Tag: Science and Religion

  • Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    In my first post, Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I, I set out some basics about epistemology, I now want to turn to one particular way we know things: testimony. Nicholas Wolterstorff defines paradigmatic cases of testimony as: believing X on the say so of someone else Y. There is a highly influential tradition of epistemology which is sceptical or critical of beliefs based on testimony.

    Testimony
    In his Essay on Human Understanding John Locke argued that one had a duty to not believe any proposition merely on the authority of another person. One should trust the testimony of another only if one has:

    (a) good reasons for thinking that the testifier is reliable; or,
    (b) good reasons for believing the truth of the proposition itself.

    Taking another persons word for something in the absence of independent evidence is irrational. Locke hinted that such gullibility was socially dangerous, tied up with intolerance, authoritarianism and oppression.

    Something like this lurks in contemporary culture and is often encapsulated in quotes such as “think for yourself.” The problem is that a little reflection shows that this view of testimony is mistaken.

    CAJ Coady summarises the problem, if one is going to have evidence for the reliability of a testifier then this evidence will either include some other testimony or it will be based upon sources apart from testimony. The first option is obviously a non-starter, any evidence based on testimony will have to, by Locke’s position, be shown to be reliable by further testimony and so on, ad infinitum, until we reach some non-testimonial source. However, if we embrace the second option and we exclude what we know by way of testimony from our evidence base then we will have so little to go on that such grounds will be almost impossible to come by.

    To demonstrate this consider an example from Greg Dawes in a paper he wrote on faith,

    Very many of our beliefs are held on the basis of testimony. (In this context I shall sometimes refer to these as beliefs held on the basis of authority.) Does e=mc2 represent the rate at which matter can be transformed into energy? I believe so, although I would not have the faintest idea how to demonstrate its truth I have it on good authority that it is true…Of course, there is a sense in which I do believe this on the basis of evidence. I have reasons to believe in the trustworthiness of the sources from which I gained the information.[1]

    Like Locke, Dawes suggests that a non-physicist such as himself can rationally believe e=mc2 because he has reasons to believe that his sources are trustworthy. I believe this last comment is incorrect. Consider, for example, what reasons he could offer for believing that the source of his information was reliable? Presumably, it would be because the author of the book where he read it or the person who told him the information was a physicist. Nevertheless, how does Dawes know this? He could have read the person’s qualifications off a faculty list, off the dust-jacket of the book or have been told them by the person in person but in each case he is relying on testimony and so, in the absence of further reasons, he cannot believe these sources. Suppose, however, Dawes was to investigate thoroughly and locate the address of the university where the degree in physics was claimed to be awarded in order to travel there and personally check the original records. Yet again, he will be relying on testimony in the form of an address list and records. He also would have to have trusted the testimony of maps and road signs in getting to the institution in question.

    Consider then what Dawes would have left to go on if he did not use testimony. He could not rely on any information that he himself did not observe first-hand. This would exclude any information about events prior to his own lifetime, any events in his own lifetime that he did not remember witnessing first-hand and any event that happened in a place other than where he was at the time. Nothing read in journals, books, heard in lectures, taught to him by his parents or teachers could be used. Nothing heard on the news, read on the computer, told over the phone or reported on in the media could be included. Almost everything he had learnt through his entire education would be excluded because nearly all of it is based on testimony. It seems, then, that if Dawes were really to comply with the epistemic standards that he laid down, he could not rationally believe in e=mc2. It appears he is mistaken in thinking that one needs to have reasons for thinking a given authority is reliable in order to be warranted in believing in testimony.

    I think this example shows that this is not isolated. What we know, by way of being told by others, accounts for a huge and pervasive amount of what we believe. Everything I know about other places, other times, everything learned at school, university, from my parents, friends, books, newspapers, television, etc is based on testimony. If I were to try to verify any of these beliefs without first relying on some other piece of testimony, I would be unable to. The kind of critical attitude where one deplores believing things on faith or on the say so of others is un-viable. As social beings with a limited perspective in time and space, and with limited areas of speciality, we need to trust the testimony of others for most of what we know.

