Category: Ethical Theory

  • God and Moral Grounding Power

    A common objection to divine command theories of ethics (DCT) is that they make morality arbitrary. There are several ways this objection can be cashed out. The most common is what is called the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’. The Horrendous deeds objection can be formalised as follows:

    (1) If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape people we would be required to rape people.

    (2) It is absurd that we could be required to rape people.

    (3) God could command us to rape.

     (4) Therefore, DCT is absurd.

    The key premise is (3), the assumption that it is possible that God could command horrendous actions like rape. Divine command theorists have responded by suggesting that (3) is dubious.  They assume a conception of God Whereby God is understood to be an immaterial person who is all powerful, all knowing, loving and just. So, as terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to rape others would only hold if it is possible for an all-knowing, loving, and just person to command rape. This is unlikely. The very reason critics use the example of rape is that they view it as a paradigm action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain.Jason Thibodeau

    Suppose, however, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Divine command theorists point out, this would mean rape would be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these hypothetical circumstances, it’ s hard to see how (2) could be maintained.

    1. Jason Thibodeau’s Argument

    In a recent article, published in Sophia, Jason Thibodeau updates the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’ to avoid this problem.[1] Jason starts by defining a concept which he refers to as moral grounding power. “Let us say that a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations.” He continues “unless it is able to deny that other possible divine beings have this power, it implies that there are possible worlds in which horrendous acts are obligatory”.

    His argument for this conclusion is as follows:

    (P1) If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power. (Premise)

    (P2) Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has. (Premise)

    (P3) In some possible world, there exists a being that is like God except that he is not omnibenevolent [henceforth this being will be called Yod]. (Premise)

    (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

    (P5) In some possible world, Yod commands the gratuitous torture of children. (Premise)

    (P6) If DCT is true, then there is a possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is morally obligatory. (From P4 and P5)

    (P7) There is no possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is obligatory. (Premise)

    (P8) DCT is false. (From P6 and P7) [2]

    Recently Jason and I discussed this argument on Capturing Christianity, here I want to lay out in writing my main objection to it. Let me stress that Jason and I are discussing this back and forth and my thoughts may alter as the discussion continues.

    A. Premise (P1): Does a Divine Command Theory entail that God has Moral Grounding Power?

    Let me begin with (P1) the claim that “ Given Jason’s definition of moral grounding power; this premise affirms that: “if God a divine command theory is true, then Gods commands constitute moral obligations”. Is this correct? The answer is it depends on the kind of divine command theory proposed. Divine command theorists contend actions are morally required if and only if and because those actions are commanded by God. However, the word “because” here can be used to describe different kinds of explanatory relationships.

    In an important article on this issue Stephen Sullivan[3] distinguishes between a causal explanation and an identity explanation. In a casual explanation, one explains the existence of A by citing some distinct thing B, which causes B to exist B. By contrast an identity explanation explains the existence of A by noting the existence of B and then saying that A just is (is identical with) B.

    There are important differences between saying B caused A and saying B is identical to A.  In a causal relationship, the explanandum (the thing being explained) and explanans (the explainer) are distinct things; the former is an effect the latter a cause. As a cause, the explanans exists prior to the explandum, and there is an asymmetric dependence relationship between them: If B causes A to exist then B does not cause A to exist.  The effect depends on the cause for its existence but not vice versa.

    In an identity relationship, the explandum (the thing explained) and explanans (explainer) are not distinct things at all; they are the same thing described in different terms. Because the explanans and explandum are identical, the explanans does not exist prior to the explandum, that would entail something existed prior to itself. Moreover, identity relationships are symmetrical: if A is identical to B then B is also identical to A. Sullivan subsumes identity relationships under a broader category of “constitutive” explanations which includes not just explanations in terms of identity relations but also relationships of non-reductive supervenience.

