Tag: Glenn Peoples

  • Glenn Peoples’ Review: Bradley v Flannagan Debate

    On Monday 2 August at the University of Auckland Emeritus Professor of Philosophy Dr Raymond Bradley and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the topic “Is God the Source of Morality? Is it rational to ground right and wrong in commands issued by God?” Philosopher Dr Glenn Peoples watched the debate via live Skype feed and has reviewed it as follows.

    Dr Glenn Peoples Reviews the Debate

    Published with permission

    Few subjects in philosophy are more interesting to me than the meta-ethical question of moral makes any moral claims true. My particular area of interest is the question of whether or not moral facts can be grounded in a purely naturalistic view of reality. The topic of this debate therefore grabbed my interest as soon as it was announced – and this was in no small part due to the fact that one of the debate participants was my good friend Matthew Flannagan, who blogs at MandM. What follows is my summary and review of that debate. As someone with no duty whatsoever to not take a side in the debate, I’ll comment on the arguments as they unfold throughout the debate rather like one commentating a live boxing match. And now the opening bell rings.

    Opening Statement: Dr Raymond Bradley

    Ray began his opening statement announcing that he did not want to praise God, but to bury him. God is not worthy of praise, the audience was told, but only a straight-jacket and a grave. God is the self-confessed author of the world’s problems, and as such, Ray says, he has taken it upon himself to play the role of the prosecutor.

    God, Ray, charges, can be indicted on four counts. A) Firstly, God is guilty of crimes against humanity, using disaster and disease to wipe out countless millions. The Bible presents God as responsible for plagues, famines and flood. B) Secondly, God is guilty of war crimes, commanding the slaughter of “hundreds of thousands” of people in the Old Testament. C) Thirdly, God has licensed “moral mayhem and murder,” requiring the execution of homosexuals, adulterers, blasphemers and hosts of other people. D) Lastly and worst of all, God is guilty of eternally torturing people in the flames of hell, all on account of them not holding the correct religious beliefs.

    In light of this horrible threat of torture, Ray asks, is it any wonder that Christians have done such horrendous things to people over the centuries, burning heretics and killing babies in an effort to prevent them from going to hell? Who takes this moral primitivism seriously? The Taliban for one, says Ray. So too do Christian fundamentalists, like many in the Southern Baptist convention, who argue openly for a theocracy, calling for the deaths of tens of millions of their fellow citizens. And it’s not just extreme conservatives who are in this mess, Ray says. Even relatively liberal Anglicanism is still in a quandary about whether or not homosexuals are abominations who should be “killed in this world and tortured in the next.” But could it be, we are asked, that those who went on Crusades for God were not actually hearing God’s voice, but merely their own? Ray has no time for biblical claims that “God is love,” in light of what the Bible says about God’s actions. The golden rule of reciprocity is likewise too full of exceptions to be correct, and in any case, God intends to torture most of us. No moral reciprocity there!

    Okay, this is the first occasion for a time out. The topic of this debate (the topic that both speakers agreed to in advance) was announced as whether or not God is the source of morality – whether or not it’s rational to ground right and wrong in the commands of God. But as Ray’s opening statement unfolded, I began to wonder if he actually had anything at all to say about that topic. We’ve learned how Ray understands various parts of the Bible, and we’ve learned that he takes exception to them, but biblical hermeneutics and Ray’s moral sentiments – while interesting in some contexts – aren’t really what people were expecting to hear about (or at least, at a debate with a topic like this one these certainly aren’t the things that I was expecting to hear about). What if, for example, all of the above were totally true (although we’ll come to that when Matt responds)? Whatever that would establish, there’s no obvious reason to suppose that this establishes that whatever the moral facts really are, they do not have their origin in God.

    But then, Ray presents an argument. He explains that his argument is as follows: Christians accept a set of five propositions, but in fact the set is inconsistent, and as such they find themselves in a “logical straight-jacket.” Those five claims are:

    1. What God proposes for our belief (including beliefs about what we ought to do) is what we ought to believe or do.

    2. In his holy scripture, God proposes for our belief that he has caused, committed, condoned or laid down commands for us to obey every one of the four types of crimes of types A, B, C and D.

    3. It is morally wrong to cause, commit, condone or command any of the crimes of types A, B, C, D.

    4. God is omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect.

    5. A morally perfect being would not do anything that is morally wrong.

    I’ve seen this kind of argument from Ray before. In fact some time ago I commented on it at my blog. Ray says that theists are committed to all five, and the result is a contradiction. Which of these can they afford to give up? They cannot give up 1) without giving up the thesis of this debate: That our moral duty is grounded in God’s will. They cannot give up 2) without giving up the authority of the Bible. They would have to say that either God didn’t know how to say what he meant, or else he did know, but didn’t actually mean what he said. They cannot give up 3) without becoming moral monsters. They cannot give up 4) without giving up the traditional theistic portrait of God altogether, and to give up 5) is to give up a truism: That a perfectly moral person is perfectly moral in all that he does.

    Which of these, asks Ray, will Matt deny?

    As Ray closed his talk, I was left feeling just a little cheated. I know what the debate over moral foundations is like. I research, write, blog, speak and publish on the issue. I’ve become familiar with the issues it delves into and the territory it needs to cover. In particular, the literature on divine command ethics (the specific ethical theory identified in the subject that both parties had agreed to debate) contains well known arguments on key features of the theory. But Ray didn’t appear to say a word about any of this. Indeed, as the debate unfolded it began to look like he was not familiar with the literature in the least – or at least if he was, he did not consider the more familiar philosophical territory to be at all relevant. Instead, we had a string of claims about the God of the Bible being a really nasty guy. Now, I can understand when the likes of Christopher Hitchens or Richard Dawkins haplessly wander into the domain of philosophy of religion and end up tub thumping about how God is a villain instead of actually doing any philosophy. But the whole reason that Ray was an ideal candidate for this debate was that he is a qualified philosopher. Where was the philosophical interaction with the claim that God is the source of morality?

    Opening Statement: Dr Matthew Flannagan

    Matt gave his opening talk next, and I think more or less everybody in attendance (and presumably Ray as well) would have noticed that the approach taken was markedly different from that of Ray. It may seem rather elementary, but first Matt explained what the subject of the debate was (namely, whether or not it is defensible to view God as the source of morality, and whether or not right and wrong could be grounded in God’s commands), he took a stance on the subject of the debate (namely an affirmative stance on both counts), and then he began to defend that stance. That, in short, was how his opening presentation differed from Ray’s.

    Matt holds to a divine command theory of ethics, the view that moral rightness and wrongness are determined by the commands of God. There are a range of familiar objections to this view, and Matt turned to a few of those first. It is said that if morality is the result of God’s commands, then horrific things like torturing people for fun could become right just because God commanded them. But this is to suppose that God can command just anything, says Matt, and in fact the traditional concept of God, even as announced by Ray, involves God being “morally perfect,” and a morally perfect being would not commit such acts. For my part, I’m never quite happy when divine command theorists appeal to God’s moral perfection here, because if morality has as its source the commands of God, then God isn’t moral, meaning that it can’t be his moral perfection that constrains his commands (this is why it is, I think, better to think of God’s goodness preventing him from such issuing such commands). However, I think Matt next explains that this is not quite what he means to say as follows:

    Some object to the above defence of divine command ethics. If we take the above line of reasoning, then just how meaningful is it to say that God is good? Surely the claim just boils down to saying that God obeys his own commands. But there is, says Matt, a grain of truth to this. We can talk about divine goodness without construing it in terms of moral perfection in the sense of doing one’s duty (this is what I was referring to earlier). Many theologians and philosophers construe God’s goodness in terms of his character: truthful, loving, merciful and so on. It may well be that God doesn’t have a duty to be loving or truthful, but that hardly shows that he isn’t loving or truthful.

    With that, Matt moved on to Ray’s argument. Prior to the debate, Ray and Matt had “traded notes,” so that they would each know what the other was going to say, and be able to respond to that position in the debate. Matt replies to the “logical straight-jacket” argument summed up in five points as follows: First, even if all of Ray’s complaints about the biblical teaching were well founded, the argument wouldn’t even begin to address the subject of the debate, namely whether or not a divine command theory of ethics is tenable. There’s nothing about a divine command theory, for example, that commits somebody to inerrancy. A person might believe that moral duties are caused by divine commands, but known through all sorts of means like conscience and not necessarily from the Old Testament (they might, in theory, even gain that knowledge for other holy books). So Ray’s argument just doesn’t address the subject of the debate.

