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This is the paper I presented to the Bioethics section of the Evangelical Theological Society, annual meeting. In November last year.
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Category: Events
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Abortion Hard Cases and Self Defence: Presentation
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The question “Why Be Moral?” and the book of Proverbs.
I gave a brief talk at Orewa Community Church on 10 January 2020. The talk was part of a short series OCC are doing on the book of proverbs. It is available here.
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The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Presentation
Last year, I presented a talk entitled “The Psychopath Objection to Divine Command Theory: Another Reply to Erik Wielenberg” to the New Zealand Association of Philosophers conference in Auckland. This was a follow up to interaction I have had with the work of Erik Wielenberg.
In 2017 I wrote a critical response to Wielenberg’s book Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism. Some, of my criticisms, were discussed in the dialogue between William Lane Craig and Erik Wielenberg at North Carolina State University in 2018 which was subsequently published by Routledge . Wielenberg has since responded to these criticisms. The talk at the NZAP was my thoughts on his latest paper.
Over 2020, I have revised the substance of this talk substantially, and a version of the paper will be published in The European Journal for Philosophy of Religion next year. In November has the opportunity to present the revised paper at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, which was held online in November. Below is a video of that paper.
Abstract: Recently, Erik Wielenberg has developed a novel objection to divine command metaethics (DCM). The objection is that DCM “has the implausible implication that psychopaths have no moral obligations and hence their evil acts, no matter how evil, are morally permissible”. This article criticizes Wielenberg’s argument. Section 1 expounds Wielenberg’s new “psychopath argument” in the context of the recent debate over the Reasonable Nonbelievers Objection. Section 2 discusses two ambiguities in the argument: in particular, Wielenberg’s formulation is ambiguous as to whether Wielenberg uses the word “obligation” in an objective or subjective sense. Section 3 argues that this ambiguity undercuts the argument. If Wielenberg is using the word obligation in a subjective sense, his arguments do not show that psychopaths “have no moral obligations”. By contrast, if Wielenberg is using the word obligation in an objective sense, his arguments do not show that divine command theorists are committed to denying that psychopaths have obligations.
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FETICIDE IN CHRISTIAN MORAL THOUGHT Part two : Feticide in Patristic Thought
I teach NCEA Religious Studies, at level three, one standard is to “Analyse the response of a religious tradition to a contemporary ethical issue”. Officially students have to describe the response a religious tradition has made to a moral issue. Our school like a lot of schools looks at Christian responses to abortion. Because I did my PhD thesis on this very subject in the last year I have been going through my dissertation and simplifying, summarising and rewriting it into short sections I can use with my classes. Because there is some interest in this, I have decided to post some of these on MandM. I welcome any feedback or comments.
In our last lesson, we examined how Alexandrian Jews responded to feticide at the time that Christian churches first started coming into existence. While Christianity and Judaism differ in many important ways, the evidence suggests that on the question of feticide and abortion early Christian communities adopted the same position that Alexandrian Jews already held.
To show this, we will look first at the Patristic period. The word Patristic is used by scholars of early Christianity to refer to Christian theologians who lived between 90AD to 475 AD. When one examines the writings of the Patristics on the question of abortion, we find over and over the same two ideas: first, that killing a formed embryo or a fetus violates the fifth commandment; secondly, an appeal to the Septuagint and the formed/unformed distinction.
I. Feticide as a Violation of the Fifth Commandment.
An important document for the study of early Christianity is The Didache. The word Didache mean’s “the teaching”.
The Didache contrasts two ways of living, “the way of life” and the “way of death”. The “Didache” was a training manual for converts to Christianity which summarises for a new convert the basic teachings of the Apostles. It is adapted from on manuals used by Jewish communities and used for instructing pagan converts to Judaism. This fact suggests the Didache is a very early Christian writing. Early Christianity was Jewish, the first Christian’s being a sect of Judaism, as time went on, however, the church broke from Judaism, and more and more non-Jewish people became Christians. Further evidence of an early date for the Didache is the primitive leadership structure of the church. The latter hierarchal structure of church leadership you find in the second century AD isn’t present instead – the Didache mentions a leadership structure of itinerant prophets and even mentions apostles. This suggests as are suggestive of a mid-first Century date for the document.[1] This would place the document within the same generation as the apostles. At the latest, the passage is dated Early-Second Century, less than a generation after the death of the apostles.There is a line in the Didache which says “you shall not murder a child by abortion nor kill that which is born”. This line occurs in a section which explains to the readers what the ten commandments require of Christians, and the prohibition on abortion occurs alongside various other commandments such as the fifth commandments prohibition of murder and the commandment against adultery. The Didache shows us that very early on, within at least a generation of the Apostle’s early Christian communities viewed the killing of a fetus as a form of homicide. It was considered to violate the fifth of the ten commandments.