    Now if we turn to (P1), Jason states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power” where “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. This assumes that divine command theorists are offering a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. But unless qualified,this assumption is dubious. It is true that some divine command theorists do this. Edward Wierenga (who Jason cites as an example) seems to have in mind a non-reductive supervenience relationship between moral requirements and Gods commands. Similarly, the divine command theories of Adam’s, Craig, Evans, Forrest, and Alston all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, and so they also offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands.

    However, other divine command theorists, do not offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. One important proponent of a divine command theory was Philip Quinn. Quinn explicitly offered a causal explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands. Quinn argued that the property of being willed by God and the property of being morally required are not identical properties but distinct properties. God’s act of willing that a person performed an immediately caused it to be the case that a moral obligation to do this action existed.

    Strictly speaking then (P1) is false. Divine command theories per se do not entail that Gods commands constitute moral obligations. Some divine command theories do, and some do not. Of course, the most significant divine command theories defended today involve identity explanations, and so these theories do have the entailment Jason refers to. For this reasons one might think my qualifications are a tad pedantic. However, the difference between causal and constitutive divine command theories will become important when we examine further premises.

    B.Premise (P4): Is the Inference Valid?

    Before, examining premise (P2), let me first say something about the Jason makes in (P4).

     (P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)

    Notice that (P4) draws an inference from (P1) (P2) and (P3). It takes the fact that a divine command theory entails that God has “moral grounding power” and, the fact that omnipotent beings have the same powers, and infers from this that any omnipotent being will have moral grounding power. If this inference is valid, the word “power” must have the same meaning in (P1) as it does in (P2). When Jason states in (P2) that Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has, the word “powers” must include the kind of moral grounding power he refers to in (P1). If  this isnt the case the inference commits the fallacy of equivocation.

    C. What does the word “power” mean in (P1) and (P2)?

    It’s precisely on this last point however that I think Jason’s argument falls down.  Jason supports (P2)   by asking us to imagine a being like God, who is omnipotent but lacks the property of benevolence: He then asks whether such a being would “in virtue of his malevolence, lack the power to flood the earth, destroy a planet or create the universe? “. He concludes “If the being is omnipotent, this seems unlikely, it’s hard to see how the mere absence of benevolence would limit Gods power in this way. “

    I find this claim intuitively plausible, but note carefully the examples Jason uses here. He gives the examples of “lacking the power to flood the earth” “destroy a planet” “create a universe” these are all acts of causal power, where God by his actions causes something distinct from himself to come into existence or go out of existence.

    However, in his first premise (P1), Jason uses the word power in a different sense. He refers to “moral grounding power” which a being has  “just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Moral grounding power then isn’t the power God has to cause moral obligations to come into existence its rather the God’s ability or power to constitute moral requirements with his commands. We saw above that, in the context of divine command theories, constitutive explanations can involve the postulation a non-reductive supervenience relationship between Gods commands and moral requirements. However, in most cases, divine command theorists who offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements are offering an “identity” explanation.  Divine command theorists like Craig, Evans, Adams, Forrest, all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.

    This means that the phrase “moral grounding power” is often just a technical way of saying that, the property of being commanded by God is identical with the property of being morally required.  The property of being obligatory isn’t something that is caused to come into existence by Gods commands; it just is the property of being commanded by God by a different name. Just as the morning star and evening star are the same thing under different descriptions. The property of being morally required and being commanded by God are the same property under different descriptions.

    The problem is that while (P2) is intuitively plausible if you are referring to causal powers. It is not so obvious when one is talking of something like a moral grounding power.  To say God has moral grounding power could just mean that God has the power to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions under a different description. However, it is impossible for any person who is not God to have this kind of power. This is because the relationship of identity can only hold between a thing and itself. It is impossible for any being, no matter how powerful, who is not God to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions. This is an incoherent idea.

    Let me illustrate this: By waving my hand I can make it the case that Matthew Flannagan Has waved his hand. However, it is not possible for anyone else, even an omnipotent being to do this. An omnipotent being has the causal power to make me wave my hand. If he becomes incarnate in human form, he could himself wave his hand. However, he could not make it the case that his standing up is identical with me standing up. That is because his actions are not identical to my actions.  Nor is it possible for him a distinct person from me to perform actions which are identical with actions I perform. If you want to refer to this ability as a power, then it is a power that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone but me to have. The only person who can perform actions numerically identical to my actions is me.

