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Guest Post: The Virtue of Christian Dogma

April 17th, 2009 by Madeleine

The following is authored by Dominic Bnonn Tennant, of the blog Dominic Bnonn Tennant – Developing the Mind of Christ. Please support Bnonn by clicking through to his site. Bnonn writes:

Damian over at ‘And Slaters Go Plop’ has recently written on Dogma, arguing against its intellectual legitimacy, and asking how we can avoid it. He says,

By ‘dogmatic’ I am describing an absolutist kind of belief that, if I could summarise in my own words, boils down to the fact that you would really rather hold to what you believe than accept an alternative even if the alternative is true. Dogma is the belief you refuse to interrogate.

Dogma in Christianity
“I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue”I’d like to note, for the record, that this is not how dogmatism is typically perceived in Christianity. Dogma is a mainstay of biblical Christianity, and where it is rejected the religion crumbles. Dogma is there whenever a doctrine is taken as authoritative, or presupposed as true—such as when we treat the Bible as the word of God. So, for the sake of avoiding confusion, let it be noted that Christians do not define dogma in such a negative way. That is not the primary meaning of the word, as most dictionaries reflect. William Shedd’s Dogmatic Theology, for instance, is a seminal and highly positive dissertation on the theoretical truths of faith concerning God and his works.

Why is dogmatism bad anyway?
As regards this colloquial, negative view of dogmatism, however, some questions need to be asked. Damian seems to be taking absolutism in one’s beliefs as inherently undesirable, assuming we do want truth. But this doesn’t seem a very sustainable attitude if he wishes to be consistent and avoid special pleading.

A dogma, he says, is the belief you refuse to interrogate. But what of beliefs which are not readily interrogatable? Presumably, for instance, we all believe that our sense perception correlates accurately to a real, external world. Is that belief undesirable or unlikely merely because it cannot be readily interrogated? In fact, since we resist attempts to interrogate that belief, and don’t take them seriously, are we acting in a poor or intellectually shoddy manner? It certainly doesn’t seem so. Thus, there look to be at least some beliefs we may hold quite rightly and properly as being basically unquestionable, without shirking our philosophical responsibilities. Why is it, then, that Christians should not take the divine inspiration of Scripture as such a belief? Damian needs to make a better case as regards the negative nature of dogmatism, spell out just when it does and does not apply, and why.

“should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts?”Similarly, what of beliefs which are held on good grounds? Damian presumably thinks he has good grounds for believing that I am a real person and not, say, an advanced computer program writing posts in a convincingly human way. Should he be condemned for resisting the compulsion to interrogate his belief in my existence as a real person on every possible occasion? Were someone to say to him: Your belief in that chap Bnonn Tennant is dogmatic because you refuse to interrogate it! should he jump up in dismay and hire a private detective to find me and stake out my home to verify that, indeed, I am a real person who makes real blog posts? In fact, is he not being entirely rational to refuse to interrogate this belief, in the absence of any good evidence that it is false? If so, why should a Christian be criticized for refusing to interrogate his belief in God, when he has no good reasons to think that it’s false?

Good reasons
And what, indeed, would constitute a good reason for thinking that God doesn’t exist? No doubt Damian believes there are many. But on the other hand, a delusional out-patient from the halfway house down the road might think that there are good reasons for believing I don’t exist and am in fact a complicated artificial intelligence. He could probably find all sorts of evidences which, if looked at the right way and with the right mindset, seem quite compelling; and he might produce all sorts of arguments showing that Damian really has the burden of proof. Should Damian be persuaded—should he even look at these evidences or accept this burden of proof—if he already knows that the fellow is a schizophrenic who reverts to believing that Christian bloggers are really internet-capable AIs whenever he’s off his meds? If not, why should a Christian act differently when he knows from Scripture that atheists are self-deceiving fools who deny the existence of God because of their sin?

The skeptic’s false humility
The last point I’d like to make is as regards Damian’s assertion that if we refuse to honestly put our beliefs to the test then we ought to show a little more humility when telling others what we ‘know’ to be true. As I’ve already suggested above, this is a perfectly silly attitude to knowledge—its implication being that a belief which is not tested cannot constitute knowledge in any proper sense.

