Last year I gave a paper entitled “Reflections on Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the Problem of Hell’ at the Rethinking Hell conference in Auckland. This talk is now available online.
Category: Events
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The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Three Problems with Relativism
This is the third of a series of posts on moral relativism. These talks are based on some talks I have given on the subject in the last few months. In the first post, I looked at what the basic issues are. The second post examines some of the reasons people offer for accepting relativism. This last post looks at some problems with relativism.
Today most ethicists whether Christian or non-Christian reject relativism. Critics of relativism argue it faces several problems, which give us reason to reject it. I will focus on three.
1. The Problem of Moral Progress and Moral Reform.
Relativism is incompatible with moral progress or reform. While relativists can accept that the moral judgements of societies change they can’t consistently claim these changes amount to progress. If society at one time supports
slavery or racial segregation, and then later disapproves of these things. Relativists cannot say that society has thrown off an incorrect view and adopted a correct, one. Instead, it must say that it has gone from one correct view to another one.A related problem is that relativism suggests that moral reformers who spoke out against slavery and segregation were in fact in the wrong. They were opposing what society approved of and hence what was right for members of society.
This problem also applies to subjectivism. If a member of the Ku Klux Klan holds racist judgements at one time and then later rejects these judgements as bigotry, The subjectivist can’t say he has moved from a mistaken to a correct. Instead, he has changed from one correct view to another. Individuals don’t grow in moral insight or develop more discernment
2.The possibility of Error
There is another problem with relativism. It seems plausible that we can be mistaken in our moral judgements. I can make judgements about what is right and wrong which are incorrect, and whole societies can do this. Relativism, however, suggests mistakes like this are impossible. Subjectivism means that If I believe something is right, then I am right in doing it. Relativism means that if a society endorses a practice then its right for members of that society to do the practice. The consequence is that mistakes about morality are impossible. For a person or a community to make a mistake, it has to be possible for the standards an individual or society accepts to be different from the standards which are correct.
3. Relativism Implies that Obvious Moral Wrongs Are Acceptable
Perhaps the most important objection to relativism is that it implies that obvious moral wrongs are acceptable. If actions are right or wrong relative to an individual or societies standpoint, then anything at all can be justified. Genocide, rape, torture of children, racial intolerance, are all morally right for a person if he believes that they are or his society endorses them. Many find this implication hard to swallow if a serial killer thinks it’s permissible to kill women, is it really plausible to suggest this fact alone means his actions are right or did the fact German society adopted Nazism in the 1930s mean that Germans did no wrong when they implemented these policies.
Conclusion
Let me now bring the threads of this talk to a close. I have explained what relativism and objectivism are. I noted some common reasons why people accept relativism and suggested these reasons fail. The appeal to diversity fails to make some important distinctions and appeals to tolerance, openness and so on are incoherent. I have also sketched several problems with relativism it entails moral reform is impossible moral error is impossible and that obvious moral wrongs are right. For reasons like this most philosophers, today reject moral relativism. While it’s a challenge to the way, Christians think about ethics. I am not convinced it’s a challenge which is very defensible.
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The Challenge of Moral Relativism: Arguments for Relativism
This post is based on a series of talks I have given on moral relativism. In my last post, I looked at what relativism and objectivism are. Here I examine some common reasons people accept or defend relativism I will offer critical commentary on these arguments.
When examining any position in philosophy it is important to understand what motivates people to hold it, why do people find it plausible? Two reasons are commonly cited.
- The Argument from Cultural Diversity
One common motivation for relativism, particularly cultural relativism, is the observation that different societies have different moral beliefs. To use a well-known example: people in 14th century Europe believed witchcraft was seriously immoral and executed witches. People in 21st century New Zealand doesn’t believe this. Some societies endorse polygamy others endorse monogamy. Facts like these are held to cast doubt on the idea there is a single true morality
independent of what society thinks.Response to the argument from cultural diversity.
Objectivists make several responses to this argument.
Distinguishing Separate idea’s.
First, they argue that this argument conflates two separate ideas. (a) the idea that beliefs about what is right and wrong differ from society to society. And (b) that idea that what really is right, and wrong differs from society. The fact different societies have different moral beliefs provides evidence for the first of these ideas. It establishes (a). However, cultural relativism affirms something stronger than this. Relativists believe moral standards are correct or incorrect relative to society. Cultural Relativists contend an action is wrong for a person because their society condemns that action. Hence, they affirm (b).
However, that the fact different societies have different moral beliefs doesn’t support (b) It’s possible that when different societies make different judgements about something that one of them is mistaken. When don’t normally assume that when societies disagree on something the correct answer is relative to society. If different societies have different beliefs about the shape or age of the earth, we would not take this to demonstrate that the earth’s actual age and shape differ in various societies. So why do we do this when the disagreement involves moral judgements? The mere fact societies make different judgements on a topic tells us nothing about whether those judgements are objectively true or false.
