Several years ago, I gave a talk on the morality of abortion at New Hope Community Church in East Auckland. This talk was based on my Ph.D. research at Otago University. Apparently, in the wake of recent supreme court decisions in America, some interest has been expressed in this talk. So, I attach it here.
Category: Events
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Evil, limited, and Indifferent deities: The Horrendous Deeds Objection Redivivus?
Last week, I was scheduled to present the above paper at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society at Fort Worth, Texas. Unfortunately, Auckland’s lockdown prevented this, and the paper had to be cancelled due to the logistics involved. I did, however, pre-record the talk, so it is available below:
Abstract: A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (‘DCM’) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just. A person with these character traits cannot command just anything.
Recently, Jason Thibodeau[1] has offered a new version of the horrendous deed’s objection. Thibodeau, asks us to imagine the existence of Yod, a being just like God, who lacks omnibenevolence. Thibodeau argues that if God’s commands can ground morality so can Yod’s and Yod can command horrendous deeds. In this paper I examine and refute Thibodeau’s argument. I look at three interpretations of Thibodeau’s of objection (a) the objection from God’s moral grounding power, (b) the objection from evil and indifferent deities, and (c) the objection from lesser deities. I will maintain all of them fail.
Appeals to moral-grounding power, malevolent, indifferent, or lesser benevolent deities, do not salvage the horrendous deeds objection.
[1] Thibodeau, J. (2019). God’s love is irrelevant to the Euthyphro problem. Sophia, 58(3), 437–453. -
Matt Speaks at Orewa Community Church.
I was scheduled to speak on the topic “The Holy Spirit teaches” at Orewa Community Church on Sunday September the 26th. Because the government ordered New Zealand into lockdown six weeks ago, and has maintained Auckland in lockdown since, I had to do the message in an ad hoc manner by video.
The message is available below, the quality is not as good as I would have liked. But I think it is good enough for general consumption.
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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part IV
This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.
In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I argued this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. Focusing on the Anything Goes Objection. My third post examined the claim that a divine command theory would, if true, entail that morality is arbitrary. This post concludes this discussion.
In my last post, I argued that divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of those actions’ non-moral properties, properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.
The Vacuity Objection
Finally, critics press what is known as the vacuity objection. A divine
command theory entails that “the doctrine of the goodness of God is rendered meaningless”[1] Oppy puts the objection forcefully: “It cannot be…that God’s commands or decisions determine what is morally good because God is morally good prior to the giving of those commands or the making of those decisions.”[2] If God is essentially good, he must be good prior to the issue any commands. However, this means that goodness cannot depend upon the existence of these commands. If it did, goodness would exist prior to itself. Like the previous objection, I think this one is based on an equivalent. In the first section of this talk, I pointed out that the word “good” is ambiguous”. I stated that a divine command theory is an account of moral requirements, not an account of goodness in general. This observation is essential here. When divine command theorists say God’s commands determine what is good, they mean only that the existence of moral obligations or moral requirements depends upon God. By contrast, when a divine command theorist says God is good, he means by this that God has certain character traits: God is loving, just, impartial, faithful, in all possible worlds.
But the question of whether someone has certain character traits is distinct from whether they have moral requirements to behave in a certain way.
Consider a nihilist who denies the existence of objective moral requirements. This nihilist could, if he wanted, choose to live in accord with the norms of justice and could decide to be a faithful, loving and impartial person. What he could not do is claim that there exists any moral obligation to live this way.[3]
This distinction removes the sting from Oppy’s objection. God’s commands determine the existence and content of moral requirements. This does not mean his commands determine whether people can have certain character traits. Consequently, God can have these character traits prior to giving any commands.
Even if, antecedent to commanding, God has no moral duties, it does not follow that he can’t have certain character traits. Traits such as being truthful, benevolent, loving, gracious, merciful. Nor does it mean he is not opposed to actions such as murder, rape, torturing people for fun, and so on. If God has no duties, he is not under any obligation to love others or tell the truth, but that does not mean he cannot love others or be truthful. God does not have to have a duty to do something to do it.
