Category: Due Process

  • Why Defamatory Speech is not Free Speech

    The following is a representation of the standard argument as to why a remedy requiring the removal of defamatory speech from a publication is not a violation of the right to free speech:

    1. The right to Freedom of Expression is protected by s14 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“BORA”).
    2. The operational provisions of the BORA provide in section 5 that a reasonable limit to Freedom of Expression can be justified in a free and democratic society where that limit is prescribed by law.
    3. Section 5 is subject to section 4, which states in mandatory terms that no court can decline to apply any provision of an enactment on the sole grounds that the provision is inconsistent with the BORA.
    4. Notwithstanding this, section 6 requires the court rule in a manner as consistent as possible with Bill of Rights.
    5. If a Respondent’s actions constitute a breach of s4 of the Defamation Act 1992 therefore the remedy sought, removal of the defamatory material from the publication, does not violate the Respondent’s right to Freedom of Expression.

    Freedom of SpeechWhile this is the standard argument it has always felt wrong to me. There is something unsatisfactory about appealing to a mechanism in the law that, as argued, feels like it is shearing off a part of an important right and freedom, even if the law says that it is ok.

    I find this argument unsettling and lacking something; at the same time defamatory speech is insidious, causes harm, hurts; intuitively it just feels wrong to say that one is morally justified in spreading harmful falsehoods about a person and is not required to account for the wrongs done, because of their right to free speech.

    After discussions with Matt about this I have decided that I prefer the following argument:

    1. Freedom of Expression exists to allow people to freely express their opinions and impart information without fear of legal penalty.
    2. Defamation is expression imparted to another that lowers the standing of a person in the eyes of their peers and is not true and is not honest opinion which is genuinely held.(I am ignoring the third defence, privilege).
    3. A person who expresses defamation is not engaging in Freedom of Expression as where there is no truth or honest opinion then a person is neither attempting to inform another or attempting to express their opinion.
    4. The basis for this is that to attempt to inform someone is to attempt to increase that person’s repertoire of true beliefs’ and to impart an opinion is to express what one honestly believes to be the case.
    5. Therefore, the freedom that the right to Freedom of Expression protects is all speech that is true or honestly held to be true by the speaker.

    That is much better.

    Defamatory speech is not free speech therefore legal sanctions against it are entirely appropriate in both legal and moral senses.

    Context:
    Two blogs have recently been found to have published defamation of me, the nature of which was described as “extremely serious” by a Court of Law. The above demonstrates why I feel I was perfectly justified in seeking the removal of the defamatory material, one by Court Order, one by private request. John Stuart Mill, the UN Charter, Milton, Common Law, to point to a few, have agreed for centuries that defining Freedom of Speech to be all speech that is not Defamation is just in all mediums. Defamatory speech being restricted or punished by law, offline or online, poses no threat to anyone.

  • Yet Another Lawyer Agrees: Marriage Amendment Act Bill is an Affront to Freedom of Religion and Belief

    Barrister Ian Bassett has given another opinion describing the risks to freedom of religion and belief of Louisa Wall’s Marriage Amendment Act Bill if it is enacted in its presently proposed form, which would include this amendment:

    “Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), no celebrant who is a minister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in Schedule 1, and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnize marriages by an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnize a marriage if solemnizing that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of the religious body or the religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian convictions of the approved organisation.”

    It is clear that any marriage celebrant exercising their public function who is not covered by the amendment risks being in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to perform their public function as marriage celebrants because it is a same sex couple seeking to be married.

    Injustice

    Church ministers, marriage celebrants, court registrars, church elders, leaders, photographers and caterers and any other person or entity supplying services to the public risks being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a couple seeking to be married because the couple are same sex. For some this could also mean risking their employment.

    Service providers to the public risk being in breach of the Human Rights Act 1993 if they refuse to supply services to a married couple because the couple are same sex.

    The New Zealand Law Society’s Law Reform Committee headed by Professor Paul Rishworth LLB (Hons) M Jur highlighted the risk to freedom of religion and belief in the Bill in its submission to Parliament:

    “The proposer of the Bill said that the Bill was not intended to compel marriage celebrants to perform marriages contrary to their religious beliefs. However, in the Law Society’s view, Professor Rishworth says it is arguable that marriage celebrants who refuse to perform same-sex marriages will be acting unlawfully under the Human Rights Act 1993, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, or both.