This community that produced the Didache were not alone in this. The position laid down in the Didache appears to have been widely accepted. Every theologian from the Patristic period who wrote on the question comes to the same conclusion. Here are some examples:
- Athenagoras (133–190AD) called abortion murder and compared it to infanticide.[2]
- Tertullian (155 – c. 240) calls it “speedier man-killing”[3]And states the Law of Moses condemns it.
- Minucius Felix (150 and 270AD) see abortion it as “parricidium”[4]A Roman legal term for homicide.[5]
Cyprian (200 –258 AD) calls it murder and views violations of this command as more serious than violating the laws against idol worship.[6]
- Hippolytus (170 – 235 AD) describes abortion as murder and, like adultery, as against God’s commands.[7]
- The author of the Apocalypse of Paul (end of 4th century) describes feticide as “destroying the image of God” and as “contrary to God’s commandments”. [8]
- Augustine (354 430 AD) says that Gods law declares killing a formed fetus as murder[9] and that abortion at any stage is a cruelty akin to infanticide.[10]
- Jerome (347-420) declares feticide to be murder.[11]
- Basil (330-379) classifies it as homicide alongside killing one’s spouse and killing a person in a highway robbery.[12]
- Ambrose (340 – 397) views it as “taking away life before birth”.[13]
- Chrysostom (349 407 AD) states that abortion is “murder before birth” that abortionists turn a woman’s womb into a “chamber for murder” and in doing so “fight against His [God’s] laws”.[14]
We mentioned Philo of Alexandria in the last section and mentioned how he appealed to Jewish teaching on abortion to reject the Greek and Roman practise of infanticide. Like Philo, numerous, Early-Christian writers appealed to this teaching to offer arguments against infanticide.
In the first few centuries after Christ, Christianity was viewed with suspicion and Christians were often falsely accused of all sorts of horrible things. One accusation was that Christians engaged in infant sacrifice. Athenagoras, for example, responded to this accusation by saying Christians couldn’t support killing infants because; “we say that those women who use drugs to bring on abortion commit murder, and will have to give an account to God for the abortion”.[15] If killing a fetus was murder then infanticide must be as well. Christians “are in all things always alike and the same, submitting ourselves to reason, and not ruling over it”.[16] Tertullian responded to the same accusation by noting that for Christians, infanticide is “murder” because Christians “may not destroy even the fetus in the womb”.42 Minucius Felix responded by turning the tables arguing that it was, in fact, the pagans who practised infanticide of which because killing a fetus was merely to “commit a parricide before they bring forth”.[17]
II. Formed/Unformed Distinction and the Septuagint
In addition to seeing feticide as a violation of the fifth commandment, numerous, early Christians followed Philo in basing this conclusion upon the Septuagint and the formed/unformed distinction found in Greek Philosophy. Here are some examples:
Tertullian (155 – c. 240) stated “The embryo, therefore, becomes a human being in the womb from the moment that its form is completed. The law of Moses, indeed, punishes with due penalties the man who shall cause abortion.”[18]
- Jerome (347-420) wrote, “The seed gradually takes shape in the uterus, and it [abortion] does not count as killing until the individual elements have acquired their external appearance and their limbs”.[19]
- Lactantius (250 – 325) argued that a fetus is formed on the 40th day and it is this stage when it is ensouled and a full human being.[20]
- Gregory of Nyssa (335–395) wrote “ [J]ust as it would not be possible to style the unformed embryo a human being, but only a potential one, assuming that it is completed so as to come forth to human birth, while as long as it is in this unformed state, it is something other than a human being.”[21]
- Cyril of Alexandria: (376 – 444) cites the Septuagint and argues a fetus becomes human at 40 days when it acquires form.[22]
- Ambrosiaster (366 and 384) argues that a human soul is infused into a fetus when the conceptus is formed, and hence abortion of a formed fetus is homicide [23].