Exaggerated disagreement
Second, objectivists argue that appeals to cultural diversity often exaggerate the amount of cross-cultural disagreement over moral standards. Often when societies have different moral beliefs, this isn’t due to different moral standards but the result of disagreement over certain factual questions. Consider the abovementioned case of witchcraft. In the 14th-century people believed in the existence of witches. They believed witches met together secretly and sacrificed children and ate these children in a ritual feast. They bound themselves by oath to the devil to use supernatural powers to harm, and kill innocent people. Hence the believed witchcraft involved the deliberate conspiracy to cause serious harm to innocent people.
We don’t hold these beliefs today but if we did our opinion of witchcraft would be very different. Suppose we believed there was a group which conspired to randomly kill and maim innocent people and killed and ate children as part of its rituals. We probably would legally suppress this group. And many people would support the death penalty for those who did these things, killing children is a horrendous form of murder after all. The difference between us and 14th-century Europeans is due, in a large part, to different factual beliefs not simply a disagreement over moral standards.
- Relativism Promotes Tolerance
A second motivation behind relativism is the idea that moral relativism promotes tolerance and humility. When you realise that your own moral standards are correct only for you, you are less likely to fall into arrogance and pass judgements on the beliefs and practises of others. Nor are you likely to demand they change these practices and adopt yours.
Response:
Objectivists respond that this concern reveals a subtle contradiction. The argument assumes that tolerance and humility are good things, it assumes people should be tolerant and humble and should not be arrogant and rush to judgement. However, if relativism is correct, this isn’t the case. According to cultural relativism, it is wrong to be intolerant only if your society believes that it is. Societies which are imperialistic and arrogant and believes its permissible to colonialize other nations don’t do any wrong if it imposes its moral judgements on to others. Similarly, according to subjectivism humility and tolerance are wrong only if you think it is. If someone has bigoted or arrogant beliefs, then bigotry is morally required of them, and they shouldn’t act in a humble, tolerant way.
Objectivists maintain that one can condemn individuals or societies who have arrogant and bigoted practices only if you hold these things are wrong despite the fact societies or individuals may endorse them. There is something incoherent about offering a moral criticism about the arrogant and intolerant moral judgements of societies or individuals and then concluding you can’t make judgements about societies and individuals
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The challenge of Moral Relativism: Relativism vs Objectivism: understanding the issues:
This post is the first of a series of posts which reproduce a talk on Moral Relativism I gave at both the Auckland and Tauranga Confident Christianity Conference’s and was given earlier in the year as part at a series of talks on apologetics at Orewa Community Church.
In moral debates about you will hear slogans like “if you don’t like abortion don’t have one” or “if you don’t like pornography don’t watch it.” The basic idea is that if you think a particular action is morally wrong, then you shouldn’t do it, however, it is mistaken or inappropriate to claim that people who don’t share your opinion shouldn’t do it. The slogans in question assume that moral principles correctly apply only to people who believe in those principles.
The pervasiveness of this kind of thinking can be seen in a media report I watched several years ago. A pornographer
had organised a festival on the main street of Auckland, called “Boobs on Bikes”. It involved people, including topless women, riding down Queenstreet displaying erotica. There was some controversy over this event. During the media coverage journalists interviewed several people present. What was interesting was how many people responded by saying something like this: “It is the 21st century” or “we live in a liberal society”. Notice what happens when people do this. They were asked whether a particular action or policy was right or wrong. They answered by appealing to what they perceived to be currently fashionable or conventionally accepted. The assumption is that what is right or wrong is determined by what is conventionally accepted or fashionable.These responses reflect a position called Relativism by moral philosophers. In a bestselling book. The Closing of the American Mind. The prominent philosopher Alan Bloom opened by saying:
There is one thing a professor can be certain absolutely of: almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative. If this belief is put to the test, one can count on the students’ reaction: they will be uncomprehending. That anyone should regard the proposition as not self-evident astonishes them, as though he were calling into question 2 + 2 = 4. These are things you don’t think about. The students’ backgrounds are as various as America can provide. Some are religious, some atheists; some are to the Left, some to the Right; some intend to be scientists, some humanists or professionals or businessmen; some are poor, some rich. They are unified only in their relativism and in their allegiance to equality. And the two are related in a moral intention. The relativity of truth is not a theoretical insight but a moral postulate, the condition of a free society, or so they see it. They have all been equipped with this framework early on, and it is the modern replacement for the inalienable natural rights that used to be the traditional American grounds for a free society. That it is a moral issue for students is revealed by the character of their response when challenged – a combination of disbelief and indignation: “Are you an absolutist?,” the only alternative they know, uttered in the same tone as “Are you a monarchist?” or “Do you believe in witches?” This latter leads into the indignation, for someone who believes in witches might well be a witch-hunter or a Salem judge. The danger they have been taught to fear from absolutism is not error but intolerance. Relativism is necessary to openness; and this is the virtue, the only virtue, which all primary education for more than fifty years has dedicated itself to inculcating. Openness – and the relativism that makes it the only plausible stance in the face of various claims to truth and various ways of life and kinds of human beings – is the great insight of our times. The true believer is the real danger. The study of history and of culture teaches that all the world was mad in the past; men always thought they were right, and that led to wars, persecutions, slavery, xenophobia, racism and chauvinism. The point is not to correct the mistakes and really be right; rather it is not to think you are right at all. (Bloom 1987)
Bloom was beginning a scathing critique of what is often called moral relativism. Note that Bloom mentions students entering university. One reason for this is that relativism is not a common position in contemporary philosophy or ethics, and most philosophers I know of think it is pretty clearly a mistaken position. However, it is extremely common at the popular level. Because relativism is is an important challenge to Christian ethics it is important to reflect on how Christians respond to this challenge.