Even ignoring his obvious imposition of a scientific method of knowledge-acquisition onto religious or philosophical matters, where it doesn’t belong, is this reasonable? Does Damian need to verify my existence, for example, before he can say that he knows I’m not an artificial intelligence? Is this the way he really operates in terms of making knowledge claims? Or take another example: say he sees an acquaintance, Roger, at the supermarket. He doesn’t speak to Roger for whatever reason, and no one else at the supermarket knows him, so Damian is the only one to recognize him. Say Roger is arrested the next day on some charge. Damian thinks Roger can’t be guilty, because he saw him at the supermarket at the time the crime was committed. Is Damian really going to say that he does not know Roger was there, since he did not (and no longer can) test that belief? Is it reasonable for me to get up before the jury when he is testifying in Roger’s defense, and say that he ought to show a little more humility when telling them that he ‘knows’ Roger is innocent? Or imagine the situation is reversed, and Damian ‘knows’ Roger is guilty on a similar basis. Is this sort of stringent view of things really sensible? How would it cash out in the real world?

Maybe Damian means to confine this constraint on knowledge to religious claims. This seems arbitrary, but it doesn’t get him anything in any case, since Christian beliefs enjoy far better attestation than the trivial amount of support in the example above. In fact, Christians have excellent grounds for saying that they know certain things—so why should they shuffle and slink and pretend false humility, as if they really aren’t certain when they are? A Christian grounds his beliefs in God’s word—does he then need to interrogate these beliefs, or find ways to test them, in order for them to constitute knowledge? Of course not.

The plain fact that they are God’s own testimony is all the justification required. Thus, rather than being commendable, this “humility” of which Damian speaks is despicable. Imagine a Christian who knows the gospel witnessing to someone as follows:

I don’t presume to say I know this, but, well, I believe you’re under God’s wrath and liable to judgment if you don’t repent and trust in the work of Jesus. And…well, I don’t know that Jesus really existed…but I’m sure you should believe anyway!

This is certainly an ignoble way of witnessing. If we, in fact, have good reasons for believing the gospel—if we indeed know the gospel to be true—and then do not urgently entreat others to heed it, attempting to persuade them of its truth as well, we aren’t being “humble”. We are being cads. It doesn’t matter if we have tested our knowledge, or if we can defend it against attack. Speaking for myself, I can—but some Christians can’t for whatever reason. That doesn’t invalidate what they know. Christians don’t accept Damian’s views on epistemology, and neither should they.

So let’s not throw around the “dogmatism” charge too hastily. I am proud to be a dogmatic Christian, and I consider my dogmatism an intellectual virtue. Saying that I am dogmatic is essentially the same as saying that I am a presuppositionalist in my Christian philosophy—a position which I’ve defended on many occasions. If Damian or other atheists would like to dogmatically oppose that, let them start by showing that it even makes sense to do so.

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24 responses so far ↓

  • hi,

    I always thought the same could be said for the term ‘fundamentalist’ Christian.

  • Great post. I really enjoyed the examples and analogies you put forward. I’d never really thought of myself as a dogmatic christian, though I am one. Thanks for the insight.

    Recent blog post: True Story Progress

  • Hey Dominic, my initial response is similar to Matt’s comment on defeaters. I’d put it as a question: Do you think it’s possible for a basic belief to be false?

    Recent blog post: Naturalism and Purpose: Rumours of them being seen together are false

  • Matt,

    I’ve used something similar as a classroom illustration for years: “Burning babies in gasoline as a spectator sport is morally wrong — always, for everyone, in all cultures.” There are always a few students so pickled in relativism that they’re unwilling to agree with it. I tell them that their names have been crossed off of my list of potential babysitters. 🙂

  • Which sense of fundamentalist do you mean?
    – The precise theological definition?
    – The loose definition – theologically conservative?
    – The insult – extremist, hate-filled, nut-job?
    – The shifting media version – today we agree with your efforts to help the poor, so you’re not, but tomorrow when you speak out against abortion you are?

    Recent blog post: Guest Post: The Virtue of Christian Dogma

  • Bnonn writes:

    In fact, is he not being entirely rational to refuse to interrogate this belief, in the absence of any good evidence that it is false? If so, why should a Christian be criticized for refusing to interrogate his belief in God, when he has no good reasons to think that it’s false?
    It seems that someone could reasonably respond here by pointing out the difference between refusing to go to the trouble of “interrogating” (still not quite clear on what this means) a belief for which one has justification, on the one hand, and refusing to interrogate a belief for which one lacks justification. This distinction would become particularly pressing if the belief in question were vital to the justification of some course of action.

