Tag: Alvin Plantinga

  • Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II

    In my previous post, Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I, I mentioned the position suggested by Alvin Plantinga and endorsed by Nicholas Wolterstorff that the passages in Joshua that appear to record the carrying out of genocide at God’s command, such as, “putting all the people to the sword”, “leaving no survivors”, “totally destroying”, “striking all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword” are not intended to be taken literally but rather as hyperbole.

    Plantinga suggests that such phrases should “be understood more like a person who in the context of a boxing match states, “knock his block off, hand him his head” or in a football or baseball game where it is stated that the team should “kill the opposition” or that “we totally slaughtered them.”[1] In reading Joshua, Wolterstorff defends the thesis that the relevant passages are hyperbolic. He argues essentially that:

    (a) the picture of total conquest and annihilation of populations is incompatible with what is said elsewhere in Joshua and Judges;
    (b) this is obvious to anyone who reads the narrative straight through without artificially dividing the text into chapter divisions and verses;
    (c) the redactors or authors would not have been so mindless as to accidentally put obviously contradictory accounts into one narrative;
    (d) the annihilation language appears stereotyped and formulaic whereas the other passages read like more down-to-earth history.[2]

    On the basis of these points Wolterstorff argues that texts are hyperboles, similar to a football player who says “we slaughtered the opposition just like Coach told us to”[3]

    In my previous post I addressed (a); I argued, in some detail, that the picture of Joshua conquering all southern and northern Canaan, killing every inhabitant of the relevant cities and regions and leaving no survivors, if taken literally, contradicts what is affirmed in the rest of the book of Joshua and what is affirmed in Judges. I also agree with Wolterstorff about (b); to any person who reads the text straight through, not breaking it artificially into chapters and verses, and who then reads the book of Judges, these contradictions are fairly obvious. These two points alongside (c) make it improbable that the text should be read in a literal fashion.

    I think Wolterstorff understates (c). If, as Wolterstorff believes, the primary author of scripture is God then obviously the author of the text is an intelligent person who is unlikely to have deliberately (or accidentally) authored an obviously contradictory narrative.

    Now it may be contended that an appeal to divine authorship in this way begs the question, however, I think this is mistaken. As I understand the objection, the sceptic who claims that God commanded genocide is offering a reductio ad absurdium; he or she starts by assuming that whatever God commands is right and that scripture is the word of God and then derives from these assumptions the absurd conclusion that genocide is not wrong. The question then is whether, granting these assumptions, such a conclusion does, in fact, follow.

    Taken together, (a),(b),(c) and (d) do make a hyperbolic reading probable. If the text cannot sensibly be taken literally, and if there is some evidence of formulaic, ritualistic language in the text, then that would suggest some kind of non-literal reading and a hyperbolic one certainly makes sense of the data.

    Wolterstorff’s case has some merit, however, I think it can be considerably strengthened. Wolterstorff limits his case to what I call internal evidence, evidence from within the text itself. I think, however, there is some interesting external evidence, evidence from how particular terms and language is used in other ancient near eastern histories of conquests and battles, which could be added to Wolterstorff’s argument to make it significantly more plausible. Here I will cite three lines of such evidence.

    The first is that rhetoric of total conquest, complete annihilation and destruction of the enemy, killing everyone, leaving no survivors, etc, is a common hyperbolic way of describing a victory in ancient near eastern histories of the same period. Kenneth Kitchen notes,

    [T]he type of rhetoric in question was a regular feature of military reports in the second and first millennia, as others have made very clear. … In the later fifteenth century Tuthmosis III could boast “the numerous army of Mitanni, was overthrown within the hour, annihilated totally, like those (now) non-existent” –- whereas, in fact, the forces of Mitanni lived to fight many another day, in the fifteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some centuries later, about 840/830, Mesha king of Moab could boast that “Israel has utterly perished for always” – a rather premature judgment at that date, by over a century! And so on, ad libitum. It is in this frame of reference that the Joshua rhetoric must also be understood.[4]

    In a comprehensive comparative study of ancient near eastern conquest accounts K Lawson Younger documents stylistic and literary similarities between Joshua and reports of wars written by the Hittites, Egyptians and Assyrians including this kind of hyperbole. Merenptah’s Stele describes a skirmish with Israel as follows, “Yanoam is nonexistent; Israel is wasted, his seed is not.”[5] Here a skirmish in which Egypt prevailed is described hyperbolically in terms of the total annihilation of Israel. Sennacherib uses similar hyperbole, “The soldiers of Hirimme, dangerous enemies, I cut down with the sword; and not one escaped.”[6] Mursilli II records making “Mt. Asharpaya empty (of humanity)” and the “mountains of Tarikarimu empty (of humanity).”[7] Mesha (whom Kitchen cited as stating “Israel has utterly perished for always”) describes victories in terms of him fighting against a town, taking it and then killing all the inhabitants of the town.[8] Similarly, The Bulletin of Ramses II, an historical narrative of Egyptian military campaigns into Syria, narrates Egypt’s considerably less than decisive victory at the battle of Kadesh with the following rhetoric,

    His majesty slew the entire force of the wretched foe from Hatti, together with his great chiefs and all his brothers, as well as all the chiefs of all the countries that had come with him, their infantry and their chariotry falling on their faces one upon the other. His majesty slaughtered and slew them in their places; … He took no note of the millions of foreigners; he regarded them as chaff.[9] [Emphasis original]

    The hyperbolic use of language similar to that in Joshua is strikingly evident.

    Second, comparisons between the book of Joshua, and other ancient near eastern conquest accounts from the same period, demonstrate some important stylistic parallels. Commenting on the structure of the campaigns mentioned in Joshua 9-12, Kitchen notes;

    This kind of report profile is familiar to readers of ancient Near Eastern military reports, not least in the second millennium. Most striking is the example of the campaign annals of Tuthmosis III of Egypt in his years 22-42 (ca. 1458-1438). … the pharaoh there gives a very full account of his initial victory at Megiddo, by contrast with the far more summary and stylized reports of the ensuing sixteen subsequent campaigns. Just like Joshua against up to seven kings in south Canaan and four-plus up north.[10] [Emphasis added]

    Kitchen adds,

    The Ten Year Annals of the Hittite king Mursil II (later fourteenth century) are also instructive. Exactly like the “prefaces” in the two Joshua war reports (10:1-4; 11:1-5), detailing hostility by a number of foreign rulers against Joshua and Israel as the reason for the wars, so in his annals Mursil II gives us a long “preface” on the hostility of neighbouring rulers and people groups that lead to his campaigns.[11] [Emphasis added]

    Kitchen adds other examples. He observes that the same formulaic style found in Joshua is also used in the Amarna letters EA 185 and EA 186.[12] Similarly, before his major campaigns, “Joshua is commissioned by YHWH not to fear (cf. 5:13-15; 10:8; 11:6). So also by Ptah and Amun were Merenptah in Egypt, and Tuthmosis IV long before him: and likewise Mursil II of the Hittites by his gods (10T-Year Annals, etc.), all in the second millennium besides such kings as Assurbanipal of Assyria down to the seventh century.”[13]

    Younger notes similarities in the preface, structure and even the way the treaty with the Gibeonites is recorded between Joshua and various ancient near eastern accounts.[14] Like Joshua, The 10 Year Annals of Mursilli and Sargon’s Letter to the God record a divine intervention where the God sends hailstones on the enemy.[15] Tuthmosis III has a similar story regarding a meteor.[16] Joshua follows ancient near eastern convention in describing numerous battles occurring in a single day or within a single campaign.[17] Ancient near eastern accounts also, like Joshua, repeatedly make reference to the enemy “melting with fear.”[18] Even the way post-battle pursuits are set out and described shows similarities with similar pursuits in ancient near eastern literature.[19] I could mention more examples; the point is that “when the composition and rhetoric of the Joshua narratives in chapters 9-12 are compared to the the conventions of writing about conquests in Egyptian, Hittite, Akkadian, Moabite, and Aramaic texts, they are revealed to be very similar”.[20]

    Finally, both Kitchen and Younger note that such hyperbolic language is used in several places within the book of Joshua itself. In Joshua 10:20, for example, we are told that Joshua and the sons of Israel had “finished destroying” and “completely destroyed” their enemies. Immediately, however, the text, affirms that the “survivors went to fortified cities.” In this context, the language of total destruction is clearly hyperbolic.