- Relativism vs Objectivism: understanding the issues:
Christian’s like Muslims and Jews, believe God has issued commands to human beings, and our moral duties are related to these commands.
However, or not God exists or issues commands doesn’t depend on whether we think he does. If God created the world, then this is a fact that occurred well before we were born and my believing or not believing it makes no difference to whether it occurred. If God did not create the world, hoping and wishing he has doesn’t make the past change. The same is true of God’s commanding, if God has issued commands then this is a fact, people may disagree with what he demands, but this disagreement doesn’t make any difference to whether the commands exist.
To illustrate the point here, return to the slogan I opened this talk with. Suppose someone was contemplating jumping off the sky tower. You responded “if you do that you’ll die” only to get the response. ‘Who are you to impose your belief in the law of gravity onto me?” I doubt anyone would be impressed by this response. Whether or not the laws of gravity exist doesn’t depend on whether you believe it. God’s moral laws don’t differ from the laws or decrees by which he governs the universe. They either exist or they don’t.
This means that Christians are objectivists about morality. Objectivism holds that: certain moral standards are correct independently of whether you, I or our society believe they are or accept that they are. Some moral principles apply to people regardless of whether they choose to accept these principles, and if people do not accept these principles, they are making a mistake.
By contrast, relativists hold that moral hold that all moral judgements are correct or incorrect relative to different cultures or individuals. Howard-Synder (1999) highlights two major kinds of relativism:
- Cultural relativism holds an action is wrong for a person because their society condemns that action.
- Subjectivism holds that actions are right and wrong relative to individual opinions. An action is wrong for a person because he or she thinks it is wrong
If relativism is true, then moral standards apply only to people who themselves or whose society accepts those standards. This is the assumption you see reflected in the slogans I mentioned at the start of my talk.
References
Bloom, Alan. 1987. The Closing of the American Mind: How higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today’s students. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Howard-Snyder, Frances. 1999. “Christianity and ethics.” In Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael Murray, 376-377. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
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Annihilationism and the Infinity of Hell: Bawulski and the Disproportionality Argument
This is part of a talk I gave at the Rethinking Hell Conference in Auckland earlier this year.
Evangelical Annihilationist’s such as John Stott, Edward Fudge, John Wenham, and various others challenge the traditional view that hell is a place of eternal conscious torment. They contend that biblical language such as “eternal fire,” “eternal destruction,” “death,” “perish,” “everlasting contempt,” “eternal punishment,” “unquenchable fire,” “second death,” “killing the body, “soul,” “lake of fire,” “the smoke of their torment rises forever,” “blackest darkness” are better interpreted as signifying the permanent destruction of the wicked. Hell is eternal in the sense that the ultimate punishment inflicted in hell, death, is permanent; one is dead forever and never to be resurrected or reincarnated to live another life.

Shawn Baluski contests this. In “Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the problem of Hell” Baluski contends that, if Annihilationism is true, then punishment in Hell is finite in duration. He offers two arguments for this conclusion. In a previous post, I discussed one of these arguments. This post will look at his second argument, which I will call the disproportionality argument.
The Disproportionality Argument
In his dialogue with liberal theologian David Edwards John Stott, a well-known evangelical annihilationist, gave several exegetical arguments for annihilationism. [1] However, in addition to these exegetical arguments, Stott offered a moral objection to traditionalism:Would there not, then, be a serious disproportion between sins consciously committed in time and torment consciously experienced throughout eternity? I do not minimise the gravity of sin as rebellion against God our Creator, and shall return to it shortly, but I question whether ‘eternal conscious torment’ is compatible with the biblical revelation of divine justice.[2]
Stott’s argument here is that annihilationism isn’t subject to a moral challenge which the traditionalism is. Traditional conceptions of hell make the punishment disproportionate to the offence. Annihilationism doesn’t have this implication.
