Tag: Alvin Plantinga

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III

    In Part I of this series, I criticised the rationalist objection to belief in God. In Part II I set out an alternative view of faith and reason defended by Alvin Plantinga. In this final post, I want to address two common objections to the view of faith and reason I have been sketching.

    Argument is irrelevant
    One argument Martin suggests is more of a statement. He claims that by classing certain theological beliefs as basic one puts those beliefs beyond rational appraisal. Once a belief is declared basic, one cannot rationally evaluate it.

    This objection is incorrect. As noted above, a belief is properly basic only if no defeaters are forthcoming for it. Consequently, the belief is not immune to argument. Sceptics could offer rebutting defeaters of theological beliefs, give arguments to the claim that theism is false or they could argue that the concept of God is incoherent or inconsistent. Further, sceptics could offer undercutting defeaters that the grounds that produce theological beliefs are questionable. The assessment of such objections would be vital to determining the rationality of belief in God.

    There are further ways sceptics and believers can engage in dialogue. One could point out inconsistencies or incoherence in a person’s belief set, even if one does not accept the beliefs in question. One can grant a proposition held by one’s opponents for the sake of argument and then point out its implications, show that these implications or the beliefs themselves entail things that the person themself rejects or considers absurd. Further, one can show that the views one person holds follow from beliefs his opponent holds and so his opponent has good reasons for accepting these beliefs and so on.

    Finally, as I noted above properly basic beliefs are foundational beliefs. A foundation needs to be able to support the structure which is built upon it. One important question, then, is to ask what happens if you take a belief as basic, can one reason from it to find plausible, coherent and defensible answers to the various existential and philosophical questions that we use basic beliefs to assist us in answering. C S Lewis put the point well when he stated, “I believe the sun has risen, not because I can see the sun, but because with it I can see everything else.”[1]

    The Great Pumpkin
    Perhaps the most common objection to Christians taking belief in God as properly basic belief is what is called “the Great Pumpkin objection.” Plantinga himself cites this argument,

    If belief in God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly basic? Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we think of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that as basic? Suppose I believe that if I flap my arms with sufficient vigour, I can take off and fly around the room; could I defend myself against the charge of irrationality by claiming this belief is basic? If we say belief in God is properly basic, will we not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything, can be properly taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irrationalism and superstition?[2][Emphasis added]

    A particularly succinct articulation of this objection is made by Keith Parsons, who offers the following reductio ad absurdum of Plantinga’s position,[3]

    (1) “God exists” is a properly basic belief for Christians. (assumption for reductio)

    (2) If “God exists” is a properly basic belief for Christians, then innumerable patently irrational beliefs are properly basic for the groups that endorse them.

    (3) Innumerable patently irrational beliefs are properly basic for the groups that endorse them. (from 1 and 2 by modus ponens)

    (4) But this is absurd.

    (5) Therefore: The assumption “God exists’ is a properly basic belief for Christians” must be rejected.

    Parsons notes, correctly, that this argument hinges on (2) and (4). I agree; however, unlike Parsons, I think these premises are not as well established as he thinks.

    Turning to (2), Parsons suggests that for any argument used by a Christian to justify the claim that belief in God is properly basic there exists an analogous argument for patently irrational beliefs. This, however, is mistaken. I noted above that basic beliefs, even ones that entail the existence of God, are properly basic in certain circumstances. First, they were typically based on grounds, either perceptual or doxastic. Second, they were justified only if there exists no defeaters for them.

    Patently irrational beliefs do not meet these criteria. The reason Parsons’ appeals to patently irrational beliefs is because anyone can see on reflection that they are absurd. But if one can see that a belief is absurd then it is unlikely that it will be a belief that seems true to that person. Moreover, if it is obviously absurd then there exists a defeater for it. One will see that it entails an obviously absurd conclusion; itself.

    If we turn to premise (4) another problem arises. Parsons takes it as absurd that a “patently irrational belief” can be rational. This is true if the word “rational” is used in the same sense both times it occurs in this statement. It is not true if the word “rational” is used in different senses. It is not absurd for a belief to be irrational in one sense and yet rational in another sense.

    We need to ask, then, what sense of rational Parsons has in mind. Now in order for his argument to follow from (1), the word “rational” must be used in an internalist sense. This is because that is how the term is used by Plantinga when he argues that, in specific circumstances, belief in God can be properly basic.

    The problem is that in this sense it is not clear that the claim that the kind of beliefs Parsons refers to are always irrational. Take an example Parsons himself cites, Voodoo. Suppose that a person suffers from some mental disorder which causes her to hallucinate and have a vivid experience, such that, it seems obvious to her that Voodoo is true. Moreover, suppose further, that she has no reason to doubt this experience. She is not aware it is a hallucination and is not aware of an argument against the truth of what she perceives. It seems clear that such a person is rational in the internalist sense, she is not acting irresponsibly given the information available to her. Of course her belief is irrational in an externalist sense, it is caused by brain disorder; and hence, is based on an unreliable process. But this externalist sense is not the sense Plantinga uses when he argues that belief in God is rational in the absence of evidence.

    Perhaps Parsons means to use rational in the externalist sense and his position is that it is absurd to claim that Voodoo could ever be rational in this sense; only a person suffering from a hallucination or mental impairment could actually have experiences such that Voodoo was obvious and fail to see the force of argument. If this is what Parsons means then (4) may well be true, the problem now is that it is false to suggest that an analogue of Plantinga’s argument shows that Voodoo is rational. Plantinga argued that a basic belief in God is externally rational only if it is based on reliable ground and a hallucination is not a reliable ground.

    Conclusion
    I have argued that the rationalist position, that belief in God is irrational in the absence of proof, is incoherent. I have sketched a way of looking at faith and reason under which one is rational in believing in God independently of proof and have defended it against two objections.

