Tag: Atheism

  • God or Natural Law: A False Dichotomy

    A few weeks ago someone showed me a newspaper article entitled “New theory could prove how life began and disprove God”, which was published in the UK newspaper The Independent. Now I have, of course, heard media pronouncements of the nature published in this article frequently, reporters often seem to have a knack for making provocative pronouncements about the theological and philosophical implications of various theories (and one can usually take such prouncemants with a grain of salt), but this one caught my attention because of the unstated premise it contained. This premise is, I think, common in discussions about religion and science, which makes it worth addressing in its own right.

    Michelangelo's 'God Creates Adam

    The author’s commentary opens as follows:

    “A new theory could answer the question of how life began – and throw out the need for God. A writer on the website of Richard Dawkins’ foundation says that the theory has put God “on the ropes” and has “terrified” Christians. It proposes that life did not emerge by accident or luck from a primordial soup and a bolt of lightning. Instead, life itself came about by necessity – it follows from the laws of nature and is as inevitable as rocks rolling downhill. …”

    According to the author, the ‘new theory’ proposes that life arose from non-life by “natural necessity”, that is: according to the laws of nature. Interestingly, the author assumes the fairly standard account of ‘laws of nature’ whereby they are more than just regularities, they involve a kind of necessity that explains or grounds regularities.  The author draws the conclusion from the new theory that God does not exist.

    Now the author is not exactly clear on why this conclusion follows. One argument he seems to grope towards is that the new theory provides all sorts of problems for belief in God because someone on Richard Dawkins’ website says it does.  I suspect, however, that – apart from simple affirmations of faith in Dawkins blog – the author has something a bit more sensible in mind in his thinking.

    The premise is that: life arose from non-life, according to the laws of nature; the conclusion is that: God did not create life. The unstated assumption seems to that: if you can explain something by natural law then it follows that God did not do it.  Implicit in the reasoning is the assumption that appeals to natural law and God are rival and incompatible hypothesises; the truth of one excludes or rules out the other.

    I think anyone familiar with the history of theological thought should find this assumption odd. For (more…)

  • Is belief in God essential for Morality? Why Crime Statistics don’t answer this question

    Readers of this blog will note that, of late, I have been focusing a lot in my thinking, writing and research on questions of the relationship between religion and morality. One particular frustration I encounter in this topic is the, unfortunately common, tendency for writers and researchers to conflate separate questions and subsequently give answers to the wrong questions thinking they have answered the right ones.

    A good example is article which was sent to me via e-mail recently entitled “The destructive myth about religion that Americans disproportionately believe.” The article comments on a recent survey which found that the majority of people in certain parts of the world, including the United States of America, believe that belief in God is essential for morality. The author considers this a “destructive myth”. His rebuttal involves two premises: (a) he interprets the survey’s results to mean that the majority of people believe you cannot live a morally good life unless you believe in God; (b) he aims to refute this by appealing to some unsourced crime statistics that suggest atheists do not commit disproportionately more crimes than theists.

    o-PRISONER-READING-facebookI think his reasoning on both points is mistaken, before getting into why, I note that this article proposes to be about whether belief in God is essential to morality; it is not about the related, though separate, question of whether the existence of morality depends on the existence of God.

    Turning to the first premise (a), the article opens with:

    “Pew Research Center published the results of a survey conducted among 40,080 people in 40 countries between 2011 and 2013. The survey asked a simple question: Is belief in God essential to morality? While clear majorities say it is necessary, the U.S. continues to be an outlier. In 22 of the 40 countries surveyed, the majority says it is necessary to believe in God in order to be a moral person. “This position is highly prevalent, if not universal, in Africa and the Middle East,” says the report.”

    This is confused. The author states the question asked was: “Is belief in God essential to morality?” The author then interprets those answering in the affirmative as saying “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be a moral person.” This does not follow from the affirmative answer. The question asked was whether belief in God is essential to the institution of morality itself; such a question is asking whether the institution needs this belief. The question did not ask what attributes were necessary to be a moral person.

    Not only are these separate issues, they are logically distinct. (more…)

  • Is it Arrogant to Claim Jesus is the Only Way?

    Last week I spoke at Massey Presbyterian Church on the topic “Is it arrogant to claim Jesus is the only way?” The following is an abridged version of the talk I gave.

    ArrogantI was recently on a panel at Auckland University where an audience member raised the issue during the Q&A of religious pluralism. The issue is commonly raised as a rhetorical challenge, “isn’t it arrogant to believe Jesus is the only way?” In a world where there exists widespread religious pluralism, where there are people who are just as intelligent, educated, and ostensibly as sincere as we are who hold to and pratice a different religion to Christianity or no religion at all, how can a Christain maintain that she is right and everyone else is wrong. Isn’t believing that Jesus is the only way simply arrogant?