This argument by Stott serves as the backdrop to Bawulski’s response. Bawulski argues that unless hell is finite, Annihilationism cannot answer the disproportionality problem. He offers two claims in support of this conclusion.
First, Bawulski argues; if annihilation is an infinite or eternal punishment, then the only morally relevant difference between traditionalism annihilationism is that in the former the involves conscious existence and the latter does not.
If annihilation is an infinite punishment, then to resolve the disproportionality problem the annihilationist must argue that a certain type of infinite punishment (that which ends in annihilation) is a just sentence for a sin of finite seriousness despite the punishment being, in fact, infinite. Presumably, this will be done by attempting to link the disproportion to something other than the infinite nature of the punishment, and the most likely candidate is everlasting conscious existence.[3]
Second, Bawulski contends that the mere existence or absence of conscious existence makes no difference to the severity of the punishment.
If annihilation is an infinite punishment: it is not obvious that extinction is genuinely a lesser and more proportionate punishment than that of the traditional view. Assuming there is some validity to the analogy, there is no consensus as to which is more severe: life imprisonment or capital punishment. If annihilation is a lesser punishment the annihilationist needs to argue this point persuasively, and I have not encountered any argument to that effect.[4]
I will respond to each of these points below.
Is Conscious existence the only relevant difference?
Let’s look at the first claim, Bawulski thinks that if that if both traditionalism and annihilationism involve infinite punishment, then, the only difference between them is that in the former the involves conscious existence and the latter does not. This seems to ignore an obvious issue. The traditional view of hell involves not just conscious existence, but also the notion of eternal conscious torment. And the presence or absence of torment is obviously relevant to assessing the severity of punishment.And it is precisely this feature of traditionalism that Stott objects to. Consider Bawulski’s discussion of John Stott, only a few pages earlier:
Not surprisingly, annihilationists often cite their view’s supposed ability to dodge the traditionalist’s disproportionality problem as a great virtue. For example, in his defense of annihilationism, John Stott says, “Would there not, then, be a serious disproportion between sins consciously committed in time and torment consciously experienced throughout eternity? . . . no finite set of deeds that individual sinners have done could justify such an infinite sentence.”[5]
It’s clear that what Stott considers disproportionate is not just the infinite duration of the sentence or even the fact that the people are conscious. What is disproportionate are “sins consciously committed in time” and “torment consciously experienced throughout eternity”. (emphasis added)
Is Annihilation a less severe punishment?
This brings me to Bawulski’s second claim; that the mere existence of conscious existence isn’t morally relevant. Bawulski asks us to compare which is more severe: life imprisonment or capital punishment. But, the answer to that question depends crucially on the kind of prison being envisaged. If I were under house arrest at a beautiful Manson at Mount Maunganui, a life sentence would be less severe than capital punishment. But, that is not what’s being envisaged when hell is construed as eternal conscious torment. Here we are being asked to compare capital punishment with a life of torture. The analogy is someone imprisoned for life in the tower of London perpetually hooked up to a rack, or, being continually alive while they slowly experience searing and burning on hot coals. I submit that, under these conditions, the claim that life imprisonment is less severe than capital punishment is implausible.Jonathan Kvanvig objects that the kind of argument I offer here attacks a straw man. He says that “our ordinary conceptions of punishment … view capital punishment as a far more severe kind than life imprisonment.” He grants that “ If the traditional view is embellished with vivid images of the sort that appear in Jesus’ parable of the Lazarus and Dives, or in Dante’s descriptions of hell, Annihilationism can be seen as preferable” But, “ the fundamental tenets of the traditional view do not involve these embellishments.”[6]
To foreclose this kind of response, I will simply point the reader to what Bawulski himself states a few pages later. In a footnote on p 69 he argues:
[A]nnihilationism has not accounted for the interconnectedness of texts like Matt.25:31-46, Rev. 14:9-11, and Rev. 20:9-15, all of which share the same referent-the place/state of eternal punishment. In this eternal fire the smoke of the torment of the condemned goes up forever and ever; the condemned will have no rest, day or night; Satan, the beast and the false prophet are “tormented day and night forever and ever.” In Rev. 20, the finally impenitent are cast into this place, and there is nothing to indicate that their experience there will be any different from that of the other beings who reside there (Satan and the demons): tormented day and night forever and ever. In fact, reading Rev. 20:9-15 in light of Rev. 14:9-11, Matt. 25:31-46[7]
Here Bawluski describes the difference between annihilationism and traditionalism not merely in terms of eternal conscious existence. But, conscious torment.[8] His interpretation of phrases such as “eternal fire” scripture doesn’t commit him merely to the view that the state of eternal punishment involves consciousness. It involves, people “tormented day and night forever and ever” and he faults Annihilationism for not taking this feature of the imagery seriously. In light of this its hard to understand why he seems to think the only significant difference between annihilationism and traditionalism is conscious existence.