    Secondly, says Matt, premise three of Ray’s argument is ambiguous. It could mean that it’s morally wrong for us (i.e. human beings) to engage in or will acts like A B C or D, or it could mean that it’s wrong for God to engage in them, as well as wrong for us. Ray claims that denying 3) amounts to becoming like Genghis Kahn or Hitler, but this is only so if we deny that it’s wrong for humans to do those things. We might say that it’s wrong for humans do do A B C or D, but still deny 3) because we think that it’s not wrong for God to do those things. What’s more, Ray, says Matt, is using circular reasoning here by just assuming that God has duties not to do A B C or D. But if God is the source of morality then he cannot have such duties, and this is the very subject in dispute. Ray is therefore assuming the very thing he needed to prove.

    Matt’s third response is to address premise 2) in Ray’s argument, and here, if I may say so, is where the debate got rather sidetracked – not because Matt responded to Ray’s arguments at this point (it’s fairly inevitable that one wishes to respond to the other debater’s points), but because, as a whole, arguments about this premise came to dominate the entire discussion that followed. Here Matt argues that actually God did not do or command the things that many people allege that the Bible depicts him as doing or commanding. I summarise considerably here:

    When it comes to the conquest and supposed genocide in the Old Testament, critics often note the harsh sounding instructions to wipe out everything that breathes in the Canaanite communities, but then fail to notice that the same books of the Bible later talk about the Canaanites still living where they lived before. There’s a widely recognised phenomenon in Ancient Near Eastern writing of extreme hyperbole, much like we use today when we talk about “annihilating” the opposition in a sporting match. The language refers to utter defeat, rather than the actual killing of every living creature. As an aside of my own, this line of argument is not new among fairly conservative Christians. In fact, even before there was any such thing as the “New Atheist” movement, Martin Luther in the 16th century discussed the fact that there are obvious exaggerations for rhetorical effect in Old Testament battle accounts.

    Next, Matt argues that in fact while the death sentence is mentioned for fifteen offences in the Old Testament, it was usually anticipated that actual execution would not take place, but some sort of payment would suffice instead, the death penalty being mentioned only to underscore just how serious the offending was. In fact, for murder the Torah pointed out that a ransom (a payment in lieu of execution) was impossible and that execution must take place, which implies that in other cases a ransom was considered quits acceptable. The legal reference to execution was thus a hyperbole or a worst case scenario in most cases.

    Lastly, Matt commented on Ray’s claim that God will torture people forever just for holding the wrong beliefs. Firstly, says Matt, the texts that speak about hell or eternal punishment actually do not, in context, speak of literal endless torment at all. The Book of Revelation is apocalyptic literature, full of symbolic language from the Old Testament, language that originally referred to destruction of wicked empires. Similarly, language of weeping and gnashing of teeth or unquenchable fire, in the Old Testament context from which they are borrowed, refers to destruction and not endless suffering. What is more, the texts in question indicate that people will be punished for their actions, and not just for holding false beliefs.

    Attempting to drag the debate kicking and screaming back onto the intended subject, Matt sums up by recapping: Ray, even if right, hasn’t offered an argument against God being the source of morality. Some of the premises of his key argument either equivocate or involve circular reasoning, and his interpretation of Scripture can be faulted for failing to take important features like genre and context into account.

    End of round one. I think the impression created at this point was fairly unmistakable. Ray has presumed, it appeared, that he could simply embarrass God (or in God’s absence, those who believe in God) by seeking to make the biblical God look like a monster, while not turning to the philosophical issue in question: the source of morality. By presenting such a shocking picture, he seems to have supposed, people wouldn’t care about whether or not it’s acceptable to construe morality in terms of obedience to divine commands. Don’t think about that, just look at how awful the Old Testament is! By contrast, Matt singled out and offered defence of a stance on the subject in question. The problem is that he didn’t do it a lot – and the reason for that is that in responding to Ray’s argument, he was forced to talk about issues other than the subject of the debate. For what it’s worth, I also think the specific angle taken on defending a stance on the debate topic came across to many as a little on the technical side. The subject of the debate was introduced in Matt’s talk was a defence of his position against the possibility of horrendous commands and the claim that divine command ethics results in a vacuous view of ethics. The trouble is, given the nature of Ray’s approach, these objections never even arose, and as a result it seemed a little technical and out of place. I would have been inclined to start with a more general thesis about the relationship between God and morality, and then – without anticipating rebuttals that might not even follow, offer some fairly general arguments for that thesis. However, it proved to be the first and last interaction with the more philosophical aspects of the subject in the debate.

    Rebuttals

    Next came the rebuttal round where each speaker made use of a right of reply. Ray went first.

    Rebuttal: Raymond Bradley

    Ray’s first objection was to the suggestion that God does not have moral duties. Nobody, he said, is above the law. I cannot be the only one present who found this to be completely gratuitous. The entire debate was supposed to be about whether or not God’s commands are the source of morality. If they are, then it follows that God has no moral duties. How can Ray appeal to this belief in order to rebut the affirmative position? Why, I thought at the time, do his logical senses not scream out at him “stop! You’re using the most circular argument in the world!” Commenting further on the claim that God doesn’t have moral duties, Ray next claims that this is moral relativism, an abandonment of moral objectivity: These are rules that apply to some people (i.e. all humans) and not to God. Moral objectivity requires that all moral rules apply to all persons no matter who they are. Again, I blinked, thinking – as a philosopher (a former head of a philosophy department, no less), how could he think that this is so? Moral objectivity has never meant that everyone has the same duties (for example, I have an objective moral obligation to provide for my children, but it doesn’t follow that Ray has that obligation to provide for my children). All it means is that it’s a fact that those people have the duties they have, regardless of what anyone else thinks about it. I could only imagine that his fellow philosophers in the audience were wincing as they listened.

    Ray followed this up by saying that it’s no good defining God as good. We can define anything any way we like, that doesn’t make those definitions true. But of course defining things a certain way does not indicate that those things exist or that they are correctly defined that way, and nor had anyone suggested otherwise. Matt’s point had been a very different one, namely that if God is good in the way that theologians have portrayed him, then divine command ethics is not subject to the objection that God might just command horrific things, which would then become morally right.

    Philosophically speaking, the rebuttals that Ray offered were not just poor, they were bewilderingly poor. Next came the rebuttals aimed at Matt’s biblical arguments (which had originally been responses to Ray’s own biblical arguments).

    Yes, Ray says, it may be that the same books of the Bible that speak of the annihilation of the Canaanites also later speaks of them living in the land. However, this doesn’t justify the claim that the reference to complete destruction is a hyperbole. Instead, we should read both parts absolutely literally, and therefore see that what we have is a contradiction. But (in my view), one might have thought that had the contradiction been this obvious the author might have noticed, but Ray assures us that in fact this is how we should read the text. What does he say about the evidence from Ancient Near Easter literature indicating that such hyperbole was common and therefore unsurprising? Interestingly, he says nothing at all.

    Staying with the Old Testament, Ray replies to Matt’s comments about the death sentence being substituted with a lesser penalty like a monetary fine. Ray’s challenge is: If those cases permitted something other than execution, then what would Matt propose? A “lesser execution”? As a listener I was somewhat confused by this challenge, given that Matt’s argument was that the lesser penalty was not execution but a fine. I assumed that Ray might simply have misheard Matt on the issue. But Ray has a question here for Matt: Which penalties should be carried out, and how do we know what they refer to?

    But apart from the conquest and the death penalty, Ray added, there are other examples of atrocities in the Old Testament that Matt had not commented on. What, for example, of the biblical flood? Will Matt say that this too is merely a metaphor or a hyperbole?

    Can it just be explained away?

    Rebuttal: Matthew Flannagan:

    Matt’s first rebuttal was to note that Ray rejects part of Matt’s argument because, Ray says, God must have moral duties, and cannot be thought to have none. But the debate is about whether or not God is the source of moral duties, so Ray has to be begging the question (i.e. using circular reasoning) to argue this way. He cannot just assume the thing that he is meant to be trying to prove.

    Matt next commented on the claim that if God isn’t subject to moral duties but we are, then we must embrace moral relativism. But, he says, this is only true if we think that objective facts are independent of what everybody thinks. But Matt construes objective facts as being true independent of what human beings think. They aren’t true independent of what God thinks, and therefore he is not committed to relativism. Now, this is not the way I would have gone with the argument. I don’t know how persuasive it is to say that something can be objectively true and yet still false from God’s point of view (e.g. the fact that “it’s wrong to steal”). For my part, I think the way to respond to Ray would be to say that this view is not relativism because it doesn’t present facts as only holding for some people but not others. Divine command ethics is the thesis that our duties are determined by what God commands us to do. So if God commands Moses to climb Mt Sinai, then in fact he had the duty to do so. This is not moral relativism just because the command does not require everybody to climb Mt Sinai. It became an objective fact, when the command was issued, that Moses was morally required to climb Mt Sinai, and this was a fact independently of what anyone though of that fact, even God. It just happens that since God believes only true things, God is never mistaken about moral duties. It is therefore perfectly compatible with moral objectivism to say that while we have some moral duties, God has none. We need not sacrifice the thought that objective facts are true independently of what anyone (even God) thinks. Now, I happen to suspect that Matt agrees with this, but it’s a very different response from the one he offered here, and I don’t agree with the response that was offered. I felt it was only fair to point this out so that people realise that I’m perfectly prepared to state where I think people on “my side” get it wrong, it just happens that Matt did so very little, and Ray, I think, did little else.