    Let me finish by citing from Alvin Plantinga’s famous advice to Christian philosophers,

    We come to philosophy with a range of opinions about the world and humankind and the place of the latter in the former; and in philosophy we think about these matters, systematically articulate our views, put together and relate our views on diverse topics, and deepen our views by finding unexpected interconnections and by discovering and answering unanticipated questions. Of course we may come to change our minds by virtue of philosophical endeavor; we may discover incompatibilities or other infelicities. But we come to philosophy with prephilosophical opinions; we can do no other. And the point is: the Christian has as much right to his prephilosophical opinions, as others have to theirs. He needn’t try first to ‘prove’ them from propositions accepted by, say, the bulk of the non-Christian philosophical community; and if they are widely rejected as naive, or pre-scientific, or primitive, or unworthy of “man come of age,” that is nothing whatever against them. Of course if there were genuine and substantial arguments against them from premises that have some legitimate claim on the Christian philosopher, then he would have a problem; he would have to make some kind of change somewhere. But in the absence of such arguments-and the absence of such arguments is evident-the Christian philosophical community, quite properly starts, in philosophy, from what it believes.[4]

    [1] C S Lewis “Is Theology Poetry?” The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses (Harper Collins, 1980) 140.
    [2] Plantinga “Reason and Belief in God” 74.
    [3] Keith Parsons “Some Contemporary Theistic Arguments” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 108.
    [4] Alvin Plantinga “Advice to Christian Philosophers” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers vol. 1:3, 253-271 available online http://www.faithandphilosophy.com/article_advice.php

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II

    In my previous post I criticised the rationalist objection to belief in God. In this post I want to sketch an alternative view of faith and reason defended by Alvin Plantinga. In my next post I will address two common objections to this conception.

    Belief in God as Properly Basic
    In several of his works Alvin Plantinga has suggested that the best way for Christians to proceed is to take belief in God as properly basic. Let me explain what this statement means. In Part I, I quoted Roy Clouser to the effect that if everything needs to be proven we get an infinite regress of proofs and can never know or rationally believe anything. One obvious way of avoiding this problem is to get to a point where proof is no longer needed, to have a set of beliefs which are rationally believed independent of proof. Plantinga refers to these beliefs as properly basic beliefs. It is important to elucidate carefully how such beliefs function.

    First and very importantly, properly basic beliefs are not arbitrary or groundless. While one does not believe a basic belief based on an inference or proof, basic beliefs are often based on some form of experience. Plantinga discerns two types of experience; sensory evidence, such things as appearing to see, hear or feel a given object and doxastic evidence, which he describes as “the belief feels right, acceptable, natural,”[1] “the belief seems true, appropriate, the right thing to believe.”[2]

    An example of sensory evidence would be the grounds for perceptual beliefs; I have an experience of a certain shape, colour and sound and so I form the belief that a car has driven past. I do not infer the belief from the experience by way of argument yet the belief is nevertheless grounded upon this experience.

    An example of doxastic evidence is belief in basic axioms of logic; when one entertains the conditional of modus ponens it just seems to be correct, modus ponens feels obviously true in a way that an overtly-fallacious inference does not. Similarly, with memory beliefs; for me the claim that I used to live in Hamilton seems true. I have a strong experiential pull towards it. It feels right in a way that the belief that I used to live in Iran does not. I seem to remember one being the case and not the other.

    The second thing to note is that while properly basic beliefs are rational in the absence of proof for their truth, it does not follow that they remain rational when one is aware of good arguments against them.

    If I see John screwing his face up in a particular way and grasping his leg, I might form the belief that John is in pain. However, if later John tells me that he was not in pain but rather rehearsing his death scene in the coming dramatic play he is acting in. I take his word for it and believe he was not in pain.

    The initial belief was properly-basic; however, because of what I later discovered its rational status was defeated. Sometimes we form other beliefs that lead us to question or deny our basic beliefs. Plantinga refers to these types of beliefs as defeaters.[3]

    There are two types of defeaters, undercutting defeaters and rebutting defeaters. The former are beliefs that cause you to question the grounds on which the original belief was held. The latter are beliefs that are inconsistent with the original belief so that accepting the defeater entails rejection of the original belief.[4]

    Finally, properly basic beliefs are foundational beliefs. Beliefs that we believe on the basis of proof are inferred from other beliefs which themselves must be rational if the proof is to stand. These further beliefs will need proofs and so on. Eventually the demand for proof will terminate in a set of beliefs that do not need proof. This is what I have referred to as a properly basic belief. What needs to be noted is that these beliefs will be the starting points that one reasons from to prove and assess everything else. Everything else one accepts or believes will be justified on the basis of whether or not it is supported by basic beliefs.

    In a short treatment like this a full examination of Plantinga’s work is impossible. Instead I will simply spell out briefly a summary of his position. Plantinga notes that when rationalists argue that belief in God is irrational independent of proof they typically use the word ‘rational’ in what is called an internalist sense.

    [W]hether for all I can tell from the inside, so to speak, my beliefs meet the appropriate internal standards … whether I have properly taken account of other things I know, whether I have paid proper attention to objections and to what others say. [5]

    The basic idea here is that of “epistemic responsibility,”[6] “believing responsibly given ones evidence … being formed responsibly in light of the available evidence.”[7] He notes that in this sense of rationality a belief can be totally deluded, even false but still formed responsibly given the evidence. “My memory unbeknown to me starts malfunctioning; I remember things that never happened. If I see no reason to think my memory is malfunctioning, and no reason to think those things didn’t happen.”[8]

    Plantinga suggests that in this sense of the word ‘rational’ belief in God can be justified in the absence of proof. He notes that “for many people the doxastic evidence for belief in God is very strong.”[9] In Reason and Belief in God he gives a series of examples,

    Upon reading the Bible, one may be impressed with a deep sense that God is speaking to him. Upon doing what I know is cheap, or wrong, or wicked, I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I have done. Upon confession and repentance I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I have done. A person in grave danger may turn to God asking him for help; and then of course he or she has the belief that God is indeed able to hear and to help if he sees fit.[10]

    Plantinga suggests that if a Christian has some doxastic or perceptual experience that makes it seem to them that God exists then provided that they have no defeaters for this belief and they have done things such as “carefully considered the objections”[11] they have encountered and “considered how it [theism] fits with other beliefs they hold”[12] then they are rational in continuing to believe. If one finds oneself in certain situations with a strong sense that God exists and on reflection finds no defeaters for this claim then one is internally rational in believing God exists. One may be deluded but one is not acting irresponsibly in believing what seems to oneself to be true and for which, one has no reason for doubting.

    This internalist sense is contrasted with a more externalist sense, a conception of rationality “that is more attuned to truth or falsehood or probably of truth or falsehood,”[13] An externalist sense of rationality implies “not just that, that a justified belief has been formed in relation appropriately in response to doxastic evidence but, also that the doxastic evidence is not seriously misleading.”[14] The basic idea is that the belief “is produced by a cognitive faculty or process that is reliable, one that produces a preponderance of true over false beliefs.”[15]

    With regards to external rationality, Plantinga’s position is more nuanced. Plantinga argues that if Christian beliefs are in fact true then one is externally rational in believing in God in the absence of proof. This is because if Christian beliefs are true then the kinds of process mentioned above are reliable processes. On the other hand if God does not exist then it is not reliable. Hence any argument that Theism belief is externally irrational will have presupposed from the outset that it’s false.