    When these lines of external evidence are conjoined with the internal evidence that Wolterstorff proposes (and that which I elaborated on in my previous post) seven things are evident:

    (a) the picture of total conquest and annihilation of populations is incompatible with what is said elsewhere in Joshua and Judges;
    (b) this is obvious to anyone who reads the narrative straight through without artificially dividing the text into chapter divisions and verses;
    (c) the redactors or authors would not have been so mindless as to accidentally put obviously contradictory accounts into one narrative;
    (d) the annihilation language appears stereotyped and formulaic whereas the other passages read like more down-to-earth history;
    (e) the kind of formulaic language used in Joshua is a common form of rhetorical hyperbole for describing a victory in ancient near eastern accounts;
    (f) Joshua is written in accord with the literary and rhetorical conventions typical of such ancient near eastern accounts;
    (e) the rhetorical use of “finished destroying” and “completely destroyed” is attested to elsewhere in the book of Joshua.

    In light of these seven lines of evidence, I am inclined to think that the case for the reading that Wolterstorff defends is compelling.

    While space prevents me exploring all the implications of this conclusion, it is worthwhile commenting on one. Wolterstorff argues,

    On the assumption that Deuteronomy and Joshua are part of the same sequence of books then I submit that this interpretation of Joshua forces a back interpretation of Deuteronomy. If ‘struck down all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword is a literary convention when used to describe Joshua’s exploits then it must, likewise, be a literary convention when used by Moses in his instructions to Israel in general and to Joshua in particular. Remember this is one sequence edited just before the end of captivity.[21]

    I think Wolterstorff is correct here. The same point can be seen from the text of Joshua itself,

    So Joshua subdued the whole region, including the hill country, the Negev, the western foothills and the mountain slopes, together with all their kings. He left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded. (Joshua 10:40 NIV) [Emphasis added]

    Similarly we see,

    Everyone in it they put to the sword. They totally destroyed them, not sparing anything that breathed, and he burned up Hazor itself. Joshua took all these royal cities and their kings and put them to the sword. He totally destroyed them, as Moses the servant of the LORD had commanded.” (Joshua 11:11-12 NIV) [Emphasis added]

    Also,

    So that he might destroy them totally, exterminating them without mercy, as the LORD had commanded Moses (Joshua 11:20b NIV) [Emphasis added]

    As the LORD commanded his servant Moses, so Moses commanded Joshua, and Joshua did it; he left nothing undone of all that the LORD commanded Moses. (Joshua 11:15 NIV) [Emphasis added]

    The text of Joshua clearly and explicitly states that what Joshua did fulfilled the command that Moses had given regarding the Canaanites in Deuteronomy. If the language of “putting all the people to the sword”, “leaving no survivors”, “totally destroying”, “striking all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword”, and so on, is hyperbolic (as the evidence suggests it is) then the command cannot have been intended to be taken literally.


    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Comments on Evan Fales’ Satanic Versus: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ” a paper presented to My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Friday 11 September 2009.
    [2] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Reading Joshua” a paper presented to My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Saturday 12 September 2009.
    [3] Ibid.
    [4]
    Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids MI: Erdmans Publishing Co, 2003) 174.
    [5] K Lawson Younger Jr Ancient Conquest Accounts: A Study in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical History Writing (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990) 227.
    [6]
    Ibid 228.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8]
    Ibid, 227.
    [9]
    Ibid, 245.
    [10]
    Kitchen, note 4, 170.
    [11] Ibid, 170.
    [12]
    Ibid, 172.
    [13] Ibid, 174-175.
    [14]
    Younger, note 5, 200-204.
    [15] Ibid, 208-211.
    [16] Ibid, 217.
    [17] Ibid, 216.
    [18] Ibid, 258-260.
    [19] Ibid, 220-225.
    [20] Ziony Zevit The Religions of Ancient Israel: A Synthesis of Parallactic Approaches (London and New York: Continuum, 2001) 114.
    [21]
    Wolterstorff, note 2.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part One
    William Lane Craig, Raymond Bradley and the Problem of Hell Part Two

  • Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part I

    Critics of Christianity often claim that the book of Joshua teaches that God commanded genocide. Raymond Bradley for example states,

    In chapters 7 through 12, [the book of Joshua] treats us to a chilling chronicle of the 31 kingdoms, and all the cities therein, that fell victim to Joshua’s, and God’s, genocidal policies. Time and again we read the phrases “he utterly destroyed every person who was in it,” “he left no survivor,” and “there was no one left who breathed.”[1]

    Similarly, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong cites passages in Joshua with the same point in mind.[2]

    The objection that Bradley and Armstrong raise in highlighting these passages is that Christians are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions.

    [1] Any act that God commands is morally permissible.
    [2] The scriptures are an authoritative revelation of God’s commands.
    [3] It is morally impermissible for anyone to commit genocide.
    [4] According to the book of Joshua, God commanded Israel to commit genocide.

    If we are to rationally affirm both [1] and [2] then we must give up either [3] or [4]. So which one should we reject?

    Philip Quinn has developed a way of addressing clashes such as this. He suggests that we can draw on a principle whereby “whenever two conflicting claims differ in epistemic status, the claim with the lower epistemic status is to be rejected.”

    [3]Given this approach, if a particular interpretation of any passage conflicts with one of our moral intuitions then we should ask whether or not the case for that interpretation is as convincing as the principle that it clashes with. Now, the principle that genocide is wrong is, I think, a highly plausible one. Therefore, if one is to prefer [3] to [4] then the case for a literal reading must at least be this plausible, and preferably even more plausible. In this series of posts I will argue, perhaps surprisingly to some, that [4] is doubtful. While it is true that taken in isolation and interpreted in a strict literal fashion the book of Joshua does appear to state that God commanded Genocide, I contend that when the text is read in its literary and textual context this conclusion is far from evident and is, in fact, rather questionable.