    Conclusions:

    Above I noted that the inference he draws in P4 is valid. Only if the word “power” is used the same way in both premises P1 and P2. The kind of power, God, is said to have when Jason states “Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has” must include the kind of power he has in mind when he states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power”.

    We have seen that this is not the case. In our discussion of P1, we noted that the claim “If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape” is true only of divine command theories which do not postulate a causal explanation of moral requirements. In other words (P1) is true only in cases where the word “power” excludes causal relationships. (P2) however is defensible only if the word power refers to causal powers. If it is understood more broadly to refer to constitutive explanations of Gods commands (P2) is false. It isn’t true that any omnipotent being can perform an action which is identical with the action of another being. The crucial premise (P4) then commits the fallacy of equivocation.


     

    [1] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” Sophia:1-17 (forthcoming)

    [2] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” 9,

    [3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33 (1) (1993) 33-45

  • The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Three Problems with Relativism

    This is the third of a series of posts on moral relativism. These talks are based on some talks I have given on the subject in the last few months. In the first post, I looked at what the basic issues are. The second post examines some of the reasons people offer for accepting relativism. This last post looks at some problems with relativism.

    Today most ethicists whether Christian or non-Christian reject relativism. Critics of relativism argue it faces several problems, which give us reason to reject it. I will focus on three.

    1. The Problem of Moral Progress and Moral Reform.

    Relativism is incompatible with moral progress or reform.  While relativists can accept that the moral judgements of societies change they can’t consistently claim these changes amount to progress. If society at one time supports relativism-1slavery or racial segregation, and then later disapproves of these things. Relativists cannot say that society has thrown off an incorrect view and adopted a correct, one. Instead, it must say that it has gone from one correct view to another one.

    A related problem is that relativism suggests that moral reformers who spoke out against slavery and segregation were in fact in the wrong. They were opposing what society approved of and hence what was right for members of society.

    This problem also applies to subjectivism. If a member of the Ku Klux Klan holds racist judgements at one time and then later rejects these judgements as bigotry, The subjectivist can’t say he has moved from a mistaken to a correct. Instead, he has changed from one correct view to another.  Individuals don’t grow in moral insight or develop more discernment

    2.The possibility of Error

    There is another problem with relativism. It seems plausible that we can be mistaken in our moral judgements. I can make judgements about what is right and wrong which are incorrect, and whole societies can do this.  Relativism, however, suggests mistakes like this are impossible. Subjectivism means that If I believe something is right, then I am right in doing it. Relativism means that if a society endorses a practice then its right for members of that society to do the practice. The consequence is that mistakes about morality are impossible.  For a person or a community to make a mistake, it has to be possible for the standards an individual or society accepts to be different from the standards which are correct.

    3. Relativism Implies that Obvious Moral Wrongs Are Acceptable

    Perhaps the most important objection to relativism is that it implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable. If actions are right or wrong relative to an individual or societies standpoint, then anything at all can be justified. Genocide, rape, torture of children, racial intolerance, are all morally right for a person if he believes that they are or his society endorses them.   Many find this implication hard to swallow if a serial killer thinks it’s permissible to kill women, is it really plausible to suggest this fact alone means his actions are right or did the fact German society adopted Nazism in the 1930s mean that Germans did no wrong when they implemented these policies.

    Conclusion

    Let me now bring the threads of this talk to a close. I have explained what relativism and objectivism are. I noted some common reasons why people accept relativism and suggested these reasons fail. The appeal to diversity fails to make some important distinctions and appeals to tolerance, openness and so on are incoherent. I have also sketched several problems with relativism it entails moral reform is impossible moral error is impossible and that obvious moral wrongs are right. For reasons like this most philosophers, today reject moral relativism. While it’s a challenge to the way, Christians think about ethics. I am not convinced it’s a challenge which is very defensible.

