Category: Sexual Morality

  • Spot the Difference

    A few weeks ago wide publicity was given to a study that concluded that NZ women are the most promiscuous in the world. (The fact that, this study had some serious scientific shortcomings having neither a control group nor a random sample group was not so widely publicised.)

    What was interesting was the reaction by some that this study as somehow validated permissive sexual mores. To cite one typical example, at the recent family first forum a question was asked from the floor about what would be taught in sex education courses at public schools. The response, from at least one politician, was that this study showed that encouraging people outside of a monogamous sexual relationship to practise abstinence was unrealistic.

    Now this morning we see another study has come out this study suggests that sexual molestation of children is prevalent in NZ it suggests that one in four women have been sexually molested. I note the almost universal response from our politicians and media and quite rightly so, is to condemn these practises and exhort NZers to change any actions and attitudes that lead to such behaviour.

    I am confused: I thought that when a significant number of people engaged in a sexual practise, then it was unrealistic to condemn it? I thought the state was supposed to simply accept contemporary practise and alter their values to fit it. Can the politicians who make the aforementioned argument about sex ed answer me this: When are you going to advocate that the state to teach safe child molestation techniques in public schools?

    The reality is that we do not look to contemporary practise to determine what’s right and wrong. Rather we use principles of right and wrong to critique contemporary practise. Despite their trendy sloganising, our politicians know this, or at least they do when it suits them, but conveniently forget when it doesn’t. If contemporary liberals want to justify their values to others, they need to provide arguments for them. Not assurances that these practises are fashionable or trendy or that “all the cool people are doing it” or that “Kinsey showed 10% of people do this” etc. Unlike some people in parliament and the media many of us grew out of our teens sometime ago.

  • Some Questions for Dr. Michael Cullen

    I saw Dr. Michael Cullen speaking in on TV3 last night. What he said was interesting because it highlights a tension I have often noted in liberal views of sexual morality . The issue was as follows: A school had hired a teacher. This teacher however had advertised on an internet adult site for a woman to have sex with him. He requested the women be 17 or adding that the younger the student was the better. His partner apparently consented to him doing this and offered to join in, apparently one of them “liked to watch”.

    Now Cullen stated that he wanted to tighten up regulations so Schools could dismiss teachers like this. He stated it was unacceptable that a person like this should be teaching teenage girls. He seemed to take this latter claim as obvious and there was no apparent disagreement from anyone in the clip.

    Let’s be clear what Cullen is saying here. He is suggesting that it should be permissible to refuse to employ someone on the basis of private sexual behaviour they engage in with other consenting adults (under NZ’s laws a 17 year old is not considered a minor when it comes to sex and hence is a consenting adult). Moreover, he is also suggesting that a person’s private consensual sexual behaviour can be grounds for considering them unfit to teach at public schools. Moreover Cullen appeared to think this was obvious and certainly no one appeared to disagree in this instance.

    If this is so the question I have for Cullen and the Labour party is this. If you believe this, why have you repeatedly stated the opposite in the past? This is the party whose activists have repeatedly stated that it’s wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual behaviour.

    I also have another question. Suppose this teacher had instead of advertising for a member of the opposite sex on a website he had been cruising for causal sex with another man in a local gay bar. Would Cullen say this person was unfit to teach teenage children? Suppose he had advertised for causal in Express magazine? Would that be grounds to discriminate against him and to claim he is unfit to teach at public schools?

    I suspect I know the answer to this question. If a person were to make this argument about a homosexual teacher Cullen and his supporters would denounce the person as a bigot and an intolerant homophobe. No doubt the person would be compared to the Nazis and to the Taliban (as though somehow saying that a person is unfit to teach at a school is the same as engaging in mass murder and genocide).

    But this raises an obvious question; If it’s obvious that a heterosexual male is unfit to teach because he advertises for sex on the net. Why is a homosexual male who advertises for causal sex in a Gay bar or on the pages of express not also unfit? In both cases the sex is consensual in private. The only difference is the gender of his partner. I thought Labour believed it was wrong to treat same sex relationships differently to heterosexual ones?

