Category: Ethical Theory

  • Divine Command Theory and Utilitarianism forgotten bedfellows? Paley’s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (part one)

    This post is adapted from a short essay I wrote on William Paley’s Ethics

    In a widely used textbook, James Rachels refers to “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries.  Referring to upheavals such as the American Revolution, French Revolution, Rachel’s contends that people began to think differently about Ethics. There arose “A new conception of ethics” a conception we today call “utilitarianism”. Rachels states that this was a theory of ethics “proposed by David Hume (1711-1776) but given definitive formulation by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill ( 1806-1873)”  Rachel’s continues:paley

    Bentham’s argument for a new conception of ethics had a powerful influence. Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God, nor is it about following abstract rules; Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world[1]

    This picture of the history of moral thought seems to be widely held. Stephen Nathanson, for example, writes that utilitarians:

    [R]eject moral codes or systems that consist of commands or taboos that are based on customs, traditions, or orders given by leaders or supernatural beings. Instead, utilitarians think that what makes a morality be true or justifiable is its positive contribution to human (and perhaps non-human) beings.[2]

    The story draws a contrast between moral theories which based morality on divine commands or divine laws and those based on human happiness. The claim is that Utilitarianism was a new or novel theory of ethics proposed by secular thinkers such as Hume and Bentham in the late 18th century. This new happiness based conception was in contrast to and replaced the divine command conception. Utilitarianism is associated with social and political radicalism and the upheavals that followed the American revolution and French revolutions and so is seen not just as secular, but radical.

    I maintain this story is untrue, manifestly untrue when one examines 18th-century moral thought. I can’t spell all the ins and outs here, so will focus on one book that this narrative fails to come to grips with. This is William Paley’s The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (henceforth The Principles) which was first published in 1785, four years before Jeremy Bentham published An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.

    Paley book is significant for three reasons: First, it is a clear presentation of the position known as Theological Utilitarianism: “a doctrine according to which we have a duty to promote the good of humanity because God, our universally benevolent creator, wants us to do so.” [3]   Second, theological utilitarianism was highly influential in the eighteenth century and represented a common way people thought about morality and politics which had dominated English moral thought for several decades. Third, given the rise of classical utilitarianism under Bentham and Mill and its dominance in contemporary moral thought today, utilitarianism is often viewed as a thoroughly secular, liberal and radical moral philosophy at odds with conservative religious and moral viewpoints. Paley’s book provides insight into an alternative conservative religious tradition of utilitarian thought which predates Bentham by several decades.

    1. Paley’s Theological Utilitarianism

     In The Principles Paley summarizes theological utilitarianism succinctly: “Virtue is ‘the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness.’[4]If we were to, anachronistically, expound Paley’s position in today’s philosophical categories, his summary offers an answer to three meta-ethical questions.

    The first is the question of moral ontology: if moral requirements exist, what are they what is there nature? Paley proposes a divine command theory of meta-ethics whereby “the property of ethical wrongness is (identical) with the property of being contrary to God’ s command. ” [5]

    The second, is the question “why be moral”? Sometimes doing my duty conflicts with my self-interest, or with goals I really want to achieve in such cases why should I follow duty and not prudence? Paley’s answer is to distinguish between “what we shall gain or lose in the present world”, and what “what we shall gain or lose in the world to come.” Because God is just and awards good behaviour with eternal life, it is never in our long-term best interests to disobey [6]

    The third, question is:“what is the content of morality?” what types of actions do moral requirements supervene upon. Paley’s answer is that:

    God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, “that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.  [7]

    An interesting feature of Paley’s answer is his appeal to rules. Contemporary moral philosophers distinguish between act and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarians hold that “we should perform the action that will create the greatest net utility.” [8]  The principle of utility is “applied on a case by case basis. The right action in any situation is the one that yields more utility (i.e. creates more well-being) than other available actions.” [9] By contrast rule utilitarians adopt a “two-part view… a) a specific action is morally justified if it conforms to a justified moral rule, and b) a moral rule is justified if its inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules (or no rule at all).” [10]  In contemporary moral philosophy, this distinction “was not sharply drawn until the late 1950s when Richard Brandt and introduced this terminology”. [11].

    The move from act to rule utilitarianism appears to have been motivated by problems which emerged in act utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism seemed to imply that a doctor who could save five people from death by killing one healthy person and using that person’s organs for life-saving transplants, should do so. Rule utilitarianism avoids this: while more good would be done by killing the healthy patient in a specific individual case. Having a publically acknowledged and accepted general rule which permits doctors to kill patients whenever they perceive there is the need for organs arguably would have bad consequences.