    In the tenth chapter of the book of Joshua we read,

    They [Joshua and his troops] took the city, its king and its villages, and put them to the sword. Everyone in it they totally destroyed. They left no survivors. They did to Debir and its king as they had done to Libnah and its king and to Hebron. So Joshua subdued the whole region, including the hill country, the Negev, the western foothills and the mountain slopes, together with all their kings. He left no survivors. He totally destroyed all who breathed, just as the LORD, the God of Israel, had commanded. Joshua subdued them from Kadesh Barnea to Gaza and from the whole region of Goshen to Gibeon. (Joshua 10:39-41)

    This text summarises Joshua’s campaign in southern Canaan. The northern campaign is summarised in a similar fashion in the following chapter,

    So Joshua took this entire land: the hill country, all the Negev, the whole region of Goshen, the western foothills, the Arabah and the mountains of Israel with their foothills, from Mount Halak, which rises toward Seir, to Baal Gad in the Valley of Lebanon below Mount Hermon. He captured all their kings and struck them down, putting them to death. Joshua waged war against all these kings for a long time. Except for the Hivites living in Gibeon, not one city made a treaty of peace with the Israelites, who took them all in battle. For it was the LORD himself who hardened their hearts to wage war against Israel, so that he might destroy them totally, exterminating them without mercy, as the LORD had commanded Moses. At that time Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah, and from all the hill country of Israel; Joshua utterly destroyed them with their towns. No Anakites were left in Israelite territory; only in Gaza, Gath and Ashdod did any survive. So Joshua took the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses, and he gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions. Then the land had rest from war. (Joshua 11:16-23)

    If these passages are taken in a strict literal fashion and read in isolation from the proceeding narrative they record the divinely authorised commission of genocide. Taken literally these passages state three things.

    Firstly, that Joshua conquered and subdued the entire regions of southern and northern Canaan. Verse 11:23 states that “Joshua took the entire land” and then “gave it as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” This suggests that the region in question is the same land that is later divided between the Israelite tribes, which was the entire land of Canaan.

    Secondly, the passage repeatedly emphasises that Joshua exterminated all the Canaanites in this region. Verse 11:21 states “Joshua came and wiped out the Anakim from the hill country, from Hebron, from Debir, from Anab, and from all the hill country of Judah.” Verse 11:22 states that no Anakites were left living in Israeli territory after this campaign.  Repeatedly it states that Joshua left “no survivors” and “destroyed everything that breathed” in “the entire land.” Alongside these general claims the text goes to identifies several specific places and cities where Joshua exterminated everyone and left no survivors and killed all who breathed. These include Hebron, Debir, the hill country and the Negev.

    Thirdly, the text states that God commanded these actions. Verse 23 identifies the commands with those laid down in the Law of Moses, which refers back to passages like Deut 20:16-19 and Deut 7.1-5.

    The first thing I want to note is that the text should not be read in isolation from the narrative in which this occurs. This hermeneutical point may seem rather obvious but when it is taken seriously immediate and obvious problems occur with a strictly literal reading of the ‘genocide passages’ I mention above. The most glaringly obvious issue relates to the opening of the book of Judges. In the first chapter of Judges we read of events that occurred after the death of Joshua (and, hence, after the campaigns mentioned in Josh 10 and 11). Here it is explicitly stated that Canaanites are living in the land which had been allotted to various Israeli tribes, the land that Joshua is said to have conquered and “left no survivors” in. Note that this was not a small remnant. They existed in such numbers that each of the tribes of Israel needed to fight in order to dislodge them from the land. Several of the tribes were unable to do so and so Israel failed to dislodge them.

    Of particular interest, however, are the several cities and regions mentioned. In the first chapter we are told that the Canaanites lived Gaza (Judg 1:18), the Negev (1:9), in the hill country  (Judg 1:9) in Debir (Judg 1:11), in Hebron (Judg 1:10) and in the the western foothills (Judg 1:9). Moreover, they did so in such numbers and strength that they had to be driven out by force. These are the same cities that Joshua 10 tells us Joshua had annihilated and left no survivors in.  Moreover, the text explicitly states that Anakites are in Hebron, yet Joshua 11:22 tells us that “No Anakites were left in Israelite territory.” This seems rather odd if Joshua had exterminated everyone there and left no survivors. It is also odd given that Joshua is said, in the genocide passages, to have conquered and subdued the entire region.

    Moreover, the account of what God commanded also differs in Judges 2:1. Here no mention of genocide or annihilation is made, instead we hear of how God had promised to drive them out and has commanded the Israelites to not to make treaties with them and to destroy their shrines. Taken in a straight-forward literal manner then, Joshua’s actions are at odds with the first two chapters of Judges.

    It is not just Judges that this problem occurs in. There are numerous places within the book of Joshua itself where the same picture is presented. As noted, Joshua 11 ends by stating that “the entire land, just as the LORD had directed Moses” was given “as an inheritance to Israel according to their tribal divisions.” When the text turns to giving an account of these tribal divisions it is evident that the Israelites do not actually occupy it, but living, breathing, Canaanites do.

    The allotments begin with God telling Joshua, “You are very old, and there are still very large areas of land to be taken over” (Josh 13:1). Moreover, when one examines the allotment given to Judah we see Caleb asking permission to drive the  Anakites (Josh14: 11) from the hill countries and we also hear how Caleb has to defeat Anakites living in Hebron and, after this, marches against the people “living in Debir” (Josh 15:13-19). Similarly it is evident with several of the other allotments that the people have yet to drive Canaanites entrenched in the area and that Israelites were not always successful in doing so.

    We read, for example, that Ephraimites and Manassites “did not dislodge the Canaanites living in Gezer; to this day the Canaanites live among the people of Ephraim” (Josh 16:10). Similarly, in Chapter 17 it states “Yet the Manassites were not able to occupy these towns, for the Canaanites were determined to live in that region. However, when the Israelites grew stronger, they subjected the Canaanites to forced labor but did not drive them out completely” (Joshua 17:12-13). We hear that “Danites had difficulty taking possession of their territory, so they went up and attacked Leshem, took it, put it to the sword and occupied it. They settled in Leshem and named it Dan after their forefather” (Joshua 19:47). Here, we see the same land said to be subdued and conquered by Joshua in battles where he exterminated and left alive nothing that breathed. This land is yet to be occupied by the tribes of Israel and is occupied by Canaanites, often heavily armed and deeply entrenched (17:17-18).

    Brevard Childs notes the apparent contradiction,

    Critical scholars have long since pointed out the tension – usually it is called a contradiction – in the portrayal of the conquest of the land. On the one hand, the conquest is pictured in the main source of Josh. 1-12 as a unified assault against the inhabitants of the land under the leadership of Joshua which succeeded in conquering the entire land. On the other hand, there is a conflicting view of the conquest represented by Judges 1 and its parallels in Joshua which appears to picture the conquest as undertaken by individual tribes, extending over a long period beyond the age of Joshua, and unsuccessful in driving out the Canaanites from much of the land.[4]

    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    The conflict with Canaanite city-state rulers in the southern part of Canaan is worth close examination. After the battle for Gibeon, we see the Hebrews advancing upon six towns in order, attacking and capturing them, killing their local kings and such inhabitants that had not gotten clear, and moving on, not holding on to those places. Twice over (10:15, 43), it is clearly stated that their strike force returned to base camp at Gilgal.  So there was no sweeping take over and occupation of this region at this point. And no total destruction of the towns attacked.[5]

    Kitchen goes on to note,

    What happened in the south was repeated up north. Hazor was both leader and famed center for the north Canaanite kinglets. Thus as in the south the Hebrew strike force defeated the opposition; captured their towns, killed rulers and less mobile inhabitants, symbolically burned Hazor and Hazor only[6] to emphasis its end to its local supremacy. Again Israel did not attempt to immediately hold on to Galilee: they remained based at Gilgal (14:6).[7]

    Kitchen notes that the first “real indication of a move in occupation beyond Gilgal comes in 18:4.” This is after the first allotment of “lands to be occupied are made” and as we saw above the Israelites did not find occupying these allotments easy. He concludes, “these campaigns were essentially disabling raids: they were not territorial conquests with instant Hebrew occupation. The text is very clear about this.”[8]