    A good evidentialist — and I classify myself with that group — could take a somewhat different line but still resist the charge of irrationality by saying that belief in God has ample grounds (as indeed it does) and that there is no need to obsess over the logical possibility of falsehood for any belief that has ample grounds.

    The grounds might be broadly public (historical and scientific evidence), intrinsically private (direct experience of God, sensus divinitatus, etc.), or some of both. The private grounds cannot be shared so as to provide others with the same level of rational conviction, but it seems to me that they could in principle suffice, if present, to defeat the charge of individual irrationality.

    This is all stated with great force and clarity by Philip Doddridge in a passage I will now transcribe (minus Doddridge’s italics):

    But before I proceed, I must desire you to observe, that there is no Proof in the World so satisfactory to the true Christian, as to have felt the transforming Power of the Gospel on his own Soul. As that illiterate Man whose Eyes were miraculously opened by Christ, when he was questioned by the Jewish Sanhedrim, who endeavoured with all their Sophistry to prove Christ an Impostor, answered with great Steadiness and Constancy, and with a great deal of Reason too, This one Thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see: So the most unlearned of the Disciples of Jesus, having found his Soul enlightened and sanctified, and felt his Heart so effectually wrought upon, as to bring him home to his Duty, his GOD, and his Happiness, by the constraining Power of the Gospel, will despise a thousand subtle Objections which may be urged against it: And though the Cross of Christ be to the Jews a Stumbling block, and to the Greeks Foolishness, yet with this Experience of its saving Energy, he will honour it in the Midst of all their Contempt and Ridicule, as the Power of GOD, and the Wisdom of God. In this Sense, though the miraculous Communication of the Spirit be ceased, he that believes, hath still the Witness in himself; and while the Spirit beareth Witness with his Spirit, that he is a Child of GOD, he cannot doubt, but that the Word, by which he was, as it were, begotten unto him, is indeed a Divine and incorruptible Seed. And perhaps, there are certain Seasons of pressing Temptation, in which the most learned, as well of the most illiterate Christian, will find this the surest Anchor of his Hope.

    Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged, that this glorious kind of evidence is like the white stone, mentioned in the Revelation, in which there was a new name written, which no man knew, but he who received it. God has therefore made other provision for the honour and support of his Gospel, by furnishing it with a variety of proof, which may with undiminished, and indeed with growing conviction, be communicated from one to another. And we should be greatly wanting in gratitude to him, in zeal for a redeemer’s kingdom, and in charitable concern for the conversion of those who reject the Gospel, as well as for the edification of those who embrace it, should we wholly overlook these arguments, or neglect to acquaint ourselves with them. This is the evidence, which I am now to propose; and I desire you would hear it with a becoming attention. I speak to you, as to rational creatures; judge ye of the reasonableness of what I shall say.

    Three Sermons on the Evidences of the Gospel, 3rd ed. (London: J. Waugh, 1752), pp. 6-7.

  • That was funny. I can’t believe Bart Ehrman had been on before and yet still came back if the previous time was anything like that!

    The host makes for entertaining viewing – we have nothing like that on our 4 TV channels (2 of which are state owned – Christian TV on the main channels is cringe material).

    Recent blog post: Good Friday: Why Celebrate Easter?

  • I’m a big fan of Colbert, thanks for the link Tim!

    Recent blog post: Colbert vs Ehrman

  • Hi everyone—thanks for your comments.

    Matt, you asked:

    I wonder what role you see defeaters having in this picture. You suggest that certain theological beliefs are properly basic like belief in the existence of other people with thoughts and feelings etc.And Glenn asked,

    Do you think it’s possible for a basic belief to be false? Yes. Defeaters have what seems to me an obvious role here, though I chose not to discuss them by name given the sort of level I was pitching the article at, and the length I wanted it to be. But yes, the mere fact that a belief is properly basic does not immunize it from being defeated. Neither, indeed, does the fact of a belief being properly basic and true—nor even it being properly basic and necessarily true. We’d all agree that the proposition (G), “the Christian God exists”, is necessarily true. (G) has been held as properly basic by any number of people who have since abandoned the faith. Presumably at least some of them abandoned the faith because they encountered some kind of defeater to (G).