    Interestingly, Paley draws this distinction in 1785 he contrasts the particular and general consequences of performing an action. The particular consequences are the total consequences of performing an action itself. The general consequences, however, are those that would occur “if the same sort of actions were generally permitted.” Paley identifies himself in what today we would call the rule utilitarian position. Interesting he does so, in anticipation of the problems act utilitarianism would face. Paley forsees that act utilitarianism would have the kind of implications that critics would later press and stresses that utility attaches to the rule to avoid the problem.

    In my next post in this series, I will look at the important influence theological utilitarianism had in the 18th century.


    [1] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [2]  Stephen Nathanson “Act and Rule Utilitarianism” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

    [3] Matti Häyry “Passive Obedience and Berkeley’s Moral Philosophy” Berkeley Studies 23 (2012) 3

    [4] William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy [1785] Book I chapter 7, available online at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/paley-the-principles-of-moral-and-political-philosophy accessed 25/8/2016

    [5] This technical definition comes from Robert Adams “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979) 76.  Paley of course does not use this level of precision; I am attempting rather to interpret Paley’s answers in light of more recent technical discussions of the issues.

    [6] William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy Bk II Chapter 3

    [7] Ibid Book II Chapter 5

    [8] Stephen Nathanson “Act and Rule Utilitarianism” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

    [9] Ibid

    [10] Ibid

    [11] Ibid

  • Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part one

    This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.

    I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part one.

    First, I want to thank the association for asking me to speak, seeing I have been teaching in the secondary sector full time for only a  couple of years so I am not sure I have a lot to share with you and feel very much like I have more to learn from you.

    I have been asked to talk about the contemporary philosophy of religion.  In my talk this morning I will focus on three things. First, I will talk about what philosophy of religion is. Second, I will talk a little bit about its history but focus on recent developments in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Finally, I will link some of these things with the current National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) Standards in Religious Studies. I hope what I say is helpful to you.

    What is Philosophy of Religion
    What is the philosophy of religion? Charles Taliaferro at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “thephilosophy-of-religion philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions.” He adds “Philosophy of religion also includes an investigation into the religious significance of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust) and general features of the cosmos (e.g., laws of nature, the emergence of conscious life, widespread testimony of religious significance, and so on)”[1] Chad Meister at The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “ the philosophical study of the meaning and nature of religion. It includes the analyses of religious concepts, beliefs, terms, arguments, and practices of religious adherents.”[2]

    The History of Philosophy of Religion

    Now, Philosophy of religion has a very long history, going back to the Pre-Socratics. And it was an integral part of medieval philosophy, Augustine, Aquinas, Anselm, Abelard, Scotus, Ockham and so forth worked in the tradition of “faith seeking understanding”. They used philosophy as a conceptual tool to reflect upon, analyse, refine, the religious faith that they held and develop philosophically informed models of core religious doctrines, they also used it to respond to objections and critique rival views and develop arguments for the own for theological models they supported. Some of these reflections proved very fruitful.  The Islamic-Christian dialogue over Aristotle’s understanding of causation and how it related to miracles, and Gods causal activity in the world, for example, is profoundly influential on latter accounts of causation by people like David Hume and the concepts of laws of nature used by early modern scientists.

    Perhaps lesser appreciated is the role of philosophy of religion during the enlightenment.  There is an unfortunate tendency in the history of philosophy not to appreciate the religious context in which important key thinkers of the enlightenment operated. Descartes cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am), for example, comes from Augustine’s response to sceptics about religious knowledge in the city of God Book 11: 26. Descartes immediately follows this up of course with an appeal to his own version of the ontological argument, proposed famously by Anselm of Canterbury.

    Or consider John Locke, according to Locke’s associate James Tyrell, the impetus for Locke’s “Essay on human understanding” was a conversation  he, Locke and four others had on the topic of “the principles of morality and revealed religion.” Locke’s attempt to develop a comprehensive empiricist understanding of knowledge was an attempt to answer the question of faith and reason, a topic he explicitly addresses in the last section of the book. (Incidentally, it’s a section often skipped in contemporary courses on Locke.)

    Or consider what a widely used textbook refers to as the “revolution in ethics” which occurred in the 18-19th centuries. Which the author, James Rachels, contends is due to Hume, Bentham and Mill. Rachel’s refers to as “A new conception of ethics”… “Morality, he [Bentham] urged is not a matter of pleasing God,  nor is it about following abstract rules, Rather, morality is nothing more than the attempt to bring about as much happiness as possible into the world”.[3]

    Rachel’s is, of course, talking about utilitarianism. However, his characterisation of the history is quite selective. In 1715, some 74 years before Bentham, George Berkley had defended a rule utilitarian conception of ethics[4]Berkeley was a divine command theorist hat moral rightness, and wrongness consists in agreement and disagreement, respectively, with the will of God.  Because  God’s purposes were benevolent a God’s aim was to maximize the happiness of his creatures, so one could assume that whatever rules maximized happiness were those enjoined by God. Berkley used this theoretical account of God and morality to attempt to reconcile his Irish Anglican commitment to passive obedience with loyalty to the Glorious revolution during Jacobite uprisings in Ireland. Berkley’s “theological utilitarianism” was adopted by people like John Gay, Abraham Tucker and compiled by William Paley. Paley’s textbook defending this way of looking at ethics was the standard text at Cambridge and widely influential several years before Bentham published his defence of utilitarianism.