    Testimony Beliefs as Basic Beliefs
    For this reason the idea that one cannot accept something on the say so of testimony until it is verified is problematic. Instead I am inclined to accept a different picture of the role that testimony and faith in authorities should play in our knowledge. The picture that testimony beliefs are properly basic beliefs.

    To see what I mean by this consider the following point by Roy Clouser,

    If everything needs to be proven then the premises of every proof would need to be proven. But if you need a proof for every proof, you need a proof for your proof, and a proof for your proof of a proof and so on-forever. Thus it makes no sense to demand that everything be proven because an infinite regress of proofs is impossible.[2]

    Clouser notes that the appeal to evidence, in the form of premises from which one infers a conclusion, have to terminate somewhere if we are to avoid being sceptical about everything.

    The terminus is a set of ultimate premises called basic beliefs, which are those beliefs that form the foundation of our knowledge. We are justified in believing them independently of any argument or proof for them.

    If this seems counter-intuitive consider that there are plenty of things we believe that are not based on arguments. Our belief in the existence of the past or our belief that it is wrong to rape women or our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation so that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives. It is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against.

    Usually basic beliefs are grounded in some form of experience. We recognise these as true because we experience or see them to be true. For example, I see that the basic axioms of logic are self-evident, I remember the existence of a past event, I intuitively see that rape is wrong and think anyone who does not see this is simply morally blind. I see the chair in front of me, I hear the car outside and so on. These beliefs function as fundamental premises that we argue to other theories from.

    It is important to note that while we are justified in believing basic beliefs in the absence of evidence for them, their justified status can be defeated if we gain good reasons for rejecting these beliefs. For example, on a Tuesday evening I have a vivid experience of my brother entering my room, I form the basic belief that “my brother is in my room.” The next morning I hear that my brother was out all evening. I also discover that the medication I took the night before has hallucinatory side effects. The basic belief, grounded in my perceptual experience of observing my brother entering the room on Tuesday night is defeated. There are two ways basic beliefs can be defeated, undercutting defeaters involve a reason a person acquires which, when added to their stock of beliefs, gives them reasons for thinking that the source of the basic belief is unreliable – my discovery of the hallucinatory side effects is an example of this. Rebutting defeaters, on the other hand, are reasons one acquires for thinking the belief itself is false. My discovery that my brother was not home is a rebutting defeater, if he was not home then he was not in my room.

    The picture I want to suggest is that in many circumstances beliefs held on the basis of testimony function as basic beliefs. When a person, whom we take to be a competent authority, affirms a proposition P then in the absence of defeaters we are rational in accepting P. We do not need to prove that what the person says is true before we can accept it and nor do we have to prove that they are a reliable authority before we have to accept it. We do, however, have to take seriously any purported defeaters we are confronted with. We have to take seriously evidence we have that the authorities in question are not actually a reliable guide in the area in which they are speaking and we have to take seriously arguments given against what we accept.

    Translating this into a current context, contrary to what is often thought, most of our knowledge of scientific facts is, in fact, on the basis of testimony. As a child I ask questions, why does this happen? what caused this? and so on, my parents tell me answers and I believe them. I go to school and I am taught science and later physics and chemistry, I go to university and attend lectures, I read text books, I might do some experimental work myself but it is in the context of what I have already learned from testimonial sources. I read about studies scientists have done in journals and I believe what is written in these journals. Despite the bravado of self-professed free thinkers, our  acquisition of scientific knowledge is pervasively shot through with faith – faith in authorities, faith that others are being honest to us and are trustworthy and so on. It can be no other way. Hence, to believe some fact about the world merely because another has told you it is true is not irrational but in fact a sensible thing to do.