    Of course the Christian cannot demonstrate that these processes are reliable in a non-circular fashion. This, however, is not as significant as one might think because one cannot provide a non-circular argument for the claim that reason or our perceptual faculties, are reliable either; nor can I provide a non-circular argument to the conclusion that my memory is reliable. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, as I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it, any such argument could not get off the ground.

    Nor would any other argument be forthcoming. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without first assuming the reliability of memory, one cannot reason at all.

    With basic beliefs we simply trust the grounds upon which they are based are reliable and proceed on the assumption that they are and that what they deliver us is true. We cannot prove any of this by a non-circular argument; nevertheless we continue to trust them in the absence of evidence that the beliefs they deliver are false or that they are unreliable.[16] There is no reason why Christians should treat their basic beliefs any differently.

    In my next post I will address two common objections to Plantinga’s position.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 110-111.
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” Knowledge of God ed. Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 175.
    [3] For further elaboration of Plantinga’s understanding of defeaters see Alvin Plantinga “Naturalism Defeated” (1994) http://philofreligion.homestead.com/files/alspaper.htm.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Alvin Plantinga “On Being Evidentially Challenged” in The Evidential Argument from Evil ed. D Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996) 259.
    [6] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 174.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 175.
    [9] Ibid.
    [10] Alvin Plantinga “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, ID: Notre Dame University Press, 1983) 80.
    [11] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 225.
    [12] Ibid.
    [13] Plantinga “Reply to Tooley’s Opening Statement” 176.
    [14] Ibid.
    [15] Ibid.
    [16] For a good discussion of this point see William Alston Perceiving God: An Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991) Ch 3-5.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III

  • Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part I

    This series is effectively the talk I gave to Thinking Matters Auckland on Belief without Proof; It will be split into three posts.

    First, I will examine a common objection to belief in God, the objection that it is irrational to believe in God without proof; I will unpack this objection and argue that it fails. Second, I will propose an alternative view of faith and reason, that defended by Alvin Plantinga. Third, I will address two common objections to this view of faith and reason.

    The Rationalist Objection
    Since the 17th century, one of the most common objections to the Christian faith is the claim that Christianity is irrational because its central tenets cannot be proven to be true.[1] John Mackie raises this argument,

    If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . it [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue.[2]

    Mackie claims that the “rationality consideration” of theism (by which he means belief in God) depends on the arguments that can be mustered in support of theism; if belief in God cannot be proven then it is irrational.

    Mackie’s method here is not unusual. In the 19th century Clifford wrote a famous article about the rationality of Theism entitled The Ethics of Belief.[3] Clifford writes, “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”[4] The same thesis can be seen in the writings of prominent atheists such as Michael Scriven,[5] Bertrand Russell,[6] Antony Flew,[7] Gordon Stein,[8] Michael Tooley[9] and Michael Martin.[10] A particularly lucid example of the same approach is seen in the writings of Antony Flew,

    [T]he debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of atheism, that the onus of proof must lie upon the theist…What the protagonist of my presumption of atheism wants to show is that the debate about the existence of God ought to be conducted in a particular way, and that the issue should be seen in a certain perspective. His thesis about the onus of proof involves that it is up to the theist: first to introduce and to defend his proposed concept of God; and second, to provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept of his does in fact have an application.[11]

    Central to these writers is an important contention. It is contended that Theism is rationally acceptable only if there is good evidence for it. In this context it is clear that the word evidence is being used synonymously with the idea of an argument or proof. Mackie states, “[whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation;” Flew talks of a “burden of proof” their contention is that if theism cannot be proven in the manner laid down, it is irrational. This contention is often known as “Rationalism.”

    Why Accept Rationalism?
    The initial question to ask is why assume this? It is important to note that not everything one believes needs to be proven to be rational for at least two reasons. First the claim that everything must be proven to be rationally believed leads to a regress problem. Roy Clouser notes,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[12]

    A second problem is that there are many things that we believe quite rationally which cannot be proved. Such things as there is a chair in front of me or that other people have thoughts and feelings.

    Consider my belief that I was in New Market yesterday. I reflect on what I did yesterday and automatically find myself strongly inclined to accept the belief ‘I was in New Market.’ In this instance, I believe ‘I was in New Market’ because I remember being there. Yet I am unable to provide any argument or proof for this claim.

    Nevertheless, my belief that I was in New Market yesterday and numerous other beliefs about the mental states of other people and the existence of various objects are obviously rational. So if not everything needs to be proven, why does Theism need to be proven to be rational? This question was put to a conference by Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga; the answer he received from a leading sceptic is interesting;

    All of us can agree, at least for a large range of cases, whether somebody is in pain, whether he’s thinking, feeling anxious or the like. We do in general agree about these things. Only a madman would claim that no one is ever in pain or that no one ever knows that another person is in pain. The same is true for thinking, feeling anxious or sad and the like… Now the situation is very different in religion.[13]

    Others have offered similar answers;

    Part of the justification for believing that our perception or memory is not faulty is that in general it agrees with the perception or memory of our epistemological peers … one knows that one’s memory is reliable by determining whether it coheres with the memory reports of other people whose memory is normal and with one’s other experiences. As we have already seen, lack of agreement is commonplace in religious contexts.[14]

    Richard Grigg argues in response to Plantinga,

    [T]here is a universality about the genesis of the paradigm beliefs that does not attach to the genesis of belief in God. For example, nearly all persons upon having the perceptual experience X, will automatically form the belief that they are seeing a tree.[15]

    Ernan McMullin has made a similar suggestion as to why belief in God cannot be utilised as a premise, as opposed to a conclusion, in an argument in scientific theorising. This is because, “It appeals to a specifically Christian belief, one that lays no claim to assent from a Hindu or an agnostic.”[16]

    The basic idea, then, is that religious beliefs are private beliefs that not all people (at least all sane people educated people) believe; whereas the belief that other people have thoughts and feelings are public beliefs that all people accept and no sane person would doubt. Once we see this, then, I think we can make sense of the objection here.

    [1] A belief is rational if it is either:
    (a) acknowledged to be true by all sane people; or,
    (b) can be proven from premises that are acknowledged to be true by all sane people;

    [2] Religious beliefs are not acknowledged by all sane people nor can they be proven to be true from beliefs acknowledged by all sane people.