By the end of the Patristic period, two church councils adopted policies on dealing with the killing of a fetus. The councils of Elvira and Ancyra, held in 305 A.D. and 314 A.D. respectively. The Council of Elvira declared that a woman had an abortion to cover up an affair could not be re-admitted to full communion for the rest of her life. The reason the council gives for this is that the woman has committed a double sin; she has not just committed adultery she has made this worse this by committing homicide as well.[24] This practice reflected the very harsh discipline that existed in the Early Church where serious sins committed after baptism were not forgiven. This harsh discipline was relaxed by the council of Ancyra only a few years later. Those who attended Ancyra referred to the earlier practice (reflected in Elvira) and ruled “more humanely” and required only 10 years penance before one could be received back into the fold.[25]
It seems safe to say that, throughout the patristic period, almost every Christian theologian who addressed the question of feticide did so by articulating two basic premises [1] that God has commanded people to refrain from killing a human being, and [2] that a fetus, or a formed embryo, is a human being.
However, we should be careful about interpreting these statements to mean that the early church condemned abortion absolutely in every single possible situation. There some evidence that Christain’s also permitted abortion in those rare circumstances where a woman’s life was in danger. The only Christian writer to address this situation was Tertullian. Tertullian refers to a situation where a child gets “twisted” in the womb and cannot be delivered alive without killing the mother. He describes the process of killing it with strong negative language as “a criminal deed” “infanticide” “robber in the dark” and “cruelty” however he also describes it as a “necessary crime” and “necessary cruelty” While Tertullian isn’t clear, many scholars think Tertullian here assumes that when continuing the pregnancy will kill the mother abortion is a necessary evil.
We can summarise the early churches position then as follows:
Premise: [1] Killing a human being without justification violates the law of God.
Premise: [2] A formed embryo (i.e. a fetus) is a human being.
Premise: [3] In the case of feticide (at least in the majority of cases) insufficient or no justification is forthcoming.
[1] John Robinson, Redating the New Testament, (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1976), 324-27.
[2] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.
[3] Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.
[4] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.
[5] John Noonan, Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians, (Cambridge, MA:
The Bellknap Press of Harvard University, 1965), 91. Noonan notes that ‘parricidium’ was the specific Latin term for the unlawful killing of a close relative such as a parent or brother.
[6] Cyprian, Letters, 48.
[7] Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies, 9.7.
[8] Apocalypse of Paul 40.
[9] Augustine, Commentary on the Heptateuch, 2. 80.
[10] Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, 1.17.
[11] Jerome, Letters, 22.13 and 121.4.
[12] Basil, Letter CLXXXVIII, 8.
[13] Ambrose, Hexameron, 5.18.58.
[14] Chrysostom, Homily 24 on Romans.
[15] Athenagoras, A Plea for the Christians, 35.
[16] Ibid. 42 Tertullian, Apology, 9.8.
[17] Minucius Felix, Octavius, 30.
[18] Tertullian, Treatise on the Soul, Ch VII.
[19] Jerome, Letters, 121.4.
[20] Lactantius, De Opifico Dei, 12, 17.
[21] Gregory of Nyssa, On the Holy Spirit Against Macedonius
[22] Cyril of Alexandria, De Adoratione in Spirtu et Veritate, 8.
[23] Ambrosiaster, QQ Veteris et Novi Testamenti, 23.
[24] John Connery, Abortion: The Development of the Roman Catholic Position (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1977), 47-48
[25] Ibid., 48-49.
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God and Moral Grounding Power
A common objection to divine command theories of ethics (DCT) is that they make morality arbitrary. There are several ways this objection can be cashed out. The most common is what is called the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’. The Horrendous deeds objection can be formalised as follows:
(1) If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape people we would be required to rape people.
(2) It is absurd that we could be required to rape people.
(3) God could command us to rape.
(4) Therefore, DCT is absurd.
The key premise is (3), the assumption that it is possible that God could command horrendous actions like rape. Divine command theorists have responded by suggesting that (3) is dubious. They assume a conception of God Whereby God is understood to be an immaterial person who is all powerful, all knowing, loving and just. So, as terms are defined, the claim that it is possible for God to command people to rape others would only hold if it is possible for an all-knowing, loving, and just person to command rape. This is unlikely. The very reason critics use the example of rape is that they view it as a paradigm action that no virtuous person could ever knowingly entertain.