    What then of Ray’s challenge about the capital offences in the Old Testament? Ray had challenged Matt to explain how we know which ones had to be carried out and which did not. How can we tell? Matt’s reply was simple: Read it, and pay attention to what you find in the context. You don’t have to guess.

    Ray had complained at the suggestion that we find hyperbole and metaphor in the Old Testament. But does this fact really make the Bible so hard to understand? Ray’s own comments have been littered with such things, including his favourite metaphor of putting God into a straight jacket. And yet, in spite of Ray’s frequent use of such figures of speech, he expects that we will have no trouble understanding his point. Likewise, the mere fact that the Bible uses metaphor should not imply that it can’t be understood.

    Lastly, Matt commented on Ray’s last comment about the biblical flood. Ray had challenge Matt to say that that wasn’t literal. “So Ray’s is a creationist!” Matt quipped, to the amusement of many present. Matt explained that while it might be convenient to portray all Christians as simple literalists, in fact many evangelicals do not think of the flood story as literal history.

    Closing Statements

    Now the time came for each speaker to sum up their position.

    Closing Statement: Raymond Bradley

    In summing up his position, Ray did not mention the issue of whether or not God is the source of morality. It was a bewildering phenomenon. He had discarded that issue altogether, and now summed up by referring to a string of barely connected issues as follows:

    It’s all very well, Ray says, to say that that biblical texts aren’t to be read literally. But can you give a sensible non literal explanation of those texts? How can you non-literally understand references to stoning people to death? Of course, some people take the whole Bible metaphorically. But the problem is that God is supposed to be all-knowing, and as such he should know that people are going to interpret him literally, as many have.

    But now, let’s get away from accusations of taking the biblical passages out of context. Let’s just leave those behind, Ray says (how convenient!), and instead talk about the (brand new) issue of exclusivity. The Bible says (in the book of Acts) that there is “no other name” through which people can be saved (namely, the name of Jesus), further implying that God really does reject people because of their beliefs. Christian apologist William Lane Craig defends this biblical claim at length in an article on the subject. And yet in spite of this, Christians themselves are divided into thirty-eight thousand different denominations, and over the centuries the existence of these different groups has led to “bloodshed and mayhem.” Sure, why not. Instead of talking about whether or not Ray’s arguments have been based on misunderstandings, let’s instead talk about the fact that there are heaps of different Christian sects who have conflicted with each other. It’s just staggering that this kind of thing seems to Ray to be so important and relevant that it should dominate the closing, instead of summing up how he has argued that God is not the source of morality. The fact is, Ray has done no such thing. It’s not that he tried but failed to do so. He simply never broached the subject in the first place!

    Next, Ray asks whether or not God actually killed a world of people in the flood. “Did that event occur”? There are millions of Christians who believe that the Universe was created 6000-10,000 years ago. Millions believe in Noah’s flood occurring about 2300 years ago. And with that observation, Ray’s summing up came to a close, in front of what must surely have been a sea of utterly confused faces.

    Closing Statements: Matthew Flannagan

    The final summing up belong to Matt. He started by noting that he had already given an account of what biblical passages referring to execution might mean if they are hyperbolic (where he spoke about the possibility of a ransom).

    Secondly, it’s no good for Ray to continue complaining about metaphors when, as Matt has already noted, Ray’s own presentations make use of metaphors.

    Thirdly, Matt commented on the new point raised in Ray’s closing statement (bearing in mind that raising new points in a closing statement is not typically permitted in a moderated debate, precisely because it leaves no opportunity for a response). In fact, contrary to Ray’s claim, William Lane Craig did not dodge the potential problem of exclusivity. Matt notes, drawing on the very article that Ray referred to, that to be saved in someone’s name does not mean to be saved by having explicit beliefs about that person, it means to be saved on the authority of that person, and in fact Craig’s article claimed that some could indeed be saved without such explicit beliefs, so Ray has simply misrepresented him.

    As for there being many different Christian perspectives, while this may be true, Matt notes that there are also many different secular perspectives, but this hardly shows that any secular outlook must be false. Also, while it may be true that Christian sects over the years have done awful things (Ray referred to the Crusades), it’s also true that plenty of Christians were opposed to those things, which suggests that the examples of Christian thought in action that Ray uses are rather selective.

    Lastly, Matt noted that Ray claims to have once been a fundamentalist, but to have left it behind. In reality, he hasn’t. He continues to assume that the most literalistic and conservative interpretation of biblical passages must be the correct ones, and that by attacking those views, he is attacking Christianity as a whole, and that in doing so he thinks that he has somehow managed to undermine the view that God is the source of morality, when in fact he has done no such thing.

    Thus ended the debate.

    Questions and Answers

    I’ve made it fairly clear what I thought of how things went. Ray simply did not come prepared. For a person chosen for the debate specifically because of his background in philosophy, he disappointed by largely ignoring the philosophical issues altogether. When he did wade into the territory of moral philosophy (most notably when accusing Matt of moral relativism), he proved, in my view, to be very wide of the mark. But by far the most frustrating aspect of Ray’s presentation was that he simply didn’t want to talk about the debate topic that people had come along to hear about. For him, his argument was that the God of the Bible is horrid, no more, no less.

    What about Matt then? To be honest, given Ray’s much longer history of debating on issues of religion, plenty of people (including me) were interested in this debate, more than for any other reason, to see how Matt would handle himself (and his opponent). But here too there was one major frustration: We never really got to see how Matt can defend his stance on God as the source of morality in debate. He was able to open with some reference to that subject, with what I though was possibly a slightly obscure defence for an opening statement. Perhaps he could have done a lot more, but the problem is, obviously your responses to your opponent’s arguments are going to be tailored to the arguments that your opponent uses, and in this debate Ray just didn’t use any arguments that required a philosophical defence of divine command ethics. Just as with a review of a book or a movie, I should probably tell you whether or not I liked the debate, and the reality is, it was something of a fizzer. It was one sided, and one of the speakers simply decided that instead of debating the proposition in question, he was going to talk about something else entirely. It wasn’t what people had come to see.

    What the audience thought of the debate can in part be gleamed from the questions and answers. I won’t attempt to reproduce those in full, but there were several general themes:

    First was the theme of metaphorical, hyperbolic and literal readings of the Bible. Matt was asked, if the Bible is really all metaphorical, what does it have over other works of literature that are also metaphorical. Later, Bill Cooke from the New Zealand Association of Rationalist Humanists suggested that perhaps Matt was just using appeals to metaphor, context or genre to avoid texts that he doesn’t like. He would never accept, for example, that the Ten Commandments (part of the same book of law that refers to stoning people) was just metaphor or shouldn’t be taken literally, so why they other parts? After all, Jesus said in Matthew 5 that he didn’t come to do away with the law.

    The the former question, Matt explained that you shouldn’t just decide to take the whole Bible literally or metaphorically. For any given passage, you have to check the context. Who wrote it? What genre does it appear in? For example, when Ray says that God is in a straight-jacket, because of who said it we know that it’s not literal, since Ray doesn’t actually believe in God. We know of other very similar types of creation story in the ancient world that weren’t meant to belong to the genre of simple history. Likewise when it comes to the Gospels we have plenty of very similar types of writing in ancient Greek biographies that were meant to be read as history.

    In regard to Bill Cooke’s question, the response was similar. Firstly, Matt pointed out that he had given reasons in each case for taking a specific text as a hyperbole or metaphor. Those same rules apply for these texts that Cooke mentioned as well. The Ten Commandments are presented like other pieces of writing from that period in history as the prologue to a book of law, so examining the genre guides the way that we treat the passage. As for Jesus’ words about the law, Matt said that he was speaking to a Jewish audience and not a Gentile one, so his words only applied in that context. In the book of Acts (in chapter 15), the issue of the Gentile relationship to the law was spelled out. As a listener with a keen interest in the particular issue of the applicability and role of Old Testament law in a New Testament context I really would like more to have been said than just this. I think that left as brief as this a rather misleading impression could have been given that in the Christian faith we see moral obligation as depending on whether or not one is a Jew or Gentile (which I know is not what Matt thinks). In fact, Acts 15 has applicability to all people, be they Jewish or Gentile, but realistically, a question and answer session just doesn’t allow for a lot of depth.