    So a straight-forward, literal, reading of the passages cited at the beginning of this post does not cohere with the rest of the narrative. The best account I have come across for explaining this apparent contradiction between a literal reading of the “genocide passages” and the rest of Joshua and Judges is one recently defended by Nicholas Wolterstorff.[9] Wolterstorff suggests that the phrases such as, “Everyone in it they totally destroyed,” “They left no survivors,” etc are not intended to be read literally but function as hyperboles. The analogy he gives is of a high school student who, after a baseball game states, “we totally slaughtered the opposition, we annihilated them just as coach told us to.”[10]

    Plantinga suggests a similar line as a possibility. That phrases such as, “put to death men women infants and cattle” are to be understood more like a person who in the context of a boxing match states, “knock his block off, hand him his head” or  in a football or baseball game where it is stated that the team should “kill the opposition” or that “we totally slaughtered them.”[11] Understood in a non-literal sense the phrases probably meant “something like, attack them, defeat them, drive them out; not literally kill every man, woman, child donkey and the like.”[12] Wolterstorff elaborates,

    When a high-school basket ball player says his team slaughtered the other team last night he’s not asserting, literally now, that they slaughter the other team. What is he asserting? Not easy to tell. That they scored a decisive victory? Maybe, but suppose they barely eked out a win? Was he lying? Maybe not. Maybe he was speaking with a wink of the eye hyperbole. High school kids do.[13]

    In the same way,

    To say Joshua struck down all the inhabitants with the edge of the sword is a way of saying something like Israel scored a decisive victory and once you recognise the presence of hyperbole it is not even clear how decisive the victories were. Joshua did not conquer all the cities in the land nor did he slaughter all the inhabitants in the cities he did conquer. The book of Joshua does not say that he did.[14]

    In my next Sunday Study, Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II,  I will attempt to defend Wolterstorff’s position.


    [1] Raymond Bradley “A moral Argument for Atheism” Presented at the University of Western Washington, May 27, 1999, and–in a revised form–at the University of Auckland, September 29, 1999.
    [2] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008) 110.
    [3]
    Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in ed William Mann The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Religion (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) 316.
    [4]
    Brevard Childs An Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Fortress Press Philadelphia: 1979) 247.
    [5]
    Kenneth Kitchen On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003) 162.
    [6]
    See Joshua 11:13 “But Israel burned none of the towns that stood on mounds except Hazor, which Joshua did burn.”
    [7] Kitchen, above n 5.
    [8]
    Ibid.
    [9] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Reading Joshua” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Saturday 12 September 2009
    [10] Ibid.
    [11]
    Alvin Plantinga “Comments on Evan Fales’ Satanic Versus: Moral Chaos in Holy Writ” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame, Friday 11 September 2009.
    [12]
    Ibid – stated by Plantinga in the Q&A session.
    [13] Nicholas Wolterstorff “Response to Louise Anthony” a paper presented to “My Ways Are Not Your Ways: The Character of the God of the Hebrew Bible” Conference at the centre for Philosophy of Religion, University of Notre Dame. Saturday 12 September 2009.
    [14]
    Wolterstorff, above n 9.





    More recently Kenneth Kitchen has taken issue with Childs’ picture of Joshua 1-12. He notes that, apart from the passages cited at the beginning of this post, a careful reading of  Joshua 1-12 makes it clear that Israel did not actually occupy or conquer the areas mentioned at all. Kitchen notes that after crossing the Jordan the Israelites set up camp in Gilgal “on the east border of Jericho” (Joshua 4:19). He notes that after every battle in the next six chapters the text explicitly states that they returned to Gilgal,

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Joshua and the Genocide of the Canaanites Part II

  • Plantinga & Ruse on Methodological Naturalism & Science Definitions

    Michael Ruse (and many others) contend that science is constrained by methodological naturalism, which is the thesis that that neither the data, for a scientific investigation, nor a scientific theory nor the background beliefs, against which a theory is assessed, can properly refer to or contain supernatural beings or propositions based on revelation. In Darwinism Defended Michael Ruse seems to think science, by the very definition of science, is constrained by methodological naturalism.  He writes,

    Furthermore, even if Scientific Creationism were totally successful in making its case as science, it would not yield a scientific explanation of origins. Rather, at most, it could prove that science shows that there can be no scientific explanation of origins. The Creationists believe that the world started miraculously. But miracles lie outside of science, which by definition deals only with the natural, the repeatable, that which is governed by law.[1]

    Ruse’s specific target here are creationists who typically contend that the world was created around 6-10 thousand years ago, in 6×24 hour days and that the fossil record is the result of a world-wide flood. However, the definition he offers excludes far more than this specific position. Ruse’s definition entails that any reference to God’s activity is unacceptable in scientific theorising. Any claims such as that the universe was created (in some way or another), that God created the universe ex nihlo, that God sustains the universe, upholds laws of nature God or even theological interpretations of the big bang and the advocacy of theistic evolution would be ruled out as non scientific.

    Moreover, this ruling out is a prori. It is not that scientists have examined whether God exists, that they have gathered evidence showing he does not exist and this has become a settled, peer-reviewed, consensus; science has, in fact, done no such thing. Further, Ruse is clear that his definition would hold even if God does exist and even if there is compelling evidence for his existence. Science would not consider such facts in its theorising; the very rules governing scientific inquiry would rule it out of consideration from the outset. This is because, according to Ruse, science by definition deals only with what is:

    (i) natural;
    (ii) repeatable;
    (iii) law-governed.

    Elsewhere in the same article Ruse defines in more detail what he means by (iii). He states,

    [A]n approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or an other we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.[Emphasis added][2]

    Ruse contends that science only postulates and presupposes objects and properties that are natural, repeatable and governed by laws of nature. He understands these as regularities grounded in some form of necessary succession.

    Plantinga’s critique
    Alvin Plantinga argues that Ruse’s definition of science is mistaken,

    What about the Big Bang: if it turns out to be unrepeatable, must we conclude that it can’t be studied scientifically? And consider the claim that science, by definition, deals only with that which is governed by law—natural law, one supposes. Some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there aren’t any natural laws (but only regularities): if they are right, would it follow that there is nothing at all for science to study?[3]

    Plantinga here suggests that Ruse’s conditions (ii) and (iii) are subject to straightforward counter-examples and that, as such, his definition is mistaken. In Methodological Naturalism Under Fire Ruse responds to both these criticisms. Below I will examine Ruse’s response and argue that it is unsuccessful.

    The Repeatability Requirement
    Turning to (ii), Plantinga notes that on at least one possible cosmological model the big bang is unrepeatable. Despite this studies into the first instant of the big bang are clearly parts of science and would continue to be so even if this model is true and the big bang is unrepeatable. It follows from this that science can study unrepeatable events which renders (ii) false.

    Ruse’s response is two-fold; first Ruse suggests that Plantinga is repeating a common line of argument,

    As a matter of fact, Plantinga here is raising an objection which has often been raised by critics of the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law. His point, as was theirs, is that there are many unique events that science must surely try to cover and under stand, but that given the uniqueness of these events, in some sense this precludes lawful understanding.[4]

    Ruse then goes on to address this common line of argument,

    But, as many critics of the critics have countered, there surely has to be some thing wrong with this argument. Take for in stance the demise of the dinosaurs at the end of the Cretaceous. This was in it self a unique phenomenon and un repeat able; but, uniqueness not with standing, the demise was made up of many factors which can individually be brought beneath lawful under standing. To day, it seems most probable that an asteroid or a comet or some such thing hit the earth. This was no unique phenomenon, nor was the hit ting of the earth by the asteroid or comet such that the normal laws of nature – that is to say Galileo’s laws of motion – could not be applied.[5]

    Ruse’s response misses its target. Ruse construes Plantinga’s objection to be aimed at (iii), “the claim that scientific understanding involves reference to law.” This, however, is false. The appeal to the big bang was actually proposed as a counter example to (ii), Ruse’s contention that science deals only with repeatable events. The common line of argument Ruse responds to is not the line of argument Plantinga actually offers.

