hard going, but it did give me one advantage. I had not been captivated by a superficial treatment of the issue but by arguably the best treatment of that issue in the literature. Plantinga opened my eyes to the possibilities of Christian theorising.

    I began devouring other authors. I stumbled on Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God, one of the most rigorous arguments for the existence of God written in the last century. I read Paul Helm’s discussion Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time and Reichenbach’s defence of the cosmological argument in Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Following up a footnote in Helm’s book, I came across another author I had never heard of, William Lane Craig and read his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. I discovered Thomas Morris’s The Logic of the God Incarnate (I don’t know why more theologians don’t read Morris) and began reading various anthologies on Philosophy of Religion.

    At the same time I was studying religious studies under Doug Pratt, someone very sympathetic to Lloyd Geering, and we covered the rationality of theism in our Introduction to Philosophy course. I can honestly say the sceptical focus of these courses had absolutely no effect except to teach me how superficial the scepticism I was being subjected to was. To be told by Geering that no intelligent person can believe in God with only brief justification and then be informed that Christianity must be completely re-worked alongside contrasted by the detailed point by point rebuttal of arguments for atheism in my extra-curricula reading by Plantinga and Swinburne meant there was no contest.

    By my second year, I had read Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. This book was absolutely brilliant. Plantinga demolished several common arguments for atheism; however, he also made some astutely critical points against the standard Christian arguments for God’s existence. Two thirds through the book he concluded that the arguments for and the arguments against were inconclusive, he the made what seemed to be a bizarre move and turned to the problem of other minds, he pointed out that the arguments for and against the existence of other people were equally inconclusive and in some cases the arguments failed for reasons very similar to the arguments for the existence of God. Yet, belief in other minds was clearly rational, so why wasn’t belief in God?

    This struck me as odd. Surely belief in God was totally different to belief in other minds. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff changed my stance. Until then I had been devouring books by Craig and Swinburne arguing for the existence of God. Plantinga, however, suggested that there was a flawed method behind the demand for evidence. Many discussions on the existence of God tacitly assumed that there was a neutral body of propositions assented to by believer and non-believer alike. All other propositions were rational only if they followed from this original body by evidence. Plantinga’s radical suggestion was that Christians and non-Christians started with a different body of evidence to each other. The idea of a neutral agreed upon starting point was a fiction and usually incoherent. Frequently assumptions that made sense only from a naturalistic viewpoint were smuggled in to the ‘neutral’ starting point, subtly rigging the debate.

    This opened my eyes, particularly in the area of ethics. I started seeing why people came to the conclusions they did and Christians seemed unable to combat them despite perceiving that there was something wrong with their argument. The idea that religion had no place in public life or scholarship and people had to bracket their faith commitments when answering normative questions meant that the fundamental premises Christians relied on for their conclusions were discounted from the outset. Christians were being forced to justify their conclusions from a perspective that was really hostilely secular but was taken for granted as the neutral starting point that nobody could question.

    I went on to write my Masters thesis in Philosophy on Plantinga’s ideas on faith and reason. I took the lessons I learned into my PhD in Theology and extended them into ethics. At no point, at any institution I studied in, was I ever taught these things in class. The textbooks used contained superficial treatments of Christian ethics that had been shredded by Christian Philosophers. The lecturers hadn’t read Christian Philosophy or if they had, they had only dabbled in it and had a superficial understanding or were unaware of the extent it went focussing on minor players. I had no choice but to teach myself by reading widely.

    So in summation, in New Zealand, there is nowhere (yet) where I could recommend people to study Christian Philosophy. If you want to become proficient in this field you are probably best to enrol in a secular philosophy degree program, and hunt down and read all the counter arguments from the high-level Christian philosophers as you progress.

    As a starting point, accessible to anyone without a background in Philosophy, I would recommend the book Reason for the Hope Within: Alvin Plantinga edited by Michael Murray. This book is hands down, the best introduction to Christian Philosophy and Apologetics as it combines rigour with accessibility to the lay person. I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

    Further, in conjunction with Thinking Matters Tauranga, we are developing a critical thinking course for lay people to teach the basics of logical analysis of arguments, some intro to Christian Philosophy and how to approach common objections to the faith. This will initially be launched in Tauranga early next year but we intend to bring it to Auckland and hopefully make it available more widely from there.

  • Answering the New Atheism: Invitation to a Thinking Matters Event

    Taken from Thinking Matters – Events & Announcements:

    Answering the New Atheism

    Dr Steve Kumar Dip Theo, BA, M Div, PhD

    When: Tuesday 28 October
    Time: 7.30 – 9.30pm
    Where: Bethlehem Community Church Center – 183 Moffat Rd, Bethlehem
    Cost: Free
    Event Format: Live Presentation followed by Q&A and discussions

    In this presentation, Dr Kumar will examine the objections to religion put forward by the New Atheists, showing how they fail the tests of reason, history and common sense. He will then weigh Christianity against the atheist view of the world and show how Christianity better accounts for the source of morality, meaning and truth.