  • The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Arguments for Relativism

    This post is based on a series of talks I have given on moral relativism. In my last post, I looked at what relativism and objectivism are. Here I examine some common reasons people accept or defend relativism I will offer critical commentary on these arguments.

    When examining any position in philosophy it is important to understand what motivates people to hold it, why do people find it plausible? Two reasons are commonly cited.

    1. The Argument from Cultural Diversity

    One common motivation for relativism, particularly cultural relativism, is the observation that different societies have different moral beliefs.  To use a well-known example: people in 14th century Europe believed witchcraft was seriously immoral and executed witches. People in 21st century New Zealand doesn’t believe this. Some societies endorse polygamy others endorse monogamy.   Facts like these are held to cast doubt on the idea there is a single true morality relativism-1independent of what society thinks.

     Response to the argument from cultural diversity.

    Objectivists make several responses to this argument.

     Distinguishing Separate idea’s.

    First, they argue that this argument conflates two separate ideas.  (a) the idea that beliefs about what is right and wrong differ from society to society. And  (b) that idea that what really is right, and wrong differs from society.  The fact different societies have different moral beliefs provides evidence for the first of these ideas. It establishes (a).  However, cultural relativism affirms something stronger than this. Relativists believe moral standards are correct or incorrect relative to society.  Cultural Relativists contend an action is wrong for a person because their society condemns that action.  Hence, they affirm (b).

    However, that the fact different societies have different moral beliefs doesn’t support (b) It’s possible that when different societies make different judgements about something that one of them is mistaken. When don’t normally assume that when societies disagree on something the correct answer is relative to society.  If different societies have different beliefs about the shape or age of the earth, we would not take this to demonstrate that the earth’s actual age and shape differ in various societies. So why do we do this when the disagreement involves moral judgements?  The mere fact societies make different judgements on a topic tells us nothing about whether those judgements are objectively true or false.

    Exaggerated disagreement

    Second, objectivists argue that appeals to cultural diversity often exaggerate the amount of cross-cultural disagreement over moral standards. Often when societies have different moral beliefs, this isn’t due to different moral standards but the result of disagreement over certain factual questions.  Consider the abovementioned case of witchcraft. In the 14th-century people believed in the existence of witches. They believed witches met together secretly and sacrificed children and ate these children in a ritual feast. They bound themselves by oath to the devil to use supernatural powers to harm, and kill innocent people. Hence the believed witchcraft involved the deliberate conspiracy to cause serious harm to innocent people.

    We don’t hold these beliefs today but if we did our opinion of witchcraft would be very different. Suppose we believed there was a group which conspired to randomly kill and maim innocent people and killed and ate children as part of its rituals.  We probably would legally suppress this group. And many people would support the death penalty for those who did these things, killing children is a horrendous form of murder after all. The difference between us and 14th-century Europeans is due, in a large part, to different factual beliefs not simply a disagreement over moral standards.

    1. Relativism Promotes Tolerance

    A second motivation behind relativism is the idea that moral relativism promotes tolerance and humility. When you realise that your own moral standards are correct only for you, you are less likely to fall into arrogance and pass judgements on the beliefs and practises of others. Nor are you likely to demand they change these practices and adopt yours. 

    Response:

    Objectivists respond that this concern reveals a subtle contradiction. The argument assumes that tolerance and humility are good things, it assumes people should be tolerant and humble and should not be arrogant and rush to judgement.  However, if relativism is correct, this isn’t the case. According to cultural relativism, it is wrong to be intolerant only if your society believes that it is.  Societies which are imperialistic and arrogant and believes its permissible to colonialize other nations don’t do any wrong if it imposes its moral judgements on to others.  Similarly, according to subjectivism humility and tolerance are wrong only if you think it is. If someone has bigoted or arrogant beliefs, then bigotry is morally required of them, and they shouldn’t act in a humble, tolerant way.