    I could go on; my point is that Philosophy of religion has a long and prestigious history, even during the enlightenment and an important part of educating students about our history and the history of concepts that undergird much of the modern world involves acknowledging these connections rather than ignoring them.

    [1] Charles Taliaferro “Philosophy of Religion”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/philosophy-religion/

    [2] Chad Meister, “Philosophy of Religion” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://www.iep.utm.edu/religion/

    [3] James Rachels The Elements of Moral Philosophy, (Random House: New York, 1993) 80

    [4] For explication see Stephen Darwall, “Berkeley’s Moral and Political Philosophy” Kenneth Winkler (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley. Cambridge University Press. (2005) see also C. D. Broad, “Berkeley’s Theory of Morals” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 23-24 (1953):  72-86.

     

  • Richard Carrier on the Moral Scepticism Objection to Divine Command Theory 

    In my paper “Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong”. I discussed the what I called the “Moral Scepticism objection’ to a Divine command theory (DCT) of ethics.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong had argued as follows:

    [1] If DCT is true then we cannot know whether an action is wrong unless we know that God has it.Carrier

    [2] We have no sound way to determine what God commanded.

     From which it is concluded that:

    [3] If DCT is correct, we cannot know whether an action is wrong. [1]

    In response, I suggested [1] is false. A DCT contends that the property of being morally wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to Gods commands. However, [1] contends we cannot know whether an action is wrong unless we know that action is contrary to Gods commands.  Armstrong’s argument, therefore, presupposes the following inference:

    I1:  If A is identical to B then one cannot know whether something is an A unless one knows it’s a B.

    But, I1 is false. Consider the following counterexample:  The property of being water is identical with the property of being H20. For thousands of year’s people have been able to perceive water, drink water, detect water, and use water, without knowing the first thing about atomic theory. Obviously, one two things A and B can be identical without it being the case that a person knowing something is an A unless they know it’s a B.[2]

    In “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Richard Carrier rejects this line of response. As far as I can tell he provides two lines of response.
    His first response is to offer an argument for [1].

    Flannagan claims we can discover that x is moral by some means other than ascertaining what God has commanded and that it can still be the case that x is moral because God commands it. But this is not true, or at least not true in any relevant sense. If we can verify that x is moral by virtue of some property p, then all we need in order to ground the morality of x is p. We then have no need of God commanding it. DCT is therefore false—even if God commands x. Thus, Flannagan’s rebuttal only ends up disconfirming DCT. We call that an “own goal.” [3] 

    Here Carrier defends [1] by arguing that “If we can verify that x is moral by virtue of some property p, then all we need in order to ground the morality of x is p.” This, however, is simply false. As I noted in my article, the kind of “grounding relationship” relevant to the truth or falsity of DCT is the relationship of identity. DCT contends moral that the property of being morally wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to Gods commands. What carrier seems to be presupposing is the following:

    [CP] If we can verify that x has the property of being q by virtue of some property p, then p is identical with the property of being q

    I have labelled this CP for Carrier’s premise. Why should anyone assume that CP is true? In fact, it appears to me to be clearly false. Suppose I want to verify whether it was Tom who robbed a particular safe, I verify this by noting that it was Toms fingerprints that were on the safe. Does it follow that the action of Tom robbing the safe is identical with my discerning Toms fingerprints? Or suppose I determine whether my car has petrol in the tank by looking at the dial on the dashboard, does it follow that the property of “having petrol in the tank” is just identical with the dial on my car? Or, to take another example, I determine who the author of a particular online hit piece is because it has the words “written by Richard Carrier” under it. Does it follow that Richard Carrier is identical with the words “written by Richard Carrier”?  This is frankly silly.

    Carrier’s second response is to take issue with my counterexample to I1.

    Flannagan’s analogy of laymen identifying water without recourse to molecular instruments only verifies the point: God’s commandments are more like faeries than water. Water is consistently, reliably identifiable across all cultures and all historical time. The will of God has never been. Not even remotely. Flannagan’s rebuttal to Armstrong thus again makes Armstrong’s point for him. A rebuttal that proves your opponent’s point is, well, not really a rebuttal. .[4]

    Carrier’s here takes me to be drawing an analogy between the way we know the water exists and the way we know God’s will. He then suggests that, because “Water is consistently, reliably identifiable across all cultures and all historical time” whereas “The will of God has never been.” So the two aren’t known the same way.

    This, however, misfires on several fronts.