    Dr Kumar has been speaking and writing about questions of religion and philosophy for over twenty five years. He is a frequent debater and guest speaker at universities and conferences throughout Europe, Asia and the Pacific and is the author of many books, including Christianity for Skeptics.

    Thinking Matters
    Thinking Matters is an inter-denominational group where you can come to analyse and discuss some of the deeper issues of the Christian faith in the areas of Philosophy, Science and Apologetics (see definitions here

    ).

    The purpose is to make Christian truth claims more relevant to an increasingly sceptical and secular culture, showing the reasons why we believe what we believe and providing answers that simply make sense.

    Who is Welcome?
    It’s open to Christian and Non-Christian alike – anyone who is seeking the truth in philosophy, science and scripture. You don’t need a philosophy or a theology degree to be able to understand the speakers.

    More on Thinking Matters Tauranga

    More on Thinking Matters

    RELATED POST: The Point of Intellectual Engagement: Why Thinking Matters

  • Guest Post: Laidlaw College’s Mark Strom Responds to Critics

    Some weeks ago I wrote a review on the launch of Laidlaw College. I commented on the new vision for the future and my own reflections and frustrations of studying at its previous incarnation, Bible College of New Zealand.

    The comments section of this post saw the eruption of strong sentiment and criticism of Laidlaw College. The level of tension evident in what was said and the volume of readers concerned about the issue was quite surprising; our site stats record that this entry is one of our most read and most commonly Googled-for blog posts. Under fire was the seriousness of Laidlaw’s commitment to its new stated vision, its ability to commit to it and the employment process around the appointment of one of the new heads of department.

    As we are not party to the hiring practices of Laidlaw and as I was an unsuccessful candidate for the position that came under fire, we did not feel it appropriate to participate in the discussion. However, given the nature of some of the claims made, we have granted Dr Mark Strom, Principal of Laidlaw College, a right of reply.

    Matt

    Mark Strom’s Response:

     

    I’m delighted that the changes at Laidlaw have drawn so much interest. I’m also amazed that so many people (claim to) know (alleged) relationships between institutions, the intentions of board members, the processes of faculty appointments, my motives, the extent of faculty members’ knowledge, and so much more.


    Perhaps I can clarify one or two things.

    First of all, a big thanks to Matt and Madeleine for their very fair and balanced comments on Laidlaw. I personally appreciate encouragement and support from fair-minded friends able to be constructively critique and provoke us to push on.

    Second, people are right that Laidlaw still has a very long way to go. Our best over 86 years has been very significant. But did we become somewhat captive to a dualistic piety and its attendant culture(s)? Yes. Was this true of everyone and everything at college? No. Are we genuinely imagining, articulating, designing and making concrete something more holistic and engaged? Yes. Are there gaps between what we espouse and what we deliver? Yes. Is the trajectory clearly toward teaching, researching and championing real integration of thought and culture around a critically-informed evangelical theology at the highest standards of academic quality, intellectual rigour and serious faith? Yes, yes, and yes. This is our commitment. Piece by piece we are rethinking things and taking decisions that move us toward this. And we’ll take all the constructive criticism we can get from people who can imagine what a difference Laidlaw College could make to New Zealand and beyond, and who will give us room to try, to fall short, to grow and just maybe to succeed.

    Third, a few comments on details raised by respondents.

    Matt is right to note that evangelical organisations sometimes do not follow through on significant reforms. Like every other western institution, two legacies shape us: a Classical tradition that (for the greater part) censured change; and a Judeo-Christian tradition that introduced the appalling innovation (to classical minds) that one could break with conformity and be transformed by a radically changed mindset. Centuries of dialogue, intrigue, enmity and plagiarism between the traditions, overlaid by wave upon wave of Christian convention, has bequeathed an uneasy juxtaposition of conformity and innovation to evangelical institutions and leaders. I know this only too well within myself.

    I am loathe to comment on a colleague (and Rod will be appalled that I have defended him). Were there other candidates? Yes. Were some better qualified as per degrees and writings? Yes. Were these the only criteria for the appointment? No. The following competencies were crucial. First, an ability to see the disciplines of theology through the lens of the Bible’s own narrative structures and in particular the NT witness that the story and its great themes have reached their culmination in Jesus Christ. In other words, to read Christology not as one of many loci of Christian theology, but as that which makes theology Christian. [Barth surely had that right.] Second, an ability to model the teaching of theology as engaged in matters of historical, intellectual and public discourse, ie. worldviews and their impact on society. Third, an ability to inspire teaching around these themes. Fourth, an ability to model a realistic and effective mentoring of students as they seek to choose patterns of personal and public response to God and his world that reflect an integrated faith grounded in the historic gospel. Fifth, the maturity and gifts to nurture a relational culture between academics. Rod was a very strong choice on all these criteria.