    Consider an example, I am in my car listening to the radio and Keisha Castle-Hughes is on air talking about climate change. The media are praising her for her brave efforts to educate the public. How should I respond? In this instance I am inclined to think that I face some defeaters. I know Castle-Hughes is an actor and has no real expertise in the area in which she is talking. I also know that actors are good at being very convincing at playing a role, which is not real. I know Castle-Hughes is quite young and is unlikely to have had a very substantial science education, much less time to specialise in climatology. I know the media are notoriously unreliable, journalists tend to be very political, their deadline give them limited time to research and they are not experts in science at all. In this instance, I think that I have real reasons to be sceptical of what Castle-Hughes is saying. Even if what she is saying, in fact, is true, I should not believe it just because she says so.

    Here is another example. I read a book by Richard Dawkins. He claims that the evidence quite conclusively suggests there is no God. Now in some places Dawkins offers arguments and I can assess these using my ability to reason deductively but in other places he simply tells his readers things. He puts forward various arguments for God’s existence, which he says these are representative of the case for theism, he attributes these to Thomas Aquinas, talks of first-cause arguments and the like. This is a bona fide, scientist with a professorship at Oxford. His specialty is zoology.

    However, accurately representing Aquinas’ arguments for God requires knowledge not in zoology but in medieval philosophy. A knowledge of what arguments have been put forward for theism, which are the most representative, which are the best, requires knowledge of a discipline called philosophy of religion. Dawkins’ position as a zoologist means his knowledge is in a very different field. Hence, his being a scientist gives me no reason to accept his work on Aquinas.

    This underscores an important point. If a person has some bone fide authority in a field it means he has authority in that field, it does not mean he or she has any authority in another field. Scientists qua scientists are experts in science, not morality, public policy, law, ethics, theology and what have you. Similarly, pastors are trained in biblical exegesis and theology, their knowledge, therefore, is in those fields and not science. One of the problems with the rise of the Internet is that people can get information on any subject any where from any source. In this context it is important to examine carefully whether we have good reasons for questioning whether the source is authoritative.

    It is not a bad idea to make our starting place be that we will accept what we are told by authorities but we should not always end there.

    In my final post in this series, Part III, I will look at what we should do when authorities clash.

    [1] Greg Dawes, “Faith and Reason”, a paper presented to the University of Otago Theology and Religious Studies Faculty. This is contained in Dawes, Philosophy of Religion (so far unpublished) 34.
    [2] Roy Clouser  Knowing With the Heart (IVP: Downers Grove, 1999) 69.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part III

  • Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part I

    This three-part blog series is essentially the talk I gave at the recent Clearing the Air Forum, which was entitled “Discovering Truth in the Synthesis of Science and Faith.” The audience was comprised of scientists, church leaders, journalists and other interested parties so this is a fairly lay introduction to epistemology.

    I was asked to address the epistemological issues around the climate change debate from a Christian perspective. In some ways I feel significantly under qualified to address this issue, I have no degrees in or knowledge of climatology, I am a theologian with an interest in Philosophy of Religion. Despite this, my research into religious epistemology has led me to some conclusions as to how faith and science should relate and how those of us who are Christians should respond to scientific challenges or purported scientific challenges to our theological beliefs. I’ve also gained some understanding on the role of testimony and the way believing things on the basis of authority figures in our knowledge. So, given this, I would like to share a few of my conclusions with you.

    What is Epistemology?
    Epistemology is one of those technical terms that often makes peoples eyes glaze over but it is important to grasp what it is. You may know it as “ways of knowing” or “the theory of knowledge.” Human beings are knowers, we like to gain accurate information about the world, about morality, about God and a whole host of other subjects.

    Sometimes we do this task well and sometimes we do it poorly. A person, for example, who believed the moon was made of green cheese on the basis that he had resolved to believe this if a coin-toss came up heads (and it had in fact come up heads) has believed poorly. The way he believes is irrational, it does not count as knowledge, his belief is unjustified and so on. Epistemology involves asking questions such as, what is it to have knowledge, what is it to be justified? The idea is to help gain clarity as to what knowledge is, how we ought to believe and so on.

    The subject and literature is vast and I cannot really do it justice here, so I will just give some basics.