    First, when, I  used the example of water being identical to H20 in response to I1 I wasn’t offering an “analogy”. I was offering a straightforward counterexample to I1. I1 contends that if:  If one thing A is identical with another thing B, then one cannot know whether something is an A unless one knows it’s a B. The example of water and H20 shows this is false. Here we have a case where one thing, water, is identical to another thing, H20, yet it’s not true that we cannot know whether something is water unless we know its H20. The example, therefore, doesn’t “prove” Armstrong’s point it rebuts it. It also rebuts Carriers attempted response, the fact two things are identical does not mean that you know the existence of one in virtue of the other.

    Of course, earlier in my paper, I did use the example of water and H20 as an analogy. There I said :

    Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion. [5]

    Here I do draw an analogy, but it’s not an analogy between the way we know water exists and the way we know about Gods will. What I am saying is that the explanatory relationship between water and h20 is analogous to the explanatory relationship between moral requirements and divine commands. Both are explanations via informative identity.  Nothing commits me to saying our knowledge of water is analogous to our knowledge of Gods commands. So here Carrier is attacking a straw man.

    A second problem is that Carrier seems to miss how this analogy works. In the analogy, the property of being water parallels the property of being morally required. In both cases, this is the explanandum, the phenomena being explained. God’s will or commands parallels, not the property of being water, but the property of being H20.  H20 and Gods commands are both explanans, the thing doing the explaining.

    So, if even I was making an analogy about the way we know, the question is not whether Gods will is relevantly like water. It’s about whether it’s relevantly like H20. Here Carrier’s point has no traction at all. Neither H20 or Gods will is “reliably identifiable across all cultures and all historical time.” Belief in the existence of hydrogen and oxygen and molecular structures is something that arose in western culture at a particular point in time in history.  Most people in most cultures historically knew nothing about H20, did not believe in H20 and did not conceptualise the physical world in the atomic way it presupposes.

    As far as I can tell then Carrier’s attempt to rebut my rejoinder carries no weight. Carrier gleefully describes my arguments as “an own, goal” and one that “makes Armstrong’s point for him”. However, as confident as he may be, he provides no reason for thinking that [1] of Armstrong’s argument is true. It simply does not follow from the claim that moral requirements are identical with divine commands, that one cannot know what is right and wrong unless they believe in the existence of divine commands.

    [1] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 109

    [2] Matthew Flannagan “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” Philo 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2012)

    [3] Richard Carrier “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Philo 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012) 206.

    [4] Ibid. 207.

    [5] Matthew Flannagan “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong” Philo 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2012)

     

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy thesis: part four Intrinsic goodness

    In my last two posts, I argued that  Erik Wielenberg fails to show that Godless Normative Robust Realism (GRNR) avoids some of the standard objections to the autonomy thesis. This brings me to Wielenberg’s third claim III, Wielenberg suggests that GRNR is prima facie preferable to various theistic accounts of axiological properties. Several authors have defended accounts of the nature of moral goodness which identify goodness with certain types of relationships to God. Robert Adam’s has defended a platonic conception of goodness, where God is the paradigmatic good, and all finite things are good or bad depending on how they resemble Gods nature. Mark Murphy has defended an Aristotelian position whereby goodness consists in “being like God in ways that belong to the kind to be like God”[1]. Linda Zagzebski, by contrast, has appealed to Gods motives[2] and, and Thomas Carson has defended an account of Goodness whereby goodness is what God prefers[3]. defaul1

    Wielenberg refers to all these positions under the umbrella term “theological stateism” (TS). Wielenberg argues that prima facie GRNR is preferable to TS because, unlike TS, GRNR is consistent with the intuition that certain things have intrinsic value:

    “I suggest that among our common-sense moral beliefs are the belief that some things distinct from God are intrinsically good: for example, the pleasure of an innocent back rub, or the love between parent and child,” …“[B]ecause non-theistic robust normative realism allows for the intrinsic goodness of things distinct from God, that theory fares better in this respect than its theistic alternatives.”[4]

    By “the intrinsic value of a given thing” Wielenberg means the “value it has, if any, in virtue of its intrinsic properties.” Something’s extrinsic value by contrast “is the value it has in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.”[5]

    Can Theological Stateism accommodate Intrinsic Value?

    Wielenberg’s argument relies, crucially, on the claim that TS entails that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. His argument for this claim is as follows:

    A second noteworthy aspect of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature. (emphasis mine)[6]

    Later he cites Mark Murphy’s view as an example;

    Back in section 2.2, I noted that Adam’s theory implies no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since, on Adam’s view, the goodness (and badness) of all finite things is partly determined by how they are related to God. Consequently, Adam’s view holds that nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good. Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God.[7]

    According to Wielenberg then reason TS  entails that “the value of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God” (emphasis mine)[8].  However, if a finite thing has intrinsic value, it is valuable “in virtue of its intrinsic properties” and not “in virtue of how it is related to things apart from itself.” Consequently, TS entails that that “nothing distinct from God is intrinsically good.”