    Moreover, Ruse’s response fails to address Plantinga’s counter example completely. Plantinga’s counter example was based on big bang cosmology. Instead of showing that his definition can accommodate the big bang, Ruse instead notes that other people (not Plantinga) have offered a different counter-example, the extinction of the dinosaurs, and that this different counter example is unsuccessful. Ruse may well be correct; the extinction of the dinosaurs is not a valid counter-example to (iii) however, Plantinga never said it was. What he said was that the possibility that the big bang is unrepeatable is a counter-example to (ii) and to this line of argument Ruse says nothing.

    Requirement of Being Law-Governed
    Of course Plantinga does offer a response to (iii), the idea that science, by definition, deals only with what is governed by law but his argument against this is very different to an appeal to the extinction of the dinosaurs. Plantinga turns to the issue of being law-governed in the next paragraph and raises quite a different objection to this,

    Consider next the property of being governed by law. The first point, here, would be that the very existence of natural law is controversial; Bas van Fraassen, for example, has given an extended and formidable argument for the conclusion that there are no natural laws. There are regularities, of course, but a regularity is not yet a law; a law is what is supposed to explain and ground a regularity. Furthermore, a law is supposed to hold with some kind of necessity, typically thought to be less stringent than broadly logical necessity, but necessity nonetheless. … So suppose van Fraassen is right and there are no natural laws: would it follow by definition that there isn’t any science? That seems a bit strong.[6]

    Plantinga’s point is that some empiricists (in particular, Bas van Fraassen) argue that there are not any natural laws, there are only regularities. Regardless of whether one agrees with van Frassen or not, even if he is correct it clearly would not follow that science does not exist. This entails that the existence of science does not depend on the existence of laws of nature; hence it is a mistake to define the former in terms of the latter.

    Ruse’s response is as follows,

    Now, whilst I am the last per son to belittle the formidable philosophical powers of Bas van Fraassen – as eminent in the field of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as Plantinga is in the field of the philosophy of religion – what is being extrapolated here is far stronger than van Fraassen or any one else would want (should want) to claim. Certainly there are questions about how one might interpret the necessity of laws: I myself have al lowed that already. But neither van Fraassen, nor any one else is going to deny that there are certain sorts of regularities of some kind and that these are pre -supposed in the activity of science.[7]

    Here Ruse states the existence of science does not presuppose the existence of natural laws, it merely presupposes regularities in nature and this is compatible with the empiricist critiques of laws of nature. The problem is that this explicitly contradicts Ruse’s definition. Ruse states that science deals only with the natural, the repeatable and that which is governed by law. In elucidating this Ruse states that science is “an approach to the empirical world that demands understanding in terms of unbroken law. That is to say, understanding in terms of regularities, which in some way or another we feel are more than mere contingencies, but rather part of the necessary succession of the empirical world.” As Ruse defines science then it presupposes more than mere regularities. This position requires that these be necessary in some sense and it is precisely this understanding of laws of nature that empiricists, such as van Fraassen, do criticise.

    Ruse appears to be in a dilemma; if he accepts natural laws as necessary in some sense then his argument is subject to the objection Plantinga raises. Some empiricists reject the existence of laws so understood but even if they are correct it would be erroneous to claim that science did not exist. If Ruse contends that science need only presuppose regularities then his definition is false because his definition states science demands an understanding in terms of a necessity over and above mere regularity. It seems then that Ruse’s definition of science is problematic; if this is the case, attempts to argue for methodological naturalism on the basis of such a definition are unsound.


    [1] Michael Ruse Darwinism Defended (Reading, MA: Addison -Wesley, 1982) 322.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    Alvin Plantinga “Religion and Science” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy accessed 8 December 2009.
    [4]
    Michael Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1) 2005 47.
    [5]
    Ibid.
    [6] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism” Perspectives on Science and the Christian Faith 49 (September 1997).
    [7]
    Ruse, above n4, 48.

  • Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak

    I am a Theologian with a strong background in Philosophy; apart from Philosophical Theology, my particular area of interest is Ethics. Given this, I often publish my thoughts and reflections on moral issues, of various persuasions, in various media.

    I have written on the morality of warfare, whether it is sometimes permissible to lie, the morality of torture, capital punishment, the nature of our obligations to the poor, issues around abortion and homosexual conduct – topics, I think, that are unavoidable if one is a theologian writing from a relatively conservative evangelical perspective.

    Some of my positions are controversial, I believe that homosexual conduct is contrary to divine law and I believe that feticide is homicide. The latter claim is not just a casual opinion; I spent some years writing a PhD thesis on the topic and over the last couple of years I have had academic articles published in this area.

    Now an all too pervasive response to a Christian, like me, expressing a position on these issues is to be deemed a “fundamentalist bigot” (or variation to that effect). One would think that it would be fairly obvious that one cannot refute a position simply by calling the person who holds it names, and it is tempting to dismiss this response as simply a confused ad hominem, the problem is that people do not appear to find this obvious. In my experience, many people, even educated people, recoil from considering any argument against feticide or homosexual conduct or listening to theological concerns on these or other matters because they perceive such positions to be “fundamentalist” and “bigoted.”

    It is worth fisking this objection a bit. A good place to start is to ask what this charge amounts to?

    Take the term “fundamentalist,” what exactly does it mean? It is hard to find a consistent definition of the term. Originally the term referred to a particular protestant movement of Christianity in the early 20th century who published a series of tracts entitled the “the fundamentals.” Clearly, when the term is used today, few who use it have this meaning in mind.

    Muslim terrorists are regularly called “fundamentalist” yet they do not defend the fundamental Christian doctrines that this movement defended. In other contexts, fundamentalist is a term used to describe those with a strict dispensationalist pre-millennial and 6-day creationist reading of scripture. However, many of the authors of “The Fundamentals” were Darwinists and rejected pre-millennialism. To complicate things further, Islamic terrorists are not dispensational pre-millenial, though some are literal 6-day creationists and others are old earth creationists. Now, dispensationalists are committed to the State of Israel. I doubt Al Qaeda, Hamas, et al are terribly enthusiastic about the protection of the Israeli state.

    When I was researching for my doctorate in theology I noted Roman Catholic apologists often use the term “fundamentalist” to designate evangelicals. Yet when I studied at Laidlaw College the term was used by evangelical professors to designate defenders of a strict understanding of biblical inerrancy, particularly those who emphasised a strict adherence to scripture in contrast to the experiential theology associated with Pentecostalism. However, the media often describes Pentecostal churches, like Destiny Church as fundamentalist.

    In his book Warranted Christian Belief, Alvin Plantinga noted that the term “fundamentalist” tends to expand or contract depending upon who uses it and we can definitely see that in the examples above. Plantinga’s conclusion was that,

    Its cognitive content is given by the phrase ‘considerably to the right, theologically speaking, of me and my enlightened friends.’ The full meaning of the term, therefore (in this use), can be given by something like ‘stupid sumbitch whose theological opinions are considerably to the right of mine’.[1]

    It is hard to resist his conclusion that “merely pointing out that they differ from the objector’s (even with the addition of that abusive emotive force) is not [a valid objection].”[2] The term fundamentalist in its contemporary use “is simply meant to denigrate and demonise, to label and conjure up stereotypes to avoid having to actually come up with anything concrete”[3] like an actual argument against their position.