    The second comment from the audience was, in my view, the best, as it summed up what most people must surely have been thinking. It went roughly like this: “You’ve been talking about whether or not God is moral, but not about whether or not God is the source of morality.” The comment was met with applause from most in attendance. This was exactly what had been wrong with the debate. It had gotten bogged down on one issue: Ray thinks the God of the Bible is nasty and immoral. Never mind the subject of the debate, this was what the discussion ended up focussing on.

    Ray replied by saying that he did argue that God wasn’t the source of morality, but he didn’t refer to any of those arguments, which I frankly think is because there hadn’t been any such arguments. However, he now added that a moral code is just empty unless it gives primacy to empathy and compassion, and there’s an evolutionary account of how those things came about. Matt replied by saying that he had tried to talk about God as the source of morality, but in order to reply to Ray’s other arguments he had to deviate from that subject (a comment that drew a sound from the audience that appeared to mean something like “oooh, burn”). What’s more, he added, an evolutionary account might tell us how we came to hold moral beliefs, but that’s not an account of what makes those beliefs true, so whether it’s true or not, it doesn’t tell us about the source of morality.

    This last point was also related to another question put to Matt (the questioners seemed, overall to favour Matt – perhaps an attempt to stump the new guy). The question was: Sure there is a variety of secular viewpoints, but given the large number of Christian sects, doesn’t morality come, not from God, but from our own interpretation of various texts? But this question, as Matt noted, made a similar assumption to the previous one: that if people get their moral beliefs in a number of different ways (i.e. by reading different texts and interpreting them various ways), this is an account of where morality actually has its basis. But this confuses metaphysics (i.e. questions of fact about what’s real) with epistemology (i.e. questions of how we find out what’s real). What’s more, in spite of the fact that there’s a diversity of Christian viewpoints as well as secular viewpoints, there is probably more disagreement among secular outlooks. Could the secular philosophers get together and come up with, say, ecumenical creeds like Christians have?

    Ray’s comments on this question were a little stunning, and I think they basically revealed his approach to the Bible to involve exactly the kind of fundamentalism that Matt attributed to him during the debate. He said here that the real question is whether or not God is the author of morality (a fact he forgot for most of the debate). Well, God would be the author of morality if he actually told us, in the Bible, what was moral and what wasn’t. The Bible is supposed to be inerrant. And yet, if Matt is correct, then people actually have to study it to find out what it means! The need to look at issues of context and genre and so on. But that’s the essence of subjectivity, not objectivity. We shouldn’t have to do that, the Bible should just tell us what’s right and wrong.

    As far as arguments go, this was surely the bottom of the intellectual barrel for the night. How could Ray not see that this destroys every ethical theory. It destroys utilitarianism, because figuring out which course of action maximises utility isn’t always clear or obvious, and often involves careful thought. It destroys virtue ethics, since figuring out what a maximally virtuous person would do is not always obvious, and involves careful thought. It destroys natural law theories, and it destroys, interestingly (given Ray’s earlier comments), evolutionary accounts of ethics. What’s more, Ray is practically demanding that everyone who is a Christian be a simplistic, dumbed down fundamentalist when it comes to reading the Bible. Ignore subtlety, context, history, literary form, and more or less any interpretative tool that requires anything beyond a lower high school reading age, just accept the most literalistic and careless interpretation you can find. True, if more Christians were actually like this then it might make them easier targets for Ray’s style of tirade against God, but that is hardly a good reason to go down that path! Matt was absolutely right: Ray hasn’t even gotten close to leaving fundamentalism behind.

    Several more questions followed. First, an audience member read from Numbers chapter 15, which actually relates the account of a person who was found working on the Sabbath. The Israelites were not sure what to do, so they inquired of God, who told them to stone the man to death, which they then did. The question was put to Matt: How can you say this didn’t literally happen?

    Matt’s response was threefold: First, the people had to inquire of God, which suggests that perhaps the law wasn’t crystal clear on the penalty required. Second, and related to this, this sounds like the first such recorded offence, so – as in other law codes – there would be a need to use this offence to really set an example and underscore the seriousness of the offending. Thirdly, it might not have actually taken place. Maybe it was a piece of Midrash, a fictional account written for the purpose of explaining the seriousness of this law. Now, sympathetic though I am to taking clues from other examples of Jewish legal writing, I get the feeling I’m not the only one who might start to think that there are only so many times a new text can be explained in terms of “perhaps it just didn’t happen but it was written as though it did.” I think this would have started to wear thin on some in attendance. In the case of Numbers 15 and the case of a man executed for working on the Sabbath, I don’t even think this defence is required. My own view is that a Midrash of that sort, even though I have no reason to think that this is what we have in Numbers 15, would only be written if the writer really believed that the offence described is such that it would actually warrant the punishment described. Maybe a more persuasive line of response would have been something like: “Well, I never said the death penalty was never applied. All I noted is the fact that we need not suppose that it happened left right and centre as Ray supposes, since we know that a ransom was available in many cases. Obviously it would not be available in direct contradiction to God’s command on a given occasion, which is what is depicted in Numbers 15.” Rather than a serving as defence of biblical accounts, too many attempts to reach for the “it never really happened” card are likely to have the opposite effect form the intended one.

    Next, Ray was asked why – if his interpretation of the Bible is the correct one – how come those most noted over the centuries for doing acts of love and kindness have been Christians, but those most notorious for the worst atrocities of all time like Stalin, Mao Tse Tung or Pol Pot were atheists?

    Ray first said that Hitler and Stalin had both at some point attended seminary, but then (perhaps realising that this had nothing to do with the question), said that Christians do this because they are selective in reading the Bible. They ignore the bits they don’t like. Christians just “don’t read the Bible.”

    Matt here noted that when Christians over the years have done bad things, Ray claims that this is highly significant and supports his argument, but when the good things done by Christians is noted, Ray somehow thinks this doesn’t establish anything. This is clearly a double standard.

    The last question (actually, two questions from the same person) was for Ray: Firstly, if morality is based on our sentiment (e.g. empathy), doesn’t that make it subjective and not objective at all? And secondly, if there really is a hell, then wasn’t it actually loving, rather than cruel, for Jesus to preach about it, so that people would avoid it?

    Ray said that he would address the second question first, but then proceeded to answer neither the second nor the first question at all (not even badly). Instead, he decided to take this opportunity to say that he didn’t even believe that there had been an historical Jesus of Nazareth at all, just because no non-Christian historian at the time referred to him. Only one ancient non-Christian work spoke of him (a work by Josephus), and that reference is a forgery, added later by Christians.

    I have to confess that I have no idea where this reply came from. It certainly had nothing to do with the two questions put to him. In reply, matt noted that Tacitus and Seutonius also refer to Jesus. He also pointed out that the disputed text in Jospehus is not generally regarded as an entirely fabricated reference to Jesus. Instead, it is a genuine reference to Jesus that was tampered with and enlarged by a later writer. Plus, there are two separate references to Jesus in Josephus’ work, and only one of them was the target of alteration. Now, of course, this was not a debate on the historicity of Jesus, but had it been one, a number of other examples could also have been used as I have discussed elsewhere (see my series on whether Jesus ever existed here, here and here.) In short, Ray places himself in a fairly radical minority when he goes as far as to deny the very historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth. Combined with his self confessedly shallow approach to biblical interpretation, this only reinforces my observation that he really ought to have made an effort to get involved in the debate about whether or not God is the source of morality, instead of straying into fields that he shows no evidence of being qualified to comment on. An opportunity for a genuinely riveting debate was, unfortunately, wasted.

    If you were at the debate, have listened to the podcast or read the written papers, do you agree with how Glenn called it?

    RELATED POSTS:
    Video: Bradley v Flannagan “Is God the Source of Morality?

    The Podcast: Bradley v Flannagan
    Joint Communique: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Raymond Bradley’s Opening Statement: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Matthew Flannagan’s Opening Statement: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Bradley’s Reply to Matt: Bradley v Flannagan Debate
    Flannagan’s Reply to Ray: Bradley v Flannagan Debate

  • Dissecting the Bradley v Flannagan Debate

    We’re just in from the debate at Auckland University where Raymond Bradley and Matt debated  “Is God the Source of Morality? Is it rational to ground right and wrong in commands issued by God?” and we see the discussion from those there has started in more than one place on the net – including here. We don’t plan to write much on our own thoughts just yet – we need to wind down first! But for those of you keen to start/keep sharing your thoughts go ahead – the discussion is off to a great start!

    • Glenn Peoples, a Dunedin based Philosopher of Religion who many regulars will know as the author of Say Hello to my Little Friend: The Beretta Blog and Podcast, watched a live video feed of the debate via Skype and will be writing a review of his thoughts which we hope to have online in the next few days.
    • We plan to publish Matt’s opening statement and Ray’s (if he is agreeable) tomorrow.
    • The video will be online in a few weeks once it is edited and uploaded.