    For this argument to be valid, the kind of dependence that  TS postulates to hold between God and the goodness of finite things must be the same kind of dependence that Wielenberg’s definition of intrinsic value rules out. Consequently, the phrase “in virtue” in Wielenberg’s definition, must refer to the same kind of dependence relationship which TS entails exists between God and the value of finite things. However, a careful examination of Wielenberg’s definition, however, shows this is not the case.

    Earlier in Robust Ethics  Wielenberg spends some time elaborating what he means when he defines intrinsic value something has in virtue of its intrinsic properties. On pages 9-15 he distinguishes between two[9] different types of supervenience relationship which can hold between finite things and their evaluative properties. The first is what Wielenberg calls “reductive supervenience” (or R supervenience) this is where a moral property M supervenes upon a base property B because the moral property is identical with the base property. The second is what Wielenberg refers to as “De-Paul supervenience” (D- supervenience). If a moral property M D supervenes upon a base property B then “M is not identical with, reducible to or entirely constituted by B” instead “B’s instantiation makes M be instantiated”.

    D supervenience and R supervenience are distinct types of relationship.  M can R supervene upon B without D supervening upon B and  M can D supervene upon B without R supervening upon it.  GRNR is itself an example of this distinction. According to GRNR moral properties are sui generis irreducible non-natural properties that  D supervene upon natural properties. Consequently, GRNR presupposes that moral properties can D supervene upon natural properties without R supervening upon them.

    Not only do are D and R supervenience distinct relationships. It appears they are mutually exclusive.  If B is reducible to or identical to M, it B cannot be a distinct property from M, which M causes to exist. That would involve self-causation. Similarly, if B is distinct from M and B makes M be instantiated, B is not reducible to or identical with M.

    When Wielenberg defines a finite thing’s intrinsic value as the value, it has in virtue of its intrinsic properties,  he uses the phrase “in virtue” to refer to a relationship of D supervenience.

    If there are entities distinct from God that possess intrinsic value, then Craig is mistaken. I think there are such entities. As I suggested in chapter 1, some finite things pass the isolation and annihilation tests which, which suggests such things are intrinsically valuable. The intrinsic value of such entities D supervenes upon some set of their intrinsic properties and not on how they are related to other things.[10]

    Earlier he writes:

    In my view, the most plausible way of understanding the “in virtue” relationship which I earlier claimed holds between the intrinsic properties of certain things and their intrinsic value is making. To claim that a given thing is intrinsically valuable is to claim that some of that thing’s intrinsic properties make it valuable… More generally, I think that moral properties indeed all moral properties D supervene upon non-moral properties.(emphasis mine)[11]

    The problem is that proponents of TS are not committed to denying that moral properties D supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite objects.  When people like Mark Murphy or Robert Adam’s or William Lane Craig contend that the goodness of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God, they are not claiming that goodness D supervenes upon this relationship. They are claiming it R supervenes upon this relationship. Consider how Wielenberg himself describes Adams’s position.

     A noteworthy feature of Adams’s view is its implication that no finite thing is intrinsically good (or evil) since the goodness (and badness of things) of all finite things is dependent upon their relationship to God. Craig follows Adam’s in holding that finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature...  Murphy holds also holds that the goodness of things distinct from God consists in their standing in certain relationships to God: their goodness is extrinsic rather than intrinsic because it is explained not merely by intrinsic properties but also by certain properties of God. (emphasis mine)[12]

    It is true that according to Adams the goodness of finite things is “dependent” upon their relationship to God. However, but in the highlighted sentence, Wielenberg spells out the kind of dependence Adam’s has in mind. The dependence Adams refers to is one where “finite goodness=resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature”.  Adam’s is, therefore, saying that the goodness of finite objects R supervenes upon the divine nature. Wielenberg notes this when a few paragraphs earlier he describes Adam’s (and Craig) as holding that:

    [S]ince the Good just is God, the existence of God cannot explain or ground the existence of the good. In the context of Adams’s view, the claim God serves as the foundation of the Good is no more sensible than the claim that H20 serves as the foundation of water. Indeed, once we see that on Adams’s view the good = God, we see that Adams’s  theory entails that the Good has no external foundation, since God has no external foundation.[13]

    Similarly, when Wielenberg discusses Murphy he notes that according to Murphy the goodness of things distinct from God “is explained”, not merely by intrinsic properties, but also by certain properties of God. However, he clarifies that, by this, Murphy means the goodness of finite things “consist in” their relationship to God So again, Murphy is talking about R Supervenience, not D Supervenience.

    So, contrary to Wielenberg TS does not entail that things distinct from God cannot have value in virtue of, their intrinsic properties. TS entails that the value of something distinct from God  R supervenes upon its relationship with God. However, that does not entail its value D supervenes upon this relationship. So TS is not incompatible with the common sense intuition that finite objects can have intrinsic value.