    The labeling of someone as a “bigot” fairs little better. The dictionary defines a bigot as “an obstinate or intolerant adherent of a point of view.”[4] Presumably, the objector claims that one who appeals to the law of God to condemn feticide or homosexual conduct (or some other practice celebrated by contemporary liberal secularists) displays or expresses these features; they are both obstinate and intolerant. The accusation clarified, an obvious question arises, why?

    Turning first to the issue of obstinance, why assume that the fact that someone holds these beliefs automatically renders them obstinant? Could they not have come to these beliefs as a result of careful and considered reflection? Alternatively, could they hold to them because they are not convinced that the counter arguments are sound? What is needed here is some argument to preclude such options and none is forthcoming; names and labels won’t do the job.

    I suspect that what lingers behind this accusation is the belief that theologically-based opposition to issues like abortion is obviously mistaken and the case against it so compelling that no rational, informed person could possibly think otherwise. If so, then this is not so much an argument against such appeals but an assumption that those who make them are mistaken on other grounds. The objector should come clean about what these other grounds are and put forward these compelling, unassailable arguments that everyone else should apparently already know about.

    Regarding the charge of intolerance, let me here just say that the concern about intolerance implicit in this objection is mistaken. Even if the proponents of more conservative positions were intolerant, this would only constitute an objection to their behaviour if it were first assumed that people have a duty to refrain from intolerance but this assumption is problematic.

    In many contexts intolerance is appropriate and contrary to popular slogans, is a virtue. Imagine a society that tolerated rape, child molestation or infant sacrifice? Moreover, if unqualified, the assertion that people have a duty to be tolerant entails that one is required to tolerate intolerance; a deeply paradoxical claim.

    For this charge to have any substance, the objector needs to specify what sorts of action he or she thinks one should tolerate and which ones are such that intolerance is inappropriate. He or she needs to justify this distinction and then provide reasons for thinking that appeals to divine law on a subject like feticide fall into the latter category. Again, a label will not achieve this.

    Here us the rub; if feticide is an action on a par with infanticide then intolerance towards it is justified. In asserting that it is not, the objector implicitly assumes that feticide is not homicide without offering an argument. Similarly, if homosexual conduct is a serious form of sexual immorality, on par with incest, bestiality, polygamy or adultery, then intolerance against it is not necessarily wrong. Our society, for example, has laws against incest and bestiality and few contend for their repeal (though the chipping away has begun). Once again, the objector here, in making their charge, assumes that homosexual conduct is not seriously immoral without providing an argument.

    Now it is possible that these assumptions are correct but it is also possible they are not.

    Anyone who appeals to divine law to condemn practices like feticide or homosexual conduct is denying these assumptions. You don’t provide a cogent objection to a position by assuming it is false at the outset and then using this assumption to prove that it is, arguing in this circular fashion proves nothing and is an error of logic. What is needed is an actual argument for the assumption in the first place. Until some actual argument is forthcoming that demonstrates the falsity of what has been defended, objections based on the notion of tolerance merely beg the question and have no impact on the thesis being advanced.

    I think there is a kind of irony here; often when someone accuses Christians of “fundamentalist bigotry” they themselves are the ones obstinately assuming that their position is true and their assumption leads them to castigate and refuse to tolerate the opinions or persons who express dissent to their secular liberal orthodoxy. In using these labels they are dismissing a person’s opinion, not on the basis of reason but on the basis of a religious stereotype. Here, as elsewhere, the accusation of “fundamentalist bigotry” is a form of Orwellian double-speak.


    [1] Alvin Plantinga Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 245.
    [2]
    Ibid.
    [3]
    I am grateful to my wife, Madeleine Flannagan, for these words.
    [4]
    Oxford English Dictionary.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the November 09 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

  • Darwinian Evolution, God and Ockham’s Razor

    In a previous post, Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design, I argued that the contention that Darwinian evolution occurs by chance does not entail that it shows the world was not designed. Once one sees how the concept of chance is defined in evolutionary theory one can see that it does not rule out design.

    It is possible at this stage to argue that evolutionary theory rules out design by appeal to Ockham’s razor. Suppose one grants that chance is used in a limited sense to refer to the fact that, following Sober, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.”[1] Or following Mayr, it means, “that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptation needs of an organism in a given environment.”[2] Suppose that evolution occurring by chance in this sense is well supported by the evidence. One could go on to interpret this theory in at least two ways; one might argue that evolution was in some sense guided by God or that it occurred by chance in a stronger sense that precludes design. Both arguments would be compatible with the empirical evidence. However, the sceptic could argue that the latter is preferable in virtue of the principle of Ockham’s razor, “entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily.”

    The idea is that that the hypothesis of unguided evolution is simpler, more in accord with Ockham’s razor, than the hypothesis that God guided evolution. The former theory explains everything in terms of natural causes without appeal to a supernatural being such as God; hence, to claim God did it is to add an extra entity and is superfluous. Something like this argument is sometimes given by scientists writing in the field. George Gaylord Simpson writes,

    Although many details remain to be worked out, it is already evident that all the objective phenomena of the history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic or, in a proper sense of the sometimes abused word, materialistic factors.[3]

    Similarly, Douglas Futuyma states,

    By coupling undirected, purposeless variation to the blind, uncaring process of natural selection Darwin made theological or spiritual explanations of the life processes superfluous.[4]

    In this post I will respond to this appeal to Ockham’s razor and identify two problems with this line of argument. The first is that Ockham’s razor is only one criteria used to adjudicate rival hypotheses; the fact that one hypothesis is preferable on grounds of simplicity does not entail that it is preferable all things considered. There are at least couple of other considerations to take into account.[5]

    One other consideration to bear in mind is which hypothesis is more probable? To answer this question one would need to assess whether the probability that the history of life coming to be by a process of guided evolution is significantly higher than the probability of life coming to be by an evolution of blind chance and it seems to me, on the face of it at least, quite plausible to suggest that the chances of life evolving by chance is significantly lower than its coming about by divine guidance. If this is correct, then while atheistic evolution gives a simpler or more economical explanation of the origin of species it is considerably less probable.

    A further consideration is that Ockham’s razor tells us that if two theories can explain the phenomena equally well then the one that postulates the least entities is the preferred one. For naturalistic evolution to be preferable to theistic evolution it would need to be argued that it explains all the data equally as well.[6] The person who proposes the above line of argument, however, does not do this; all he or she does is show that both theories equally explain the history of life on earth. However, the history of life is only one feature of the world that scientists seek to explain. Showing that your theory explains one feature as well as a rival theory is a long way from showing that it explains all features as well.

    This is important because one of the arguments theists offer is that God can explain numerous features of the world better, better than theism’s rivals. It has been argued that theism explains the origin of the universe, the continued existence of the contingent universe, the existence of laws of nature, the existence of cosmic fine-tuning, the existence and nature of objective moral duties  and so on. To show that unguided evolution is a better theory then, one would need to show that unguided evolution provides a better explanation of all these phenomena together than theistic evolution does. If it does not then theism explains the history of life equally as well as atheistic naturalism but it also provides a better explanation of various other features of the world, thus it is a better overall theory.

    So even if we grant that unguided evolution conforms to Ockham’s razor better than theistic evolution, it is not at all clear or obvious that this means it is a better theory, all things considered. Theistic evolution may be a significantly more probable theory and have significantly greater explanatory scope and comprehensiveness.