    If we are to believe what Labours activists have told us then either one of two things is true either (a) Cullen is a pro Taliban Nazi bigot or (b) much of what Labour has told us about consenting sex in private is false and much of the character assassination it has dished out to Conservatives is unjustified. Which is it?

    A rational person should not prescribe a principle unless he is willing to also prescribe the logical implications of that principle. If you prescribe a rule but are unable to accept its implications because you find them intuitively absurd then you have good grounds for rejecting the rule. No amount of denouncing others as bigots can change this fact.

    The claim that its wrong to discriminate against people on the basis of their private consensual sexual activities has counter intuitive implications. Hence in the absence of compelling arguments for this claim it should be rejected.

  • Jim Flynn’s suggestion: Contraception and Religious Freedom

    When I was teaching the history of early modern philosophy at Otago last year, one of my students told me I reminded them of Dr Jim Flynn. This was supposed to be a compliment. Flynn was highly regarded at Otago even those who considered themselves conservatives had good things to say about Flynn. I knew him by reputation only, having never had the privilege of meeting him. I did however learn one thing about Flynn during my stint at Otago: he is a left wing activist who is militantly secular.

    Recently Flynn has attracted negative attention for these comments.

    “I do have faith in science, and science may give us something that renders conception impossible unless you take an antidote,”

    “You could of course have a chemical in the water supply and have to take an antidote. If you had contraception made easier by progress, then every child is a wanted child.”

    Flynn here seems to view a situation where contraception was placed in the water supply an example of progress. Many have interpreted this to mean that Dr Flynn believes that the government should put contraceptive in the water supply? Flynn has claimed this is a misrepresentation of his comments.

    Dr Flynn told the Otago Daily Times he was merely trying to illustrate a point,
    not seriously suggesting contraception in the water supply. Considering the opposition to fluoride in the water, such a scheme would never go ahead, he said.
    But to have a contraception device that meant women had to take action to get pregnant instead of having to take a pill not to get pregnant, “would be wonderful”. “It doesn’t seem to me too controversial at all.”

    What really bothers me in this quote is that Flynn only states that such a policy is politically unfeasible. He does not appear to think it is unjust or violates people’s rights. I think this fact illustrates something important about the political culture in which we live.

    First let me state why I believe a policy of putting contraceptives in the water supply is unjust. It violates a persons freedom of religion. Let me explain: As a Christian Theist I believe that every person has a sacred responsibility to carefully consider ones conscience and act in accord with what one considers to be Gods will. The existence of this responsibility entails a freedom or right to carry it out. Now according to Roman Catholic teaching artificial contraception is a mortal sin which violates natural law. While this teaching is popularly associated with Catholicism Catholics are not alone in believing it, many of the Protestant Reformers also held this view, and many Protestants still do. Now I happen to disagree with them. I do not think contraception violates the law of God. However, I do acknowledge that these people believe sincerely that God commands this and because of this they have a right to refrain from using contraception if they choose. They have right not just to opt out of contraceptive practises but to not opt in in the first place.

    Now, there is an obvious objection to this argument: freedom of religion is a only prima facie right. Consider Sati a Hindu practise whereby a wife is burnt alive at her husband’s cremation. This practise was justly suppressed by the British in India. This however shows that freedom of religion is only a prima facie right and it can be overridden by other more weighty principles such as “do not kill innocent human beings”.

    But this is precisely where I see the battle lines being drawn in contemporary culture. While there is a broad consensus that there exists a prima facie right to freedom of religion. There is no consensus on when is it appropriate to override this prima facie right? Are you permitted to do so only when the religion advocates engaging in a seriously immoral action like homicide? Or is the promotion of social utility sufficient to override it? To make things specific: If it is good that every child be a wanted child is this good of sufficient weight to override the prima facie right to freedom of religion?