    Critiquing Rationalism
    Alvin Plantinga has levelled two powerful objections against Rationalism.

    The first is to note that if it is true then almost every philosophical position of any significance is irrational. This is because, as Marilyn Adams points out,

    [D]efense of any well formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises that are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable people.[17]

    In a slightly different context Philip Quinn makes a similar point, “it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some.”[18]

    The second, more pertinent, response to this objection is to note that [1] is self-refuting. Take the claim explicitly articulated in [1] that if something is not acknowledged to be true by all sane people then it needs to be proven to be true. Now the truth of this claim itself is not acknowledged by all sane, educated people. Many theologians, philosophers and lay people don’t accept [1] so by [1] we are irrational in believing it unless someone offers a proof for its truth. However, to the best of my knowledge no one has done this; therefore, if [1] is true then the rational response is to reject [1].

    Note also that any proof the proponent of this argument attempts to offer can only appeal to premises that are accepted by all sane people. If the proponent does not, we will be required to disbelieve the premises and hence the proof.

    This, then, is the problem with this kind of critical rejection of theism; the sceptic rejects God’s existence out of allegiance to certain assumptions about what constitutes a rational belief. The problem is that these assumptions are in the same boat as theism is alleged to be; a person who rejects theism because he or she believes these assumptions is acting inconsistently.

    In my next post I will sketch and defend an alternative view of faith and reason and in the post after that, I will address two common objections to this view.

    [1] For an essay arguing that this objection has its origin in the 17th century, see Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Migration of Theistic Arguments: from Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
    [2] John Mackie The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 4-6.
    [3] William Kingdon Clifford “The Ethics of Belief” in Lecture and Essays ed. William Kingdon Clifford (London: Macmillan, 1879) 339-63.
    [4] Ibid, 186.
    [5] Michael Scriven Primary Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966) 87.
    [6] Bertrand Russell “Why I am not a Christian,” in Why I am not a Christian, ed. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge Publishing, 2004) 3.
    [7] Antony Flew The Presumption of Atheism (London: Pemberton Publishing, 1976).
    [8] See his debate with Bahnsen www.geocities.com/jeremyandrobin/bahnsensteindebate.html.
    [9] See his debate with Craig http://www.origins.org/articles/craig_tooley_2.html.
    [10] Michael Martin Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) particularly Chapter 1.
    [11] Flew The Presumption of Atheism 14-15.
    [12] Roy Clouser Knowing With the Heart 69.
    [13] Kai Nielsen “The Skeptics Reply” in Faith and the Philosophers, ed. John Hick (London: Macmillan, 1964) 274.
    [14] Martin Atheism 274.
    [15] Richard Grigg “Theism and Proper Basicality: A Reply to Plantinga” The International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983) 123-27; see also, “Crucial Disanalogies between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God” Religious Studies 26 (October 1990) 389-401.
    [16] Ernen McMullin “Plantinga’s Defense of Special Creation” Christian Scholars Review XXI:1 (1991) 55-79 http://www.asa3.org/ASA/dialogues/Faith-reason/CRS9-91McMullin.html
    [17] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) 180.
    [18] Phillip Quinn, “Political Liberalism and their Exclusion of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul Weithman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 144.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part II
    Belief without Proof: Is Belief in God Rational if there is no Evidence? Part III

  • Some Autobiographical Remarks: How I Discovered Christian Philosophy

    Increasingly so of late, I find myself in conversations, in the receipt of email requests or blog comments asking where to begin and how to expand one’s Christian philosophical understanding. I have been asked to recommend books and places to study and to share my own journey in this area.

    I started my studies at Waikato University in 1993. I was advised by the leadership at the church I attended, a church with some 300 student members I might add, to not study philosophy. I was told that this subject was one Christians should avoid or risk being led astray. However, for the reasons of timetabling, I was left with no option but to study Introduction to Philosophy.

    At that time the only apologists I was familiar with were Josh McDowell and Steve Kumar, who had spoken to our youth group. In Kumar’s book, Christian Apologetics: Think Why You Believe, there was a bibliography and for some reason I decided to go to the University library and follow these books up. I did not end up following the bibliography exactly as the first book that stood out on the shelf when I went into philosophy of religion section of the library was a book called God, Freedom and Evil by Alvin Plantinga and something prompted me to pick it up. I had never heard of Alvin Plantinga and had no idea that I had just picked up the definitive discussion of the logical problem of evil. As a first year student, with no background in philosophy, I actually managed to read it from cover to cover.

    This is not where I recommend people to start, as Plantinga is hard going, but it did give me one advantage. I had not been captivated by a superficial treatment of the issue but by arguably the best treatment of that issue in the literature. Plantinga opened my eyes to the possibilities of Christian theorising.

    I began devouring other authors. I stumbled on Richard Swinburne’s The Existence of God, one of the most rigorous arguments for the existence of God written in the last century. I read Paul Helm’s discussion Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time and Reichenbach’s defence of the cosmological argument in Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment. Following up a footnote in Helm’s book, I came across another author I had never heard of, William Lane Craig and read his book The Kalam Cosmological Argument. I discovered Thomas Morris’s The Logic of the God Incarnate (I don’t know why more theologians don’t read Morris) and began reading various anthologies on Philosophy of Religion.

    At the same time I was studying religious studies under Doug Pratt, someone very sympathetic to Lloyd Geering, and we covered the rationality of theism in our Introduction to Philosophy course. I can honestly say the sceptical focus of these courses had absolutely no effect except to teach me how superficial the scepticism I was being subjected to was. To be told by Geering that no intelligent person can believe in God with only brief justification and then be informed that Christianity must be completely re-worked alongside contrasted by the detailed point by point rebuttal of arguments for atheism in my extra-curricula reading by Plantinga and Swinburne meant there was no contest.

    By my second year, I had read Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God. This book was absolutely brilliant. Plantinga demolished several common arguments for atheism; however, he also made some astutely critical points against the standard Christian arguments for God’s existence. Two thirds through the book he concluded that the arguments for and the arguments against were inconclusive, he the made what seemed to be a bizarre move and turned to the problem of other minds, he pointed out that the arguments for and against the existence of other people were equally inconclusive and in some cases the arguments failed for reasons very similar to the arguments for the existence of God. Yet, belief in other minds was clearly rational, so why wasn’t belief in God?