    [I’ve moved the comments people have already left on the sticky post (which I have now unstickied so it is further down the page) to this thread in case you were wondering how your comment got here.

  • Oxford Calling… Can you Help Glenn Peoples?

    The 18th Conference of the European Society of the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Oxford is on “Religion in the Public Square” and will feature my favourite philosopher (next to Matt of course) Professor Nicholas Wolterstorff and New Zealand’s own Glenn Peoples who blogs and produces brilliant podcasts at Say Hello to my Little Friend. Back in February Glenn blogged of his interest in giving a paper to this conference and of his intention, if accepted, to find a way there.

    The first hurdle was to get his paper accepted, which is no small feat but one that Glenn has pulled off – well done Glenn!

    The second hurdle is to raise the funds to get there, which is a work in progress…

    Glenn’s situation is much like Matt’s. Glenn holds a PhD in Philosophy and a Masters in Theology (the opposite way around to Matt). He is a very good Christian philosopher; I referenced him in my own philosophy of law paper on the subject, Matt has cited from him also  in several works (see our Glenn Peoples tag) and we both view Glenn’s blog to be MandM’s toughest competition in the NZ blog rankings for our niche .  Like Matt,  since graduating, Glenn has struggled to find work in his field. He currently works for the IRD and earns a very modest wage. Glenn is trying to find a position using his skills, if not in New Zealand, anywhere in the world so this conference is not only an opportunity for him to meet one of the world’s best living philosophers in Glenn’s field, it is not just an opportunity to have New Zealand Christian philosophy showcased at Oxford but it is a chance to help someone with a gift take another step towards using that gift to provide for his family and to support the broader church. Donations are currently being gathered and more information is available here if you would like to help and/or follow his progress.

  • Sunday Study: Inerrancy and Biblical Authority

    Recently Glenn Peoples and Dominic Bnonn Tennant had an interesting exchange over the issue of biblical inerrancy, the doctrine, that the bible contains no errors. In his post, Errantly Assuming Inerrancy in History, Peoples makes this interesting comment,

    While there has always been a clear expression of the view that what Scripture teaches is correct, this has certainly not always been seen in terms of the notion of “inerrancy.” After all, the very disagreement that exists between evangelicals who affirm inerrancy and those who do not is whether or not the idea that the Bible is authoritative and truthful in what it teaches us should (or need not) give rise to the further claim that the Bible is also inerrant.

    Peoples here distinguishes between two theses; the first is that bible contains no errors, the second is that whatever the bible teaches is true. In his article Peoples argues that the first of these theses is false, he argues that there are numerous factual errors in scripture. On the other hand Peoples maintains that the second thesis is true, none of the errors he mentions call into question the authority of scripture because they do not affect the truth or falsity of what scripture teaches. Hence, one can affirm the authority of the bible, even the claim that it is infallible in what it teaches, without affirming that it is inerrant, in the sense of containing no errors.

    In A response to Glenn Peoples’s ‘No, I am not an inerrantist’ Bnonn argues that Peoples is attacking a straw-man. The doctrine that the bible is inerrant does not mean to deny that the kind of discrepancies Peoples points to do not exist; rather, supporters of the position Peoples attacked have in mind a different account of what constitutes an error to what Peoples’ critique suggests. Here, I do not want to discuss whether Bnonn is correct or incorrect here because whether he is or not, I think Peoples is onto an important distinction here and he offers an important critique of one way of understanding biblical authority which is often assumed by sceptics.

    A couple of examples may illustrate this point. In Does God Exist Michael Tooley, for example, suggests that those who hold that Genesis is the revealed word of God run into trouble because in Genesis God decided to “drown all men, women, and children in a great flood” and suggests that this means they must believe that God has engaged in genocide of the human race.[1] David Brink similarly argues that the Genesis story of Adam and Eve is contradicted by contemporary geological evidence and evolutionary biology so, hence, is unreliable.[2] Fales notes “then, there is the generally mythical character of Genesis, and the fact that many of the themes in the first eleven chapters are borrowed from, or influenced by, the myths of other ancient Near Eastern cultures”[3] and considers this to undercut the authority and reliability of the book of Genesis. Some sceptics contend that primitive scientific understandings of the world are presupposed in various biblical passages. In Matt 15:18-19 Jesus states “But the things that come out of the mouth come from the heart, and these things make a man unclean. For out of the heart comes evil thoughts, murder, adultery, sexual immorality, theft, false testimony, slander” Some sceptics argue that this passage reflects a primitive ancient understanding of human anatomy that held that the heart was literally the seat of the emotions, will and intellect.

    Now some evangelical scholars would contest each of these claims by questioning the existence of such underlying cultural beliefs, the geological evidence and so on, however, here, for the sake of argument, I will assume these basic contentions are correct. I think an important question to ask is, so what? Because even if the sceptic’s claims are true it is far from clear that this actually calls into question biblical authority, the distinction Peoples raised gives us some insight into why. The examples might show that the text contains errors in some sense of that term but it is not clear that they actually show that what the bible teaches is false.

    Interestingly something like this distinction occurs in the characterisation of inerrancy offered by two leading, contemporary, Christian philosophers. Alvin Plantinga states, “Scripture is inerrant: the Lord makes no mistakes; what he proposes for our belief is what we ought to believe”. Here Plantinga defines inerrancy not in terms of the bible containing no errors at all, but rather that what God proposes to teach with scripture is not mistaken. William Lane Craig articulates a similar account:

    Nobody thinks that when Jesus says that the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds (Mark 4.31) this is an error, even though there are smaller seeds than mustard seeds.  Why?  Because Jesus is not teaching botany; he is trying to teach a lesson about the Kingdom of God, and the illustration is incidental to this lesson. Defenders of inerrancy claim that the Bible is authoritative and inerrant in all that it teaches or all that it means to affirm.  This raises the huge question as to what the authors of Scripture intend to affirm or teach.[4]

    Craig’s point here is that Jesus’s comment taken literally contains a falsehood, that the mustard seed is the smallest of all seeds. I myself am inclined to see hyperbole here and so do not think that Jesus did literally say the mustard seed is the smallest of seeds, suppose however he did, then his statement would be false. Nether the less Craig notes, and I think correctly, that this is irrelevant because even if Christ said this about mustard seeds, this passage is not supposed to teach us about Botany. It’s a teaching about the growth of the kingdom of God. The saying about the mustard seed is simply a way of illustrating the point Jesus is trying to teach. And it’s the truth or falsity of this teaching, not the details of the illustration that is what is at stake in the question of biblical authority.  I think Craig is correct here, God uses texts written by human beings to teach people certain truths about himself and the world. What is authoritative is what is taught not the details of how it is expressed. This distinction between what the text teaches and what it contains then is I think illuminating, it also I think casts some light on cases of error that Peoples refers to the difference between the gospel of John and the synoptic gospels in terms of the cleansing of the temple:

    Scholars have come to see that the genre to which the Gospels most closely conform is ancient biography.  This is important for our question because ancient biography does not have the intention of providing a chronological account of the hero’s life from the cradle to the grave.  Rather ancient biography relates anecdotes that serve to illustrate the hero’s character qualities.  What one might consider an error in a modern biography need not at all count as an error in an ancient biography.  To illustrate, at one time in my Christian life I believed that Jesus actually cleansed the Temple in Jerusalem twice, once near the beginning of his ministry as John relates, and once near the end of his life, as we read in the Synoptic Gospels.  But an understanding of the Gospels as ancient biographies relieves us of such a supposition, for an ancient biographer can relate incidents in a non-chronological way.

    Craig’s point can be seen this way. John records the cleansing of the temple near the beginning of his ministry, whereas the synoptic gospels record it occurring near the end of his ministry. Hence, these accounts contain contradictory records of the same event. This, however, does not call into question the accuracy of what is being taught because once one understands the genre being employed, the genre of ancient biography, it is evident the authors did not intend to teach that every event they recorded actually happened in the precise way they narrate. The authors are not teaching that Christ actually cleansed the temple at a particular time and place in history, they are trying, rather, to provide a faithful account of who Christ was, what he was like, what he taught, the major things he did and said. These records are accurate if they faithfully reflect a correct answer to these questions. They, like other biographers of the time, drew on accounts or traditions that highlighted the point they were trying to make without necessarily accepting that every account they refer to actually happened precisely how it is stated. The authors, in relaying the story of the cleansing of the temple, are teaching not that the event actually happened as they narrated it but that Christ was opposed to the kind of actions that were taking place in the temple; he was so opposed to it that given the opportunity, whether late in his ministry or early, he would respond in the way the Gospels portray and take the kind of stance he is portrayed as taking. The text teaches truth if it is true that Christ was like this and false if he was not. If Christ had no problem with money changers in the temple, and considered this activity to be a perfectly appropriate way to make money, then what this text asserts would be false.