    This brings me to a crucial point: How one answer’s this question in fact depends on the theological perspective one adopts.

    Suppose one believes that belief in God is irrational on par with belief in Santa Claus or the tooth fairy and those traditional views about sexuality and procreation are simply homophobic misogynist bigotry. Suppose one is also a secular utilitarian and believes our duties consist not of following commands but of doing whatever maximises net utility. Then one is not going to grant the freedom to follow what one believes God commands a huge amount of weight in ones reasoning. Suppose a person stated that he was opposed to a utility maximising policy because he thought Santa Claus had informed him that Aryans’ were the superior race and this policy prevented him and his community living in accord with that belief. How many people would cease to support the policy? Most I think would be unmoved.

    On the other hand suppose one believes that God exists, that he issues commands to human beings that constitute our moral duties and that God holds people accountable for how well they discharge these duties. Then one will grant the freedom to act in accord with what believes to be Gods will much higher weight. Moreover, seeing one sees morality as “a set of rules or precepts of conduct, constituting a divine law”[1] one will not find utilitarian justifications of social policy plausible.

    Returning to the policy of putting contraception in the water supply from the perspective of some secular leftists there is nothing unjust about this policy. True the policy violates freedom of religion if that freedom is understood in Christian context. However, if we remove this right from this context and replace it with a secular context freedom of religion can be re-contextualised. Re-contextualised in a manner where Roman Catholicism does not fall under it. And where the freedom to be an evangelical protestant is viewed the same way current society views a Nazis freedom to be a Nazi something begrudging deferred to when the matter is not to serious, but easily overridden by important social policy.

    [1] Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 6.

  • Dear Hell Pizza

    My kids get taught about sex when I decide to teach them about it. As their parents I get to decide what and how I tell them about it.

    No one else gets to infringe my right to educate my kids, not the state, not family planning and not the local pizza company.

    I used to buy your pizza’s but since you decided you could override my rights as a parent, you will never, ever, ever see any of my money, ever again.

    Further, I will encourage anyone who claims to be right wing to join me in my boycott of your business. Hell Pizza are right up there with the worst of the nanny state lefties and do not deserve to prosper.

    PS. Your pizza’s were never that great anyway and my kids always preferred Pizza Hut and Dominoes.

  • An Argument for Gay Marriage

    Here is a common argument for gay marriage that I have heard multiple times.

    [1] Justice requires that all people be treated equally by the state.
    [2] Homosexuals are people.
    [3] The marriage act does not treat homosexuals
    equally to heterosexuals unless it is amended to allow for Gay marriage,

    Therefore

    [4] Justice requires that the marriage act should be amended to allow for Gay
    marriage.

    This argument is formally valid. If its premises are true, the conclusion follows. However, with the exception of premise [2] every premise is false which means it is unsound.

    Re [1] It is not true that justice requires that the state treat all people equally. Consider a person guilty of a crime. A person guilty of a crime is a person yet clearly justice does not require that the state treat the guilty the same way it treats the innocent. Criminals are deprived of their liberty rights (they are incarcerated), their property rights (fined) or in some cases their life (capital punishment) those who do not engage in crimes are not deprived of these things.

    I am not trying to say that gay people are on par with criminals, I am making the point that the state does not in fact treat all people equally.

    Further, justice does not require that all people be treated equally. The classical definition of justice is to “render to each what is his due.” As Wolterstorff notes in God, Justice and Duty:

    [In some contexts] that which is due to them is some ‘evil’ in the other cases … that which is due them is some life-good. If it is a life-good that is due them, then what is
    due them is what they have a right to, what they are entitled to. If it is an “evil,” what is due them is their desert.

    To make the case, the defender of homosexual marriage needs to supplement [1] with two further arguments (i) that those who engage in homosexual relationships have not done anything wrong which would deserve them being treated differently; and, (ii) a state sanctioned marriage is a right. Simply, citing dubious claims about equality does neither.