    “We want to highlight arguable conclusions which seem to be at odds with the settled intentions of the Bill’s drafters. Whatever the position, the Law Society believes it makes sense to put the matter beyond doubt,” Professor Rishworth says.

    The only thing that the amended Bill puts beyond doubt is that the critics of those raising fears about the Bill’s threat to freedom of religion and belief were wrong. By recommending an amendment the Select Committee are agreeing that a risk existed, as the likes of Ian Bassett, Grant Illingworth have argued, contra to The Human Rights Commission’s claim that all “…religious officials and leaders are free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.”

    Bassett, Illingworth and Rishworth are not alone with their concerns among the legal fraternity.

    Graeme Edgeler, a Wellington Barrister has been quoted in the Herald saying:

    … if an independent celebrant declined to marry a same-sex couple, the couple could then complain to the Human Rights Commission.

    “It’s not about [celebrants] being forced, it’s about people getting in trouble afterwards if they didn’t,” he told APNZ.

    “They’re not breaking any rule in the Marriage Act, but rules in other acts. The main one would be the Human Rights Act, which says you can’t discriminate on the basis on sexual orientation or gender.”

    Auckland Barrister Rachel Wong has raised issues against the Bill.

    This blog’s Madeleine Flannagan LLB, Associate Barrister and Solicitor at Coast Legal, adds her voice:

    “The Bill, in its present form, fails to protect individual freedom of religion and belief (belief being a comprehensive viewpoint not based on religion). The proposed amendment only protects group religious rights, which is little protection at all for most religious celebrants as few denominations hold formal views on marriage, many practitioners of religion do not belong to a group and for those that do they might hold a different personal view on this topic to the group view. The amendment then fails to protect the religious freedom of most religious celebrants just as it utterly fails to protect the freedom of belief of non-religious celebrants who have no group to appeal to to protect their freedom.”

    Ian Bassett’s latest opinion thoroughly analyses the legal effects of the amended Bill, a summary as to whose freedom of religion and belief it protects and whose it does not follows: (more…)

  • Tune in to Marae Tomorrow

    Yesterday Matt and I participated in filming a debate on the Treaty of Waitangi. The moot was “That the Treaty of Waitangi is holding NZ back.” There were four panelists, Stephen Franks, Tim Wikiriwhi, Matthew Hooten and Hana O’Regan and an active audience, of which Matt and I were asked to be members of to represent blogging New Zealand (apparently they considered David Farrar but decided we’d be more interesting on the basis of Matt’s blog post, Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi).

    The audience, who comprised a range of commentators, Members of Parliament and even activist John Minto, were expected to comment and ask questions, which we dutifully did. Who knows if we’ll make the editing room cut, or how what we said will play on screen (it always feels different in the moment to how it looks on air I find)  – one way to find out I guess!

    The debate will screen on Marae tomorrow morning, Saturday, 6 Feb, from 8:00am – 9:30am on TV One.

    Here is a brief rundown of our thoughts:

    • Speaker of the Day goes to Stephen Franks for presenting the best case and for managing to use terms like “fake treaty”, “bogus” and “spurious” whilst still managing to come across calm, pleasant and reasonable.
    • The Most Inflammatory award goes to Tim Wikiriwhi – you can read his transcript at Not PC. The award was for his  student-politician-styled-delivery coupled with claims later on in the debate that there had not been a single past injustice towards Maori, which earned him shocked and awed hissing. (That aside his message was good and his historical claims were fascinating.)
    • Best Impersonation of Peter Dunne award goes to Matthew Hooten for trying to take the middle ground and please everyone whilst effectively saying nothing but sounding profound.
    • The Loonie Leftie Why–Didn’t–Her–Over-Sized–Tiki–Explode? award goes to Hana O’Regan for (and it was hard to pick a winner from the many incoherent and internally inconsistent examples she had on offer) arguing for the confiscation of property  (tax dollars) to support the promotion of Maori language “because it is beautiful” [so too is the NZ countryside] citing the Treaty as justification for said confiscation of property (I kid you not!). We both called her on this in the Q&A.
    • Funniest Moment was when the producer decided that our paper voting forms didn’t look so good on camera so had the audience pretend to push invisible electronic voting buttons and to vote multiple times so that the camera could grab a range of shots. Shane Taurima, the host, completely lost it with laughter when he delivered the instructions to the audience to push the green button for the affirmative and the red button for the negative “on the small electronic device you see before you” and he had to re-shoot it. (Then they decided to have us vote with the paper ballots).