    Objectivists maintain that one can condemn individuals or societies who have arrogant and bigoted practices only if you hold these things are wrong despite the fact societies or individuals may endorse them. There is something incoherent about offering a moral criticism about the arrogant and intolerant moral judgements of societies or individuals and then concluding you can’t make judgements about societies and individuals

  • The challenge of Moral Relativism: Relativism vs Objectivism: understanding the issues:

    This post is the first of a series of posts which reproduce a talk on Moral Relativism I gave at both the Auckland and Tauranga  Confident Christianity Conference’s and was given earlier in the year as part at a series of talks on apologetics at Orewa Community Church.

    In moral debates about you will hear slogans like “if you don’t like abortion don’t have one” or “if you don’t like pornography don’t watch it.” The basic idea is that if you think a particular action is morally wrong, then you shouldn’t do it, however, it is mistaken or inappropriate to claim that people who don’t share your opinion shouldn’t do it. The slogans in question assume that moral principles correctly apply only to people who believe in those principles.

    The pervasiveness of this kind of thinking can be seen in a media report I watched several years ago. A pornographer relativism-1had organised a festival on the main street of Auckland, called “Boobs on Bikes”. It involved people, including topless women, riding down Queenstreet displaying erotica. There was some controversy over this event. During the media coverage journalists interviewed several people present. What was interesting was how many people responded by saying something like this: “It is the 21st century” or “we live in a liberal society”. Notice what happens when people do this. They were asked whether a particular action or policy was right or wrong. They answered by appealing to what they perceived to be currently fashionable or conventionally accepted.  The assumption is that what is right or wrong is determined by what is conventionally accepted or fashionable.

    These responses reflect a position called Relativism by moral philosophers.  In a bestselling book. The Closing of the American Mind. The prominent philosopher Alan Bloom opened by saying:

    There is one thing a professor can be certain absolutely of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students’ reaction: they will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as though he were calling into question 2 + 2 = 4. These are things you don’t think about. The students’ backgrounds are as various as America can provide. Some are religious, some atheists; some are to the Left, some to the Right; some intend to be scientists, some humanists or professionals or businessmen; some are poor, some rich. They are unified only in their relativism and in their allegiance to equality. And the two are related in a moral intention. The relativity of truth is not a theoretical insight but a moral postulate, the condition of a free society, or so they see it. They have all been equipped with this framework early on, and it is the modern replacement for the inalienable natural rights that used to be the traditional American grounds for a free society. That it is a moral issue for students is revealed by the character of their response when challenged – a combination of disbelief and indignation: “Are you an absolutist?,” the only alternative they know, uttered in the same tone as “Are you a monarchist?” or “Do you believe in witches?” This latter leads into the indignation, for someone who believes in witches might well be a witch-hunter or a Salem judge. The danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism is not error but intolerance. Relativism is necessary to openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which all primary education for more than fifty years has dedicated itself to inculcating. Openness – and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of various claims to truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings – is the great insight of our times. The true believer is the real danger. The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. (Bloom 1987)

    Bloom was beginning a scathing critique of what is often called moral relativism. Note that Bloom mentions students entering university. One reason for this is that relativism is not a common position in contemporary philosophy or ethics, and most philosophers I know of think it is pretty clearly a mistaken position. However, it is extremely common at the popular level.  Because relativism is is an important challenge to Christian ethics it is important to reflect on how Christians respond to this challenge.

    1. Relativism vs Objectivism: understanding the issues:

    Christian’s like Muslims and Jews, believe God has issued commands to human beings, and our moral duties are related to these commands.

    However, or not God exists or issues commands doesn’t depend on whether we think he does. If God created the world, then this is a fact that occurred well before we were born and my believing or not believing it makes no difference to whether it occurred. If God did not create the world, hoping and wishing he has doesn’t make the past change.  The same is true of God’s commanding, if God has issued commands then this is a fact, people may disagree with what he demands, but this disagreement doesn’t make any difference to whether the commands exist.