    I think many of the cases cited by sceptics of the Hebrew and Greek scriptures are unpersuasive because they fail to distinguish between what is contained in the text and what the text teaches. Given this they fail to really challenge biblical authority as this has, according to Peoples, been traditionally understood.

    Suppose, as Fales suggests, the evidence supports the contention that Genesis is not an historical account of origins but a rewritten legend or myth, it does not follow that what this myth teaches is false. Myths are used to teach theological and ethical points and the question of whether these points are true or false or not is whether the genre that expresses them is mythic.

    Similar points can be made about the other examples. The fact that Genesis contains a story about God drowning the human race in a flood does not entail that the text teaches that God committed genocide. For this latter conclusion to follow one would need to establish that the genre of Genesis is on par with the genre of modern histography and hence intends to teach the events recorded actually happened. This may or may not be the case but it requires argument. Merely citing a passage does not do this.

    Similarly, Brinks’ argument assumes that the text not only contains stories about Adam and Eve but also teaches the story occurred as historical fact. This involves important questions of genre that Brink ignores. It is possible that these stories are included by the author to teach certain theological and moral truths about human beings, sin and God; of course they might not be either, but merely pointing out that a story contains error if taken as literal historical fact does not substantiate this.

    Finally, even if Christ’s statement presupposes or reflects a mistaken ancient view of human anatomy it is clear that in the passage in question he is not teaching that this anatomy is true. He is teaching about human sin and its relationship to the Torah. He might use a primitive understanding of anatomy to illustrate or make the point but that is not the point he is imparting.

    Here, as elsewhere, sceptics show themselves up as fundamentalists working with an excessively pedantic understanding of inerrancy; a conception that Peoples correctly rejects and also argues, again correctly, is largely irrelevant to the question of biblical authority. Moreover, if Bnonn is correct, most inerrantists do not assume this understanding of biblical authority either, which means that such arguments are simply attacks on straw men, often by people who should know better.


    [1] Michael Tooley “Does God Exist?” in The Knowledge of God eds Michael Tooley and Alvin Plantinga (Malden, M A: Blackwell Publishers, 2008) 75.
    [2]
    David O Brink “The Autonomy of Ethics” The Cambridge Companion to Atheism ed Michael Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 159.
    [3] Evan Fales “Plantinga’s Case against Naturalistic Epistemology” 63 Philosophy of Science 1996, 447-448.
    [4]
    William Lane Craig “What Price Biblical Errancy?” Reasonable Faith Q&A.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Sunday Study: Two Forms of Inerrancy

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I,  I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of it. I looked at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much and Audi’s response to this. In this post I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility.

    (d)        Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility

    I have argued that the argument from respect is subject to two objections, incoherence and thinness. One should not appeal to religious reasons to justify coercive legislation because people can reasonably reject religious reasons; as religious reasons are not shared by all reasonable people there is a duty to not appeal to them.  However, if this is true then both the DRR in its “public reason” form, as exemplified by Rawls, and in its more secularist form, as exemplified by Audi, should also be rejected. Reasonable people do not agree on secular moral theory nor do they agree on the principles of public reason.

    In addition to being incoherent the DRR excludes far too much. It leaves us with content that is insufficiently thin to justify substantive legislative questions. I cited Gaus above who agreed that “little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”

    In response to the thinness objection Gaus introduced the idea of “open justification.”[55]

    Open justification … takes a person’s current system of beliefs and asks, first, whether given this system that person is committed to accepting some new piece of information, and, second, whether that person is then committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.

    According to Gaus, what respect requires is not that laws be justified to all reasonable people in such a way that those reasonable people can be expected to accept the justification, but rather “a coercive law is justified to an agent only if, were he reasonable and adequately informed, then he would have a sufficient reason from his own perspective to support it.”[56] [Emphasis added]

    Peoples explains,[57]

    [One] might hold to all kinds of prejudices and false beliefs that would lead him to reject a policy, and yet we might still be justified in advocating that this policy be imposed on him because if he were a bit more reasonable and open to new information, he would have a reason to endorse it. Stated differently, a person can be openly justified in accepting a policy, and yet consciously reject that policy because he doesn’t realise that if he only knew a bit more, understood the situation a little better, or was more open minded, he would have reasons to accept the policy.

    Gaus prefers open justification over two other forms he identifies as “closed justification” and “strong externalism.” Gaus describes closed justification as being justified internally from the viewpoints that person currently holds.[58] He defines strong externalism as being justified from a viewpoint where one was adequately informed and had no mistaken beliefs. Gaus suggests that respecting others means that one is able to openly justify the policies one supports to other reasonable people in society. He does not require that persuasion is achieved or that a person’s current comprehensive viewpoint endorses the policy in question. Rather he holds that one must be able show the person that his or her current viewpoint provides grounds or reasons for believing things they currently do not. Further, that if they did accept these other things then they would have reasons for embracing the coercive policy being advocated.

    Gaus’ opinion does appear to improve on that of Rawls. He is not alone in suggesting this. Audi has offered a solution to the thinness problem along the lines Gaus suggests.[59]

    Two people who disagree on the justice of allowing a Nazi group to present its case may share intuitions about freed speech in general and be divided by, for instance, paranoia about Nazis, which one party has and the other does not. When this happens, there is often a possible route from the shared intuitions about the justice of protecting freedom of expression to agreement on the case in hand. It appears, moreover, that among rational civilized people, establishing agreement on what factual information is relevant and on what the relevant facts are tends to bring intuitions closer together.

    Often when two people disagree there will be a set of moral intuitions[60] on which they do agree. The disagreement stems from other facts brought about by certain biases. If people can be shown that they are mistaken on these facts, it is possible that the biases can be corrected and agreement might occur. Audi suggests that something like open justification will decrease the amount of disagreement between rational people on at least some issues of justice.

    As Audi’s example is simply that of a dispute between two people I am not sure that it escapes the thinness objection. It is one thing for a person to openly justify his or her position to one other but, according to Gaus, it is wrong to advocate a coercive law unless one can provide open justification to all reasonable people. Further, in the context of a defence of the DRR, and in the face of a charge of unjust asymmetry, Gaus must also contend both that religious reasons can never achieve open justification in this manner and that secular reasons can.

    (i)         Open justification and the thinness objection
    According to Gaus, the provision of open justification for a policy, to another person who rejects that policy, should proceed in two stages. First, one should assess whether the other person’s viewpoint commits that person to “accepting some new piece of information”. If it does, then one should assess whether the person is then “committed to revising his or her system of beliefs in the light of that new information.” Consequently, a person is only permitted to advocate a position if he or she can show that the position follows from premises that all reasonable people in society currently accept and according to a type of inference that all reasonable people recognise as valid.

    An immediate problem arises, namely that few, if any, laws are justified by arguments that meet this standard (probably because few arguments on any substantive topic meet this standard). Marilyn McCord Adams notes, “the defence of any well-formulated philosophical position will eventually involve premises which are fundamentally controversial and so unable to command the assent of all reasonable persons.”[61] Consider the list of controversial issues I gave earlier: welfare, abortion, state funding of social projects, euthanasia, pornography, genetic modification of foods, climate change, capital punishment, Maori seats and so on. Do any of the proponents on either side of these debates offer arguments that ultimately appeal to premises that all rational people accept, without ever appealing to some premise, that is either drawn from or depends for its plausibility on, a comprehensive perspective that only some reasonable people accept? Could anyone advance such a justification? I doubt it.

    This doubt stems from the fact that in such ethical debates often the very foundations of the subject are a matter of dispute. Nihilists deny moral claims are defensible at all. Non-nihilists disagree fundamentally over whether moral language is descriptive, prescriptive, both or merely an expression of emotion. There is disagreement over how moral knowledge is gained, what the fundamental criteria for right actions are and so on. Given this, almost any moral premise will be subject to dispute by some reasonable people.[62]

    Eberle and Cuneo raise a related point by citing the example of Islamic intellectual, Sayyid Qutb.[63]

    While in prison, Qutb wrote an intelligent, informed, and morally serious commentary on the Koran in which he laid the ills of modern society at the feet of Christianity and liberal democracy. The only way to extricate ourselves from the problems spawned by liberal democracy, Qutb argued, is to implement shariah or Islamic legal code, which implies that the state should not protect a robust right to religious freedom. In short, Qutb articulates what is, from his point of view, a compelling theological rationale against any law that authorizes the state to protect a robust right to religious freedom.