    I must note that at the beginning of the debate the audience was asked for a show of hands as to who was for the motion and who was against it. At the outset less than 5 people were for the motion. This is an important consideration to factor into the voting results announced at the end of the debate. As Stephen said to me afterwards, I think the for’s won it as they gained votes and the againsts lost them.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

  • Can State Appropriation of Minerals in Privately Held Land be Justified? Resources Needed

    I am currently undertaking my second-to-last paper in pursuit of my Bachelor of Law (LLB).  Due to a complicated bunch of factors involving the potential staleness of my papers, if I do not apply to the New Zealand Council of Legal Education for a completion certificate with an LLB and a Professional Legal Studies certificate in hand prior to 31 Dec 2010, combined with limitations of my ability to do much more than one paper at the time due to my neck injury and chronic pain issues and due to the fact that with only two papers to go I need to submit three opinion papers (only one of which can be substituted with voluntary community legal service), I had little choice but to choose a summer school paper that had the option of an opinion credit. This set of circumstances has seen me engaged in the project for which I now hope some of our readers can help me with.

    My paper is Mining and Natural Resource Law (there is not much choice at Summer School). As an opinion topic we were allowed to take our budding legal specialty and apply it to any of the topics on the course outline. I like to take a philosophical rights and freedoms approach to most of what I research and write within the field of law so I have submitted and had approved a topic with a bit of a jurisprudential twist. I intend to analyse the justifications given for the state appropriation of minerals in the sub-soil of privately owned property.

    Most articles I have found on state appropriation so far seem to tacitly assume that if the state has legislated that it owns the minerals in the sub-soil of privately owned land then the state’s action is justified or the author simply does not question this, even if he or she acknowledges that a few private property owners had an issue with this at the time, which is not helpful as I intend to question the justification.

    New Zealand philosophical writings from the perspective of classical liberal/pro-property rights/limited state angles are fairly difficult to find. Further international writings on this subject are not commonly cited in New Zealand so they too are hard to find. If any of our readers can point me to any good sources that might help me in the project or even if you can just leave your thoughts in the comments section (if I use your ideas in the work I promise to attribute them back to you) that would be most helpful.

    The following is the gist of the direction I hope to take.

    Since at least the 16th century, the maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (Latin for for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to heaven and down to hell) meant that at common law, minerals in the sub-soil of land belonged to land owner. Such minerals were assumed to be conveyed along with the land on its change of ownership unless wording in the conveyance instrument specified otherwise. Until fairly recently, the last century or so, the only minerals not subject to this rule were gold and silver. The Case of Mines found “that by the law all mines of gold and silver within the realm, whether they be in the lands of the Queen, or of subjects, belong to the Queen by prerogative”. According to Dr Robyn Anderson,[1]

    The Court of Exchequer found in Case of Mines, that base metals – tin, lead, iron, copper, and non-precious minerals – belonged to the owner of the soil, but that the right to gold, silver, and their ores and admixtures, lay with the Crown. That right was not an incident of ownership of the soil, but rather, an attribute of the monarchy. The Elizabethan assertion of the prerogative reflected the pragmatic needs of the developing English state to control the coinage, and finance an army … [1]

    The argument that back in the 16th century the Monarch needed to be able to protect the realm by using coinage to raise an army (there was no standing army) and weapons to arm it, seems, prima facie, a reasonable justification for the state appropriation of gold and silver. However, in the last century or so many of the base metals and minerals deemed non-precious in the Case of Mines are now included in statutory reservations to the crown. This has reached the point in 2010 where, with few exceptions, the state currently owns almost all minerals in territorial New Zealand and has exclusive right to alienate (or grant a licence to alienate) most of those minerals from even those lands held in private ownership. Further, in many circumstances, land owners cannot even refuse consent for prospective, exploration and mining to occur on their land.

    The New Zealand government owns all naturally occurring petroleum (including both oil and gas), radioactive minerals, and gold and silver in New Zealand. Any individual or company wanting to prospect, explore or mine these substances must obtain a permit under the Crown Minerals Act 1991 and pay the specified fees and royalties [to the state]. The same rules apply to coal and all other metallic and non-metallic minerals and aggregates on Crown-owned land.