The line Kvanvig takes seems to me to undercut the exegetical case traditionalist make to support their doctrine. Consider the image of a lake of fire. I can understand how a person can interpret an image of fire as signifying destruction. Fire, after all, consumes and destroys, anything thrown into the fire would normally be consumed and destroyed. Similarly, I can understand how people can interpret this image as torment, being thrown in fire clearly would be painful. However, the suggestion that this metaphor signifies some nefarious conscious existence, analogous to simple incarceration in a high-quality western prison, stretches credibility.
I have looked at two arguments Bawulski gives for the conclusion that annihilationism entails the finitude of hell. The first contended that punishment must be experienced to count as punishment. I offered the example of capital punishment as a counter-example. His second argument, in my opinion, fares no better, only by ignoring the emphasis on eternal conscious torment does his argument have any merit. However, seeing the exegetical case for traditionalism relies on interpreting specific images as signifying torment and conscious suffering. This is an unjustified omission.
[1] David L. Edwards and John Stott, Evangelical Essentials: a liberal-evangelical dialogue (Hodder & Stoughton Religious: 1988) 312-329 available at https://www.truthaccordingtoscripture.com/documents/death/judgement-hell.php#.Wk4HL1WWbIU
[2] Ibid
[3] Shawn Bawulski “Annihilationism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Hell” Philosophia Christi 12.1(2010) 66
[4] Ibid
[5] Shawn Bawulski “Annihilationism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Hell” Philosophia Christi 12.1(2010) 65
[6] Jonathan Kvanvig, “Heaven and Hell”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/heaven-hell/
[7] Shawn Bawulski “Annihilationism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Hell” Philosophia Christi 12.1(2010) 69.
[8] For an annihilationist response to Bawulski’s exegesis here see Ralph G. Bowles “Does Revelation 14: 11 Teach Eternal Torment? Examining a Proof-text on Hell” available at https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/eq/2001-1_021.pdf
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Annihilationism and the Infinity of Hell: Bawulski and the Experience Argument
This is part of a talk I gave at the ReThinking Hell Conference in Auckland earlier this year.
The traditional conception of hell understands the punishment of the finally impenitent to be conscious eternal torment. The punishment of hell is eternal in the sense of it being of an unending duration, and it involves conscious torment.
Evangelical Annihilationist’s such as John Stott, Edward Fudge, John Wenham, and various others challenge the traditional view. They argue the traditional view is contrary to scripture. They contend that, in scripture, the punishment of hell is eternal destruction, which involves the total and irreversible destruction of the wicked. Hell is eternal in the sense that the ultimate punishment inflicted in hell, death, is permanent; one is dead forever and never to be resurrected or reincarnated to live another life.
Much of the debate over this in evangelical circles is exegetical. It focuses on the meanings of biblical phrases such as “eternal fire,” “eternal destruction,” “death,” “perish,” “everlasting contempt,” “eternal punishment,” “unquenchable fire,” “second death,” “killing the body, “soul,” “lake of fire,” “the smoke of their torment rises forever,” “blackest darkness [that] has been reserved forever,” “outer darkness where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth”, and so on. Traditionalists take these passages to refer to eternal conscious torment. Annihilationists argue that, in their contexts, they signify the permanent destruction of the wicked.
Sometimes, however, more philosophical considerations are raised. One example is Shawn Bawulski’s article
“Annihilationism, Traditionalism and the problem of Hell” which argues that Annihilationism cannot answer particular moral and philosophical questions as well as the traditional view.There is a lot in this article and space presents a detailed consideration of all the issues. Here I want to focus on one question. Central to Bawulski’s argument is the contention that if Annihilationism is true. Hell is not infinite in duration and hence finite. This implication Bawulski believes to be philosophically and theologically problematic.
I noted above that Annihilationists typically reject the claim that Hell involves finite punishment. They contend Hell involves the punishment of eternal destruction or eternal death. The ultimate punishment inflicted in hell, death, is permanent; one is dead forever and is never resurrected or reincarnated to live another life. Bawulski offers two arguments against this conclusion. This post will look at one of these arguments. This is what I will call the argument from conscious experience.
Punishment and ExperienceA key argument Bawulski offers is that punishment must be experienced. For something to count as a punishment the person punished must experience it or be conscious of it. Bawulski illustrates this with the example Irreversible Coma:
It is hard to see how we might punish an offender who is in a coma, especially if that coma were irreversible. We might be able to extract compensation from her estate, but we would normally consider this means of punishment to be a contingency-plan sentence in lieu of punishment that involved the offender’s knowledge and recognition of her wrongdoing.[1]
I tend to agree that it would be difficult to punish someone in already in an irreversible coma. However, I don’t think this fact shows that punishment must be experienced. To see this, imagine a different case. John engages in a rape and murder spree and is shot by the police; he lies in the hospital in a temporary coma from which he will wake in three months. While he is unconscious the court, on the basis of compelling evidence, sentences John to die and so before he wakes he is given a lethal injection. Has John been punished?