    On the other hand, If the objection is that TS  entails that the value of finite things cannot R supervene upon their intrinsic properties, then GRNR fares no better. According to Wielenberg, the proponent of GRNR holds that moral properties are “real and sui generis; they are non-natural and not reducible to any other sort of property” (emphasis mine). If moral properties are not reducible to other properties, then they do not R supervene on the intrinsic properties of finite things. In fact, on GRNR and the goodness of every distinct and finite thing will R supervene, not upon its intrinsic properties but on its relationship to distinct irreducible non-natural properties and so finite things will have only extrinsic value. This objection, therefore, is a non-starter.


    [1] Mark Murphy God and The Moral Law: A Theistic Explanation of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 155

    [2] Linda Zagzebski Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

    [3] Thomas Carson Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000)

    [4] Erik Wielenberg Robust Ethics 84

    [5] Ibid. 2

    [6] Ibid. 44

    [7] Ibid.

    [8] Ibid.

    [9] Wielenberg actually spells out three relationships, but mentioning the third would only complicate this discussion unnecessarily. The proceeding argument applies equally well when the third type of supervenience is taken into account.

    [10] Ibid. 44

    [11] Ibid. 13

    [12] Ibid. 44

    [13] Ibid. 43

  • Erik Wielenberg and the Autonomy Thesis: Part Three Standard Objections to the Autonomy Thesis, Human Rights and Dignity without God

    In my last post I looked at Erik Wielenberg’s response to the objection that, in the absence of God, people lack compelling reasons to comply with morality’s demands.  A second objection Wielenberg briefly addresses is that without certain theological doctrines, one cannot provide a plausible basis for human rights and dignity.  Wielenberg, here again, takes Craig as paradigmatic.

    defaul1If there is no God, then what’s so special about human beings? They’re just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a relatively short time[1]

    Craig’s rhetorical question alludes to a serious point, made in more detail by Peter Singer, Louis Pojman, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, this is that it is hard to plausibly accommodate the thesis that all human beings have equal dignity and rights outside a theistic framework. Wielenberg’s response is that human rights are grounded in “non-moral intrinsic properties of human beings” He notes: “Human beings can, reason, suffer, fall in love, set goals for themselves and so on. God or no God, human beings obviously differ when it comes to intrinsic properties than dogs or mere lumps of clay[2]”

    Wielenberg here appeals to certain higher cognitive capacities human beings possess that other animals lack.

    This brief response to Craig is central to his Wielenberg’s rebuttal of evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism latter in the book. Sharon Street and others have raised epistemological challenges to moral realism by noting that many of our basic evaluative capacities, our disposition to judge certain types of behaviour as morally wrong, has been shaped by naturalistic evolution.  Naturalistic evolution, however, isn’t guided by considerations of truth, in selecting such dispositions, but by adaptability, these basic evaluative judgements exist, because making such judgements enabled our ancestors to reproduce effectively in the environment in which they lived. Street notes “the striking coincide between independent moral truths posited by the realist and the normative views evolution has pushed us towards” and “challenges the realist to explain this coincidence.”[3]

    Wielenberg proposes that “our cognitive capacities” explain the coincidence. Moral rights D supervene upon any creature that possesses certain cognitive capacities.  Seeing these are the same cognitive capacities which produce moral beliefs. It follows that any being which believes it has moral rights will necessarily have them.[4]

    Wielenberg specifies that the supervenience relationship here involves both modal covariation, and a form of “robust causation” analogous to the way theist understand God’s relationship to the created universe, just as Theists believe that God immediately sustains the universe in existence moment by moment simply by willing its existence. So, natural those properties which constitute our higher cognitive faculties, robustly cause the existence of moral rights, without any intermediatory agency or laws of nature.

    This answer both to the grounding of human rights and evolutionary debunking arguments has a cost.  As Wolterstorff [5] and Singer [6].  have both pointed out, while it is true that normal adult humans have the cognitive capacities in question, many important categories of human beings do not. Infants and small children cannot reason, or fall in love, set goals for themselves, nor do they have the developed moral cognition Wielenberg refers to. In fact, David Boonin has noted: “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows, and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”[7].

    So, Wielenberg’s answer gives us no reason for thinking a child or infant has a rights or dignity, over and above any other animal. In fact, seeing moral rights modally covary with possession of the relevant cognitive faculties, such capacities are necessary and sufficient for the possession of moral rights.  Consequently, His position seems to entail that infant’s small children, and mentally impaired human adults have no moral rights.


    [1] Wielenberg, Robust Ethics 51, the citation is from William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong God: A Debate Between a Christian and an Atheist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 18

    [2] Ibid 51

    [3] Ibid 155

    [4] Ibid 134-175

    [5] Nicholas Wolterstorff Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) 325-341.