    People like Qutb are not alone in society. Whatever we might think of the conclusions they draw, Islamic intellectuals appear to be educated, rational and morally serious people. Qutb rejects “a robust right to religious freedom” and liberal democracy itself. A coercive law that protects a robust right to freedom of religion and any of the other substantive commitments of a liberal democracy is only defensible if secularists can provide a valid argument for these commitments, from premises that Qutb accepts, to the conclusion that such commitments are correct. It is doubtful that secularists have done this or even that they would be able to.[64] Cuneo and Eberle note the conclusion.[65]

    If respect for persons requires that each coercive law be justified to those reasonable persons subject to that law, and if a person such as Qutb were a citizen of a liberal democracy, then the argument from respect implies that laws that protect the right to religious freedom are morally illegitimate, as they lack moral justification—at least for agents such as Qutb.

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V, I will examine and critique Gaus’s idea of open justification in more detail.


    [55] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 32.
    [56]
    Christopher J. Eberle and Terence Cuneo “Religion and Political Theory” (2008) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (at 9 August 2009).
    [57] Glenn Peoples “Religion in the Public Square: Is it Justified?” (speech delivered at Thinking Matters, Laidlaw College, 12 May 2009, 14; text obtained via Email from Glenn Peoples to Madeleine Flannagan, 12 October 2009.
    [58]
    Gaus, above n 54, 36.
    [59] Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 132-133.
    [60] Audi is a moral intuitionist. He believes people can discern basic moral truths through moral intuition; hence, for Audi, agreement on intuitions means agreement on basic moral principles.
    [61] Marilyn McCord Adams Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1999) 180.
    [62] I am grateful to Matthew Flannagan for the development of this point.
    [63] Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.
    [64] For a critical discussion on the standard arguments for religious freedom and the controversial premises on which they rest see, Philip Quinn “Religion and Politics” in William E Mann (ed) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Reference Online 2004) (at 7 October 2009).
    [65]
    Eberle and Cuneo, above n 55.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part III

    In my last posts, beginning Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I, I set out the doctrine of religious restraint and touched on some criticisms of it. I looked at and critiqued some of the key arguments in support of the doctrine of religious restraint. In this post I will look at the objection that the argument from respect is too thin, that applied consistently it excludes too much. I will conclude by looking at Audi’s response to this.

    (b)        Thinness

    A closely related problem is that if it is applied consistently the argument from respect excludes too much. If justification is limited to principles that no reasonable person can reasonably be expected to reject then little will be able to be justified. Glenn Peoples notes the problem;[31]

    Given this view of justification, you can only endorse a policy if it is such that it can be endorsed in light of the actual beliefs and goals held by the KKK, the Catholic Church and the humanist rationalist society.

    Wolterstorff observes that “in our actual societies, anyone who embraced this position would simply refrain from advocating any position whatsoever on any issue of importance to society.”[32] Quinn agrees, “as Wolterstorff notes, he knows of no law or policy that has come up for discussion in the United Sates in recent years that has had the support of a consensus of all the rational adult citizens.”[33]

    Gerald Gaus, who is otherwise sympathetic to the DRR, also agrees; he notes that, given Rawls’s requirement for consensus, public reason “loses its character as a liberal doctrine, for little, if anything, is the object of consensus among reasonable people.”[34] Kent Greenawalt argues that public reason is incapable of grounding policy on most contentious political issues.[35] Peter de Marneffe concurs.[36]

    Wolterstorff contends that public reason must be supplemented by ideas drawn from comprehensive doctrines or it will not be able to function as an adequate base for justifying many substantive policies. To make his point, Wolterstorff cites the welfare debate. Advocates for the varying perspectives appeal to ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ but mean different things by these terms; they prioritise the relevant rights differently, they disagree as to how such rights should be weighed against social utility. It is unlikely that public reason, common sense and uncontroversial science can justify welfare legislation to a standard that all can reasonably accept. [37]

    Wolterstorff makes similar points over the fundamental premise in the abortion debate; equal protection has radically different meanings depending on how one interprets public reason’s answer to the question, ‘is the fetus a person or not?’[38] Eberle,[39] Quinn[40] and Jean Hampton[41] agree that public reason cannot settle the question as to whether a fetus is a person yet Rawls argues that public reason can settle the abortion debate (case in point: reasonable people disagree over the answers public reason can give). [42]

    Rawls’ version of the argument from respect is not the only one that faces these problems; similar issues arise with other conceptions of the DRR. Any attempt to ground the DRR in the notion that coercive legislation cannot be justified unless the reasons advanced can be grounded in the reasonably-held principles and beliefs shared by all people will face the same problem. This is evident when one examines other versions of the DRR which do not employ Rawls’ idea of public reason.

    Rawls employs public reason to place a restraint on all comprehensive viewpoints, whether religious or secular. Robert Audi’s position is less restrictive. Audi applies the restraint primarily to religious reasons. He proposes a principle of “secular rationale”, a principle of “secular motivation” and something he calls “theo-ethical equilibrium.”[43]

    His secular rationale principle claims that “one should not advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct unless one has, and is willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support.”[44] His principle of secular motivation goes further; “one should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless one not only has and is willing to offer, but is also motivated by, adequate secular reason, where this reason (or set of reasons) is motivationally sufficient for the conduct in question.”[45] Theo-ethical equilibrium is “a rational integration between religious deliverances and insights and, on the other hand, secular ethical considerations … a mature, conscientious theist who cannot reach it [theo-ethical equilibrium] should be reluctant or unwilling to support coercive laws or public policies on a religious basis that cannot be placed in that equilibrium.”[46]

    Audi argues that “an adequate reason for a law or policy is a proposition whose truth is sufficient to justify it.”[47] He places the restraint on religious reasons;[48]

    A secular reason is, roughly, one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element, does not (evidentially) depend on the existence of God (for example, through appeals to divine command) or on theological considerations (such as interpretations of a sacred text), or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority.

    Given that comprehensive secular perspectives are not excluded by this version of the DRR, it appears that Audi’s conception can escape the problem of thinness that Rawls’ public reason faces. Comprehensive secular viewpoints should provide people with a thicker perspective, broad enough to justify many substantive policies.

    However, an examination of the reasons Audi advances in favour of his version of the DRR will reveal this contention to be mistaken. By broadening public reason to adequate secular reason Audi’s position is thicker than Rawls’ but its asymmetrical treatment of religious and secular views puts it back in the path of the charges of incoherence and thinness. I will elaborate.

    Like Rawls, Audi offers a version of the argument from respect. He states “as advocates for laws and public policies, then, and especially for those that are coercive, virtuous citizens will seek grounds of a kind that any rational adult citizen can endorse as sufficient for the purpose”[49] [Emphasis added] In another article, he argues that[50]

    adherence to the principle of secular rationale helps to ensure that, in determining the scope of freedom in a society, the decisive principles and considerations can be shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.

    Audi assumes that secular views are accepted by all whereas not everyone accepts the truth of religious premises. This is a big assumption. In fact some secular views are not accepted by all; religious people can and do reasonably reject secular views. This renders Audi’s position incoherent as adherence to Audi’s position, by Audi’s position, requires us to reject it. Quinn explains, [51]

    If the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds. For example, justification of a restrictive law or policy by an appeal to its maximization of utility should be excluded because many citizens reasonably reject utilitarianism. Indeed, it would seem that the appeal to any comprehensive ethical theory, including all known secular ethical theories, should be disallowed on the grounds that every such theory can be reasonably rejected by some citizens of a pluralistic democracy. And if justification of restrictive laws or policies can be conducted only in terms of moral considerations no citizen of a pluralistic democracy can reasonably reject, then in a pluralistic democracy such as ours very few restrictive laws or policies can be morally justified, a conclusion that would, I suspect, be welcomed only by anarchists.

    In addition, Audi’s position imposes a burden on religion that is not imposed on secularism despite secularism possessing the same features used to exclude religion. In the absence of some other factor, specific to religion and not applicable to secularism, the asymmetry is arbitrary. To escape this problem Audi would have to reject not only religious reasons but all reasons that are not “shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious convictions at all.” However, if he takes this line, his position is rendered too thin and fares no better than Rawls.’

    (c)        Audi’s defence

    In a defence of his position against this line of critique, Robert Audi questions if the DRR is as thin as critics maintain, [52]

    I would think that if we stick to principles of justice, which form only a small part of a comprehensive view, and if we do not take agreement to imply unanimity as opposed to consensus, there is a better chance of agreement than on the whole of such a larger view. Perhaps the chance is still not good, … But is there not a strong consensus, at least among citizens of democratic societies, that justice requires not only equal protection of the laws but also laws that protect liberty, including political and religious liberty and freedom of speech, up to a certain level? There are of course disagreements on matters of detail…

    While it is true that most people hold to some conception of justice and equality, and affirm the right to exercise certain liberties, the details of their understanding of these norms are not as minor as Audi suggests. As I alluded to earlier, people can mean quite different things by these terms and can prioritise and weigh their importance quite differently. Closer examination of these “matters of detail” reveals substantive lack of consensus.