    Since the time of Plato it has been widely acknowledged that knowledge involves at least two things: belief and truth. I have found that scientists often get irritated when they are told that their knowledge is a form of belief. This, however, is based on a verbal confusion. In epistemology to believe something is to simply think that it is the case, it is to assent to a proposition. I believe that the sky is blue if I think that the sky is blue; if I do not think this, if, in fact, I think that the sky is over-cast and grey then I do not believe that the sky is blue.

    What is meant by truth is defined best by Aristotle, “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” A belief is true if what you think is the case actually is the case. My belief that the sky is blue is true if the sky is blue and it is false if it is not blue but some other colour such as green. Truth is determined by facts about the world, the way things are; the point of being a knower is that one tries to match what one believes with reality. Knowledge involves achieving this match.

    My knowing P then involves at least two things:

    [1] I believe P
    [2] P

    The problem is that while these two conditions are necessary for knowledge they are not sufficient. Suppose I decide to choose beliefs about a particular subject matter on the basis of a coin-toss. Every time I throw a heads I will affirm the proposition and every time I throw a tails I will deny it. If such a method were employed I would, at least sometimes, form true beliefs but I would not have knowledge as my grasp of the truth would be the result of a lucky guess. Some third condition (or conditions) are needed.

    One of the biggest issues in epistemology today involves working out what this third condition is. The normal starting point in the discussion is the idea that knowledge is a justified true belief, I know when I believe P, that P is the case and that I am justified in believing P.

    [1] I believe P
    [2] P
    [3] I am justified in believing P

    At the same time it is also widely acknowledged that this position is incomplete. In a short but very important paper Edmund Gettier put forward a series of counter examples to the idea that knowledge is justified true belief. Consider the following. You are watching the All Blacks beat the Spring Boks on Sky TV and so you justifiably believe “the All Blacks beat the Spring Boks.” As it turns out, Sky has mucked its coverage up and the game you are watching is a repeat of a previous Tri-Nations win. Coincidentally, however, the All Blacks are playing the Spring Boks this very night and they win the game. Your belief is true and justified, yet it is not knowledge. Something more is needed to turn justified true belief into knowledge.

    Much of the debate in the contemporary epistemology is about how best to fix this problem and arrive at an answer as to what is needed to be added to true belief to make it into knowledge. Broadly speaking, accounts of knowledge fall into two schools, internalist and externalist.

    The internalist school emphasises properties that are internal to the consciousness of the knower, conditions the knower could be aware of on reflection – such things as appearing to be true, not having any reasons to think something false or reasons for thinking something false that are not outweighed by other reasons. It involves being coherent, believing responsibly and not carelessly and so on. These are all things that the knower can be aware of in an important sense.

    Externalist positions, on the other hand, emphasise conditions that the knower may not be aware of and may be unable to become aware of. Such things as basing one’s beliefs on what is, in fact, a reliable method or cognitive process, having properly functioning cognitive faculties, the belief being caused by the truth in question or tracking the truth in the right way. Frequently one cannot demonstrate the truth of these conditions for the obvious reason that we need to use our mind and belief sources to conduct such a demonstration in the first place. What is important on this view is that these sources are actually reliable, that they work properly, hook up to truth in the correct way and so on.

    The basic point is that despite slogans such as “you are entitled to believe whatever you like” not all beliefs are equal. We should aim to believe what is true, there are good and bad ways of believing, being rational involves trying to avoid the latter and seek the former.

    In Part II I look at testimony and authority and in Part III, I look at what to do when authorities clash.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part II

    Epistemology 101: Science, Faith and Authority Part III

  • Contra Mundum: Richard Dawkins and Open Mindedness

    The bold statement “Richard Dawkins opens minds” leaped out at me from the newsletter sitting on the University of Auckland’s Law Library counter. The article went on to sing the praises of Richard Dawkins and mentioned his book The God Delusion. On reading the piece one could be forgiven for concluding that Dawkins’ works are a paragon of the open minded assessment of ideas.