    [6] Peter Singer, Writings on an Ethical Life (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001) 186-187

    [7] David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121, the neurological data is summarised in Michael Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Ch. 11.5.

  • Carrier on infantile moral reasoning: one more time

    In a previous post, I discussed Carrier’s defence of “The infantile Objection” to divine a command theory (DCT) of meta-ethics. Some comments he makes in the same paper, suggest a slightly different version of the argument. Seeing I have found this version of the objection relatively common in oral discussions. It is worth having a second look.

    As we saw, Carrier distinguished between “mature” or “adult” moral reasoning which is “based on actually caring about the people affected by our actions” and immature reasoning “which involves “actually not wanting to do good but begrudgingly doing it anyway to avoid punishment (or get paid).”

    At one-point Carrier argues as follows:

    CarrierDCT in practice (regardless of what claims are made of it in theory) interferes with the development of this mature form of moral reasoning, by not basing moral motivation on the compassion of the agent (and their own reasoning and observation), but on the commands of a third-party (God) who supposedly knows better. DCT thus abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it (we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right). It also replaces an agent’s own compassion with the hypothetical compassion of a hypothetical being constructed in the imaginations of certain supposed religious authorities. Though one can theoretically avoid these defective forms of moral reasoning on DCT, in practice DCT is not very successful at it. That Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral only verifies the point. When it comes to actual adult decision-making, ethical naturalism works far more consistently, because it requires the agent to engage their own moral reasoning and to motivate their behavior on their own compassion for others (and not someone else’s). [1]

    What carrier here claims is that, whatever may or may not be true of in theory in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning, as he defines, it and encourages immaturity. On the other hand, Naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning.

    He provides two reasons for this conclusion. The first (a) is that DCT, identifies moral requirements with on “the “hypothetical compassion” of “a hypothetical being” “who knows better” whereas ethical naturalism which requires the agent to engage there “own” reasoning, and their own compassion not someone else’s. The second is that (b) “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder as moral”. Neither argument is compelling,

    Actual Compassion Vs Compassion of a Hypothetical Being who knows better

    let’s turn to (a). Only a few paragraphs earlier, Carrier spells out his own version of ethical naturalism. He states: “I have demonstrated elsewhere that the ground for morality must be motivational (the consequences of moral behavior must actually be what the moral agent would most want, if he or she knew better)”[2] Carrier here is explicit, on the view he defends, which he takes to have demonstrated, is that morality is based on what a person would most want, if he or she knew better. Hence, Carrier grounds moral requirements in the claims of a hypothetical being who knows better.

    Similarly, on p 208 he states:

    “S morally ought to do A” means “If S’s desires were rationally deduced from as many facts as S can reasonably obtain at that time (about S’s preferences and the outcomes of S’s available alternatives in S’s circumstances), then S would prefer A over all the available alternative courses of action (at that time and in those circumstances).”[3]

    Notice the word “if” in the first line here, Carrier does not base moral requirements in the actual compassion of the agent, but rather in the compassion the agent would have under hypothetical circumstances where they knew better. So, it’s difficult to understand why, when he wants to accuse DCT of being immature, he claims that DCT relies on a hypothetical being who knows better, whereas naturalism relies on a person’s actual compassion. Because this is false.  Both views attempt to identify moral requirements with the demands of a compassionate person who knows better.

    Slavery, War, and Torture

    I turn then to (b) Carrier’s second reason for thinking that, in practise DCT encourages “immature reasoning” while naturalism more consistently leads to mature reasoning. This is verified by the fact “Christianity has endorsed slavery and war and mass torture and murder”

    An initial question that could be raised in this context is whether it is a fact that  Christianity has “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Part of the problem with saying this, is that in many cases it’s not easy to answer the question of whether a historical person endorses war slavery and torture.

    Take for example the issue of war. Many theologians, (in fact most) such as Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria. Suarez, Calvin, Luther, held to what is called the just war theory, this theory holds that war is justified in certain narrow situations such as when a king is defending his realm from aggressive invasion. But it’s not justified for the purpose of empire building or conquest, does this make them in favour of war or against it?

    Or take several 18-19th-century theologians who addressed the issue of slavery.  They argued that, while there are circumstances under which the institution of slavery in and of itself was justified, such as when a person sells their labour to pay a debt or as a punishment for a crime, the way it was concretely practised in their culture was unjust and immoral. For this reason, they advocated slavery’s abolition.  Were they defenders of slavery or opponents of it?

    Or consider medieval jurists who held (following secular law) that gaining information by torture was normally prohibited, it could be used in rare circumstances where there was compelling circumstantial evidence the accused was guilty and more information was needed to gain a conviction, were they in favor of torture or opposed to it?