    To illustrate the point here, return to the slogan I opened this talk with. Suppose someone was contemplating jumping off the sky tower. You responded “if you do that you’ll die” only to get the response. ‘Who are you to impose your belief in the law of gravity onto me?” I doubt anyone would be impressed by this response. Whether or not the laws of gravity exist doesn’t depend on whether you believe it. God’s moral laws don’t differ from the laws or decrees by which he governs the universe. They either exist or they don’t.

    This means that Christians are objectivists about morality. Objectivism holds that: certain moral standards are correct independently of whether you, I or our society believe they are or accept that they are. Some moral principles apply to people regardless of whether they choose to accept these principles, and if people do not accept these principles, they are making a mistake.

    By contrast, relativists hold that moral hold that all moral judgements are correct or incorrect relative to different cultures or individuals. Howard-Synder (1999) highlights two major kinds of relativism:

    1. Cultural relativism holds an action is wrong for a person because their society condemns that action.
    2. Subjectivism holds that actions are right and wrong relative to individual opinions. An action is wrong for a person because he or she thinks it is wrong

    If relativism is true, then moral standards apply only to people who themselves or whose society accepts those standards. This is the assumption you see reflected in the slogans I mentioned at the start of my talk.


    References

    Bloom, Alan. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind: How higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today’s students. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Howard-Snyder, Frances. 1999. “Christianity and ethics.” In Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael Murray, 376-377. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

     

  • “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” Now Online

    Recently, Philosophia Christi published Matt’s article “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg”. This article consisted of some critical commentary and responses to Erik Wielenberg’s bookdefaul1 Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism.

    Since then Matt’s article has received a little bit of unexpected attention. One of my arguments was discussed in a dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg that took place at North Carolina State University earlier this year, and on the back of this, we have received several received requests to read the paper. It is now available here: Flannagan Robust Ethics PC 19 2 (1)

    Permission has been granted from the Editor of Philosophia Christi to upload this contribution. Learn more about the Journal by going to www.epsociety.org/philchristi.

  • “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis” published in Philosophia Christi

    Matt’s article, “Robust Ethics and the Autonomy Thesis: A reply to Erik Wielenberg” has been published in the wiPhilosophia Christinter issue ( Vol 19 Num. 2 – Winter 2017) of Philosophia Christi.  An overview of the contents of the full issue can be found here.  The editor has given Matt permission to upload the article in a couple of months. For now here is the abstract:

    In his monograph, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, Erik Wielenberg offers arguably one of the most sophisticated defenses of the autonomy thesis to date. Wielenberg argues that (I) the divine command theory is problematic because it cannot account for the moral obligations of reasonable unbelievers; (II) Godless normative robust realism (GRNR) can be formulated in a way that avoids the standard objections to the autonomy thesis; and (III) GRNR provides a better account of intrinsic value. In this paper, I will argue Wielenberg’s defenses of the autonomy thesis fails. I will argue that his objection to divine command theories fails, that he fails to address two standard challenges to the autonomy thesis adequately, and, finally, that Wielenberg fails to show that GRNR better accounts for the intuition that certain things are intrinsically good than various forms of theistic alternatives.

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part two)

    In my last post, I explained the position of Theological Utilitarianism as expounded in William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. I pointed out The Principles was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. In this post, I want to look at the influence Theological Utilitarianism had in the 18th and 19th centuries. Was Paley expounding some novel idiosyncratic position? Or was he simply repeating a fairly mainstream position on the relationship between Gods law and happiness which had been around for decades?