    Mining of minerals and aggregates other than petroleum, radioactive minerals and gold and silver on privately owned land requires the consent of the landowner together with resource consents from local authorities granted under provisions of the Resource Management Act. [Emphasis added] [2]

    The current state of mineral rights in New Zealand seems to me, prima facie, to be a violation of ad coelum et ad inferos (the right of land ownership “down to hell” or in sub-soil), so the question I want to ask in my opinion is: what is the basis for the state’s appropriation of sub-soil minerals from the lands of private property owners and is it justified? The New Zealand army is not armed with gold and silver these days, further,  I cannot see any legitimate argument for why the state needs to own petroleum and “Nuclear Free New Zealand” does not have a nuclear weapons program (and are,  just a guess here,  highly unlikely to in the future) so what is with the state ownership of radioactive resources?

    Obviously 3,000 words will not give me a lot of space to develop this topic so I will try to keep the topic to more of a general overview but I need resources and fast both directly on this topic and on property rights generally so if you have any thoughts…


    [1] Robyn Anderson Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration (Rangahaua Whanui Report, Waitangi Tribunal, Dec 1996) RANGAHAUA Whanui NATIONAL Theme N: GOLDMINING: Policy, Legislation, and Administration (Robyn Anderson ed., 1996) 1.
    [2] Simon Nathan “Mining and underground resources – Mining regulation and education” Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, updated 2-Mar-09.

  • Grr: On Naming Names the Court has Suppressed

    Just because I am a blogger, I’m friends with Cameron Slater a.k.a. Whale Oil, I’ve gone on the record as supporting some of Cameron Slater’s concern with the current practice of name suppression orders for celebrities and I’m legally connected does NOT mean that I automatically always know who the beneficiary of  every celebrity name suppression order is and is most certainly does NOT mean that if I know that I will tell everyone who emails me and asks. (The number of requests for names I’ve received in the past 24 hours is well into double digits).

    I am not about to break the law. I do not view this issue as grounds for civil disobedience (as I do not believe it meets the criteria) and I am planning on applying for admission to the bar later this year so you have got to be kidding if you think I would share if I knew. (And yeah, ok, I do know who the sport celebrity, the comedian and the MP are… but I’m zipped, ok, so stop trying it.)

    I wish Cam all the best with his mission, I stand with him as a friend, I hope he comes through this fairly unscathed but that does not mean I am about to join him so give. it. up. please 🙂

    I’m seriously going to yell at the next person who asks.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Name Suppression and the Balancing of Rights and Freedoms

  • Name Suppression and the Balancing of Rights and Freedoms

    God, via the consent of the governed, gives authority to the state to administer justice against those who violate the rights and freedoms of others. Given this, it is important that the citizens can see that justice is being done. My fellow blogger WhaleOil’s very public battle with New Zealand’s name suppression laws and the wide support he’s received (if not for his actions at least for the sentiment behind them) highlights a concern that name suppression law, as practiced in New Zealand – especially with regard to celebrities – offends this notion.

    Suppression orders offend important liberal concepts; the principle of openness, transparent and public trials, is grounded in the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression, for each citizen to be able to seek, receive and impart information, are both contained the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Suppression orders meant that we, the public, are unable to receive information about matters of justice and thus we cannot fully witness justice being done; the balance of power becomes too weighted in favour of the state.

    This is not to say there is no place for suppression orders, I believe there clearly is, but in granting one the interests of justice must be properly weighed against the right to expression “and only where the Court’s capacity to ensure justice is significantly imperilled will the right of citizens and the media to seek, receive and impart information be curtailed.” (Thomas J in Police v O’Connor [1992] 1 NZLR 87, 99) The court must take into consideration the effect of doing so on freedom of expression, alongside its affronts to the principle of openness, and engage in the weighing and balancing that Thomas J referred to.

    Now given the presumption of innocence, innocent until proven guilty in a court of law, one wonders why someone simply being accused of something causes the court to tip the balance in favour of the right to privacy, a right not typically contained in Bills of Rights or listed by jurists when considering the key elements of a just and liberal society? If the reason is that once accused everyone thinks you did it then why doesn’t everyone get name suppression? Do non-celebrities not also have very real risks to their careers and relationships when they are tainted by accusations?