    Let’s, however, put this initial question to the side and assume it’s true that there is a clear, unambiguous sense in which it is true that Christianity “endorsed slavery and war and mass torture”. Does  this support the conclusion that DCT in practise his “abrogates moral reasoning, and all too often becomes an excuse not to engage in it” whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently.”

    The answer is “No”, Carrier’s reasoning here seems to me to be rather weak. I will highlight three problems with it.

    The first problem is that the conclusion and premises refer to different groups of people. The premise here is that Christians have endorsed slavery and war torture. The conclusion is that divine command theorists have a tendency to engage in immature patterns of reasoning.

    But obviously divine command theorists and Christians are different groups. There are divine command theorists who are not Christians, such as Jewish and Islamic divine command theorists[4] and there are Christians who are not divine command theorists. It’s true that some Christians thinkers have endorsed divine command theory of meta-ethics, but it’s also true that many have not. Given the prominence of natural law reasoning in Christian theology many Christian thinkers have in fact been ethical naturalists.

    So the first problem is that there is a gap between conclusion and premise here. The premise attributes a tendency to one group, and the conclusion attributes a tendency to a different group. Such an inference doesn’t follow.

    The second problem is that Carrier’s conclusion asserts a  claim about the comparative merits of divine command theory and meta-ethical naturalism. claim. His claim is that the in practise DCT leads to immature reasoning whereas “ethical naturalism works far more consistently”. The premise, however, tells us only what Christians have done.

    It’s pertinent, in this context,  to remember that the actions Carrier mentions are war, slavery and torture.  After all, the vast majority of on-Christian cultures have also endorsed war and slavery, Ancient Rome, for example, practised both before Christianity came on the scene.  As did ancient Greece, Assyria, Egypt, Persia and so on. Modern secular philosophers today defend various military actions including the killing of non-combatants and terrorism. Consider such things as nuclear deterrence or the bombing of Hiroshima. Slavery was given a spirited defence by Aristotle, an ethical naturalist over 300 years before the birth of Christ, and so on.

    What is needed  is evidence, not just that Christians have supported these things, but that Christians have been more prone to doing this than non-Christians have.  We would need some evidence for example that Pacifism has been less commonly justified by Christians than other groups. That Slavery has been abolished more frequently in non-Christian cultures than others. That Christians have been less likely to defend absolute prohibitions on killing non-combatants than secular utilitarian’s who appeal to impartial benevolence. That torture was more frequently justified and used in ecclesiastical justice than was common in secular courts and so on.  Carrier of course hasn’t provided any evidence for these sorts of claims.

    This brings me to the third problem in Carrier’s argument. His conclusion regards the kind of reasoning engaged in by divine command theorists. The premise, however, gives us information about some of the conclusions  Christian’s have come to, they have “endorsed slavery, war and mass torture as moral”.

    Such an inference, however again, doesn’t follow. People can and have supported war, slavery and torture out of a sense of “their own compassion” and have been motivated by care “about the people affected by our actions” Aristotle for example famously argued that slavery was necessary for the welfare of the slave. The Crusades were often defended on the grounds of love and humility, liberating Eastern Christians from the threat of Muslim invasion was seen as self-sacrifice for the good of one’s neighbour.[5].

    So we can’t conclude from the mere fact that a Christians endorsed slavery, or war or torture, that they were engaging in immature as opposed to adult reasoning. To determine that, we would need to know not just the conclusions they drew, but the reasoning they used to get to moral conclusions. We would need to know why various Christian thinkers endorsed these practises.  What were the reasons?  What kind of reasoning lead them to support war or torture or slavery?  Did they do so “begrudgingly to avoid punishment” reasoning that “we just do what God commands; we don’t think about whether that’s actually good or right” Or did they appeal to altruistic reasons such their own compassion and concern for the good of others to justify these things.

    For these reasons I think that Carrier has failed to establish in practise, DCT interferes with mature reasoning and encourages immaturity. Both naturalists and theists ground morality in the compassion of a hypothetical being who knows better, and Carrier’s inference from undefended claim that Christians have endorsed war and slavery, to the conclusion that divine command theorist have engaged in immature moral reason more than other groups involves multiple unjustified leaps in logic.


    [1] Richard Carrier “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Philo 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012) 206.

    [2] Ibid. 205.

    [3] Ibid. 208.

     [5] See, for example, Douglas Earl, “Joshua and the Crusades,” in Holy War in the Bible: Christian Morality and

    an Old Testament Problem, ed. Heath A. Thomas, Jeremy Evans, and Paul Copan (Downers Grove,

    IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 19–43.

  • Video: The Smith-Flannagan Debate “Morality Does Not Need God”

    On Wednesday 21st May at the University of Waikato retired Philosophy and Political science lecturer Dr Ron Smith and Dr Matthew Flannagan (of this blog) debated the resolution “Morality Does not need God”. Here is the video of that debate.