Conclusion
The “anything goes,” “arbitrariness,” and “vacuity” objections, therefore, all fail. This is significant because these are the three reasons commonly given for rejecting Divine command theories. Almost everyone who dismisses the claim that morality is dependent upon God cites these three objections as decisive. Seeing that these objections all fail, in the absence of further argument, one cannot proclaim with any confidence that a divine command theory is a flawed theory.
[1] James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Mcgraw-hill Education, 2003), 50.
[2]Graham Oppy, “Morality Does Not Depend Upon God,” in Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values, and Government, ed. Steve Cowan (Bloomsbury Publishing House, Forthcoming 2018).
[3] For this point, see John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), 26-27.
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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part III
This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.
In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. I divided the talk into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. My second post began my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III. This post continues that discussion.
In my last post, I argued that a divine command theory does not entail the content of morality is arbitrary, in the sense that anything at all could be right or wrong. It entails that an action can only be permissible, only in situations where it is possible for a fully informed, rational, loving and just person to command it knowingly. Far from being absurd, this implication is entirely plausible.
Some have objected that divine command theory makes morality arbitrary in a different sense. It means there is no reason why one action is right or wrong rather than another. Russ Shafer-Landau presses the following dilemma: “Either there are, or there are not, excellent reasons that support God’s prohibitions. If there are no such reasons, then God’s choice is
arbitrary, i.e. insufficiently well supported by reason and argument.” [1] Alternatively:If God is, in fact, issuing commands based on excellent reasons, then it is those excellent reasons and not the fact of God’s having commanded various actions, that make those actions right. The excellent reasons that support the requirements of charity and kindness are what make it right to be charitable and kind.[2]
We can summarise this argument as follows, take a paradigmatically immoral action such as rape.
(P1) Either (a) God has a reason for prohibiting rape, or (b) God has no reason for prohibiting rape.
(P2) If God has no reason for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.
(P3) If God has a reason for prohibiting rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong.
(P4) If something distinct from God’s commands is what makes rape morally wrong, then the divine command theory is false.
(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false
This argument is based on a subtle equivocation. (P3) and (P4) refer to what “makes” something morally right. But the word “makes” is ambiguous.
In this context, Stephen Sullivan has argued that the word “make” can be used in two different senses.[3] The first sense refers to what Sullivan calls a constitutive explanation: On a hot February day, I pour a glass of water to drink it and quench my thirst. There is a legitimate sense in which I can say that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am pouring a glass of H20. When I speak like this, I use the word “makes” to refer to a relationship of identity. I am explaining one thing (the pouring of the water) but citing the existence of another thing that I take to be identical with it.
The second sense involves what Sullivan calls a motivational explanation, such as when I state that what makes me pour a glass of water is the fact that I am thirsty. Motivational explanations do not explain an action by referring to something taken to be identical with it. Instead, they attempt to tell us why an agent acted the way they did by giving us the reasons and motivations the agent acted upon.
Let’s assume that Landau is using the word “makes” in the “motivational” sense. The inference is:
(P1) Either (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape.
(P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.
(P3)’ If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong.
(P4)’ If something distinct from God’s commands motivationally explain why rape is morally wrong, then a divine command theory is false.
(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false.
On this interpretation of the argument (P3)’ is plausible. Suppose God has reasons for issuing the commands he does, and the property of being wrong is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. In that case, these reasons do provide a motivational explanation as to why rape is wrong. However, (P4′) is false. The fact that God’s prohibition does not motivationally explain the wrongness of rape is wrong does not entail that the prohibition is not identical to the moral wrongness of rape. Divine command theories contend that wrongness is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. So it only in the constitutive sense of the word “makes” that they deny anything other than God’s commands “make” actions wrong.
Consequently, For Shafer-Landau’s argument to have a bite, he must use the word “makes” to refer to a constitutional explanation. So interpreted, the argument is:
(P1) Either: (a) God has reasons for prohibiting rape, or (b) God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape.
(P2) If God doesn’t have reasons for prohibiting rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.
(P3)” If God has reasons for prohibiting rape, then those reasons are identical with the property of moral wrongness.
(P4)” If something distinct from God’s commands is identical with the property of moral wrongness, then a divine command theory is false.
(C1) Either morality is arbitrary, or the divine command theory is false.