Suppose, however, it is possible for a just and loving, omniscient person to command rape. Divine command theorists point out, this would mean rape would be commanded in situations where a just and loving person, aware of all the relevant facts, could endorse it– and under these hypothetical circumstances, it’ s hard to see how (2) could be maintained.
- Jason Thibodeau’s Argument
In a recent article, published in Sophia, Jason Thibodeau updates the ‘Horrendous deeds objection’ to avoid this problem.[1] Jason starts by defining a concept which he refers to as moral grounding power. “Let us say that a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations.” He continues “unless it is able to deny that other possible divine beings have this power, it implies that there are possible worlds in which horrendous acts are obligatory”.
His argument for this conclusion is as follows:
(P1) If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power. (Premise)
(P2) Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has. (Premise)
(P3) In some possible world, there exists a being that is like God except that he is not omnibenevolent [henceforth this being will be called Yod]. (Premise)
(P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)
(P5) In some possible world, Yod commands the gratuitous torture of children. (Premise)
(P6) If DCT is true, then there is a possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is morally obligatory. (From P4 and P5)
(P7) There is no possible world in which the gratuitous torture of children is obligatory. (Premise)
(P8) DCT is false. (From P6 and P7) [2]
Recently Jason and I discussed this argument on Capturing Christianity, here I want to lay out in writing my main objection to it. Let me stress that Jason and I are discussing this back and forth and my thoughts may alter as the discussion continues.
A. Premise (P1): Does a Divine Command Theory entail that God has Moral Grounding Power?
Let me begin with (P1) the claim that “ Given Jason’s definition of moral grounding power; this premise affirms that: “if God a divine command theory is true, then Gods commands constitute moral obligations”. Is this correct? The answer is it depends on the kind of divine command theory proposed. Divine command theorists contend actions are morally required if and only if and because those actions are commanded by God. However, the word “because” here can be used to describe different kinds of explanatory relationships.
In an important article on this issue Stephen Sullivan[3] distinguishes between a causal explanation and an identity explanation. In a casual explanation, one explains the existence of A by citing some distinct thing B, which causes B to exist B. By contrast an identity explanation explains the existence of A by noting the existence of B and then saying that A just is (is identical with) B.
There are important differences between saying B caused A and saying B is identical to A. In a causal relationship, the explanandum (the thing being explained) and explanans (the explainer) are distinct things; the former is an effect the latter a cause. As a cause, the explanans exists prior to the explandum, and there is an asymmetric dependence relationship between them: If B causes A to exist then B does not cause A to exist. The effect depends on the cause for its existence but not vice versa.
In an identity relationship, the explandum (the thing explained) and explanans (explainer) are not distinct things at all; they are the same thing described in different terms. Because the explanans and explandum are identical, the explanans does not exist prior to the explandum, that would entail something existed prior to itself. Moreover, identity relationships are symmetrical: if A is identical to B then B is also identical to A. Sullivan subsumes identity relationships under a broader category of “constitutive” explanations which includes not just explanations in terms of identity relations but also relationships of non-reductive supervenience.
Now if we turn to (P1), Jason states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power” where “a being b has moral grounding power just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. This assumes that divine command theorists are offering a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. But unless qualified,this assumption is dubious. It is true that some divine command theorists do this. Edward Wierenga (who Jason cites as an example) seems to have in mind a non-reductive supervenience relationship between moral requirements and Gods commands. Similarly, the divine command theories of Adam’s, Craig, Evans, Forrest, and Alston all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God, and so they also offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands.
However, other divine command theorists, do not offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements. One important proponent of a divine command theory was Philip Quinn. Quinn explicitly offered a causal explanation of moral requirements in terms of Gods commands. Quinn argued that the property of being willed by God and the property of being morally required are not identical properties but distinct properties. God’s act of willing that a person performed an immediately caused it to be the case that a moral obligation to do this action existed.
Strictly speaking then (P1) is false. Divine command theories per se do not entail that Gods commands constitute moral obligations. Some divine command theories do, and some do not. Of course, the most significant divine command theories defended today involve identity explanations, and so these theories do have the entailment Jason refers to. For this reasons one might think my qualifications are a tad pedantic. However, the difference between causal and constitutive divine command theories will become important when we examine further premises.
B.Premise (P4): Is the Inference Valid?
Before, examining premise (P2), let me first say something about the Jason makes in (P4).