    Now Dawkins is a Zoologist and I, not being a Zoologist, would not presume to assess his work on Zoology. What is interesting, however, is that much of Dawkins’ most famous work is not on Zoology; it is on Theology and specifically Philosophy of Religion. That field of Philosophy which critically analyses religious questions, such as, the veracity of arguments for and against God’s existence. Having some background in these fields I find it a little surprising that an Auckland University publication would contend that his work is open minded because it is evidently not.

    In The God Delusion Dawkins’ main argument against the existence of God alludes to Fred Hoyle’s famous claim that the probability of something as complex as life evolving by blind chance was less likely than a fully-functional Boeing 747 being created by a hurricane blowing parts around in a junk yard. Dawkins writes, “However statistically improbable the entity you seek to explain by invoking a designer, the designer himself has got to be at least as improbable. God is the Ultimate Boeing 747.” Dawkins has made the same line of argument elsewhere “God, or any intelligent, decision-making calculating agent, is complex, which is another way of saying improbable.” In The Blind Watchmaker he argues,

    Once we are allowed simply to postulate organized complexity, if only the organized complexity of the DNA/protein replicating machine, it is relatively easy to invoke it as a generator of yet more organized complexity”. But of course any God capable of intelligently designing something as complex as the DNA/protein machine must have been at least as complex and organized as that machine itself.

    This argument contains three premises. First, that theism (belief in God) is justified by “postulating” God to explain the existence of organised complexity. Second that the God appealed to by theists is complex. Third, that the existence of complex beings are highly improbable. These lead to the conclusion that “God is the Ultimate Boeing 747” and hence “almost certainly does not exist”. The problem with this argument is that all three premises rest on caricatures and misunderstandings of contemporary theology and ignorance of contemporary philosophy of religion. I will explain.

    Dawkins contends that God is postulated to explain organised complexity. There are two problems with this contention. First, Dawkins assumes that God is rationally believed only if his existence is inferred by some kind of argument for the best explanation of a given phenomenon. However, not all beliefs are justified on the basis of some kind of argument of this sort. Our belief in the existence of the past, our belief that it is wrong to rape, our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation. It is not that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives, it is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against. These things are true because we immediately experience them as true. I have the experience of remembering the existence of a past event. I intuitively perceive that rape is wrong. I experience the basic axioms of logic as self-evident and so on. Such beliefs are called properly-basic beliefs.

    Since the late 1970’s an extremely important movement within Philosophy of Religion, known as the reformed epistemology movement, has offered detailed and rigorous defences of the contention that, for theists, belief in God can be properly-basic. This position has been defended by leading philosophers of religion such Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Peter Van Inwagen and others. Now, of course, it is possible that this movement is mistaken but Dawkins surely owes us an argument to this end as opposed to his simply assuming it and ignoring the counter evidence.

    Second, among those theists who do defend God’s existence on the basis of some argument for the best explanation, very few do so on the basis that God explains “organized complexity”. Richard Swinburne, the leading proponent of such arguments, argues that God explains the existence of laws of nature, religious experience, the origin of the universe and the continued existence of the universe. Swinburne does not postulate God to explain “organised complexity”. Similarly, William Lane Craig, a leading defender of theism, suggests that God explains the origin of the universe, the existence of morality and the fine tuning of the laws of nature. Again, Craig makes no appeal to “organized complexity”. In 2009 The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology was published which contains the most up to date versions of the 11 most definitive arguments used to defend the existence of God in the literature today. Not one of them involves an appeal to “organised complexity”. While the cogency of arguments for the existence of God that do not involve “organized complexity” remains open to substantive debate, it is undisputed that these arguments exist. Dawkins’ picture of God as a postulate to explain organised complexity is a crude caricature of theistic scholarship.

    To be fair Dawkins attempts to address some of these other arguments elsewhere in the book. However, here again much of his writing consists of caricature. He attacks five arguments proposed 800 years ago by Thomas Aquinas as being representative of the current case for theism and completely ignores the vastly more sophisticated and vigorous versions being defended in the literature today. Ironically, Dawkins quite severely misunderstands Aquinas’ arguments and attributes to him a position no Aquinas scholar would accept as accurate. However, even if his account were accurate, critiquing theism by attacking the arguments of one 12th century theologian is a bit like me attacking evolution on the basis of the evidence for it gathered in the 12th century and ignoring any of the scientific developments of the last 800 years. Such ineptitude would not be tolerated in the scientific world and should not be seen as de rigueur just because the topic is religion.