On this interpretation (P4)” is plausible, if something distinct from God’s prohibition is identical with wrongness. God’s prohibition cannot be identical with wrongness.
However, now (P3)” turns out to be implausible. Why should the fact that God has reasons for issuing a command mean that those reasons are identical with the property of being morally wrong? The Landau seems to assume the following inference: If A is identical to B, and someone has reasons r for bringing about B, then A is identical with r. However, this inference is invalid. An analogy will show this; A Batchelor is identical to an unmarried man, John has reasons for being unmarried, he dislikes women. Does it follow that the property of being a Bachelor is identical with the property of disliking women?[4]
Landau’s argument, therefore, is unsound. Graham Oppy proposes a more direct argument for the conclusion that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary:
Could it have been, for example, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating were good because God proclaimed them so? Surely not! But what could explain God’s inability to bring it about, that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are good by proclaiming them so, other than its being the case that murder, rape, lying, stealing and cheating are wrong quite apart from any proclamations that God might make?[5]
However, this is implausible. Suppose God has character traits such as being essentially loving and just. In that case, God can and would have reasons for prohibiting actions like rape, murder, or cheating, quite apart from whether these actions are antecedently wrong. Antecedent to any command on God’s part, these actions won’t have the property of being morally prohibited. But they could still have other properties such as being cruel or harmful or unjust or detrimental to human happiness— or being expressions of hatred, for example. And a loving and just God could prohibit these actions because these actions have these non-moral properties.
Consequently, divine command theories do not entail that morality is arbitrary. If anything, the opposite is the case. A divine command theory entails that actions will be wrong in virtue of certain non-moral properties those actions have. Non-moral properties that would provide an informed, loving and just person with reasons for prohibiting those actions.
[1] Russ Shafer-Landau, “Introduction to Part IV,” in Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 237.
[2]Ibid., 238.
[3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33:1 (1993): 33-45.
[4] These points are made cogently by Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, Divine Commands, and Morality,” 37-39. See also Matthew Flannagan’s, “Is Ethical Naturalism More Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,” Philo 15:1 (2012): 19-37.
[5] Graham. Oppy, Best Argument against God (Hampshire: Palgrave Pivot, 2014), 44.
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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part II
This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.
In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. The talk was divided into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. In my first post, I reproduced sections I and II. This post will begin my discussion of the Euthyphro objection in section III.
In my last post, I argued that semantic and epistemic objections to a divine command theory fail. However, the most famous and important objection to divine command theories is an argument known as “The Euthyphro Objection”. After a dialogue written by the ancient Greek philosopher Plato in the 4th century BC. Plato’s original argument is somewhat obscure and applied only to polytheistic religions (those religions that believe in many gods). However, the version used by philosophers today is an adaptation of Plato’s argument for use against monotheistic faiths. Critics of divine command theories appeal to three arguments that are loosely associated with Plato’s dialogue. These are (1) the anything goes objection, (2) the arbitrariness objection, and (3) the vacuity objection. I will take each in turn.The Anything Goes Objection
One objection is that a divine command theory makes morality arbitrary in the sense that anything at all could be right or wrong. King and Garcia explain the alleged problem in this way:
[Divine command theory] implies that it is possible for any kind of action, such as rape, not to be wrong. But it seems intuitively impossible for rape not to be wrong. So [Divine command theory] is at odds with our common-sense intuitions about rape.[1]
We can formalise the objection as follows:
(P1) If the divine command theory is true, then whatever God commands is morally required.
(P2) God could command rape.
(C1) So, if the divine command theory is true, rape could be morally obligatory.
(P3) But rape could not be morally obligatory.
(C2) Therefore, the divine command theory is false.
In response, divine command theorists have contested (P2) Divine command theorists do not contend that moral requirements are dependent upon the commands of just anyone. They base moral obligations on the commands of God conceived in a particular way. God is an all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving, just, immaterial person who created the universe on their conception. Once we realize this, the horrendous deeds objection appears to be unsound.