    1. The influence of Theological Utilitarianism in the 18thand 19th centuries

    Theological Utilitarianism sounds novel to contemporary ears. But it wasn’t an innovative position in the late eighteenth century. Paley notes in the preface that he is a “compiler” of earlier writers of moral theory. Schneewind, states that the theory he proposed was in fact “an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues. “[1] Some trace theological utilitarianism back to the divine command theory of John Locke[2]  However, the earliest clear exponent of this position appears to be George Berkeley’s sermons in 1712.[3]

    It is worth looking at Berkeley in some detail.  According to Berkeley, things are “denominated good or evil” as “they are fitted to augment or impair our own Happiness” Good or Evil. On the other hand, “Moral Goodness” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God.” Berkley articulates the relationship between moral and non-moral goodness as follows:

    For Laws being Rules directive of our Actions to the end intended by the Legislator, in order to attain the paleyKnowledge of God’s Laws, we ought first to enquire what that end is, which he designs should be carried on by human Actions. God is a Being of Infinite Goodness. it is plain the end he proposes is Good. But God enjoying in himself all possible Perfection, it follows that it is not his own Good, but that of his Creatures. Again, the Moral Actions of Men are entirely terminated within themselves, so as to have no influence on the other orders of Intelligences or reasonable Creatures: The end therefore to be procured by them, can be no other than the good of Men. But as nothing in a natural State can entitle one Man more than another to the favour of God, except only Moral Goodness, which consisting in a Conformity to the Laws of God, doth presuppose the being of such Laws, and Law ever supposing an end, to which it guides our Actions, it follows that Antecedent to the end proposed by God, no distinction can be conceived between Men; that end therefore itself or general design of Providence is not determined or limited by any Respect of Persons: It is not therefore the private Good of this or that Man, Nation or Age, but the general well-being of all Men, of all Nations, of all Ages of the World, which God designs should be procured by the concurring Actions of each individual. Having thus discover’d the great end, to which all Moral Obligations are Subordinate; it remains, that we enquire what Methods are necessary for the obtaining that End.[4]

    When Berkeley says God is  infinitely good, he like Samuel Clarke seems to mean that God  has “an unalterable disposition to do and to communicate good or happiness.”[5] [6] God’s goal in issuing the commands he does is the happiness, impartially considered of all human beings.

    Berkeley proceeds to note two ways that God could promote this happiness. One would be “without the injunction of any certain universal Rules of Morality, to to oblige “every one upon each particular Occasion, to consult the publick Good, and always to do that, which to him shall seem in the present time and circumstances, most to conduce to it.”  The second is  “by enjoining the Observation of some determinate, established Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind” Berkeley argues that “”there lie several strong Objections.” Berkeley then anticipates the “self-effacing” objection to act utilitarianism arguing that anyone committed to promoting the happiness of others wouldn’t promulgate act utilitarianism as a decision procedure. Public endorsement and acceptance of the rule “do whatever maximises utility” would probably not maximise utility. Consequently, Berkeley concludes that God has followed the second method.

    Stephen Darwall suggests that the best way to interpret Berkeley is to distinguish between his meta-ethical theory and normative theory. His meta-ethical theory attempts “to answer metaphysical questions of what goodness and rightness themselves, respectively, are.” On the other hand, his normative theory “concerns what actions or things are good and right.” Meta-ethically Berkeley is a divine command theorist “moral goodness consists” consists in a “Conformity to the Laws of God”. However, Berkeley’s normative theory was rule-utilitarian, God commands “Laws, which, if Universally practised, have from the Nature of things an Essential fitness to procure the well-being of Mankind”.[7]

    A position very similar to Berkeley is hinted at in Butler’s writings[8] but is expounded more clearly in the writings of, John Gay [9] John Brown, and Abraham Tucker.   It’s clear that Paley clearly draws upon this earlier tradition.  In the preface to The Principles Paley acknowledges that he is attempting to compile and articulate the positions of John Gay, and Abraham Tucker. Book II chapter 1 of The Principles proposes a line of argument that closely resembles the argument of John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality”.

    Similarly, Paley’s emphasis on rules is, as we saw, found in Berkeley’s Passive obedience and performs the same function. Berkeley’s initial advancement of this distinction and advocacy of rule utilitarianism was part of a broader argument to argue against violent resistance to the state during the Jacobite agitation in Ireland. He was concerned that people were advocating the violation of certain negative rules of the law of nature such as: “do not commit adultery”, “do not steal”, “don’t rebel against the government”, whenever they perceived doing so would further the public good. Paley uses the distinction for similar purposes, to respond to the objection that utilitarianism allows people to break with impunity moral rules against theft and murder whenever they perceive it will make people happy.