    Dawkins’ second contention fares little better. Dawkins states that “A God capable of continuously monitoring and controlling the individual status of every particle in the universe cannot be simple” this seems to be because,

    The corners of God’s giant consciousness are simultaneously preoccupied with the doings and emotions and prayers of every single human being—and whatever intelligent aliens there might be on other planets in this and 100 billion other galaxies.

    There are several problems here. First, as Craig has noted, this confuses whether what God thinks about is complex with whether God himself is complex. Second, as Plantinga has noted, in The Blind Watchmaker Dawkins states that something is complex if it has parts that are “arranged in a way that is unlikely to have arisen by chance alone.” However, the concept of God employed by most theists is of an immaterial being that does not have material parts so by Dawkins’ own definition God is not complex (unless one assumes that God is a material being but theists almost unanimously maintain that God is an immaterial being).

    This misrepresentation is made all the more pertinent by the fact that for centuries theists have been offering rigorous and sophisticated arguments that God is not in fact complex but is simple. While these arguments may not be successful, Dawkins still needs to actually provide reasons for rejecting them. To simply assert that God is to be conceived in a way that no one conceives Him and to ignore the numerous arguments to the contrary seem more like a child who asserts his position and then puts his hands over his ears and repeats “I am not listening” than it does a serious critical evaluation of another’s position.

    Dawkins’ final contention, that the existence of complex beings is improbable, is similarly confused. Suppose one grants that God is “the Ultimate Boeing 747” and that God’s existence is as statically improbable as the complexity it is invoked to explain. Little in fact follows from this. This is because what is improbable in the Boeing 747 analogy is that the plane came into existence by chance. If God is “the Ultimate Boeing 747” then the conclusion to be drawn is only that it is improbable that God came into existence by chance. This, however, provides us with no reason for thinking that God does not exist. No theist holds that God came into existence by chance, theists hold that God is eternal. Here, again, Dawkins attacks a concept of God nobody holds to and hence is caught jousting with a straw-man.

    On examining Dawkins’ central argument what one discovers is not an open-minded, informed, careful examination of the contemporary debate over the existence of God. Nor does one find a carefully researched assessment of theism. Instead one finds Dawkins simply ignoring what theists mean by God. He ignores how they conceptualise God and ignores the arguments and discussions they have actually made. The theism Dawkins dismisses apparently assumes that God is a material being with parts, that He came into existence by chance and is postulated merely to explain organized complexity. The actual arguments proposed in defence of theism that have been put forward in the literature are not addressed at all.

    Some Auckland University academics might consider such tactics to count as open-minded but I do not. In my view an open-minded honest assessment of religion requires accurately representing what theologians say and teach. It means endeavouring to read and understand their position and offer informed and critical responses to these positions. Ignorance and caricature is not open-minded scholarship.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the May 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

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    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic
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  • Science and Religion: Theism and Explanatory Idleness

    A few weeks ago I was a panelist at a forum on Science and Religion at the University of Auckland, the podcast of that forum is available here. After this forum a member of the audience sent me the following email. I have reproduced my response below.

    Hey Matt

    Unfortunately I didn’t have time to ask a question last night, due to having to leave early, so hopefully I can ask now.

    I used to be a Christian, and I took my religion extremely seriously, and was very devoted to it.  Over time, as Ive read more and more about religion, trying to expand my knowledge of religion, my views have changed (my eyes have opened) and now I am an agnostic, leaning towards atheism.