    A second problem with the appeal to Ockham’s razor is that what constitutes a simpler hypothesis in a given context depends on the background information one has about what exists. Plantinga makes this point,

    The theistic noetic structure already, of course, includes the existence of God.  Relative to that noetic structure, therefore, there is no additional Ockhamistic cost in the hypothesis of guided evolution.  As an analogy: suppose we land a space ship on a planet we know is inhabited by intelligent creatures.  We find something that looks exactly like a stone arrowhead, complete with grooves and indentations made in the process of shaping and sharpening it.  Two possibilities suggest themselves: one, that it acquired these characteristics by way of erosion, let’s say, and the other, that it was intentionally designed and fashioned by the inhabitants.  Someone with a couple of courses in philosophy might suggest that the former hypothesis is to be preferred because it posits fewer entities than the latter.  He’d be wrong, of course; since we already know that the planet contains intelligent creatures, there is no Ockhamistic cost involved in thinking those structures designed. The same would go for evolution; theists already accept divine design, and do not incur additional Ockhamistic cost by way of thinking of evolution as guided.[7]

    Plantinga’s insight is correct. He goes on to note that if we did not know the planet was inhabited by intelligent beings and the erosion hypothesis was not significantly less probable then an appeal to Ockham’s razor in favour of the erosion hypothesis would have “teeth.”  If this argument works at all, it only works if one begins with an agnostic perspective and then postulates “the existence of a divine designer in order to explain the course of evolution.” If, however, one already knows that God exists and rationally believes God and has created the world on other grounds then we do not violate Ockham’s razor by appealing to the existence of God to explain the evolutionary process.

    Evolutionary theory then might mean that an agnostic has reason for accepting atheistic evolution over theistic evolution as an explanation of the origin of species (I say “might” because the problem of relative probabilities and explanatory comprehensiveness still would need addressing). However, it does not show that those who believe in God, are irrational in doing so, nor does it provide a theist with any rational reason to reject his or her belief.

    Again then, it seems that evolution by itself does not make belief in God untenable. Before it could the objector would first need to show there were no other grounds for believing in God other than the evolution of life on earth. Then he or she would need to show that one could construct a theory that has as much explanatory power as theism and on which the evolution of life by blind chance was not significantly less probable than its occurrence by divine guidance. Only after both these things were done could evolution be used to defeat theism. It is evident, however, that evolutionary theory by itself establishes none of these claims. Whether they are defensible is a substantive philosophical question over and above anything established in contemporary evolutionary theory.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?


    [1] Eliot Sober “Evolution Without Metaphysics” (unpublished).
    [2]
    Ernest Mayr Toward a New Philosophy of Biology; Observations of an Evolutionist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998) 98.
    [3] George Gaylord Simpson The Meaning of Evolution (Yale University Press, rev ed., 1967) 344-345.
    [4]
    Douglas Futuyma Evolutionary Biology (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Inc, 1986) 2.
    [5]
    Alvin Plantinga
    “Science and Religion: Where Does  the Conflict Really Lie?” (unpublished).
    [7]
    Ibid.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design
    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument
    TANSA Faith and Science Conference
    Faith and Science Conference Write-Up

  • Darwinian Evolution, Chance and Design

    In a previous post, God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument, I argued that evolution does not refute the teleological argument. Also, even if it did, a lot more significant philosophical work over and above any appeal to natural selection would be needed to infer from this that theism is rationally untenable. There is, however, a second concern lurking in this area; it is that Darwinian evolution shows that evolution occurs by chance. Chance is incompatible with design; hence, Darwinian evolution shows that biological organisms were not created by God. Del Ratzsch summarises the argument succinctly,

    [I]f it is genuine evolution, then the theory itself demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance … On the other hand, if its genuinely guided [by God], then the process must involve not chance but deliberately designed intervention.[1]

    The argument has two premises,

    [1] If evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance;

    [2] Genuine evolutionary theory demands that the processes be governed by natural law and random chance.

    I think this argument is mistaken. To be a valid argument, the word “chance” would need to be used the same way in both premises. The kind of chance that is incompatible with creation in [1] would have to be the kind of chance that is part of genuine evolutionary theory in [2].

    Alvin Plantinga has argued that when one examines how the word “chance” is being used in this kind of argument it is evident that the word is not being used the same way in both premises and that when the ambiguity is cleared up the kind of chance that is involved in contemporary evolutionary theory is compatible with the idea that God created human beings.[2]

    Let us turn to the first premise; [1] the claim that if evolution is guided [by God] then the processes must not involve random chance. This statement is true only if chance is defined a certain way, both that its existence is incompatible with the idea that God caused the event to happen (either immediately or indirectly via normal secondary causation) and that God did so intentionally and with purpose. To say then that an event occurs by random chance, on this definition, is to say the event was not caused, intended or planned by God.

    The problem is that if chance is defined this way premise [2] is false; genuine evolutionary theory does not demand that mutations are not caused by chance, when chance is defined in this way. According to Eliot Sober, when the word chance is used in the context of evolutionary theory it means, “there is no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur.” Ernest Mayr makes a similar point, “When it is said that mutation or variation is random, the statement simply means that there is no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.”

    Defined in the manner of Mayr and Sober, chance is entirely compatible with the idea that evolution is caused, intended or planned by God. The fact that there is, “no correlation between the production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment” and “no physical mechanism (either inside organisms or outside of them) that detects which mutations would be beneficial and causes those mutations to occur,” does not mean that the events had no cause and it certainly does not mean that they were not intentionally caused by God.

    To show that evolution occurred by chance, where chance is incompatible with divine design, contemporary biologists would need to show not just that no physical mechanism detects which mutations are beneficial and causes them and it would have to do much more than fail to produce a correlation between the “production of new genotypes and the adaptational needs of an organism in a given environment.” It would have to show that there was ultimately no supernatural cause to the process that intended evolution of human life to occur. Contemporary biology has not done this and it is certainly very difficult to see how it could do so without stepping outside the bounds of science, as currently practised, and venturing into controversial areas of philosophy and theology.

    [1] Del Ratzch Battle for Beginnings: Why Neither Side is Winning the Creation Evolution Debate (Downers Grove IL: Intervarsity Press, 1996).
    [2] Alvin Plantinga “Evolution and Design” in For Faith and Clarity: Philosophical Contributions to Christian Theology ed. James Beilby (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006) 201-217.

    This post draws from parts of my paper “Does Evolution Make Belief in God Untenable?” given at the recent TANSA conference, Faithful Science? – Just How Well Do Science and Faith Get Along?

    RELATED POSTS:
    God, Darwinian Evolution and The Teleological Argument

  • Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part II

    In Evolution should not be taught in State Schools: A Defence of Plantinga Part I, I articulated and defended Alvin Plantinga’s proposal that evolution should not be taught as “the sober truth” in state schools. In this post I will address what should be taught in state schools and look at Robert Pennock’s objections to this argument.