    This struck me as odd. Surely belief in God was totally different to belief in other minds. Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff changed my stance. Until then I had been devouring books by Craig and Swinburne arguing for the existence of God. Plantinga, however, suggested that there was a flawed method behind the demand for evidence. Many discussions on the existence of God tacitly assumed that there was a neutral body of propositions assented to by believer and non-believer alike. All other propositions were rational only if they followed from this original body by evidence. Plantinga’s radical suggestion was that Christians and non-Christians started with a different body of evidence to each other. The idea of a neutral agreed upon starting point was a fiction and usually incoherent. Frequently assumptions that made sense only from a naturalistic viewpoint were smuggled in to the ‘neutral’ starting point, subtly rigging the debate.

    This opened my eyes, particularly in the area of ethics. I started seeing why people came to the conclusions they did and Christians seemed unable to combat them despite perceiving that there was something wrong with their argument. The idea that religion had no place in public life or scholarship and people had to bracket their faith commitments when answering normative questions meant that the fundamental premises Christians relied on for their conclusions were discounted from the outset. Christians were being forced to justify their conclusions from a perspective that was really hostilely secular but was taken for granted as the neutral starting point that nobody could question.

    I went on to write my Masters thesis in Philosophy on Plantinga’s ideas on faith and reason. I took the lessons I learned into my PhD in Theology and extended them into ethics. At no point, at any institution I studied in, was I ever taught these things in class. The textbooks used contained superficial treatments of Christian ethics that had been shredded by Christian Philosophers. The lecturers hadn’t read Christian Philosophy or if they had, they had only dabbled in it and had a superficial understanding or were unaware of the extent it went focussing on minor players. I had no choice but to teach myself by reading widely.

    So in summation, in New Zealand, there is nowhere (yet) where I could recommend people to study Christian Philosophy. If you want to become proficient in this field you are probably best to enrol in a secular philosophy degree program, and hunt down and read all the counter arguments from the high-level Christian philosophers as you progress.

    As a starting point, accessible to anyone without a background in Philosophy, I would recommend the book Reason for the Hope Within: Alvin Plantinga edited by Michael Murray. This book is hands down, the best introduction to Christian Philosophy and Apologetics as it combines rigour with accessibility to the lay person. I cannot recommend this book highly enough.

    Further, in conjunction with Thinking Matters Tauranga, we are developing a critical thinking course for lay people to teach the basics of logical analysis of arguments, some intro to Christian Philosophy and how to approach common objections to the faith. This will initially be launched in Tauranga early next year but we intend to bring it to Auckland and hopefully make it available more widely from there.

  • The Bible Tells Me So

    Suppose a person upon reading scripture and hearing the scriptures expounded through preaching from the pulpit believes that God has prohibited a certain class of actions. Suppose further that the believer is aware of no conclusive argument either for God’s existence or for the affirmation of the command in question. Nor is he or she aware of any cogent arguments for the reliability of scripture. The believer on discerning that God affirms this in scripture simply takes it at its word and finds himself or herself deeply convinced or persuaded that the action is wrong. Does this person believe in an intellectual acceptable manner?

    Many people think the obvious answer is no, here I want to reflect on one particular argument for this negative assesment.

    In an lecture expounding Calvin’s view of faith, Greg Dawes has argued that a person who believes in this fashion does act irrationally. A claim he repeats in his text book Philosophy of Religion which was , at least couple of years ago, the proscribed text for Philosophy of Religion at Otago University. ( I should add that Dawes was one of my thesis examiners) Dawes states

    One can concede that it would be perfectly reasonable to believe something on the authority of God, even if one had no other evidence for its truth (what could be more reasonable than to believe something told me by an omniscient and morally perfect being). But on the face of it one would still need evidence in
    support of one’s belief that (a) that these propositions are revealed by God; and, (b) that God is a reliable source of knowledge. We’ll see in a moment how believers have responded to this demand.[1]

    Here Dawes claims that although it is true that one is warranted in accepting things on a reliable authority such as God, before one does so one needs evidence that the authority in question is, in fact, reliable, that the testimony is from God and that that God is a reliable testifier.

    Dawes goes on however to argue that in the case of faith in scriptural testimony, no non-circular evidence is forthcoming. In questioning what makes believers think God speaks authoritatively through Scripture he states,

    The more common response … is to ‘bootstrap’ the believer’s sense of certainty: to base the certainty of his belief on the very revelation in which he believes. … Religious faith believes certain propositions on the authority of God on the authority of God. (This is not a typographical error.) The authority of God is simultaneously that which (id quod) and that by virtue of which (id quo) one believes.

    The circularity in this position might seem to be the Achilles’ heel, not just of the Protestant system, as David Friedrich Strauss suggested, but of this traditional, ‘bootstrapping’ view of faith in whatever form it is expressed.[2]

    Dawes’s argument rests on two assumptions. Firstly, that the believer has no non-circular reasons for thinking that the scripture is a medium of divine discourse. Secondly, that the believer must have such reasons if he or she is to be warranted in accepting anything on these grounds. I think both assumptions are false.

    1. Does the Believer Need Reasons for Thinking his Source Reliable?
    I suspect Dawes conflates two separate questions in the second of his assumptions; whether a given ground is, in fact, reliable and whether one has grounds or reasons for thinking it is reliable. These are not the same question. It is possible for a ground to be reliable without knowing or having any reason for thinking it is. Likewise, the fact that a person has no reason for thinking something is reliable does not entail that it is not reliable.

    In defending Calvin’s view of faith Alvin Plantinga and those who follow a similar tack such as William Alston and Nicholas Wolterstorff utilise a highly-influential theory of knowledge known as Reliabilism. Reliabilism holds that a belief is warranted if, and only if, the source, grounds or mechanism that produces the belief, or that it is based on, is reliable, i.e. likely to produce true beliefs on the topic in question. Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, John Armstrong, Alvin Plantinga and William Alston have advanced versions of this theory.

    The exact version of Reliabilism does not matter too much but for clarity I will use Alston’s version. Alston suggests that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground or grounds.[3] A person’s belief is warranted if the grounds on which the belief is held are reliable grounds for holding a belief of that sort. He also adds that the person who holds the belief must not have a reason for thinking that the belief is false nor a reason for thinking that the belief is not reliable.

    On a reliabilist account, it is the former and not the latter condition that must be met for a belief to be warranted. Alston’s Reliabilism entails that a belief is warranted if it is based on a reliable ground; it does not hold that it must be based on what one has reason for thinking is a reliable ground. The same can be said for most Externalism and Reliabilism theories in general. Noting that a person has no reason for thinking that something is reliable does not show that this condition is not met and hence, does not show that the belief in question lacks warrant.