We can put this in terms of a dilemma: consider (P2): (P2) only holds if it is possible for a fully informed, rational, loving and just person to knowingly command rape. However, this is unlikely. Critics cite examples of rape because they view it as an action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain. So (P2) appears to be false. However, suppose; I am mistaken about this. It is possible for an essentially loving and just person to command rape. Rape, then, would only be commanded in situations where a just and loving person aware of all the relevant facts could endorse it. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how (P3) could be maintained.
Once we realize that God, as conceived by the divine command theorist, is essentially loving and just, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how both (P2) and (P3) can be true. Whatever reasons we have for thinking (P2) is true seem to undermine (P3). By contrast, whatever reasons we have for accepting (P3) undermine (P2).
[1]Nathan L King, “Introduction”, in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 11.
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Divine Command Theory and the Euthyphro Dilemma: Part I
This is a talk I gave to the Philosophy Club at Glendale Community College in Phoenix, Arizona, this weekend. The talk was followed by a long discussion with some faculty, students at the college, and others who zoomed in.
In this talk, I introduced and defended a divine command theory of ethics. The talk was divided into three parts. In section I, I set out what modern divine command theories of ethics typically contend. I distinguished this from some common misunderstandings in section II. In Section III, I discussed the Euthyphro dilemma. I will suggest this objection is not the conclusive rebuttal it is often assumed to be. This first post will contain sections I and II.I. What is a Divine Command Theory
For purposes of this talk, the term “divine command theory” will refer to the divine command meta-ethics defended by Robert Adam’s, William Lane Craig, William Alston, and C Stephen Evan’s. This theory contends that the property of being morally required is identical to the property of being commanded by God. [1] Where God is understood, in orthodox fashion, as a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, essentially loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially ordered the universe.
Note three things about this thesis:
First, it is a thesis about the nature of moral requirements, not about the nature of goodness in general. The concept of “good, is ambiguous, as is seen by the following statements “I had a really good dip in the spa pool last night”. Or “going on a low carb diet is good for you”. Or, “Carlos the Jakal was a good hitman”. The concept of the morally obligatory, or morally required, is not identical to the concept of what it is good to do. It might be good, even saintly, for me to give a kidney to benefit a stranger, but it is not an act I am obliged to do.[2] To be obligatory, an action must be more than just good or praiseworthy in some sense. Obligatory actions are actions we are required to do; another person can legitimately demand we do them. Omitting to do them without an adequate excuse renders one guilty and blameworthy. Others can justifiably blame you, censure you, and sanction you in various ways.
Nor is this is an idiosyncratic limitation of theory. While some critics of divine command theories characterize it as an account of “goodness” or of all “all evaluative properties.” Almost all contemporary defenders of divine command theories; Quinn, Adams, Alston, Craig, Wierenga, Hare, and Plantinga present a divine command theory of obligation, not goodness per se. Nor is this unique to modern divine command theorists; older divine command theorists such as William Paley, John Locke, George Berkeley, and Francisco Suarez limited divine command theories to accounts of moral obligations or requirements, not to goodness in general.
Second, the postulated relationship between moral requirements and God’s commands is one of identity. Mark Murphy refers to this sort of explanation as “informative identification”. Such as when “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion”. We are aware of something we refer to as “water” and want to understand its nature. We answer this question by postulating that what we refer to as water is identical with H20; by doing this, we answer the question, “what is the nature of water?”. In this instance, divine command theorists attempt to explain the nature of a particular kind of moral property, the property of being morally required. The theory is that the property we refer to when we say “X morally required” is the property of being commanded by God.
Third, this is a thesis about the relationship between God and morality. It is not a claim about the relationship between the bible and morality. To claim that moral requirements are identical with God’s commands is not to claim our moral requirements are identical with the commandments laid down in a particular sacred text. The thesis I laid out makes no mention of any sacred text such as the Bible, Quran, Hadith, Torah or Talmud. While many divine command theorists accept that God has revealed his commands in an infallible sacred text, some do not.
Moreover, the claim that God’s commands are contained in some particular sacred text is not part of or entailed by a divine command theory itself. It is the result of other theological commitments they have. One could consistently be a divine command theorist without holding this. Divine command theories are ecumenical; they have had advocates within the Christian, Islamic, Jewish and even deist traditions.