    That said, these would not have been propositional defeaters. They would be mental state defeaters wherein either objectively false propositions which contradict (G), or objectively true propositions which prima facie contradict (G), were believed, thus subjectively defeating (G). But a Christian who grounds his knowledge in revelation is not going to readily accept these sorts of mental state defeaters, and if (G) is indeed necessarily true it has no propositional defeaters (and thus, I’d argue, no “genuine” defeaters). I intimated at this in the article, when discussing how a Christian should regard the evidences and burdens of proof forwarded by atheists. In saying…

    And what, indeed, would constitute a good reason for thinking that God doesn’t exist? No doubt Damian believes there are many. But on the other hand, a delusional out-patient from the halfway house down the road might think that there are good reasons for believing I don’t exist and am in fact a complicated artificial intelligence. …I obviously had mental-state and propositional defeaters in mind. I just didn’t want to start throwing around confusing terms when there didn’t seem to be any need.

    I also think that your and Tim’s use of moral examples rather than the example of other minds has its place. Both seem, to my mind, to be good examples. I’d tentatively suggest that the moral example would be more useful in lay apologetics, especially given how it opens the door to the moral argument itself. But the example of other minds seems perhaps better suited to more rigorous philosophical apologetics, given its less controversial claims. In my experience, it’s better not to give philosophers more things than necessary to disagree with you about (:

    Tim, you said:

    It seems that someone could reasonably respond here by pointing out the difference between refusing to go to the trouble of “interrogating” (still not quite clear on what this means) a belief for which one has justification, on the one hand, and refusing to interrogate a belief for which one lacks justification.While I agree that the evidentialist has an out here, as you say, I don’t think this objection has much force against a presuppositionalist, because I don’t see how it’s relevant to him. The atheist cannot “reasonably” say this to a presuppositionalist if, by doing so, he’s trying to target fundamental Christian beliefs. Would it not, in fact, just beg the question against the presuppositionalist’s given justification? Isn’t the atheist just assuming that Christian beliefs aren’t justified, and therefore must be interrogated? But if the Bible is indeed the word of God, I can take a revelatory/foundationalist approach to knowledge (or at least some kinds of knowledge) which entails not merely warrant, nor some evidentialist view of justification, but maximal justification. Ie, all propositions revealed by God are maximally justified (by definition); thus, all propositions contained within Scripture, which I believe, constitute knowledge in the most stringent sense. This being the case, what is the atheist hoping to achieve in pointing out that we ought to interrogate beliefs for which we do not have justification?

    Regards,
    Bnonn

    Recent blog post: On dogmatism

  • That’s a great example Tim. I like to personalise it, when I was teaching in secular colleges, which often had quite left leaning students, I would choose their own moral stances or ones that I knew they would be anathematised by their ‘liberal’ peers for denying. I would ask the gay rights activists if executing homosexuals without trial in some Islamic country was unjust. I would ask the feminists about wife-beating and rape in other cultures.

    Another time when I was debating a local liberal theologian, who abhorred moral absolutes, I asked him if he upheld the principle “it is wrong to torture homosexuals to death”. I got hate mail a few days later from someone telling me they thought I should be tortured to death. LOL!

    When I debated the President of the Rationalist Humanist Society (the same guy Bill Craig debated when he was here last year) as heard him affirm that moral absolutes are mistaken and we should do whatever makes people happy, I noted that he was a healthy man and pointed out to him that, if I shot him in the head, harvested his organs and donated them to people suffering terminal conditions that could be alleviated with a transplant, it would make those people “happy.” I then asked him if he objected to my suggestion. He spluttered and took offence and said I was facetious and uncivil.

    Recent blog post: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • Bnonn,

    Thanks for the note. You write:

    But if the Bible is indeed the word of God, I can take a revelatory/foundationalist approach to knowledge (or at least some kinds of knowledge) which entails not merely warrant, nor some evidentialist view of justification, but maximal justification. Ie, all propositions revealed by God are maximally justified (by definition); thus, all propositions contained within Scripture, which I believe, constitute knowledge in the most stringent sense.The issue here comes down to this: which propositions can be rationally accepted as basic, and why? There is a symmetry worry here: a Muslim (or pick your favorite non-Christian religion and rework this mutatis mutandis) can stand pat on the Qu’ran in the same fashion, at which point we have difficulty adjudicating between the two sets of claims unless we recur to further evidence — in which case we are not treating those claims as epistemically basic after all.