    My question to you is, why does God need to fit in with science anyway?  It seems very much that your God is just a ‘God of the gaps’ situation.  I have no problem with simply believing what science discovers about the universe and its origins (even you believe the earth is 14.7 billion years old, and believe the theory of evolution, both of which were discovered by science) and God has no need to be in any of this.  For example, the beginning of the universe (or the beginning of the current cycle of the universe), why does God need to be put in the place of creator?  I believe in a matter of time, science will find out how the universe actually began.  I believe science will find what originally started life on our planet, and I believe science will figure out all of the other mysteries we encounter, leaving no mysteries a God would be needed to explain.  If (or when) this day actually comes, which I strongly believe it will (most likely not in our lifetime), wouldn’t your faith become blind faith?  Or would you admit you are mistaken?

    I realise you are an expert on this, I’m not trying at all to criticize you or bash your religion, I’m just trying to understand more.

    My response was as follows:

    If I understand you correctly, you seem to envisage theism (belief in God) as a kind of hypothesis that is postulated to explain things that science currently does not. Second, your suggestion is that, over time, science will fill these gaps and when it does, such theistic explanations will no longer be credible. Let me make two responses to this line of reasoning.

    First, when theists argue for the existence of God they do not typically postulate God as an explanation for something that science has yet to explain. The standard arguments are addressed towards areas where there are reasons for thinking that science cannot explain the phenomena at all. This is because, as currently practiced, science commits itself to explaining phenomena in terms of natural causes and there are some things that an appeal to natural causes cannot, in principle, explain.

    The cosmological argument, for example, postulates God to explain the existence of the universe or the origin of the universe and it seems that there are reasons for thinking that science could not ever explain this; the reason is, that science as currently practiced explains phenomena in terms of previous states of the universe and natural laws. But prior to the universe there was no previous state of the universe nor were there laws of nature.

    Similarly, one cannot explain why the universe exists by appealing to the fact it does exist. Hence, it is not then that science currently does not explain this; rather, it is that reasons have been given for thinking a naturalistic explanation is impossible. You cannot provide a naturalistic explanation of the existence of nature and you cannot appeal to laws of nature to explain the existence of such laws.

    The same is true with the arguments from design. One of the most enduring versions of this argument postulates God as an explanation for the regularities and laws of nature that govern the universe. It is hard to see how science can explain these things. Science typically explains one phenomenon by appealing to such laws but you cannot explain laws by appealing to them.

    I would say the same about moral arguments. It is not that science currently does not explain morality, it is that there are arguments that purport to show the very real problems with attempting to demonstrate an ought statement empirically. When one appeals to God to explain morality then one is not so much filling in a temporary gap, one is rather answering a question that it seems science cannot and is not likely to be able to answer. So I think the contention that these are merely gaps which science has yet to explain is a misconstrual of the situation.

    Second and I think this is a more important point, your argument assumes that God is rationally believed only if his existence is inferred by some kind of argument for the best explanation of a given phenomenon. As soon as all such arguments fail, belief in God is irrational (“blind faith” as you call it). This was precisely the point I challenged in my talk. Not all beliefs are justified on the basis of some kind of argument of this sort. As I pointed out, the claim that one needs an argument to be rational in believing something is subject to an infinite regress. If I argue for A on the basis of various premises the question can arise what is the basis for believing the premises. If I argue for these premises from further ones, the question arises about the further premises and so on, until we arrive at a set of ultimate premises.

    There are plenty of things we believe that are not based on arguments. Our belief in the existence of the past or our belief that it is wrong to rape women or our belief that other people exist or that basic axioms of logic are true are not based on inferences to the best explanation so that they are rationally believed because they explain some phenomena better than all alternatives. It is rather that these beliefs are part of the background data that we use to assess proposed explanations against. These things are true because we experience or see them to be true, for example, I see that the basic axioms of logic are self-evident, I remember the existence of a past event, I intuitively see that rape is wrong and think anyone who does not see this is simply morally blind and so on.  These function as fundamental premises that we argue to other theories from.  My position is that believers and non-believers have different fundamental premises.