    Equal protection requires agreement over the question as to whom it applies. In Nazi Germany everyone was owed equal protection by the state; however, certain classes of people were deemed sub-human. Likewise with justifications offered for the new-world slavery as practised in the British Empire and antebellum United States, slaves did not qualify; similarly, with the abortion debate over the status of the fetus. Then there is the extent and nature of the protection to consider. Should the state regulate how many times a week one engages in exercise and eats fruit and vegetables on the grounds of protecting the health of its people or should it simply protect people from aggressors? Is Audi suggesting that simply agreeing that such protection should apply equally to all is sufficient to make his case and what form that should take is mere detail? Unless supplemented by definitions as to its recipients, nature and scope the term “equal protection before the law” is a vague statement lacking substantive content.

    The liberties Audi lists are also fraught with difficulty in interpretation as reasonable people do not agree on them.  Are they negative or does the state have a duty to provide or subsidise them? The substantive content and meaning of the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ is disputed depending on whether one is talking to a libertarian or a socialist. Then there are the problems specific to each liberty.

    Consider freedom of religion. Steven Smith has argued that, strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to claim there is such a thing as a right to freedom religion. Instead there exists a spectrum of views about religious tolerance. Diverse writers, such as Aquinas, Cromwell, Locke and Mill each agreed that some religious dissent should be tolerated by the state but disagreed both on the limits and on which religions should be tolerated in society. Smith concluded that as no state tolerates all religious sects and very few tolerate none, the idea of a concept of freedom of religion supported by some and opposed by others is illusory. Which account of religious tolerance is correct depends on comprehensive views; adjudication between different understandings of religious tolerance is not possible without appealing to some comprehensive view. Settling these matters from something like public reason or adequate secular reason seems extremely difficult.[53]

    Does freedom of speech entail prior restraint or does it stop at the initiation of force? What about content and the manner of expression? How should we define speech? Does it include a right to engage in hate, racist, blasphemous, defamatory or sexist speech? Is it acceptable to wear Nazi emblems or deny the holocaust?

    Reasonable people disagree over more than just the details; they disagree over the terms, the nature, the extent and hold to a different range of finite cases. People use and understand the relevant terms in very different ways. Audi misconstrues the situation when he argues there is unanimity in society on fundamental principles of justice. The thinness objection stands.[54]

    In my next post, Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV, I will look at Gerald Gaus’ attempt to salvage the argument from epistemic inaccessibility and will offer some critical analysis of this.


    [31] Glenn Peoples Religion in the Public Square: Liberal Political Philosophy and the Place of Religious Convictions
    [32]
    Nicholas Wolterstorff “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 67-120, 154.
    [33]
    Philip Quinn “Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate” (2000) 60:2 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 486, 487 (book review), 488.
    [34] Gerald Gaus Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 293.
    [35]
    Kent Greenawalt Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) 141-150.
    [36] Peter de Marneffe “Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly232.
    [37] Wolterstorff, above n 32, 103-104.
    [38] Ibid 104.
    [39]
    Christopher Eberle Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002) 217-222.
    [40] Phillip Quinn “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious” (1995) 69:2 Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 35, 37-46.
    [41] Jean Hampton “The Common Faith of Liberalism” (1994) 75 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 208.
    [42] John Rawls Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993) 243-244.
    [43]
    Robert Audi “Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics” in Nicholas Wolterstorff & Robert Audi (eds) Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham Md, 1997) 1-66, 25-37.
    [44] Robert Audi “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 259, 279.
    [45] Ibid 284.
    [46]
    Audi, above n 43, 21.
    [47] Audi, above n 44, 284.
    [48] Ibid 278.
    [49]
    Audi, above n 43, 17.
    [50]
    Audi, above n 44, 290.
    [51] Quinn, above n 40, 39-40.
    [52] Audi, above n 43, 131-132.
    [53] Steven Smith Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995). (PhD Thesis, University of Otago, 2007) 118.
    [54] Paul Rishworth suggests these examples do not show there is no secular consensus but rather that there is a secular consensus at a high level of abstraction. Supervisor’s feedback from Paul Rishworth to Madeleine Flannagan dated 30 October 2009. This may be the case, however, the thinness objection does not maintain that there is no secular consensus; it maintains that there is no secular consensus thick enough to provide an answer to many substantive public policy questions. For Rishworth’s objection to stand, this higher level of abstraction would have to furnish principles thick enough to answer such questions and the examples above show that it cannot.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part I

    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part II
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part IV
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part V
    Religious Restraint and Public Policy: Part VI

  • (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum

    Given that yesterday we advertised Dr Glenn Peoples’ upcoming public lectures and because the smacking referendum begins on Saturday, I thought we’d share this article critiquing bad anti-smacking reasoning by Glenn.



    (dis)Honest to God: How Not to Argue about the Smacking Referendum


    smackingIan Harris tells us (“Honest to God,” Dominion Post, [Dominion Post. Saturday July 11, 2009. Page B5], reproduced at the YesVote website) that we should reject the “harsh views” on child rearing found in the Bible.

    Mr Harris, unfortunately, joins many of those who promote the criminalisation of good parents by muddying the waters. He notes, for example, that someone who defends the right to use physical discipline also believes that children (like adults) are sinners. He then announces that since “progressive” Christians (by which he seems to mean those who no longer accept Christian theology) realise that this is based on an antiquated view, we should likewise reject the right to use physical discipline and we should criminalise those who do.

    It is difficult to interact charitably with those who support the ban on smacking if this is the contorted way they are going to reason about the subject. Whether or not one thinks the theology held by some supporters of the right to use physical discipline is correct is quite a different matter from whether or not one thinks they ought to be made into criminals, surely!

    Unfortunately again, Mr Harris attempts to use his platform as a mouthpiece of liberal (what he calls “progressive) Christianity to give credence to scientific claims that are obviously subject to great dispute. He makes the sweeping claim that this nebulous thing called “modern research” (while he cites no actual studies) shows that although corporal punishment does help bring about short-term compliance, it does not help a child to “internalise positive values for the longer term.”

    I am constantly bemused by the way in which conservative religious spokespeople are ridiculed even when they do cite research, but obvious nonsense like this can be peddled by the liberal voices without so much as a single scholarly citation, and nobody is expected to bat an eyelid.

    But even if what Mr Harris says is correct, the implication is that corporal punishment in and of itself has short term benefits and no long term ill effects. Hardly something to be prosecuting people for! The reality is that the effects he cites are perfectly compatible with the good of corporal punishment. Such punishment usually is administered to children when they are not willing to reason or reflect on the long term consequences of their actions. It is for when children are being unruly and unwilling to listen. Circumstances in which they are willing to do so are the circumstances under which corporal punishment is less necessary (meaning that the older a child becomes, the less frequent a smack will become). None of this gives the careful reader any reason to think that the occasional smack is immoral, much less worthy of criminal prosecution.

    Bereft of compelling moral or scientifically grounded arguments, Mr Harris turns instead to arousing prejudice against the religious convictions of those who disagree with him about child discipline. Unable to find anything strong enough in what all Christians consider their holy book, he reaches into the book of Ecclesiasticus (part of the so-called “apocryphal” writings that did not make up part of the Hebrew canon) to find the claim that “he who loves his son will whip him often.”

    But not only has Mr Harris strayed into literature that the so-called “fundamentalists” (most of whom would identify as conservative Protestants) that he attacks do not even regard to be part of the Bible at all, he has clearly sought out the most extreme translation of the verse that he can find. He conjures up grizzly pictures of leering parents towering, horsewhip in hand, over the broken and bleeding bodies of little children with misleading language like this.

    But just a few minutes research would dispel this attempt. The New American translation reads, “He who loves his son chastises him often.” The Douay Rheims translation (the Catholic Bible, which does include this book as part of the canon) reads “He that loveth his son, frequently chastiseth him.” The old King James version, the one that “fundamentalists” are most likely to read if the read this book at all, reads “He that loveth his son causeth him oft to feel the rod.” Of course, because it’s a metaphor for physical discipline that’s probably still too much for Mr Harris, but needless to say, it robs him of his “whipping” bogeyman.

    After the rhetorical debris is stripped away, all that’s really left is a string of namecalling and fearful language. He calls the views of his opponents “repugnant.” He calls them “fundamentalists” with “antiquated” views that are opposed to “progressive” thought. But where’s the actual substance? Like much of the rhetorical fireworks that is being leveled at those who want the law changed to a common sense view that refuses to place thousands of good parents in the criminal category, Ian Harris offers more heat than light, and manifests just the sort of shallowness and bias that this debate could do without.

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