    Has Laidlaw reached its full potential as an academic institution? Not by a long shot. Do we have some fine scholars with impressive PhDs and publishing records? Yes. Do we need more of both? Absolutely, and we will seek them. Respondents may be interested to know that earlier this year we completed a faculty restructure process. Three faculty chose not to apply for new roles. All others were rehired under improved conditions for the express purpose of completion of PhDs and the generation of peer-reviewed research publications. Eleven already have PhDs. Six are underway on their PhDs (some nearing completion). Two have begun advanced studies (with highest grades) to progress into PhD studies: one in philosophy at the University of Auckland, and one in ancient history at Macquarie University. We have set the bar high for ourselves, and we have embarked on an ambitious programme of making good on these aspirations. These things do not happen overnight.

    The conspiracists may be interested to know that the Laidlaw board represents a very healthy mix of theological perspectives (within a broad evangelical consensus) and political and economic perspectives, and we enjoy spirited banter and debate on these things. The board ‘relationship’ with Maxim amounts to a few friendships. And why wouldn’t there be?! Many respondents have noted there are far too few individuals and groups in NZ prepared to engage in serious thought and action on matters that shape society. So when you find some, you engage. Do we always agree? Far from it. Do you shun the dialogue because someone has caricatured your dialogue partner (even in this blog)? I choose not to. Ignorant caricatures are one thing, but when someone writes “that Laidlaw, like many other NZ Christian organisations has been captured by Maxim institute and appointments are being made not on academic ability but from the approved Maxim checklist”, this is a stupid comment. Plain stupid…and offensive. If it were naming an individual, it might be considered defamatory. There is no agenda. There is no captivity. There is no list. This comment is ignorant, untrue and offensive to the good people of Laidlaw and of Maxim. [On a personal note, had I voted in the last Australian election (I’m an Aussie), I would have voted for Rudd – I doubt that fits the assumptions of the conspiracists.]

    The question has been raised about whether “we really need a Christian liberal arts college”. I am on record as being against the idea. Like doctoral mentor, Emeritus Professor Edwin Judge of Macquarie University, I always read the early Christians’ distinctive innovations and interactions with Greco-Roman society and thought as evidence for arguing against the idea of a distinctively Christian educational institution. Our forebears showed no sense of need nor ambition to establish Christian structures as alternatives to those of their societies. That evidence and line of inference is still suggestive to me for the modern context. Personally I have long argued against the establishment of university type programmes in Christian colleges. In my opinion, a public university education has afforded both a better education (greater breadth and less cloistered) and a stronger platform for progression into places of influence.

    However, more recently I have come to a different place. Since 2006 I have found myself arguing in favour of this College offering a small number of first class qualifications equal to or better than the best New Zealand universities (yes that is an audacious goal – but closer than some might think in some areas; yes we have a long way to go). My shift of argument has 3 pillars:

    1. I am alarmed at the loss of faith among undergraduate students (some student workers estimate it is as high as 70-80% of students by the end of their programmes). This trend includes Maori and Pacific Island students. I have come to believe the College can and should address this tragedy through the provision of first class tertiary education grounded in a biblical worldview.

    2. I believe the reductionism of knowledge in university programmes has diminished their intellectual and academic rigour and integrity (not of course in every case). I believe in time this diminishes public discourse to the detriment of the nation. I have come to believe Laidlaw can offer a credible alternative education capable in time of influencing public discourse through literate and articulate graduates. Are we there? No. This is an audacious goal that will not come quickly, easily or cheaply.

    3. I believe Laidlaw should prepare (particularly young) women and men more deliberately for leadership in society, as well as in the churches. I have come to believe Laidlaw can equip such leaders for society most effectively through first class qualifications in education and the humanities (we are moving towards a School of Humanities with a PPE style BA degree: philosophy, politics, economics). I believe these qualifications offer appropriate ‘generalist’ educations for placing leaders of faith within education, media, business, health, social services, arts, politics and community leadership as well as continuing to serve the churches. My experience advising heads of corporations (commercial and government) confirms the sense that many employers are frustrated by the narrowness of many bright young university graduates of law, accountancy, commerce, business and engineering. Many are looking for classics and PPE grads. [This was confirmed earlier this year by the global managing partner of one of the world’s highest profile consultancies when I spoke at their global partners conference.]