    I think belief in God is like the beliefs above in that it is a basic-belie, something a person directly sees to be true via direct experience or intuition of some sort.  Hence, I would reject the assumption that belief in God needs to be based on an argument of any sort. It follows then, that even if belief in God could not be established by some kind of argument from explanation it would not follow that it is irrational – anymore so, than the fact that my belief that rape is wrong does not explain any empirical data proves that my belief in the wrongness of rape constitutes blind faith.

    RELATED POST:
    Has Science Disproved God?” The Podcast

  • “Has Science Disproved God?” The Podcast (Fixed!)

    If you missed the “Has Science Disproved God?” panel discussion at Auckland University last week and you just cannot wait for the video to be edited, formatted and uploaded to You Tube then simply follow this link: “Has Science Disproved God?” to listen to the podcast of the event.

    In the first hour the speakers addressed four issues:

    1. Should a working scientist operate as a methodological atheist or, in other words, does the scientific project necessarily exclude God? – Dr Jeff Tallon
    2. Scientific beliefs are based on measurable, verifiable evidence, is belief in God any different? – Dr Matthew Flannagan
    3. Does evolution threaten belief in God? – Dr Neil Broom
    4. Science and free-will. – Dr Robert Mann

    The second hour consisted of questions from the audience.

    Hat Tip: Thinking Matters

    The second and final event in this series, Christianity on Trial, is on at Auckland University tonight at 7pm.

  • Has Science Disproved God? Thursday Night

    Just a reminder that tomorrow night, Thursday 11 March, at 7pm, in OGGB 4, at the University of Auckland, Matt will be part of a panel along with scientists Drs Neil Broom, Jeff Talon and Robert Mann, whom you can fire questions at around the topic “Has Science Disproved God?”

    The organisers – Thinking Matters, the sponsors – TSCF and Matt and I have had a lot of feedback and buzz around this event we are expecting a good turnout and people seem to be getting their questions ready; topics that look set to come up include the scientific evidence for God, against God, issues around Naturalism and the project of science itself. So make sure you don’t miss it!

    Now to the lay person these topics may sound complicated, I have been assured by the organisers that this is a lay-friendly event. All the PhD’s on the panel will be speaking plain english and breaking down anything complicated so that the rest of us can follow. Matt and I are bringing our teenagers and some of their friends so that should give you an idea of how accessible it will be.

    More information is available here.

    If you cannot make this event, can you make it to Christianity on Trial on Tues 16 March?

  • Christianity on Trial @ Auckland University

    Thinking Matters have organised some free to the public Q & A seminars at the University of Auckland.

    Christianity on Trial

    Today, many best-selling atheists argue that belief in God is delusional and a roadblock to political, moral, and scientific progress.

    In this public Q & A event, several of New Zealand’s top Christian thinkers come together to consider popular arguments against Christianity and whether belief in God is merely a consequence of superstition and credulity.

    The speakers are:

    Jeff Tallon (PhD) is Distinguished Scientist at Industrial Research Ltd and a former Professor of Physics at Victoria University. He is internationally known for his research in high-temperature superconductors, is a Fellow of the Royal Society of New Zealand and in 2002 was awarded the Rutherford Medal, New Zealand’s highest science award.

    Matthew Flannagan (PhD) adjunct lecturer in Philosophy at Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute and  is currently teaching philosophy, ethics and religious studies at St Peters College. He specialises in applied ethics and the interface between philosophy and theology. He is a prominent New Zealand Christian commentator, debater and blogger.

    Michael Drake
    (DipTeach) is the principal of Carey College in Panmure and a pastor of the Tamaki Reformed Baptist Church. He has been involved in advocacy for Christian schools and in raising issues about race, education, and Christianity before Parliament. He is also a Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship Associate Chaplain at the Manukau Institute of Technology.

    Joe Fleener (MDiv) lectures in Old Testament, Church History, Christian Worldview, Apologetics, and Christian Ethics at The Shepherd’s Bible College.

    When: Tuesday 16 March at 7pm

    Where: “The Centennial” 260 – 098 Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Road, The University of Auckland

    Mark it in your diary, check out the Facebook page and tell your friends. This event is sponsored by the Tertiary Student Christian Fellowship.