    An obvious response to this line of argument would be to claim that there is some kind of epistemological principle or requirement to avoid believing something based on a given ground or source until one has reasons for thinking that such sources are reliable and that the believer violates this requirement. However, this position has at least two problems.

    Firstly, it leads to absurd conclusions. If I cannot believe any thing on a given ground until I have good reasons for thinking the ground reliable, then I cannot believe anything because I remember it happening. To do so I would need good reasons for thinking my memory is reliable. Clearly, such reasons are not forthcoming as any argument I use to try to demonstrate my memory would be circular. I could attempt to show that most of the times I used my memory in the past it was correct but then I would need to remember how I had used my memory in the past and remember whether or not it was accurate. However, I am not permitted to utilise memory in this way until I have reason for trusting it and hence, any such argument could not get off the ground. Similarly, I would be unable to rationally rely on the deliverance of reason. After all, how can I show that a reason is reliable? This can only be done by offering reasons.

    The problems do not stop here because memory is essential to any given line of reasoning one engages in. Reasoning is a temporal process; one begins with the first premise and follows an inference through to a conclusion. One does not hold every step of an argument in one’s mind at the same time. Rather one relies on one’s memory to remember the first steps while the second is assessed and then remembers this step while the third is examined and so on. Hence, without memory one cannot reason at all. This creates an unsolvable sceptical situation. One cannot trust memory if one does not have a reason for thinking it is reliable but one cannot get any such reason unless one trusts one’s own memory. Moreover, one cannot engage in reasoning at all if one does not trust it. This position leads to the destruction of all reason.

    The second problem created by this kind of stance is that it leads to an infinite regression. To show that the source were reliable, I would have to appeal to certain premises that are based on some other source but then I would have to show that this source was reliable and so on. The claim that one needs reasons for thinking a ground is reliable before one can be warranted in believing anything on the basis of that ground appears problematic.

    A further rejoinder suggests that it is in general true that I do not need to have reasons for thinking a ground reliable before I am warranted in accepting a given proposition on this ground. However, I do need such reasons if the ground of my belief is testimony, that is, the say-so of some other person. Dawes suggests something like this in his paper.[4] He distinguishes beliefs based on testimony from basic beliefs. He states that basic beliefs are such that one is warranted in believing them independently of any argument for them, whereas beliefs based on authority are warranted by “indirect evidence”. By indirect evidence, he means evidence that the testimony in question is reliable. A person who believes something based on testimony will, if they are rational, have “reasons to believe the trustworthiness of the source” from which he or she “gained the information”.[5]

    However, this view of testimony is mistaken. Coady summarises the problem. If one is going to have grounds for the reliability of a given authority or testimony then these grounds will be either some other testimony or authority, in which case there is a problem of circularity, or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. [6] The problem with this second horn of the dilemma is that if we exclude what we know by way of testimony we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

    To demonstrate this, consider an example Dawes himself provides, the belief that E=MC2. Dawes writes,

    Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[7]

    Dawes suggests that a non-physicist can rationally believe e=mc2 because he or she has reasons to believe that his or her sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable. Presumably, it would be because the author of the book in which he read it or the person who told him it was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does he know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or been told them by the person himself but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was awarded in order to check its original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He would also have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the university in question.

    Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information which he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on would be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable to be warranted in believing in testimony.

    I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know by way of being told by others accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learnt at school, university, from parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc. is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to.

    2. Does the Believer have Non-Circular Reasons for Believing in Scripture
    These observations also give us grounds for calling into question the first contention Dawes makes in his criticism of believing in scriptural testimony. Dawes assumes that the believer has no non-circular grounds for thinking that scripture is a medium of divine discourse.[8]

    Here his argument appears to be as follows. Dawes grants that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on scriptural testimony. He then notes that the only way one could get to the conclusion that such beliefs are warranted is by affirming the antecedent of this conditional and affirming that scripture is in fact a medium of divine discourse.

    However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

    What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.

    Here his argument appears to be as follows. First he conceeds that if scripture is a medium of divine discourse then one is warranted in accepting theological beliefs on the basis that scripture affirms them. He then suggests that this entails that one can believe on the basis of scripture only if one has good reasons for thinking scripture is the word of God. However, he goes on to argue that this latter belief is typically believed based on scriptural testimony and hence the argument is circular.

    What is mistaken here is Dawes’s assumption that this practice involves some form of argument in which the proposition that scripture is a medium of divine discourse serves as a premise. On the above model a person believes propositions affirmed in scripture not by inferring them via argument but by simply taking scripture’s word for it and hence believes such propositions as basic. Consequently, these propositions are not based on any argument at all and cannot be based upon a circular argument as Dawes suggests.

    Perhaps what Dawes is driving at is not that this claim that scripture mediates divine discourse is based on a circular argument but rather, it is circular in some other fashion. The distinction between logical and epistemic circularity is helpful here. Logical circularity occurs when a person affirms in the premise of the argument what he or she is attempting to establish in the conclusion. Such circularity can then only apply to arguments and not to basic beliefs. However, William Alston has pointed out that there is also such a thing as epistemic circularity. This occurs when one in practice relies upon a particular source or type of ground in order to establish the reliability of the type of ground in question. A person who relied on perceptual judgements to argue for the reliability of sense perception would be an example. This approach is not logically circular; the person need not argue from premises affirming the reliability of perception. However, it is circular nevertheless.[9]

    It is clear, I think, that the model is epistemically circular. The real question is whether there is anything wrong with such circularity. This is borne out by another point Alston stresses, that every, major, doxastic practice, even ones that are paradigmatically rational, are epistemically circular. [10] I noted this with memory above; one can only establish that memory is reliable by relying on the deliverance of memory as premises in a deductive argument. Similarly, with beliefs based upon a sound, deductive argument. Such arguments can be shown to be reliable only with other arguments and so on. Even an omniscient being could not demonstrate that his cognitive faculties are reliable without appealing to those faculties. Hence, if the practice of believing in divine commands because they are affirmed in scripture is problematic because one cannot believe the reliability of scripture without engaging in epistemic circularity, then various paradigms of rational belief are also problematic. In fact, rationality is impossible. This is, of course, absurd.