This is because John has in fact been deprived of something quite valuable: the life he would have had he been left to wake in six months. John has been executed, and his future life snuffed out. Paradigmatically when someone is killed, they are harmed due to the fact they lose their life. But its obviously not their past life that is lost, nor is it the instantons present that is taken from them, what they lose is their future life. The life they would have lived and enjoyed had they not been killed.
It’s precisely the difficulty of envisaging any valuable or (even any conscious) future, from life in an irreversible coma that makes people reluctant to suggest it can be plausibly punished. The situation envisaged by the Annihilationist, however, is in stark contrasts. Under an annihilationist conception of hell. The alternative to annihilation is eternal life. The alternatives are being destroyed or continued living forever in eternal bliss. Being killed therefore deprives one of a great good you otherwise would have had. A life of eternal bliss.
Hell must be experienced
Later Bawulski suggests a more limited thesis: it’s not that punishment must be experienced, but rather, that punishment, as it occurs in hell, needs to be experienced. “This, coupled with several biblical texts that describe the reprobate as aware of and experiencing their punishment, point to the conclusion that a criterion of the punishment of hell is that it be experienced.[2]“It’s difficult to understand however why the punishment envisaged by annihilationists wouldn’t be experienced. Annihilationists believe that the “wages of sin is death”, that God will destroy, i.e. kill, the body and soul in hell. Normally when we punish a person with death or kill him, they experience it. Suppose Tom is sentenced to die by electric chair, or by hanging or by firing squad. Is it plausible to suggest he doesn’t experience anything?
Its true once he is dead, he will experience nothing. But killing or executing someone usually involves a process, and that process can be experienced, it can be, and often is when carried out, been terrifying, and painful. So it beggars reality to suggest that sentencing someone to death means they don’t experience the punishment.In fact, the existence of capital punishment, as a paradigmatic example of punishment seems to undermine both Bawulski’s arguments here. A person typically does experience the process of death involved in the execution, and the fact they die and lose consciousness when they are hanged or electrocuted doesn’t seem to lead us to conclude they not punished.
Bawulski’s response:
Bawulski seems loosely aware of this response and offers two responses to it. In a footnote, he states “the death sentence as retributive punishment is not a counterexample because the Christian doctrine of a final universal resurrection means that state implemented capital punishment is not personal annihilation, merely a penal ending of this life.”[3]This, however, seems inadequate. True, the death penalty only involves the penal ending of this life. But it’s hard to see how this features of capital punishment make a difference in this context. Whether or not a person rises again at a resurrection after death makes no difference to whether a person who is executed experiences the punishment. Nor does it make a difference to whether or not we consider capital punishment to involve punishment.
The following example will illustrate this. Suppose after being executed that God decided not to raise ted Bundy from the dead. Would it follow that Ted Bundy didn’t experience anything when he was executed, or that Gods refusal to resurrect meant Bundy hadn’t been punished? Obviously not. The facts remain, Bundy, was deprived of a future life; a life he would have lived, had he not been killed. And the act of killing Bundy involved a process which he experienced.
In the main body of the text, Bawulski offers a different response:
It must be noted that most annihilationist’s claim annihilation does not occur at physical death or even immediately after the final judgment, but posit a finite period of conscious punishment leading up to final annihilation. The problem then becomes this: the only penal aspect related to annihilation is the dreadful anticipation of the upcoming annihilation. Yet if the antecedent period of punishment is finite and the anticipatory period of dread is finite, even if the annihilation is permanent and in that sense infinite in consequence, the punishment itself is finite. punishment.[4]
I find this line of argument, frankly, strange. Bawulski suggests that if in the process of being killed, the victim consciously experiences his punishment, then it follows that this is the only penal aspect involved.
But surely this is implausible, precisely for the reasons just mentioned, Suppose someone is executed by lethal injection in their early 20’s, would we really suggest that, would anyone seriously suggest that only punishment this person received was a prick in the arm for a few seconds. Or suppose a person is sentenced to death in the electric chair when this happens do we really think the only punishment administered is a few seconds of electric shocks.
Obviously, these are unpleasant aspects of the punishment, but the punishment is death. These aspects don’t stand alone from the punishment but are part of the process that death is brought about. If serial killers were just pricked in the arm and then got up and walked away, we wouldn’t consider the punishment of death to have been carried out. We would contend they had escaped their punishment.
This point was made by Augustine of Hippo. Augustine himself no friend of Annihilationism, stated:
Then as to the award of death for any great crime, do the laws reckon the punishment to consist in the brief moment in which death is inflicted, or in this, that the offender is eternally banished from the society of the living? And just as the punishment of the first death cuts men off from this present mortal city, so does the punishment of the second death cut men off from that future immortal city. For as the laws of this present city do not provide for the executed criminal’s return to it, so neither is he who is condemned to the second death recalled again to life everlasting[5]
The death penalty is a paradigmatic example of a case where someone is punished. When a death penalty is inflicted the criminal usually experiences it, he experiences the shame, anticipation and even the pain involved in the process of killing. However, this while part of the punishment is not the whole of it, the punishment involves much more it involves cutting him off from the life we would have had and enjoyed. And this is a significant part of, if not the most significant part of his punishment. The fact the criminal doesn’t consciously experience these years doesn’t mean his being deprived of them isn’t a punishment.
Annihilationists understand the punishment of hell to literally involve a death sentence, one that is permanent and irreversible. If one wouldn’t contend that a person executed today isn’t punished, or that his punishment consisted only in unpleasant experiences he had prior to death and didn’t involve the loss of life itself; then one shouldn’t contend that annihilation of the finally impenitent involves these things.
[1] Shawn Bawulski “Annihilationism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Hell” Philosophia Christi 12.1(2010): 66
[2] Bawulski “Annihilationism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Hell” 66
[3] Ibid 66
[4] Ibid
[5] Augustine City of God Bk 22 chapter 11
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Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Religious Studies: Part Four
This is a talk I gave to the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers annual conference at St Cutherberts College in September this year. Several people have asked me to make this talk available.
I have broken my talk up into four parts. Part One introduces what philosophy of religion. In part two I will outline two movements within analytic philosophy during the early to mid-century which I think resulted in religious beliefs not being taken very seriously within philosophy and philosophy of religion taking a fairly minor role. Part three will look at some responses to these movements offered in the late 20th century and how they changed the philosophical landscape. Part four will look at the question of “how to do philosophy of religion” comparing the methods used by two different atheist’s J L Mackie and Graham Oppy, and how this relates the National Certificate of Educational Achievement Standards. This post will contain part four.
How to do Philosophy of Religion: A tale of Two Religious SkepticsI think the demise of verifications and the questioning of evidentialism then changed the landscape of philosophy of religion dramatically. A good way of highlighting the change is to compare the work of two philosophers who probably have made the most rigorous cases for atheism in the last fifty years.
The first is J L Mackie’s work “The Miracle of Theism” published in 1982. Mackie’s work was for many years the definitive defence of atheism in Philosophy; I quoted Mackie above, let’s look again:
If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that
they are not directly verified or directly verifiable. It follows that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will involve arguments . . . [i]t [whether or not God exists] must be examined either by deductive or inductive reasoning or if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation; for in such a context nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. (Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 4-6;)The second, atheist I want to look at is Graham Oppy; Oppy is a philosopher at Monash University, his book Arguing about God, is rightly hailed as the best contemporary attack on the theistic arguments and he is, in my view, the leading defender of philosophical atheism writing today. Here is what Oppy says in an article “What Derivations can do” published in 2015.
Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. Indeed, philosophy of God should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God’. In so far as philosophy of religion – or philosophy of God – is concerned with the clash between theistic and atheistic world-views, the proper way to proceed is: (1) to develop best theistic
and atheistic theories; (2) to assess the liability of these best theories to internal defeat; and (3) to make an assessment of the comparative theoretical virtues of these best theories, paying attention to simplicity, fit with data, explanatory scope, predictive accuracy, and the like ( Oppy “What Derivations Cannot Do” Religious Studies (2015) 51, 328The contrast between these two writers is illustrative.
Mackie focuses on the fact that the claim that God exists isn’t verifiable. He acknowledges the collapse of verificationism: despite not being directly verifiable the central assertions of theism are meaningful. However, he does think this lack of verifiability places a burden of proof on the Theist. The Theist is required to produce arguments for Gods existence. Deductive, abductive, inductive, arguments presumably from premises which ultimately are verifiable in this way. Oppy, by contrast, doesn’t focus on whether the claim “God exists” is verifiable. His focus is on this belief, embedded in broader philosophical theories, verification, when it occurs, is applied to theories.
An even clearer contrast is over evidentialism. Mackie affirms evidentialism. He contends that “any rational consideration” of the question of God’s existence depends on the Theist providing “deductive, abductive, inductive arguments for Gods existence. “Nothing else can have any coherent bearing on the issue. Oppy however explicitly repudiates this he states Philosophy of religion should not be about the standard array of ‘arguments for and against the existence of God.”