    In addressing this question I will first make three preliminary comments to identify what the issues are. Then, I will sketch three lines of response.

    First some prelimaries. As a matter of logic, if you affirm some proposition then you must reject the negation or denial of that proposition. Contradictory claims cannot both be true. It follows from this that in so far as one accepts the teachings of a religion like Christianity are true, as opposed to accepting the teachings for purely pragmatic reasons, one is rationally commited to rejecting claims that contradict this teaching. If one accepts God exists then it follows that one will believe that atheism, the denial of God’s existence, is false. If God created the world then the claim the world is not created is false. If Jesus died by crucifixition then the claim he did not exist or he died some other way is false.If there will be a final ressurection from the dead where people are judged for their actions then the claim there is no afterlife is false. So, if one accepts Christianity is true then one has to believe that other religions and perspectives that contradict Christianity are false; failure to believe this would be irrational.

    Second, accepting Christianity is true does not commit one to holding that there is no truth or value or good in other religions but it does commit one to the claim that these religions are mistaken where their teachings contradict the teachings of Christianity. This is signifcant as there are many issues on which different religions agree with Christianity, which makes them compatible with Christian teaching.

    Consider, for example Islam. Muslims believe there is only one God whom they call Allah. Allah is the Arabic word for God and was used by Christians to refer to God before the time of Mohamed. Muslims also believe that God is the creator and sustainer of the world. They believe God is all powerful, all knowing and has certain traits such as being just and merciful. Muslims believe God will judge all people and there will be a general ressurection of the dead. In all these things, Christians agree with them.

    Similarly, there are issues where Islam teaches about the way we should live that are perfectly compatible with Christian teachings, and which are arguably admirable given the standard Christian teachings on the same things. Muslims believe that one should give a third of one’s income to the poor, that one should pray five times a day.

    On the other hand, Islamic theology teaches things that are incompatible with central Christian doctrines. Muslim’s deny the Trinity, deny that Jesus was the son of God, deny that Jesus was crucified and that he rose from the dead. They affirm that Mohamaded is the final and ultimate prophet of Allah. Accepting Christianity commits one to denying these claims but not the former ones.

    What this shows is that Christians can accept that other religions and beliefs, and philosophers and theologians from within those traditions, can gain and appropriate genuine insight into the nature of God and his will for human kind. In fact, the Christian scriptures affirm this. In the first chapter of Romans the Apostle Paul states that “since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse.” Paul goes on to observe that this knowledge has been corrupted by Greco-Roman society but the point is that even behind such distortions is geniune insight of which the Pagans are (more…)

  • I’m so Objective about how You’re so Subjective

    One general objection to theistic arguments for God is that no such argument could be based on the subjective experience of one’s own cognitive processes, and that therefore it suggests delusions of grandeur to think that one can get from such a basis to God necessarily existing.

    I have an experiential awareness of a sign but I can't empirically prove it existsBut to deny that a sound argument could be based on one’s subjective experience of one’s own cognitive processes is self-exempting if it is -itself- claimed to arbitrate the status of that experience in relation to such an argument. This is the same old self-referential inconsistency that itself claims to be above that which it is itself an instance of by sheer force of the domain of its subject term.

    The delusion of grandeur is in thinking that one has the logical standing to predicate the -denial- of such an inferential move with any authority beyond one’s -own- cognitive subjectivity by exempting oneself from that alleged limitation in order to make that trans-subjective claim and thus pass judgment on the entire scope and limits of that very subjectivity itself for all thinking subjects.

    Moreover, how could one’s own subjectivity be capable of such a universal claim about what one can or cannot know or infer, if subjectivity itself is as self-limited as that claim itself asserts? Especially when no argument or criteria is ever even mentioned.

    In fact, how does this differ from a religious-like admonition: “Believe in my arbitrarily subjective self-stultifying claims about the possibility of knowledge and thou shalt be saved”?

    In other words, how does an unargued self-contradictory prohibition on everyone’s thinking differ from the religious proof-texting of an arbitrarily-protected claim that restricts all other claims except itself?

    Such self-exemption is never mentioned for a reason, although not a logical one.

  • Religion, Science, 9/11 and the Moon: Dawkins’ Response to Copan

    Richard Dawkins and Paul CopanParchment and Pen, has an audio of a brief exchange between Paul Copan and Richard Dawkins who was speaking in Ft. Lauderdale at Nova Southeastern University on “The Fact of Evolution.” (The following week, Paul Copan spoke on “The Fact of God” at Nova Southeastern and gave a direct response to Dawkins.) This MP3 of Paul Copan and Richard Dawkins’ exchange is from the Q&A of Dawkins’ talk.