    [1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion, (so far unpublished) 46.
    [2] Ibid.
    [3] William Alston, “The Concept of Epistemic Justification,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 77.
    [4] Ibid., 38.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
    [7] Dawes, “Faith and Reason,” 34.
    [8] Ibid., 9.
    [9] William Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” in Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge, ed. William Alston (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 319-349.
    [10] By doxastic practice, I refer to the practice of forming beliefs in response to certain grounds, whether the ground is argument, some form of experience or the assertion of some authority.

  • Contra PC

    Not PC has taken exception to my recent criticism of his blog. He also takes issue with my comments on faith and reason. His responses I think are illustrative of the popular secular mindset so it’s worth responding here.

    PC expounds a great deal of rhetorical energy describing my work in pejorative terms. I committed to arguing that “black is white” if the hierarchical Church says so. My reasoning consists merely of “word games” my standards of debate are “low” and my writing is a “tangled thicket” of “misdirections”. Unfortunately simply using pejorative names to describe a position does not provide any reason for rejecting it. A rational person, and PC claims to be a follower of reason, provides arguments. It is to these that I will turn.

    1.) PC objects to my comments in a previous blog where I criticised the statement that it is irrational to believe something without proof. (a proposition which was labeled [2] in the original post) PC writes:

    Now he may or may not have been referring to exchanges here at Not PC, but if he is then proposition 2 is misstated. What I’ve said here is that a proposition without proof is flatly arbitrary, and the arbitrary is out. Arbitrary statements don’t even get to be called irrational; they don’t even get to the table. Matt then goes on to base a whole post on this misstatement.

    Now the key word here is *if*.In fact I was not referring to exchanges in not PC. However it’s worth noting that even if I was, PC’s rejoinder could be easily responded to. One could simply change the word “irrational” with the word “arbitrary” in my argument and everything else would still follow. My conclusion would be that it’s not always “arbitrary” to believe things without proof and each of my arguments would be reasons for this altered conclusion.

    Not PC clearly takes issue with this conclusion. Latter in his post he states:

    Matt himself provides us with an tip that is like a signpost for those of us curious about christian epistemological standards. Says Matt: “you can rationally believe certain things, in certain situations, without evidence.”

    Oddly PC thinks that simply noting the existence of my thesis refutes it. However, in reality, PC merely demonstrates his lack of understanding of the issues. I am not in this comment defending “Christian” epistemological standards. The thesis that one can rationally (or non arbitrarily) believe some things without proof is largely uncontroversial amongst secular epistemologists. In fact Aristotle, whom not PC attempts to follow, accepted this claim for some of the very reasons I provided in my blog. Roy Clouser summarizes the problems:

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand a that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible( Knowing With the Heart p 69)

    As the above citation shows, there are arguments for the position I advanced. There are serious philosophical problems with claiming that all beliefs need to be proved. Strangely PC does not even attempt to address these arguments. Instead he merely asserts my position, calls it “Christian epistemological standards” and thinks that’s enough to rebut it. Unfortunately it is not.

    2.)PC goes on to state

    as all assiduous listeners of Monty Python are aware, “an argument is a connected series of propositions intended to establish a conclusion.” What I posted above was not an argument. It was one post with four quotes, one point and an invitation to think about it; some thoughts for a Sunday on how faith undercuts reason. It was not an argument,

    I had assumed that when PC was contending that faith destroys knowledge he was actually attempting to provide reasons for his conclusion instead of several assertions. That I though was a more charitable interpretation of PC’s work Apparently, I was mistaken, my contention that he provides a weak argument for his conclusion is mistaken, I should have said he provided none at all. Does this make his position more defensible, No

    3.) PC also contents I misinterpreted his position on Tertullian, he states “. I do not “cite” Tertullian as “a Fideist.” I simply quoted what he said.” Well what according to PC did Tertullian say? PC contends that Tertullian is one of several thinkers who “held the view that faith is antagonistic to knowledge and reason, a divorce which [Tertullian] approved.” However, as I pointed out in my blog, fideism is the name given to the view that faith is antagonistic to reason. Hence PC, by his own admission did contend that Tertullian is a fideist. He simply was unaware the position he attributed to Tertullian has a name and that name is fideism.

    4.) PC continues that

    He[Me] carries on in this manner, acribing to me all sorts of things I haven’t said and positions I haven’t taken, eg,”First, [PC] provides some counter examples to anti-evidentialism…” and “Second, he offers some criticisms of the Kalam Cosmological Argument…”. In other words, he faults me for insufficiently countering in the comments section two very specific theological sallies, when my response was simply to two fairly general and poorly argued points.

    PC states that he was not attacking the Kalam Cosmological Argument and anti-evidentialism. He was rather attacking some general and poorly argued points. Well what were those points? One was the claim that God provides the best explanation of the origin of the Universe. In Philosophy of Religion this argument is known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument. The second, was PC’s contention that its *arbitrary* to believe without evidence. In the literature this is known as evidentialism which is of course the anti-thesis of anti-evidentialism.

    Hence, contrary to what PC affirms, he in fact did comment on these issues. It’s just that PC is so unfamiliar with the literature as to know that the positions he criticized had these names. Moreover the arguments he raised were in fact general arguments against these positions not criticisms of specific popularized versions. Hence everything I said stands. PC offered dubious arguments against both positions.

    Finally, PC continues to make some questionable claims. He states that I am a doctoral student training to be a theologian. In fact I am a professional theologian with a doctorate. He asserts, that the Gospels were probably written in the second century and third centuries despite the fact the few NT scholars accept such a late date, and again without any evidence. He ignores the numerous scholarly debate about what Kant’s views on religion actually were. He seems unaware for example of Kant’s rationalistic methods in Religion within the bounds of reason or Kant’s attempt to argue for God’s existence in the Critique of Practical Reason. He seems unaware of the debate over whether Kant was a deist, a closet atheist or a Lutheran and he, oddly, seems to think that Kant’s position in the First Critique is clear and obvious (has he read it?) He refers to Mr Alvin Plantinga as a Theologian when it’s Dr Alvin Plantinga and he is a Philosopher.

  • Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction

    This blog post has been published in Think: A Journal of the Royal Institute for Philosophy 6 (2008) 87-92, which is a journal of Cambridge University.