    I’ve published something brief about the general issue of foundational beliefs here. Needless to say, the differences between my epistemology and Plantinga’s are obvious. In apologetics, I’m over on the Butler/Paley/Chalmers/Cooper/Montgomery side of the spectrum. Lydia and I have interacted with Plantinga regarding his attack on the historical argument in a series of articles published over the past few years in Philosophia Christi.

  • This may sound dreadfully conciliatory of me, but I’ve never understood why someone with a Reformed Epistemology like Plantinga should need to denounce other kinds of apologetics, just as I think it’s quite wrong for presuppositionalists to sell classical or evidential apologetics up the river.

    But I have to say Tim, I think you’re quite wrong to add “… in which case we are not treating those claims as epistemically basic after all.” In fact we are still maintaining basic belief in the Christian God, we’re just conceding (in the example you gave) that a belief’s property of being basic is not going to persuade people who don’t hold it that they ought to hold it. Reformed Epistemology was never intended, after all, as an argument for the truth of Christianity or theism.

    Recent blog post: Episode 026: In Search of the Soul, part 1

  • Thanks Tim, I’ll check out your article; it looks very interesting. To
    answer briefly, I would say that since properly basic beliefs can still be
    defeated, one need merely point the Muslim to instances where the Koran
    appeals to the Bible as a test of its (the Koran’s) authenticity, and then
    demonstrate all the ways in which the Bible falsifies it.
    Regards,
    Bnonn

  • Glenn,

    I don’t get it either. Plantinga has said in casual correspondence with another philosopher that he goes “up and down” on those arguments. If he has direct experiences in which he perceives God … well, I’m not in a position to say it can’t happen. But why does he have to insist that the other, empirical road doesn’t lead there?

    You write:

    But I have to say Tim, I think you’re quite wrong to add “… in which case we are not treating those claims as epistemically basic after all.” In fact we are still maintaining basic belief in the Christian God, we’re just conceding (in the example you gave) that a belief’s property of being basic is not going to persuade people who don’t hold it that they ought to hold it.This is probably my fault for writing unclearly. I was envisaging “us” (myself included) as looking on from the side at the two claimants to direct knowledge and adjudicating the issue between them on the basis of public evidence. This is necessary for me since — alas! — to the best of my ability to introspect, I don’t have that kind of direct certainty regarding the existence of God. I therefore cannot treat my own belief in God as properly basic. I hope that clarifies the “we” that I have in mind.

  • Bnonn,

    Wish I could follow you in that, but my view is that only beliefs that one cannot be wrong about qualify as properly basic, a view that I develop in my 1995 book. That’s one of the major watersheds between my epistemology and Plantinga’s. Another is that I’m an internalist with an evidential conception of justification, whereas he’s an externalist with a deontological conception of justification. Details on that, including criticism of Plantinga’s externalism, can be found in the 2007 book.

    Ahh well, one can’t please everyone …!

  • I get what you meant Tim. Do you think, perhaps (if you don’t mind my asking), that the reason you part ways with Plantinga on epistemology is the fact that you personally don’t have that certainty you refer to?

    Recent blog post: Baggini: The New Atheism is cringe material

  • Tim, if I read you correctly you’re suggesting something like Craig’s distinction between “knowing” and “showing;” one can know and be rationally justified in believing directly in a basic manner but evidential arguments are useful for showing.

    I do have some questions, however, about other things you claim. You state,
    If he has direct experiences in which he perceives God … well, I’m not in a position to say it can’t happen. But why does he have to insist that the other, empirical road doesn’t lead there?However, in your previous comment you suggest that a belief cannot be properly basic unless “one cannot be wrong” about it. On the face of it, this would rule out belief in God being properly basic unless you hold it is impossible to be wrong about belief in God.