    My argument for Laidlaw becoming such a College is not a reaction to ‘liberal’ humanism, nor an apologetic for a retreat into a Christian ghetto. On the contrary, I want to argue for a turning of the tables on the assumed hegemony of public universities over higher education. Most of the famed European and American universities began as colleges teaching a breadth of knowledge unified by theology as the core discipline. In short, they started like us. Over time almost every one of these institutions abandoned this theological and epistemological core. In the USA in particular this has prompted the rise of the Christian liberal arts college. [Yes, you may well hear echoes of Wolterstorf, Plantinga and others, as well as my own teacher of many years ago, Cornelius Van Til (and no, I am not a card-carrying VanTillian). By the way, Nick Wolterstorf enthused with me about the vision of Laidlaw when I visited him last year. And yes, that is name-dropping to counter some respondents’ assertions that no one knows or has read anyone.]

    The current education situation seems unnecessarily polarised: it seems we either accept the hegemony of the public university over intellectual discourse; or we retreat into the parallel universe of the Christian college. I no longer accept these as the only options. The time may be propitious for quietly, slowly building a credible alternative to university education on behalf of a nation: an alternative grounded in the theological worldview of historic Christianity, free of the dualistic legacies of traditional piety, and genuinely world-engaging and world-serving in the quality and openness of its teaching, mentoring and research and its contribution to public discourse. As Madeleine points out, this will require and make possible new engagements between Laidlaw College and the public universities.

    To all this talk of excellence I hasten to add our gospel commitment to strength-in-weakness and wisdom-in-foolishness. God delights in nullifying the “things that are” by the “things that are not”. Personally, I am a university drop-out who went on to consult to CEOs of major commercial and government institutions; I am a labourer who earned a PhD in the history of ideas; I am a spare parts salesman who become a principal. Some of the finest young men and women whom we seek as our students dropped out of school, did poorly at school, and generally do not think themselves capable of the kind of academic and personal formation we are seeking to make a reality. So in all our plans for “lifting the bar” we are working hard to establish a dignified, high-quality, effective pathway for those who would otherwise be overlooked.

    We don’t for one moment think any of this can be done easily or quickly. If this is a worthy task, it is a commitment to a generation.

    The notes about William Lane Craig are a bit of a mystery to me. I certainly know who he is (recall my VanTillian heritage). So do others at Laidlaw. I do recall hearing about it late. That happens. It had far more to do with poor communication (perhaps by us) than with ignorance or reluctance. We will endeavour not to make another “academic faux pas of this magnitude”.

    This has ended up a lot longer than I intended when I started. I’d like to frame my final comments (for now) around a thought I muse upon:

    I wonder how many respondents have lead significant institutions and been charged with effecting large-scale structural and cultural change? Or let me put it another way: a lot of people who point out our inadequacies, nonetheless join us in longing for high calibre Christian scholarship that has broken with the captivity of dualism to play a significant role in influencing a nation, society and church, with the gospel. I wonder if these people have the foggiest idea what it takes to position a traditional institution to deliver on such a desire.

    In other words, the ease with which people offer their opinions on what we should or shouldn’t have done at Laidlaw to this point is remarkable. Having been charged with being naïve, it seems only fitting to turn the table.

    Changing an 86 year old institution takes imagination, courage, humility and patience. Fortunately I am surrounded by people with far more of each than I possess. The pace at which we have instituted change has been mind-bogglingly fast for some, and too slow for others. One must honour a heritage and its continuing rich contributions even as one frames a vision that calls for radical changes. You cannot go from financial uncertainty to fully funded PhDs, new faculty and facilities overnight. Governance must be tightened. Financial reporting must be reworked. Deficits must be turned into surpluses. Assets must be reexamined. Accrediting and funding agencies must be given time to appraise and support the new directions. Cultures must begin to shift.

    Those expecting overnight adoption of the conventions and facilities of fine public universities will be deeply disappointed. Public lectures putting theological reflection on the table for the first time for hundreds of people will be viewed as populism. Hiring people with outstanding capacity to forge new trust and integration of gospel, culture and faith will be viewed as far less important than getting impressive CVs. Those with an eye to the long term will recognise strategy; the laying of further foundations (in addition to the fine existing legacies) upon which a great institution can be reimagined and redesigned by people in whom is combined an acuity and humility that will welcome scholars and students who exceed them.

    Can Laidlaw “see past their discovery of the basics”? I think so.

    Will people who read theology and philosophy beyond the popular, and who long for change within churches and evangelicalism and academies and public discourse in New Zealand, give us room to try, to fail, to grow, and just maybe to succeed? Time will tell.

    The Tall Poppy Syndrome is a pernicious, cowardly trait. Laidlaw College seeks an end to its hold over the imaginations and wills of New Zealanders. The fact that we have named a big vision makes us a target. We welcome the support of those with the faith, heart and guts to back something that just might make a difference.

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    Laidlaw College