    One argument I frequently hear is that opposition to feticide, the killing of a human fetus, is inconsistent with support for capital punishment. Some times this argument is pushed even further. It’s alleged that this inconsistency shows that what really motivates opponents of feticide is not opposition to killing, but good old fashioned misogyny. An example of this argument is Beverly Wildung Harrison. Harrison notes that, that zeal “for capital punishment more often than not thrives amongst legislators most eager to prevent all abortion”.[1] She infers from this,

    Nothing makes clearer how little women count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents than this dramatic ideological inconsistency on the part of so many anti-abortion advocates.[2]

    Harrison is referring to contemporary legislators in the United States, many of whom are motivated by traditional, theological objections to feticide. However, what she says would apply with equal force to the many notable Theologians, such as Aquinas, Augustine, Calvin who in addition to condemning feticide, permitted and supported capital punishment in many contexts.

    Harrison makes two points regarding this stance. Firstly, that support for capital punishment is inconsistent with opposition to abortion. Secondly, the fact that a person expresses such inconsistency is clear evidence that he or she believes that women do not “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”; essentially, such people are really motivated by misogyny. I will examine each of these in turn.

    Harrison contends that affirming that (a) judicial execution of a murderer is lawful and that (b) feticide is unlawful is inconsistent. To hold both (a) and (b) is to affirm a contradiction. However, this is simply incorrect. A contradiction occurs when two propositions are affirmed and one of them is the negation of the other. This is not the case with the two propositions mentioned above. The negation of (a) is the claim that it is not the case that judicial execution is just; (b) does not affirm this. It affirms quite a different proposition about the lawfulness of feticide. Similarly, the negation of (b) is the claim that it is not the case that feticide is unlawful. However, (a) does not affirm that feticide is unlawful. It makes no comment about feticide whatsoever. The affirmation of (a) and (b) is not a contradiction.

    Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is that these propositions are either formally or implicitly contradictory.[3] The former occurs when two propositions are affirmed, though, in and of themselves, they are inconsistent, such that a contradiction can be deduced from them using only the rules of first order logic. The latter occurs when a contradiction can be deduced from the propositions when they are conjoined with another proposition that asserts a necessary truth.

    If this is, in fact, what Harrison has in mind, then we need an argument to this effect. Take the claim that (a) and (b) are a formal contradiction. If this is to be more than just an unwarranted assertion then those who, like Harrison, make this claim must demonstrate that the derivation can be done. Yet nowhere in her book is such a deduction even attempted.
    The idea that (a) and (b) are an implicit contradiction can be dealt with in the same way. If this claim is warranted then we require an argument that spells out what the necessarily true proposition in question is and how this proposition conjoined with (a) and (b) entails a contradiction.

    What would such a proposition be? Harrison provides us with none. Perhaps what Harrison has in mind is something like the following. Christian theologians who oppose feticide do so because they believe it is unlawful to kill a person and capital punishment clearly violates this.[4]

    Now I agree that if this were the basis on which a given theologian opposed feticide then support for capital punishment would be inconsistent with it. However, most theologians who historically did not oppose feticide on this ground feticide was judged wrong not merely because it is homicide. As the casuistry makes clear, many theologians held that killing was justified if done as defence or as a just retribution. Hence, they understood the law of God to forbid as homicide, killing that is aggressive where the victim is innocent. It is perfectly consistent to oppose feticide and not capital punishment as capital punishment kills people who are not innocent whereas feticide does not.

    Of course, someone could argue that these theologians were mistaken in their understanding of the law of God and that it, in reality, prohibits all forms of homicide. This would require detailed argument addressing the hermeneutical and ethical arguments involved and Harrison has not even begun to attempt this. Moreover, even if she had provided compelling arguments for this claim it would not show these theologians to be inconsistent, rather it would show that one of a series of consistent propositions they hold is false.

    There is a further point worth mentioning here. If a theologian opposed feticide because he or she believed it was unlawful to kill a person, then what would be problematic is not their opposition to feticide but their support of capital punishment. The correct conclusion would be to argue that both abortion and capital punishment are wrong. The inconsistency is not in their stance towards women who have abortions, but in their stance towards states that execute criminals.

    ***

    Harrison’s contention, then, that those who oppose feticide and support capital punishment are inconsistent is unwarranted. However, even if this were the case, which it is not, it does not follow that the person who held such a view hates women. All it shows is that one of the two propositions is false. Harrison here appears to assume that anyone who holds to an inconsistent set of propositions denies that women “count as full, valued persons or as competent moral agents”. This is hard to take seriously. As will be seen below, Harrison herself affirms inconsistent propositions. Are we to conclude that she hates women?

    In fact, not only would a successful charge of inconsistency not entail that opponents of feticide were misogynist, it would not even entail that they were mistaken in opposing feticide. All it would demonstrate was that one of the propositions held, either the one affirming the permissibility of capital punishment or the one denying the lawfulness of feticide, is false. It does not provide any grounds for asserting which of these propositions is mistaken. All the charge does is show opponents of feticide that they need to make modifications to their belief structure. It does not entail that they must give up their position on feticide.

    It also should be noted that even if Harrison were correct, that inconsistency meant that one had a misogynist view of women, it still would not follow that feticide is permissible. All it would show was that the opponent of feticide hates women. A person can love women and have false beliefs and a person can hate women and have true beliefs. Here, as elsewhere, Harrison confuses attacking the characters of those who disagree with her with actually rebutting their positions.

    Ironically, Harrison’s own position is inconsistent. Harrison herself rejects both propositions mentioned. She believes that feticide is permissible and opposes capital punishment. This creates a serious problem with her objection. Two propositions are contradictory only if one entails the negation (or rejection) of the other. It follows from this that they will have opposite truth-values; one will be true and the other false. If Harrison believes that capital punishment is unjust and believes that believing the contrary is inconsistent with opposition to feticide then it follows that feticide is wrong.

    Further, a little reflection suggests that this inconsistency would afflict Harrison even if she did support capital punishment. Her argument is that because opposition to feticide is inconsistent with the stance many opponents of feticide take toward capital punishment, opposition to feticide is problematic. However, if these stances are inconsistent (which is what the objector must believe) then the position of many supporters of feticide is equally inconsistent with their stance against capital punishment. The same reasoning that suggests that opponents of feticide should drop such opposition suggests that supporters should drop their support.

    Harrison’s argument is defective in numerous ways. It postulates contradiction where there is none and infers via a non sequitur an irrelevant conclusion that does not negate the proposition she is attacking. Moreover, her argument is incoherent and entails, if it were sound, that she should abandon her own position.

    [1] Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 35.
    [2] Harrison, Our Right to Choose, 35.
    [3] In this discussion of formal and implicit contradictions I am influenced by Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1974) 14-16.
    [4] This argument was suggested to me in private correspondence.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Child Abuse
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion
    Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II