    I don’t think either claim is plausible: regarding (i), it is seriously immoral to have sex with a member of the same sex, consequently a person who enters into a Gay marriage is in fact taking a vow expressing commitment to a life of immoral activity.

    Re (ii), the state’s function is to defend the innocent against aggression and to punish those who commit crimes. Performing marriage ceremonies constitutes neither.

    Re [3] the marriage act does not treat homosexual persons differently to heterosexual persons. Under the marriage act a heterosexual person can: (a) enter into a informal marriage (de facto) with any number of people of either sex providing it is consensual and the person is not a close relative, (b) have a private ceremony to recognise, celebrate or solemnise any such marriage, (c) have the state solemnise and recognise a formal marriage with one member of the opposition sex provided it is consensual and not with a close relative.

    Similarly a homosexual person can (a) enter into a informal marriage (de facto) with any number of people of either sex providing it is consensual and the person is not a close relative, (b) have a private ceremony to recognise, celebrate or solemnise any such marriage, (c) have the state solemnise and recognise a formal marriage with one member of the opposition sex provided it is consensual and not with a close relative.

    So the marriage act grants identical rights to homosexuals and heterosexual persons. What the act does is discriminate against certain sexual relationships. However, the principle expounded in [1] is that all people should be treated equally, not, that all sexual relationships should be treated equally.

    Again, it seems the defender of this argument needs to say more, he or she needs to maintain not only that justice requires that all people be treated equally but also that all sexual relationships should be treated equally. But this is clearly absurd, it entails that the state should treat the case of Miewes and Brandes the same as it treats a married couple who consummate their wedding.

    Finally, even if [3] were true and the marriage act does not treat homosexual persons equally to heterosexual persons it would not follow that it does so unless it is amended to allow for Gay marriage. An obvious way equality could be restored would be for the state to recognise no marriages. A proposal some libertarians have put forward and one we support too.

    So as far as I can tell this argument is worthless and certainly is unsound. Of course, this will not stop defenders of gay marriage trotting this argument out ad nauseum. Providing credible arguments for their position has never been a forte.

  • Consenting Adults and Privacy

    We have all heard the slogan “what consenting adults do in privacy is their own business.” Recently Investigate alledged that one of our MP’s was getting up to dubious sexual practices where he engaged in child sex fantasies to get off. More sinisterly this is the same MP and Cabinet Minister, David Benson Pope a.k.a. Panty Slut Boy whom the police found a prima facie case against for engaging in bdsm type practices against his students when he was a teacher.

    Predictably the lefty liberals have trotted out the slogan “what consenting adults do in privacy is their own business.” Apparently anything a person, including a govt MP and Cabinet Minister responsible for CYFS, does sexually is ok providing all parties consent and it is done in private. (Of course they conveniently ignore the fact that the bdsm-type offences against the students were not consensual but since they were done against bullies its all apparently ok)

    in 2004 a real case reached the courts in Germany. A German computer technician, Armin Miewes, advertised on the internet, “If you are between 18 and 25 years old you are my boy. Come to me and I will eat your horny flesh.” His intent was to find someone who would volunteer to be killed and then eaten. Such a volunteer was forthcoming, Juergen Brandes.

    In court, Miewes testified that he and Brandes had enjoyed a final meal together. Brandes agreed to be castrated and the two sautéed his penis and testicles. After the meal Brandes willingly allowed himself to be hanged from a butcher’s hook and be slaughtered ‘like a calf’. After Brandes had died Miewes consumed his flesh. The German court found Miewes guilty of manslaughter and later this was upgraded to murder after an appeal. In this case, both parties had consented. The court had considered the evidence and documentation both parties had made prior to the event and found that consent had been legitimately obtained.

    Now I ask you, if the Minister of CYFS had done what Miewes did would that call into question his fitness to be in office? If you answer yes then clearly you do not actually believe that what consenting adults do in privacy with others who have consented is actually the be all and end all in sexual morality. Nor do you believe that what people do in private is irrelevent to the public.

    If you answer no then you are depraved.