    In fact, the proximate source for Paley’s stress on rules appears to be Abraham Tucker. Tucker. Wrote

      As we cannot upon every occasion see to the end of our proceedings, he [the moralist] will establish certain rules to serve as landmarks for guiding us on the way.  These rules, when he has leisure and opportunity for mature consideration, he will build on one another, erecting the whole fabric upon the basis of the summum bonum before described.  (Original emphasis)[10]

    Similarly, Paley’s argument that God wills the happiness of his creatures and so the commands God issues must be coextensive with promoting the happiness is ubiquitous in the tradition that preceded him. This argument is s found in Berkeley, Gay, and Brown Louden also documents the same argument occurs in Adam Smith and Joseph Butler [11]

    Finally, Paley’s exposition of this tradition was very influential. The principles became required text at Cambridge university Schneewind points out “utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley.[12] Paley, not Bentham being its most well-known exponent.  Similarly, Smith points out that Paley’s writings were once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools.[13]

    In fact, Paley’s influence is still seen clearly in John Austin’s work on Jurisprudence, in the early and late nineteenth century.  Mill himself appeals to the tradition:

    We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine. If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity. If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but more profoundly religious than any other. If it be meant that utilitarianism does not recognise the revealed will of God as the supreme law of morals, I answer, that a utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and wisdom of God, necessarily believes that whatever God has thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals, must fulfil the requirements of utility in a supreme degree. …Whether this opinion is correct or not, it is superfluous here to discuss; since whatever aid religion, either natural or revealed, can afford to ethical investigation, is as open to the utilitarian moralist as to any other. He can use it as the testimony of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given course of action.[14]

    Mill here explicitly rejects the idea that Utilitarianism does not recognize the revealed will as the supreme law of morals, and uses a line of argument very similar to Paley, whose writings Mill was aware of, to argue the contrary.

    Consequently, Utilitarianism then wasn’t a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. Nor did it develop in response to or in opposition to a conception of morality based divine commands or divine laws. Divine command theorists, in fact, had been advocating Theological Utilitarianism for decades before Bentham, and the popularity of utilitarianism in Anglo-American thought had a good deal to do with the popularity of theological utilitarianism.


    [1]J B Schneewind Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002) 446.  Paley was, therefore, summarising an already existing, popular, school of thought.

    [2] See for example A. P. Brogan “John Locke and Utilitarianism” Ethics 69: 2 (1959), 79-93.

    [3] See Berkeley’s A Discourse on Passive Obedience (1712) and dialogues I-III of the   Alciphron (1732). Berkeley had included a systematic treatise on moral theory in the draft of A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), but the manuscript was lost, leaving historians to piece together his theories from his occasional writings.

    [4] Passive obedience: or, the Christian doctrine of not resisting the supreme power, proved and vindicated … In a discourse deliver’d at the College-chapel. By George Berkeley, M.A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. Available at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ecco/004899015.0001.000/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

    [5] Clarke, Demonstration, Prop. XII; in Works, vol. II, p. 572.

    [6] Robert Louden notes this conception of God’s goodness was common in the 18th century and similar arguments can be seen in Smith and Butler see Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [7] See Stephen Darwall “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” in, The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, Kenneth Winkler, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

    [8] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280

    [9] John Gay “Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” in Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, vol. 2 [1897] available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bigge-british-moralists-vol-2 accessed 26 Aug 2016

    [11] Robert Louden “Butler’s Divine Utilitarianism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12:3 (1995):265–280.

     [12] Schneewind, Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant 446.

    [13] Wilson Smith “William Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism in America” The William and Mary Quarterly Third Series, 11:3 (1954) 402–424

    [14] John Stuart Mill “What is Utilitarianism” available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645u/chapter2.htm