    Moreover, it would seem to follow that one could only be justified in believing in God (or anything else for that matter) if it follows by argument forms about which one cannot be mistaken, from premises, which one cannot be mistaken. I am not sure much of significance would meet this standard. Morever, I wonder whether the epistemic criteria you state meets this standard itself.
    Isn’t it possible for you to be mistaken? If so, are the premises and argument forms you use to establish this epistemic criteria ones that you cannot be mistaken about?

    Perhaps I need to read your book 🙂

    Recent blog post: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part I

  • Matt and Glenn,

    Good questions. Again, I’m getting in trouble for writing quickly here when a full discussion would take a long time to craft. I would draw a distinction between the notion of direct experience of God and properly basic belief in God. I don’t (to the best of my knowledge) have either, but I can at least imagine what the former would mean: perhaps something like the opening verses of Isaiah 6, where (optional?) imagery is accompanied by an overwhelming sense of being in the presence of the Most High, and propositional information (perhaps mediated by the experience of hearing a voice) is communicated, all this transpiring while no other person is aware that anything of the sort is going on. This much, though I have never had it, I can conceive. Perhaps Plantinga and Alston do have it.

    But even in that case, the awareness of God as such would not be what I would call properly basic; it would be mediated by the imagery, or the sense of being in the presence of the Most High, or by the sound of a voice, or by the experience of becoming aware of propositional content. All of these could, in principle, occur without the actual presence of God — though we can well envisage circumstances in which it would be pretty hard to account for them without His presence.

    As far as what it would mean for “God exists” to be properly basic, I’m just not sure. The claim does not seem to me to be logically necessary. (Long footnote on modality and the conception of God as a necessary being omitted here.) Nor does it seem to be the sort of thing that one could not believe and be wrong (like “I exist” is).

    Matt, you write:

    Moreover, it would seem to follow that one could only be justified in believing in God (or anything else for that matter) if it follows by argument forms about which one cannot be mistaken, from premises, [about] which one cannot be mistaken.In a sense, this is correct, but care is required regarding “argument forms about which one cannot be mistaken.” More forms than the deductive fall into this category. A couple of papers linked from my website deal with some of the issues linked with induction and inference to the best explanation, as does one paper published in Philosophia Christi.

  • Ok so something can be directly experienced and yet not properly basic. Does that mean that if we directly percieve something (say a computer in front of me)which we could be mistaken about (Hallucinations are possible after all) then we are not justified in believing it unless we offer some argument for it from premises about which mistake is impossible?

    Recent blog post: Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, William Lane Craig and the Argument from Harm Part II

  • Matt,

    Like I said, this is hard to do in comboxes. “Directly” is a relative term here; some things are experienced more directly than others. On my view, you don’t in the strictest sense directly experience your computer; your awareness of the computer is mediated by your sensory experiences. However, there is a clear colloquial sense in which we would want to say that you can perceive the computer directly as opposed, say, to seeing its reflection in a mirror or seeing an image of it on a webcam. It’s in the latter sense that I can understand what it would mean for Plantinga (or someone else) to have a direct experience of God — direct, by comparison with the means that I (and I suppose at least some other people) have at my disposal.

    Does that help?

  • Sorry for not replying promptly, I didn’t expect a question. I guess I was referring to the ‘precise theological definition’, not that I know what that is…
    I guess, believing in the fundamental truths set forth in the bible. Although point taken, perhaps as well as the word we could include numbers…

    Today, the theory of evolution is an accepted fact for everyone but the blinkin’ fundamentalistNo.3

  • Tim, you say: “But even in that case, the awareness of God as such would not be what I would call properly basic; it would be mediated by the imagery, or the sense of being in the presence of the Most High, or by the sound of a voice, or by the experience of becoming aware of propositional content.”Where is the problem in thinking that basic beliefs can be mediated by experiences?

    Recent blog post: Baggini: The New Atheism is cringe material

  • Glenn,

    The very briefest answer to that is that every experience carries with it its cognate belief, which we might express as “I am experiencing like this,” where the demonstrative pikcs out the experience. (Wittgenstein can go hang: crypto-behaviorism is false.) This belief carries the propositional content of the experience, and that content justifies the beliefs that are mediated by the experience.

    At this point, I think I’ll have to punt to my 1995 book. If you’ll email me your surface-mail address, I’ll send you a copy. In the meanwhile, you can get at least some sense of how the position unfolds from this essay.