    Part II. Plantinga’s Proposal: What should be taught in State Schools?
    After drawing the above conclusion, Plantinga asks what should be taught regarding origins in state schools? He suggests two answers; the first is to teach nothing on matters of origins,

    One answer is to say: in a pluralistic society like ours, there is no fair way to teach anything about origins; hence public schools ought not to teach anything on that subject. They should instead stick to subjects where there isn’t disagreement at the level of religious or comprehensive beliefs. This would be just a reflection of a more general difficulty in having public schools of our sort in a pluralistic society. Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.[1]

    The second, and perhaps more interesting answer, is to teach both evolution and creationism “conditionally,” Plantinga labels this as his “modest proposal.”[2] To explain this idea of teaching conditionally Plantinga introduces the technical notion of an epistemic base, “for each person P there is an epistemic base, EBP, with respect to which the probability or acceptability of proposed beliefs is to be evaluated.”[3] A person’s epistemic base contains at least four things. First it contains their “current beliefs;”[4] second, as “some beliefs are held more strongly than others,” it includes, “an index of degree of belief.”[5] Third, an epistemic base will include, “prescriptions as to how to conduct inquiry,” how to learn about world, revise beliefs, etc.[6] Fourth, it will include their comprehensive beliefs.[7] Plantinga emphasises that a persons epistemic base is not set in stone but revisable in light of argument.

    Plantinga notes that science, as currently practiced, respects a procedure known as methodological naturalism, “the policy of avoiding hypotheses that mention or refer to God or special acts on the part of God, or other supernatural phenomena, or hypotheses whose only support is the Bible, or some other alleged divine revelation.”[8] While there is dispute over whether science should do this, as currently practised, science does involve commitment to methodological naturalism.[9] This means that science operates with a particular epistemic base; while the epistemic base of science will include things such as logic, mathematics, various common-sense beliefs, there will be certain beliefs that will not go into the epistemic base for science (EBS) at least as currently practised, “Among these would be the belief that there is such a person as God, that God has created the world, and that God has created certain forms of life specially–human beings, perhaps, or the original forms of life, or for that matter sparrows and horses.”[10]

    Plantinga’s claim that evolution be taught conditionally then amounts to this: Evolution can be taught as the most probable theory relative to the current scientific epistemic base. This, he thinks, is uncontroversial and not likely to contradict anyone’s comprehensive beliefs; even a creationist, for example, can grant that, if one brackets various theological claims and operates on methodological naturalism then evolution is likely. What schools cannot do is teach that any particular epistemic base is the correct one to start from or that what follows from a particular epistemic base is true. Plantinga thinks that creationism could be taught in a similar conditional way in state schools.

    Pennock’s Critique of Plantinga
    Robert Pennock offers a critique of Plantinga’s position. Pennock contends that a rational person would not grant parents do not have the sort of prima facie rights Plantinga attributes to them. Instead, a rational person would advocate that evolution be taught as true and creationism or any other theological view be excluded from being taught in state schools.[11] He offers two arguments for this conclusion; the first is that,

    we all know parents who are bigots or ideologues and others who are simply narrow-minded or ignorant. … A good education may be a child’s only window to a clear picture of the world and to an open future. To agree to a basic right would be to close that window. This would be a serious harm for the children of such parents.[12]

    This is a bad argument; it is true that some parents are narrow minded. It is also true that some parents do not feed their children or neglect to clothe them or give them poor medical care; however, it would be grossly unjust to infer from this that no parent has even a prima facie right to clothe and feed their child or make medical decisions for them. Moreover, a parallel line of argument would entail that teachers, schools and governments cannot make education choices either. We are all familiar with teachers and government officials who are bigoted, corrupt and abuse their power. Taken consistently, Pennock’s views would entail that no one could make educational choices for children.

    The second and more substantial argument is that accepting parental rights would “gut the curriculum of state schools.”[13]Pennock notes,

    … there are thousands of special interests groups that would use such a right to prohibit the teaching of specific facts or even whole subjects they objected to. One does not have to look far to find parents who would object to teaching about racial equality, the facts of reproductive health, or that even that the earth is round. Only the utterly trivial could have a chance of escaping the gag of basic rights. No rational person would agree to such a policy.[14]

    Pennock here suggests Plantinga’s position would prevent anything being taught at state schools and he takes this as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that parents have the kind of rights Plantinga contends they do. Three points can be made in response to this.[15]

    First, Pennock misconstrues Plantinga’s position. Plantinga’s view is that, “it is improper, unfair, to teach either creationism or evolution in the schools–that is so, at any rate for areas where a substantial proportion of the parents hold religious or comprehensive beliefs incompatible with either.” [Emphasis added][16] Consequently, it applies locally not globally. In a Native Indian reserve, for example, it would be unjust for state teaching of things that were contrary to the comprehensive beliefs of Native Indians.[17] It would not follow, however, that one could not teach these things in a school in New York, for example, where there are hardly any Native Indians who continue to believe these cultural practices.[18] Hence, the fact that almost everything is incompatible with someone’s comprehensive beliefs is irrelevant. Schools do not have to accommodate the views of everyone; they only need to accommodate the views in their area.

    Second, Plantinga stresses that parental rights are prima facie rights not absolute rights; they can be overridden in certain circumstances. Interestingly Plantinga alludes to one such circumstance in the very paper Pennock critiques,

    Of course a basic right is a prima facie right… The majority might also insist on teaching the denial of certain comprehensive views, Nazism, for example, in which case the fair thing to do would be to exclude the Nazis from the contract (and also exclude them from the tax liability).[19]

    Here Plantinga considers the very examples Pennock raised; situations where a minority has bizarre or repugnant views which the majority feel compelled to warn their own children about and it is clear that in such situations one does not need to adopt a gag rule for all state schools. One simply establishes a state school based on the views of the majority in the area in question and grants the minority freedom to opt out of these schools and an exemption from education taxation.

    Third, suppose that Pennock is correct and there is too much disagreement over comprehensive views to have a state school system and also respect the rights Plantinga attributes to parents, does it follow that we should not respect parental rights? Not at all, an alternative is to not have state schools; Plantinga notes, “Perhaps, when the citizens get together to found a system of education, what they discover is that there is too much diversity of opinion to make it feasible.”[20] An alternative could be to establish a network of private schools where parents could choose which school meets the needs of their children, basing their decisions in part on their comprehensive beliefs.[21] Some private schools could teach evolution and others could choose not to and parents could choose which ones to send their children to.

    In other words, if it is true that it is impossible to have a centralised state education system and accord parents prima facie rights of the sort Plantinga suggests, then that is an argument against having a centralised state education system. It is not, as Pennock suggests, a compelling argument against parental rights.

    Conclusion
    I conclude then that Plantinga’s position is defensible. Regardless of whether evolution is true or empirically founded it is unjust to teach the children of parents who have theological objections to evolution that it is true. State schools which have a sizeable clientele who hold such views should teach it only conditionally or not at all. Alternatively, the government should allow these people to opt out of state education and grant them a tax rebate.

    [1] Alvin Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” in Robert Pennock Ed Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, The MIT Press – Bradford Books, 2001) 787.
    [2] Ibid 789.
    [3] Ibid 787.
    [4] Ibid.
    [5] Ibid.
    [6] Ibid.
    [7] Ibid.
    [8] Ibid, 788.
    [9] Alvin Plantinga “Methodological Naturalism?” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith49 (1997) 143-154; M Ruse “Methodological Naturalism Under Fire” South African Journal of Philosophy 24(1)(2005) 44-60.
    [10] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 788.
    [11] Robert Pennock “Should Creationism Be Taught in Public Schools?” Science & Education 11(2) (2002) 111-133.
    [12] Ibid 129.
    [13] Ibid 128.
    [14] Ibid 127.
    [15] I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his helpful comments here.
    [16] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 786.
    [17] Ibid 782.
    [18] Alvin Plantinga suggested this example in correspondence
    [19] Plantinga “Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal” 782.
    [20] Ibid 787.
    [21] Here again I am grateful to Alvin Plantinga for confirming this suggestion.

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