    In it Paul alludes to an argument advanced by C S Lewis, Alvin Plantinga, Michael Rea, Victor Reppert and also alluded to by Patrica Churchland, Thomas Nagel, William Whewell and Friedrich Nietzche. The argument is that if our cognitive faculties evolved by natural selection, unguided by God, then our cognitive faculties cannot be rationally relied on to give us truth. The literature on this argument is interesting but I won’t comment on that here.

    What interests me is the comment Dawkins made in the MP3 which got the applause of the audience. Dawkins appears to not grasp the point of the argument and takes it to be asking for a reason why he supports “scientific rationalism”. He said he believes in scientific rationalism because it “works”. He then provided an example of how it “works”, it is that “science flies us to the moon, while religion flies planes into buildings.”

    Much could be said here but I want to limit myself to a single point, the evidence Dawkins cites that science works and religion does not. Dawkins offers that science has done good things such as getting us to the moon; religion has done bad things like destroying the World Trade Centre on 9/11. In other words, the positive things science does commends it as a something we should trust whereas the negative things religious does commends it as some thing which we should not trust.

    So let’s look at the claim Dawkins made that “science” got us to the moon. Now how does a subject, get us to the moon? Presumably what he means is that it was through science that we developed the rocket propulsion technology which enabled us to get to the moon.

    But here is the problem. If the fact that science developed the propulsion technology that got us to the moon means that science is responsible for the flight to the moon, and can take credit for it, then science must be responsible for the flight into the World Trade Centre; science developed the propulsion technology of aeroplanes, hence, it should be science not religion that is blamed.

    Moreover, rockets are used for other things apart from space and air travel (more…)

  • Hoist with one’s own petard

    Hoist with one's own petard

    When a Christian says that all other religions are false, he is deemed narrow minded.

    When an atheist says that all religions are false, she is deemed open minded.

     

     

     

  • The Presumption of Theism

    Modern analytic philosophy of religion, so it seems, is largely dominated by purely theoretical and evidential considerations. That is, the question of whether or not theistic belief is rational is decided purely on the balance of total available public evidence as opposed to existential and pragmatic considerations. The addition of the term “public” to the last sentence is significant in that it exactly specifies the brand of evidence focussed on in academic philosophy of religion. That is, evidence available to all people as opposed to that available only to some. Clearly this generalization of academic philosophy of religion is not universally true (sans Plantinga, Alston, Wolterstorff, Flannagan et al), nevertheless it remains largely true that the prevailing attitude within the philosophical academy is that the rationality of theistic belief is tied, almost exclusively, to the total public evidence a person has.

    Myth of SisyphusHowever, I generally regard this perspective on religious epistemology as flawed. There doesn’t seem much reason to limit the question of whether or not theistic belief is rational to solely evidential considerations. Furthermore, it would employ demonstrably double standards in our reasoning to require that the rationality of theistic belief be determined by reference solely to evidential considerations while other rational beliefs remain immune to such scrutiny. Why, for example, should we subject the rationality of our belief in God to any greater scrutiny than we do to our belief that our cognitive faculties give us true ideas about reality?

    With that in mind, we also need to ask why it is that we should exclude existential/pragmatic considerations from determining whether or not theistic belief is rational. It is this that my article principally concerns itself with, i.e. whether or not existential/pragmatic considerations can confer warrant or justification on our theistic belief. Can the question of “liveability”, by which I refer to our ability to live consistently and happily within that worldview, confer justification on that belief? Framed negatively, the question is “can the “unliveability” (by which I refer to a general inability to live consistently and happily within that worldview) of a worldview count against that system?”

    It seems at least intuitively plausible that, aside from evidentiary considerations, the “liveability” of a possible worldview is a fairly major existential concern we have when deciding upon which to adopt. When I refer to “liveability”, I refer to our ability to live in such a way as to harmonize our worldview with other concerns in life such as happiness. Furthermore, it should seem at least intuitively plausible that where we lack determinate public evidence one way or the other, it is positively irrational to choose that worldview which is ultimately unliveable. For instance, suppose that on one worldview, if we live our lives consistently (that is to its logical consequences) then we can’t be happy. Suppose further, that in order to be happy on that worldview, we must delude ourselves and others. Suppose once again, that on another worldview we wouldn’t need to engage in such grand delusion in order to be happy. Suppose finally, that the total available public evidence between the two is ultimately (more…)