(P4) If DCT is true, then Yod has moral grounding power. (From P1, P2, and P3)
Notice that (P4) draws an inference from (P1) (P2) and (P3). It takes the fact that a divine command theory entails that God has “moral grounding power” and, the fact that omnipotent beings have the same powers, and infers from this that any omnipotent being will have moral grounding power. If this inference is valid, the word “power” must have the same meaning in (P1) as it does in (P2). When Jason states in (P2) that Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has, the word “powers” must include the kind of moral grounding power he refers to in (P1). If this isnt the case the inference commits the fallacy of equivocation.
C. What does the word “power” mean in (P1) and (P2)?
It’s precisely on this last point however that I think Jason’s argument falls down. Jason supports (P2) by asking us to imagine a being like God, who is omnipotent but lacks the property of benevolence: He then asks whether such a being would “in virtue of his malevolence, lack the power to flood the earth, destroy a planet or create the universe? “. He concludes “If the being is omnipotent, this seems unlikely, it’s hard to see how the mere absence of benevolence would limit Gods power in this way. “
I find this claim intuitively plausible, but note carefully the examples Jason uses here. He gives the examples of “lacking the power to flood the earth” “destroy a planet” “create a universe” these are all acts of causal power, where God by his actions causes something distinct from himself to come into existence or go out of existence.
However, in his first premise (P1), Jason uses the word power in a different sense. He refers to “moral grounding power” which a being has “just in case the commands of b constitute moral obligations”. Moral grounding power then isn’t the power God has to cause moral obligations to come into existence its rather the God’s ability or power to constitute moral requirements with his commands. We saw above that, in the context of divine command theories, constitutive explanations can involve the postulation a non-reductive supervenience relationship between Gods commands and moral requirements. However, in most cases, divine command theorists who offer a constitutive explanation of moral requirements are offering an “identity” explanation. Divine command theorists like Craig, Evans, Adams, Forrest, all contend that the property of being morally required is identical with the property of being commanded by God.
This means that the phrase “moral grounding power” is often just a technical way of saying that, the property of being commanded by God is identical with the property of being morally required. The property of being obligatory isn’t something that is caused to come into existence by Gods commands; it just is the property of being commanded by God by a different name. Just as the morning star and evening star are the same thing under different descriptions. The property of being morally required and being commanded by God are the same property under different descriptions.
The problem is that while (P2) is intuitively plausible if you are referring to causal powers. It is not so obvious when one is talking of something like a moral grounding power. To say God has moral grounding power could just mean that God has the power to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions under a different description. However, it is impossible for any person who is not God to have this kind of power. This is because the relationship of identity can only hold between a thing and itself. It is impossible for any being, no matter how powerful, who is not God to perform actions which are identical with God’s actions. This is an incoherent idea.
Let me illustrate this: By waving my hand I can make it the case that Matthew Flannagan Has waved his hand. However, it is not possible for anyone else, even an omnipotent being to do this. An omnipotent being has the causal power to make me wave my hand. If he becomes incarnate in human form, he could himself wave his hand. However, he could not make it the case that his standing up is identical with me standing up. That is because his actions are not identical to my actions. Nor is it possible for him a distinct person from me to perform actions which are identical with actions I perform. If you want to refer to this ability as a power, then it is a power that it is metaphysically impossible for anyone but me to have. The only person who can perform actions numerically identical to my actions is me.
Conclusions:
Above I noted that the inference he draws in P4 is valid. Only if the word “power” is used the same way in both premises P1 and P2. The kind of power, God, is said to have when Jason states “Any omnipotent being has the same powers that God has” must include the kind of power he has in mind when he states “If DCT is true, then God has moral grounding power”.
We have seen that this is not the case. In our discussion of P1, we noted that the claim “If the DCT is true, then if God commanded us to rape we would be required to rape” is true only of divine command theories which do not postulate a causal explanation of moral requirements. In other words (P1) is true only in cases where the word “power” excludes causal relationships. (P2) however is defensible only if the word power refers to causal powers. If it is understood more broadly to refer to constitutive explanations of Gods commands (P2) is false. It isn’t true that any omnipotent being can perform an action which is identical with the action of another being. The crucial premise (P4) then commits the fallacy of equivocation.