Instead, Oppy suggests that the important question is what happens when people utilise theological assumptions in philosophy. Theists and atheists will reason from their prospective presuppositions and construct theories which attempt to answer important philosophical questions. Questions such as “why is there something rather than nothing?” “why are there and what are laws of nature”? “what are moral obligations” and so forth? Philosophy of religion is about how defensible these theories are. Can they be defended against objections, do they provide coherent answers to these questions, and how do the answers they give compare with each other.
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion and NCEA Achievement Standards.
You’ll probably guess my sympathies lie with Oppy, and it’s at this point that I think it’s interesting to look at the NCEA standards for Religious StudiesOne barrier to doing Philosophy in secondary schools is the fact there are no nationally recognised qualifications for the subject. There is an absence of any standards for philosophy under NCEA. Many people in this organisation have been lobbying for the government to introduce philosophy as a NCEA subject and I support this cause.
However, I want to suggest that if one looks at the standards which already exist for NCEA religious studies. There is already in the curricula plenty of scope for doing contemporary Philosophy of religion. In fact, if you move away from an excessive focus on the arguments for and against Gods existence and ask about religious and secular theories, NCEA asks and requires students to engage in contemporary philosophy of religion. The most obvious is the final achievement standard for level 3 NCEA:
Analyse the key beliefs of a religious tradition and a secular worldview in relation to ultimate questions
This sounds very much like the method Oppy refers too. Here students are asked to look at secular and religious worldviews and the theories they offer in response to critical philosophical questions. They are told to analyse these views: to discern their key premises and assumptions. When one looks, however, at the Merit and Excellence criteria for this standard it asks students to do work out the implications of these different answers, and to evaluate them, that sounds very much like Contemporary Philosophy of Religion.
Similarly, in level Three, NCEA asks students to analyse a religious tradition(s) in Aotearoa New Zealand. And analyse the response of a religious tradition to an ethical issue. Here, again, students are asked to analyse, to work out the assumptions and presumptions, assess the implications significance and evaluate the case for and against particular theories about right and wrong this is all contemporary philosophy of religion.
Of course, there are challenges to doing philosophy of religion under NCEA. NCEA classifies Religious Studies as a subset of the social sciences, and some moderators tend to interpret the words analyse or implications in more sociological senses. But, if we understand what it actually is to analysis a religious tradition or its response to an ethical issue or how it answers an ultimate question, then we are doing philosophy.
And I think this applies not just to level three religious studies where the standards require analysis. Consider the level two standard. “Explain the key beliefs within two religious traditions in relation to a significant religious question.” This uses the word “explain” however the standard defines a significant religious question. As questions regarding ” life after death, the nature of God, the existence of suffering, good and evil, the nature of the human being.” To get an achieved they have to compare how traditions answer these questions. But For merit and excellence, they are asked to ask questions about the significance and what are the implications of these views. This is asking students to engage in philosophical reflection: its asking, if these answers were true what follows, what difference would it make why is it important and so on.
Even the more descriptive level 1 standards have this, level 1, for example, asks students to “Describe key beliefs of a religious tradition” this sounds purely descriptive however to gain a merit and excellence students are asked to think through the significance of these beliefs, to look at links between the beliefs and to ask questions about their implications. Done well, this has the potential to foster a lot of philosophical reflection on the beliefs in question.
Conclusion
So in conclusion, Philosophy of religion involves “the philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts involved in religious traditions”. This has been done by assuming a default position of religious scepticism and examining the arguments for and against religious beliefs or asking if religious beliefs are verifiable and meaningful and the temptation is for this to be the modus operandi in philosophy courses in secondary school.
I am suggesting a different approach. Today Philosophy of religion is much broader; it involves looking at the answers religions have offered to some of the most profound philosophical answers, developing these as charitably and defensibly as possible and seeing if they can stand against objections. Finally, it involves asking whether religious views of the world answer these questions in a better and more plausible way than secular views do. Interestingly, as worded, this is the sort of questions NCEA Religious Studies achievement standards ask of students.
This means there is plenty of scope for doing Philosophy of religion as part of Religious Studies programs. It is my hope that those of us who want to see philosophy taken seriously in the secondary sector can, where appropriate, use the current NCEA standards to develop religious studies programs, which ask students to take these questions seriously. To get them to understand clearly various religious perspectives on various issues, to wrestle with them, significance and implications, to compare them to alternative religious or secular theories, and to critically consider the answers given.
I think this is an important part of a general education. Today’s students grow up in a philosophically pluralistic society, moreover, at a certain point in anyone’s life they will be confronted with different answers to very pressing existential questions, questions which are unavoidable, people will want to know who they are and how they should live. Avoiding these questions or allowing people to be uninformed and ignorant of how others answer them isn’t education. To allow people to be informed about different question’s and to think through carefully and honestly what these answers are, there significance and implications, and to critically evaluate them is in my view what Philosophy at the secondary level should be all about. So, I suggest that Philosophy programs at secondary school start to take seriously religious studies and religious studies take seriously philosophy of religion.