Of course, what role sacred texts should play in our moral thinking and decision-making is important. Whether God has infallibly revealed himself in such text is a question of great interest. However, it is not the question that the divine command theorist is addressing when he says moral requirements are identical with Gods commands.
II What the Divine Command Theory is Not: Avoiding Strawman
These clarifications as to what a divine command theory enable us to address two common objections to the theory: semantic and epistemic objections.
1. Semantic Objections
Harry Gensler expresses one common objection to a divine command theory. Gensler writes:
“Imagine an atheist who says the following: “kindness is good, but there is no God”. If “x is good” meant “God desires x”, then this claim would be self-contradictory (since it would mean “God desires kindness, but there is no God”). But it isn’t self contradictory. So “x is good” doesn’t mean “God desires x”.[3]
Gensler concludes that the phrases “X is good” and “desired by God” are not synonymous phrases. This is a conclusion about the meaning of moral terms and words. However, a divine command theory isn’t a theory about the meaning of moral terms. It is a thesis about the nature of moral properties. It contends that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.
Consequently, Gensler’s argument has an implicit assumption. If two phrases such as “x is wrong” and “X is contrary to Gods commands” are not synonymous in meaning, they cannot refer to the same property.
This assumption is questionable. Consider the example of water and H20; the phrase “x is a cup of water” is not synonymous with the words “x is a cup of H20”. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle could, without self-contradiction, claim “this cup is full of water and atoms don’t exist”. Yet that doesn’t entail that water is not identical to H20. “water” and “H20” are distinct non-synonymous ways of referring to what turns out to be the same property. The fact two phrases are not synonymous does not entail they are not referring to the same property.
Gensler’s argument appears to conflate two separate questions. The question of whether the words “x is morally required” has the same meaning as the phrase “God commands x” and the question of whether those words pick out the same or distinct properties. He mistakenly takes a divine command theory as answering the first of these questions, when it is proposed as an answer to the second.
2. Epistemic Objections
Many critics of divine command theories object that we know the truth of moral claims independently and prior to any beliefs they have about divine commands. This idea figures prominently in criticisms posed by Nowell Smith.[4], Lehrer and Corman[5], Louise Anthony[6]. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong[7]. Paul Kurtz provides an example:
If God is essential, then how can it be that millions of people who do not believe in God, nevertheless behave morally. On [the divine command] view they should not and so God is not essential to the moral life[8]
Like the semantic objection I just discussed, this one is based on a confusion. This objection takes a divine command theory to entail that people cannot know what is right and wrong unless they first know what God has commanded.
However, this is incorrect. Divine command theorists contend the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being contrary to God’s commands. If two descriptions refer to the same property, that doesn’t entail we cannot know something answers one description unless we believe something answers the other.
It is a fact that water is identical to H20. This does not mean that we cannot know about the existence of water unless we first know about hydrogen and oxygen. The Polynesians who first settled New Zealand around 1300 AD were very good at navigating water: they knew what water was, what rain was, and how to discern currents and tides. They had lots of justified belief about water. However, they knew nothing about atomic or molecular theory.
[1]Robert M. Adams, “Divine Command Meta-Ethics Modified Again,” Journal of Religious Ethics 7:1 (1979): 76.
[2] Example from C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16.
[3]Harry Gensler Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge Publishing, 1988) 39.
[4]Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, “Morality: Religious and Secular,” in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. Ian T. Ramsey (London: SCM Press, 1966) 97.
[5]James W. Cornman & Keith Lehrer, Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York: MacMillan, 1979), 429.
[6]Louise Anthony “Atheism as Perfect Piety” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics, Eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2008),67-84
[7] Armstrong writes, “The divine command theory makes morality unknowable [because such theories entail] we cannot know what is morally wrong, if we cannot know what God commanded … we have no sound way to determine what God commanded.” For critique, See my “Is Ethical Naturalism more Plausible than Supernaturalism: A Reply to Walter Sinnott Armstrong” Philo 15:1 (2012):19-37
[8]Ibid 33-33, note the slippage in Kurtz statement; he goes from the claim that belief in God is unnecessary to live a moral life to the claim that God is unessential to morality. This is like arguing that; because people can fly successfully in planes without believing in the laws of aerodynamics, it follows, the laws of aerodynamics are not essential for flight.