[1] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” Sophia:1-17 (forthcoming)
[2] Jason Thibodeau, “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” 9,
[3] Stephen Sullivan, “Arbitrariness, divine commands, and morality” International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 33 (1) (1993) 33-45
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Religious Studies Scholarships and the NZAPT
Those who follow me on Facebook will know that two years ago I began teaching Philosophy and Theology full time at St Peters College one of New Zealand’s largest Catholic high schools.
Only a handful of schools teach Philosophy in New Zealand and while it has official subject recognition one cannot gain any credits for Philosophy under the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA). NCEA does allow credits for Religious Studies which in the secondary sector involves a mix of religious history, ethics, theology/philosophy of religion, and hermeneutics. However, Religious studies have not been treated as a very rigorous subject in the secondary sector, and so far it is mostly Catholic schools which have taken it up as a subject.
It has been a very challenging couple of years as I have been getting my head around how Philosophy and Theology are
taught or can be taught, in the secondary sector. Trying to balance my own very high standards for Theological and Philosophical scholarship with the practicalities on the ground in the education sector. The challenges in doing this are unique and require quite a bit of wisdom and creativity to pull off well. I can’t say I have always been successful in doing so.It’s been an encouraging week for me in this regard. I spent two days in Wellington this week. I was holed up in the Ministry of Education buildings a stone throw away from the beehive and parliament attending the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Teachers. (NZAPT) annual conference. At the NZAPT several other philosophy teachers and I spent several hours dialoguing with policymakers in Wellington about the importance of teaching philosophy in the secondary sector. We had presentations from people in the ministry and even some Members of parliament come and discuss the subject with us. Whether anything will come of this remains unclear, but with the new Government initiating a review into NCEA and the assessment system being up in the air at the moment it certainly is starting to get on the radar.
Of course, there are still lots of questions; it was unclear from the meeting over precisely what teaching philosophy involved. Is it just a pedagogy involving Socratic questioning and inquiry learning or should the subject be taught more formally, do you introduce it as a kind of foundational sub-discipline for other subjects, i.e. philosophy of science for science? Philosophy of law for legal studies, classical philosophy in classics. Alternatively, introduce a new subject on the already proliferating curriculum, and some real questions came out of the conference around the teaching of political philosophy and the danger of it becoming activism. These were all things we discussed and debated amongst ourselves at the conferenceTo cap this all off on Thursday the New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) announced that Religious Studies would be included as a scholarship subject in 2020. Scholarship exams are the highest level of academic assessment in New Zealand secondary schools. Only 3% of all students gain a scholarship and its only available in subjects which are considered to meet a high level of rigour specifically the criteria is:
- significant numbers of candidates have shown the ability to perform with excellence at level 3
- there are writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level
- there is an appropriate tertiary path for Scholarship students in this subject
- the subject has the capacity to permit students to exhibit the high-level cognitive abilities for the credibility of the Scholarship examination
The New Zealand Association of Religious Studies Teachers, an association of which I am a member has been pressing for the Ministry of education to consider allowing Religious Studies to be made a Scholarship subject, a move that will require increasing the rigour of teaching and assessment in this subject substantially. My name was one of several put forward as evidence that there is now in the secondary sector “writers and markers available of sufficient calibre and experience in this subject to produce a quality assessment for students at the appropriate level”. On Thursday NZQA announced on Thursday they now consider Religious Studies to have matured enough at the high school level to meet this criterion. Religious Studies is now on the radar and a serious academic subject available in New Zealand schools, hopefully, Philosophy is not too far around the corner.
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Matthew Flannagan (MandM) and Jason Thibodeau (Secular Outpost) Debate God and Morality
Yesterday, I had a long and enjoyable public discussion with Jason Thibodeau on the topic of The Euthyphro dilemma.
Jason is a writer for the Secular Outpost and teaches philosophy at Cypress college in California. He also is the author of a recent article entitled “God’s Love is Irrelevant to the Euthyphro Problem” published in Sophia The team at Real Atheology recently interviewed Jason about his paper a couple of weeks prompting Cameron Bertuzzi from Capturing Christianity to have both of us discuss the matter further on his youtube channel.
Those who follow MandM regularly will know, Jason and I have been engaging in written exchanges on this issue for several years and he has always been a thoughtful and intelligent dialogue partner. Jason has raised some challenging responses to my arguments and yesterday’s two-hour discussion/ debate was no different. It was one of the better dialogues I have had on religion and morality in a long time. Hopefully, the dialogue generates more light than heat.
The whole dialogue is available on YouTube here: