Category: Due Process

  • Published – Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection

    The editor of the New Zealand Law Students Association (NZLSA) publication LEX has just advised me that she has published my article “Three Strikes: Proportion and Protection.”

    In it I argue that the objections to the The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill (a.k.a the “Three Strikes Bill”) on the basis that it affronts the proportionality doctrine, which stems from the Bill of Rights, is flawed. I argue that criticisms of the Bill along these lines confuse appropriate force for punishment with defensive force.

    UPDATE:
    Not to be outdone, Matt just came in from the supermarket with the October edition of Investigate Magazine, which of course, features his regular Contra Mundum article – this month entitled, “God, Proof and Faith” complete with pullquote “the sceptic’s position eats its own tail … [it] is incoherent” and photo of Richard Dawkins labeled “delusional?” (you gotta love editor Ian Wishart). We’ll have a full copy of this article available on this blog at the end of the month; the editor prefers us to penalise those of you who don’t buy his magazine by making you wait.

  • Jim Evans Decisively Smacks John Roughan

    On Saturday the NZ Herald’s John Roughan demonstrated why journalists should not engage in legal interpretation in his widely criticised piece on the smacking referendum, “Sinister undertones to referendum instigator.”


    At the time I struggled to ascertain whether Roughan was being deliberately deceptive or he just didn’t get it. He essentially quoted the non-controversial, much more straight-forward, parts of the anti-smacking law, the new s59 (1),(2) and (3) of the Crimes Act, to attempt to prove that the law was not confusing and claims to the contrary were a smoke screen put up by those who desire “the right to flog children.” Aside from his slander, his article was widely criticised because he omitted to mention the most controversial and confusing clause in the new section: s59 (4).

    More than one person asked me to write a critique of this piece but was unable to due to my injuries flaring up badly this week and massive transport headaches. I also worried that my status as a law student meant anything I wrote would not carry the necessary weight (funny how that does not apply to journalists with significantly less law papers to their name than I). Not to worry, because today the Herald features a most excellent response by Jim Evans, Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Auckland no less; see “Jim Evans: New section 59 is clearly a mess.”

    Professor Evans clearly and simply explains not only the confusion caused by the controversial sub-section (4) but also the less widely noted but equally concerning problems that sub-section (2) creates. He concludes with what we have consistently maintained,

    “This is not clear legislation. In creating this law, Parliament abandoned its constitutional responsibility to say with clarity just which conduct is criminal.


    The section results from a political fudge. Whatever other views one takes about the topic of smacking, that much at least ought to be kept clear.”

    I encourage you to read both articles, especially if you have not voted yet and you are confused by all the contradictory claims being made by both sides. I have included the piece of legislation under scrutiny as a term of reference below.


    Crimes (Substituted Section 59) Amendment Act 2007 No 18, Public Act

    New section 59 substituted
    Section 59 is repealed and the following section substituted:


    “59 Parental control
    “(1) Every parent of a child and every person in the place of a parent of the child is justified in using force if the force used is reasonable in the circumstances and is for the purpose of—

    “(a) preventing or minimising harm to the child or another person; or
    “(b) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in conduct that amounts to a criminal offence; or
    “(c) preventing the child from engaging or continuing to engage in offensive or disruptive behaviour; or
    “(d) performing the normal daily tasks that are incidental to good care and parenting.


    “(2) Nothing in subsection (1) or in any rule of common law justifies the use of force for the purpose of correction.
    “(3) Subsection (2) prevails over subsection (1).
    “(4) To avoid doubt, it is affirmed that the Police have the discretion not to prosecute complaints against a parent of a child or person in the place of a parent of a child in relation to an offence involving the use of force against a child, where the offence is considered to be so inconsequential that there is no public interest in proceeding with a prosecution.”

  • In Defence of the Partial Defence of Provocation

    The case we have all watched in horror playing out in the news is over. Clayton Weatherston has been found guilty of murdering Sophie Elliot and his attempt at the partial defence of provocation was rightly shown the contempt it deserved by the court. At MandM we maintained our standard policy of refusing to comment while a trial is in progress but now the verdict is in we will add our voices to the debate raging in New Zealand over the partial defence of provocation.

    Like everyone, we found it sickening to watch the narcissistic Weatherston trying to paint his victim as evil in an attempt to have his brutal stabbing and mutilation of her rendered manslaughter instead of murder. Watching her brave mother, who not only testified but who tried to stop him stabbing her daughter, suffer through the ordeal of the trial, made all the worse by Weatherston’s desperate attempt to save himself from the consequences of his actions, was awful. As a mother I cried with her. No mother should have to bury her daughter much less witness her daughter’s murder and then sit in the same room with her killer as he spent days in the court room trying to spin his actions into something understandable.

    However, likewise, no accused should lose their right to due process, to a fair trial, just because this accused was so obviously guilty and so obviously wrong and utterly reprehensible in his attempts to suggest that his culpability should be reduced. The Weatherston case was open and shut murder. However, not all cases are this clear and some people are falsely accused and some accuseds should succeed with a partial defence of provocation. If we remove the partial defence of provocation because of our disgust at Weatherston and what he tried to argue in the courtroom and how deeply we feel for Mrs Elliot, we would do a far greater wrong.

    Accuseds will often try to raise defences for which, if they are being honest with themselves they should not be trying to raise; however, if we remove a defence because we do not like witnessing these attempts, we will be removing it for those whose actions did amount to provocation, who do deserve the lesser charge of manslaughter.

    For example, imagine if Mrs Elliot, on breaking down the door to Sophie’s bedroom and witnessing Weatherston stabbing her daughter’s dead body, had, after calling the police and having a minute to think it through, gone back upstairs with an axe, smashed the door in and hacked Weatherston to pieces. She would have faced murder charges and she would not have available to her a defence of self-defence, her daughter was already dead so she was not defending her, Weatherston wasn’t cornering her and threatening her and the force she used was arguable disproportionate. Neither, would she necessarily be guaranteed a defence of temporary insanity. Her best option would be to argue for the partial defence of provocation.


    Would you want her to not have that option, to be stuck with murderer as her label? Surely, even though we can all appreciate hacking Weatherston to death with an axe at that moment would have been wrong, we can at least see that the level of blame we as a society should attach to the likes of Weatherston, should not apply to the hypothetical, axe-wielding, Mrs Elliot in my scenario.

    Not all killing is equal. We can tell the difference between an accidental death and a pre-meditated killing. We recognise that there are degrees between these two extremes. We also recognise that sometimes murder is understandable, even if not completely excusable; this is precisely why we have the partial defence of provocation.

    The person who reacts to discovering an intruder in their child’s bedroom by repeatedly bashing them over the head with a cast-iron frying pan is not on par with a serial killer. These degrees are recognised in both the sentences the courts hand down and the convictions placed against the actors names and it is important for justice that the police, the courts and accuseds have this range of options to measure a person’s actions and intentions against when they grapple with the evidence and the events and circumstances surrounding a homicide.

    People accused of criminal acts, who are not prepared to face up to what they have done and accept the consequences, will always try to run any kind of far-fetched defence they can dream up in a desperate bid to get off. Had Weatherston not had provocation as an option he might have tried self-defence or a complete denial of guilt and you would have seem very similar attempts to smear the victims playing out on the news as he tried to run with these options; likewise if consideration of provocation is moved to sentencing. The only way you can get rid of attempts to smear the victim and the pain the family of the victim goes through in a trial is to completely get rid of trials and summarily convict all accuseds. What Mrs Elliot and Sophie’s family, friends and memory went through, terrible as it was, is nevertheless, the lesser evil.

    The system worked. Weatherston’s attempt at provocation rightly failed and in making that attempt he made himself look worse and his victim gained more sympathy, distasteful as the process was. Further, we all understand as a community that the court was right to deem this man a murderer. John Stuart Mill was right, truth becomes more evident and thus, more valuable, when it has been permitted to grapple with falsehood.

  • Fisking Margaret Mayman: The Flawed Moral Theology on the Smacking Referendum

    In “A Christian Perspective on the Child Discipline Referendum,” Rev Dr Margaret Mayman presents a theological justification for retaining the amended section 59 of the Crimes Act 1961, which has criminalised force used against a child for the purposes of parental correction.

    Mayman began by offering three standard arguments for repealing the old section 59, the defence of reasonable force for the purposes of parental correction. The first is that, “Prior to the law change, there had been terrible cases of child abuse that had not resulted in an assault conviction because of the use of this defence.” The second is that, “New Zealand has appalling rates of lethal and non-lethal child abuse and there is strong evidence that abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” The third is that, “The law needed to be changed to ensure that the children received equal protection.” Despite their popularity and repetition in the media, these arguments are seriously flawed.

    Some Accuseds Get Off
    Turning to the first, it may be true that the existence of the defence of reasonable force meant that some child abusers escaped conviction. What Mayman fails to note is that this is true of any defence in Criminal Law. Section 48 of the Crimes Act allows a person to use reasonable force in defence of oneself or another from assault. Undoubtedly some serious assaults have not resulted in criminal prosecution as a result of the existence of this defence. Similarly, the law allows those accused of rape to mount a defence that the victim consented; this defence undoubtedly has lead to serious rapes not resulting in conviction. In fact, the very existence of a requirement for the prosecution to prove an assault has occurred, beyond reasonable doubt, has resulted in untold number of serious criminal actions not resulting in criminal convictions. Hence, if the mere fact that the former s59 occasionally resulted in criminals not being convicted entails that it should remain abolished then all defences should be abolished; clearly this is an absurd conclusion.

    Criminalisation Because of Escalation
    The second argument fares no better. Mayman asserts that, “abuse often occurs as an escalation of physical punishment.” This may be true. It is also true that spousal abuse often occurs as an escalation from a verbal argument between spouses. Does it follow that we should criminalise verbal arguments with one’s spouse.

    Equal Protection
    Mayman’s third argument, that children must receive “equal protection” under the law, is also problematic. It is true that the law does not allow a parent to smack an adult. However, it is also true that the law does not allow an adult to prevent another adult from leaving the house; to do this would be to commit false imprisonment. The law also does not allow an adult to confiscate the property of another adult; this is the crime commonly known as theft. Nor does the law allow an adult to subject another adult to medical treatment without their consent; this would be both a form of assault and a violation of the Bill of Rights’ protection of life and security of the person.

    If we were to truly give children equal protection under the law then it should be illegal for parents to send their children to their room, to ground them, to confiscate their property or keep their immunisations up to date. Clearly no sensible person advocates this because no sensible person really believes that children should receive equal protection under the law.

    After presenting these ill-thought out arguments, Mayman offers a theological case for her position. Mayman cited Jesus, “Let the little children come to me, and do not stop them; for it is to such as these that the kingdom of heaven belongs. And he laid his hands upon them and went on his way” (Matthew 19: 13-15). She also cited, “Take care that you do not despise one of these little ones; for, I tell you, in heaven their angels continually see the face of my Father in heaven. … So it is not the will of your Father in heaven that one of these little ones should be lost.” (Matthew 18:10, 14). Mayman then drew two conclusions from these passages. First, these passages call us to a “radical respect for the personhood, and therefore the bodily integrity of children.” Second, that Mayman finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.”

    Personhood and Bodily Integrity
    Turning to the first, I agree that we should respect the personhood and bodily integrity of children. I also think (as I am sure Mayman does) that we should also respect the personhood of adults. Mayman assumes, without argument, that the use of force for correction is always incompatible with respecting someone’s personhood or their bodily integrity. This claim is clearly false. Certain forms of physical punishment that cause injury or harm can damage a person’s personhood or bodily integrity but not all forms do. Moreover, if correction by force always contradicts our duty to respect personhood or bodily integrity then Mayman would have to conclude that criminal punishment of child abusers themselves is unjustified. Such criminals often do not voluntarily go to jail; they have to be forced to. The fact that Mayman supports laws against child abuse shows that she does not believe her own argument; she accepts that sometimes physical force for correction is justified (for adults anyway).

    No Directive for Physical Punishment
    Her second argument is equally problematic. Mayman states she finds, “no justification for physical punishment, let alone any directive for it.” Here she is correct; nothing in the passages she cited provides any justification for physical punishment or any directive for it. Nor, for that matter, do these particular passages provide any justification for refraining from rape, kidnapping, adultery or theft. That is because these particular passages do not address these issues; they have nothing to say about them at all. Whether such things are justified or not depends on other passages or arguments that are actually about those things. Hence, appealing to them in this context is irrelevant.

    Interestingly, immediately after citing these passages, Mayman notes that another passage in scripture does seem to imply the permissibility of corporal punishment. She provides four responses to this, none of which hold any weight.

    First she notes that people have historically appealed to the book of Proverbs, “Those who spare the rod hate their children, but those who love them are diligent to discipline them”, to justify “physical violence and assaults.” This may be true but only in the same way that historically people have appealed to notions of equality to murder millions of people in Gulags. Does it follow that all appeals to equality are wrong (and should be criminalised)? Incorrect use or application of an idea tells us nothing about whether the idea itself is true.

    Second Mayman states this passage needs to interpreted in light of the “knowledge about child development and of the damage caused by physical punishment” that we have acquired since “the scriptures were written.” I agree that one should take into account relevant empirical facts when interpreting scripture. The problem is that Mayman simply assumes that it is an empirical fact that “physical punishment” causes damage; the problem is that this is far from obvious. In “Corporal Punishment,” Professor David Benatar surveys several studies and notes,

    Although there is evidence that excessive corporal punishment can significantly increase the chances of such psychological harm, most of the psychological data are woefully inadequate to the task of demonstrating that mild and infrequent corporal punishment has such consequences.

    Moreover, he goes on to note that, “even the data suggesting that very rare instances of mild corporal punishment do have some negative effects also suggest that the effects are not substantial.” In fact, the empirical data is nowhere near as conclusive as Mayman suggests; several studies found little or no adverse effects of physical correction once the difference between severe and abusive types of physical punishment was distinguished from other, milder forms. Theologians should take into account empirical data; they should not, however, uncritically accept unsubstantiated empirical claims about what science allegedly shows.

    Literal Interpretation
    Mayman also attacks the idea that one should take the Bible literally. She backs this up by citing Deuteronomy 21: 18-21. Mayman claims that this verse teaches that parents are required, “to put to death the persistently disobedient youth.” In fact, Mayman’s interpretation of this verse is flawed. As Christopher Wright notes, in the Ancient Near East it was common for fathers to have rights of life and death over their adult children. Deuteronomy 21, in this context, actually subverts this by taking these decisions out of the hands of fathers. The passage probably refers to adult sons, not children as it describes the sons and gluttonous drunks. Moreover, many scholars have provided evidence that penal sanctions, like those recorded in this passage, serve a rhetorical function of denouncing the action and are not intended to be taken literally.

    Even if one ignores these problems, Mayman’s position remains erroneous. Mayman assumes that if one should not take Deuteronomy 21 literally it follows that one should not take any other part of Scripture literally. This is mistaken. Such a conclusion would follow, only if, one assumed that either every statement in Scripture is to be taken literally or none is. Almost any piece of writing will contain a mixture of metaphor, figures of speech, hyperbole and so on, alongside literal comments. In any event, Mayman seems to want it both ways, in several places in her article she takes the teachings of Jesus literally in an attempt to substantiate her view on corporal punishment!

    Similar contradictions inflict the rest of Mayman’s exegesis. She dismisses the Epistle to the Hebrews on the grounds that “Nowhere does the author invoke the teaching of Jesus to confirm his beliefs.” She then immediately cites Paul’s commands to “provoke your children, or they may lose heart,” despite the fact that Paul does not, in this verse, “invoke the teaching of Jesus” to confirm this instruction. Even if Mayman’s exegesis were coherent (which it is not) the claim to not provoke one’s children is not the same as the claim to never physically correct them.

    Slavery
    Mayman finally asserts “that Paul accepted the institution of slavery” but that “Nineteenth century Christians realised that to take seriously the teaching of Jesus about the dignity of all people, required that slavery be ended.” Even if Mayman’s exegesis of Paul and her historical claims about abolitionists were correct (which scholar’s dispute) it again proves nothing at all. Even if Paul was mistaken on one issue, it does not mean he was mistaken on all issues nor does it mean he is mistaken on this issue (Mayman authoritatively quotes Paul elsewhere herself). To show Paul is mistaken on this matter requires an actual argument.

    Slogans About Violence
    After the above dubious moral theology Mayman turns to a series of slogans. She suggests that physical punishment constitutes violence, she insinuates that violence is always wrong and that violence begets violence. In fact, none of these claims are true.

    The Oxford Shorter Dictionary defines violence as “the use of physical force so as to inflict injury on others or cause damage to property.” However, not all force inflicts injury or damages property. Further, violence does not always beget violence; sometimes violence stops violence. The existence of the police force, army, armed offenders squad, courts and prisons show that even civilised societies recognise that violence and force can be justly used against others and are necessary to stop and deter further violence. Therefore, while it is correct to suggest that force and violence are often unjustified, sometimes they are not, and a sensible and just social policy will recognise the difference.

    David Benatar “Corporal Punishment” in Social Theory & Practice (Summer 1998) Vol 24, Issue 2, 237.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Fisking Ian Hassall: The Arbitrary Ethical Reasoning on the Smacking Referendum
    We’re Confused about the Anti-Smacking Referendum Question
    No Defences Permitted for the Accused

  • The Foreshore and Seabed Repeal: The Inconvenience of Due Process

    That the state is not above the law but also subject to it is surely one of the foundational concepts of any just and free society. This notion has found its place in the writings of many influential philosophers, jurists and theologians, it can be found in the constitutions and bills of rights of most nations. Citizens trust their governments to wield their power accordingly and when our governments do not, when they abuse that trust, even if they wield their power against some small group whose cause we are not that into, we need to care about it and hold them to account.

    In 2004 the New Zealand Labour Government passed the Foreshore and Seabed Act. At the time both Matt and I were absolutely opposed to its passage but we felt like lone voices in the wilderness in our own community and that saddened us. Christians will happily protest laws that affront issues like marriage, sex, drugs, alcohol and parenting but on issues like freedom and civil liberty our voice is all often too quiet.

    Part of this is that we are not as educated a culture as we once were, we don’t know our history or properly understand our theology, we don’t value our freedom or understand how it works or why it is important to defend it even when we don’t feel like it is us under attack but we need to.

    A lot of people don’t even understand Foreshore and Seabed issue; they think it was about who owns the beaches and that the law was necessary to protect our beaches, our kiwi way of life. In Any Requests? Anonymous asked, “Why should the government potentially allow access to the beach denied to all New Zealanders?” The Ministerial Review Panel found that this concern was not limited to our anonymous commenter:

    Three key issues emerge from our review of submissions to the Select Committee which considered the Bill in 2004: public ownership, access and navigation, and protection of Māori customary interests in the foreshore and seabed. In our view, these issues remain at the very heart of ongoing concerns about the legislation. [Emphasis added]

    In all the submissions the amount that focused of the real problem were so negligible the panel didn’t list them. The majority missed the fact that this Act was passed to prevent a group of New Zealand citizens from taking a case to court, instead they wrote submissions about how that would affect them. The Act was and remains, a blatant breach of due process.

    Nevertheless, the passage of this Act had widespread support. Although the National party (then in opposition) voted against it, they ran a campaign promising to keep the beaches for all New Zealanders. Within the media and amongst society, debate about the Act was focused on the merits of the court case; totally missing the point that legislative denial of due process is wrong regardless of the merits of the case being brought.

    At this point a brief history is necessary due to the widespread misunderstanding about the case itself. In June 2003 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643. Public interest in this case was triggered by the reaction of the government to its decision and the way the media reported its significance.

    Eight Maori tribes claimed that the foreshore (the land between the high and low-water marks) and the seabed (the land below the low-water mark) of the Marlborough Sounds in the South Island of New Zealand, was “Maori customary land” (a Maori jurisprudence concept which is not the same concept as our western notion of fee simple ownership.) The tribes were not sure if the Maori Land Court, which is the court set up to hear historical Maori land claims against the government, had the jurisdiction to hear their case. There was dispute as to the effect of statutes regarding land and Common Law confusion over land ownership where that land is covered by water. The tribes went to the High Court to ask if they could take the case to the Maori Land Court and the case worked its way up to the Court of Appeal.

    In summary, the Court ruled that:

    • the Crown was wrong to contend that certain statutes affecting the foreshore and seabed had had the effect of extinguishing such Māori customary title as might exist; and
    • the Māori Land Court has jurisdiction, under Te Ture Whenua Māori/Māori Land Act 1993, to determine whether any part of the foreshore and seabed is still Māori customary land.

    While the decision gave rise to uncertainty regarding the “ownership” status of the foreshore and seabed, it also confirmed that this could be tested in the Māori Land Court. However, rather than let that process run its course, the government decided to legislate. The Act vested in the Crown title to all foreshore and seabed land not already in private ownership. It also made some provision for Māori customary interests to be recognised in limited circumstances.

    This case was about whether or not the Maori Land Court had the jurisdiction to hear a case. The case was not a ruling on whether the foreshore and seabed belonged to Maori or the Crown. This was a key issue that the media, the politicians and the public missed at the time.

    The ex-dean of the University of Waikato’s Law School, Margaret Wilson, was the Attorney-General at the time the Court of Appeal was deliberating. She had advised the government that there was no way the Court of Appeal would rule in favour of the appellants, she was not alone in that view, the majority in the legal profession thought that. She was wrong.

    When the government realised the error they realised there was a risk that ownership and access to the beach in the Marlborough Sounds area might be able to be handed to Ngati Apa, if the Maori Land Court heard the case and ruled that way. The political fallout from this was not something they wanted. New Zealanders love the beach. We are a small island with a lot of beautiful coastline; we all have summer memories that involve our coastline. The backlash against the government could be disastrous, the opposition could have a field-day, they may lose the next election… So they played on that fear and also on the impatience many have towards historical Maori land claims, the ‘gravy-train’ mentality, and they rammed through legislation that prevented the case ever being heard.

    The problem is that the right to due process trumps the right of the general public to enjoy the beach and the right for a government to not have negative media. If, in fact, Ngati Apa did have a legitimate claim to ownership then as much as we love the beach, the beach ain’t ours.

    Usually at this point in a discussion on the issue I am asked if I am Maori to which I throw my hands up. No, I am not Maori. It is just that I get the fact that just because I like something and enjoy it, it doesn’t make it mine and it doesn’t mean I can keep it when it is brought to my attention that it might belong to someone else. We can apply this to other spheres of life, we need to be willing to apply it even to big issues like this one.

    Another point to keep in mind is that Ngati Apa never got their day in court. It is not clear that they would have won. Many legal scholars felt they did not have a case – as we keep trying to point out in the smacking debate the mere fact someone can raise a legal issue does not mean they will always succeed – but they should have been allowed to try.

    “Public ownership, access and navigation and protection of Maori customary interests in the foreshore and seabed” are all implications of what might have been at stake had the case proceeded. Due process for Ngati Apa and the other tribes was taken by the passage of this Act.

    Fast forward to 2008. A new National government was elected, a confidence and supply agreement was drawn up between National and Maori Party (a party formed in protest to the Foreshore and Seabed Act). Policy concessions included National offering a review of the Foreshore and Seabed Act. At the time we were very pleased by this fact but less so by the detail and blogged to that effect; “It is a shame to see that National has not framed the issue in terms of the affront to due process and instead is talking about all New Zealander’s being able to access the beach, as if that is somehow more important than human rights.”

    Our fears were not unfounded, in addition to the claims made by some commentators that the specially created Ministerial Review Panel was stacked and directed as to which outcome to arrive at, the terms of reference were utterly wrong:

    a) What were the nature and extent of the mana whenua and public interests in the coastal marine area prior to Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643

    b) What options were available to the government to respond to the Court of Appeal decision in Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643

    c) Whether the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 effectively recognises and provides for customary or aboriginal title and public interests (including Māori, local government and business) in the coastal marine area and maintains and allows for the enhancement of mana whenua

    d) If the Panel has reservations that the Foreshore and Seabed Act does not provide for the above, outline options on what could be the most workable and efficient methods by which both customary and public interests in the coastal marine area could be recognised and provided for; and in particular, how processes of recognising and providing for such interests could be streamlined

    The Panel will also need to consider how these processes will integrate with legislation that regulates the coastal marine area.

    Effectively the panel is acting in the place of the Waitangi Tribunal, the appropriate, already existing, independant investigative tribunal that examines the evidence and makes recommendations. The government is expected by everyone to and has already indicated it probably will follow the recommendations being made by the Ministerial Review Panel as it would be ‘too costly for it to go back to court.’

    Basically the government looks set to settle this case, out of court, on our behalf, when it is not clear that the government are guilty and not that long ago they denied a case existed on the part of Ngati Apa and many legal scholars agreed with them. Historical Maori land ownership claims are very difficult to prove. There were no deeds or titles issued in pre-european New Zealand and records consist of tribal stories, songs, carvings and so on. To succeed in an historical claim, even if a tribe could establish which part of land their ancestors had used and no other tribe was prepared to offer a counter claim to the land, the land in question has to have been in continual use by the tribe making the claim from at least 1840 through to the present day (unless it was unjustly dispossessed). Not only is it very possible Ngati Apa may not have succeeded, there would not be a huge risk of floodgates because each tribe would need to be able to establish this long chain of use and ownership of the foreshore and seabed in the area their ancestors historically lived.

    Regardless of which party is in power, the New Zealand government seems to be happy to have the land of its citizens taken without due process as long as it furthers their political popularity. The former government was willing to suspend due process of one group of citizens and unilaterally declare that the land in question belonged to a second group of citizens. The current government is willing to unilaterally declare that the land in question belongs to the first group and not the second and again it seems they are not going to allow a court to hear the evidence.

    The Ministerial Review Panel said sending the case back to court would be “protracted, laborious, and expensive” and the politicians appear to agree. It’s funny how selectively that card has been played of late, it wasn’t too expensive to create a special Ministerial Review Panel that duplicated the services of the existing Waitangi Tribunal and the Maori Land Court but apparently now everyone is concerned with cost. Due process is too expensive apparently; tell that to the authors of the Magna Carta who wrote:

    “No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law.”

    Due process is a concept enshrined in constitutions around the world – the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution states, “No person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ….” and in New Zealand: the Treaty of Waitangi, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the body of Common Law arising from the Magna Carta itself gives us the same legal rights.

    The government does not have the right to settle land disputes, where that land is held in trust for its citizens, without due process being observed. It was wrong when Labour did it and it will be wrong if National proceeds to do it.

    Send the case back to court. Sell the state owned television company if you need to fund it – a society where I can get ‘free’ entertainment but it is too expensive to uphold justice is a society with its priorities backwards.

    Summary Report of the Ministerial Review Panel on the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, 4.
    Ibid.
    Attorney-General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643.
    Ibid.
  • No Defences Permitted for the Accused

    In, The referendum campaign is underway, No Right Turn’s Idiot/Savant gives an excellent example of an argument we see coming up a lot in the debate around the upcoming referendum on smacking. In addition to trotting out the standard ad hominem, that everyone who supports the reinstatement of the old section 59 of the Crimes Act is a “child-beater,” I’d like to examine the emphasised part:

    Over the next month I expect to see a succession of unhinged press releases from the child-beaters claiming that the law somehow impinges on their religious freedom or has caused the widespread persecution of parents. It does nothing of the sort. What it has done is prevent parents who punch their children in the face or beat them with a soup ladle from claiming a defence of “reasonable force”. And that is unequivocally a Good Thing. The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way – and we should treat them with the contempt they deserve.

    Essentially Idiot/Savant here claims the parent in his example are guilty, apriori, and as such, when they go to trial, they should not be able to attempt to raise a defence. The problem is that the whole point of having a trial is to determine guilt or innocence. Even when it seems pretty obvious, trials are still necessary and the right to due process still applies. This right to due process includes, alongside the presumption of innocence, a right to raise a defence, no matter how stupid or implausible, and have the court assess it. The importance of this concept can be summed up by Blackstone’s Ratio, “Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”[1]

    Supporters of the anti-smacking law do not seem to get this. This ‘claiming a defence’ issue has been raised a lot ever since Sue Bradford first began promoting her bill to remove the old s59 defence, of reasonable force for the purposes of correction, from the Crimes Act. If you read the Vote Yes site, if you read the media releases and the articles and listen to the interviews you will hear it a lot.

    Of course what Idiot/Savant, Bradford, the Vote Yes people, et al miss is that there is a world of difference between claiming a defence and succeeding in doing so. The court is not stupid and the people making the determinations of guilt or innocence in our courts are normal, everyday people. If it is so obvious to all of us that hitting a child across the face with a soup ladle is child abuse, and it is obvious to all of us, a court, made up of people like us, is not going to rule that such an action is an example of reasonable force.

    The 34 reported cases on the old s59 are readily available in any law library and if you read them, instead of the media reports and politicians and websites and blogs, you will see time and time and time again child abusers failing in their attempts to raise the defence of reasonable force. The majority resulted in convictions and the few that did not were more often than not due to things like it not being proven who abused the child – which is terribly sad for the child, but you can’t just convict anyone so that you can chalk up a conviction! Wrongly decided cases are a fact of life. Just like doctors making mistakes on the operating table, just like us making driving errors. We should try very hard to ensure that these do not happen but to remove a defence entirely and risk the prosecution of the innocent is not the answer. Besides, some of the cases cited in the media as being wrongly decided were not even cases where s59 was raised, other defences like self-defences were in play… shall we remove self-defence as defence?

    The contempt for due process does not stop here; statements like Idiot/Savants that, “The only people who oppose that are people who wish to abuse children in that way,” show that he is willing to accuse anyone of being a supporter of child abuse because they support the right of an accused to a fair trial.

    Chilling. Basically once accused of something heinous, one should not be allowed to defend oneself and anyone who disagrees is morally on par with a child abuser.

    There is another patently obvious flaw in Idiot/Savant’s argument; removing the defence doesn’t just prevent people who seriously abuse children from raising the defence it also prevents the wrongly accused from being able to raise it. However, without defences there is no way of separating the two. I am not speaking here of those who can stand up in court and honestly state ‘I did not touch my child,’ such accused could plead ‘not guilty,’ I am speaking of those who end up in court for smacking their children, not hitting them with soup ladles across the face; I am speaking of those who with an open hand, lightly, smack a child on the bottom once, not out of anger or in the midst of rage but in response to disobedience on the part of child. Such people cannot plead not guilty if accused of assault, they have no legal defence if they end up before a court. To remove legal defences from people innocent of child abuse to ensure that the net catches everyone is wrong.

    Hat Tip: HalfDone

    [1] William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1760).

  • Maori and Pakeha are Not Partners to the Treaty of Waitangi

    [For the benefit of our international readership: Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand; Pakeha is a term used to describe Caucasian New Zealanders; The Treaty of Waitangi is a significant founding document of our nation over which many historical and current differences have arisen around its role, interpretation and application.]

    Recently I read a document that stated, “This institution seeks to honour the partnership between Pakeha and Maori that is laid down in The Treaty of Waitangi.” I have seen this type of statement numerous times before in the mission statements of many different kinds of New Zealand institutions. I think this claim is nonsense. Below I will argue why.

    At the heart of this kind of statement is the notion that The Treaty of Waitangi (The Treaty) constitutes a partnership between Maori and Pakeha; Maori and Pakeha apparently entered into an agreement which contains mutual obligations.

    The problem with this claim is that only persons can enter into contracts. Persons are either rational self-conscious agents, such as adult human beings or legal persons which are an organisation of rational agents into an institutional structure of some sort. One cannot enter into a contract with concrete objects that are not persons such as rocks or trees; nor can one enter into contracts with abstract objects such as the colour blue. One would have thought this was an obvious point which did not need pointing out.

    ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha,’ however, are not persons. Individual Maori people and individual Pakeha people are persons, and individuals of either race can organise themselves into an institution which will have a legal personhood separate from their own individual personhood, but the racial groups ‘Maori’ and ‘Pakeha are not persons.

    The term Pakeha is an abstraction, it is simply a reference to an aggregate of individuals who share a particular genetic trait. It is false that everyone who has these genetic traits signed The Treaty. In fact, as The Treaty was signed in 1840, no individual alive today signed The Treaty. It is equally false that simply because someone with the same genetic traits as me at some point in history signed a treaty that it follows that all members of my race signed a treaty.

    What is accurate is to say is that two institutions entered into an agreement, the Crown and various Maori tribes. No Pakeha individual can be identified as the crown and no Maori individual can be identified as a tribal group unless the individuals are acting in an official capacity as the agent of these institutions. Hence, no Maori or Pakeha individual is bound by The Treaty; no individual is responsible or culpable for breeches of The Treaty.

    Someone might object that the Crown being the head of a representative government acts on behalf of all Pakeha and hence, Pakeha can be said to have entered into a partnership via The Treaty. I think this claim is mistaken. It assumes that whenever a government performs an action one can attribute the actions of the government to any and all private citizens of that government.

    This error is precisely the error we condemn when terrorists target a civilian population. When terrorists target non-combatants they assume that because a government has unjustifiably committed aggression against them that it follows that the citizens of that government can be attacked. The principles of non-combatant immunity, however, deny this. If a state engages in aggression then the military personal who act as the state’s agents can be attacked but citizens who are not acting as agents for the state cannot be. They are innocent third parties.

    Maori and Pakeha, therefore, did not enter into a partnership at the time of The Treaty was signed, and private individuals from either race have no obligations to each other under The Treaty. To suggest they do is to commit the error of attributing personhood to racial groups as opposed to individual members of that group. It suggests that the actions of one person who has a particular genetic trait can be attributed to everyone who has that trait. The implication of this is that whenever a Maori gang member commits a crime one could justly claim that ‘Maori’ committed the crime. This is of course racist and would justifiably be condemned in any other context. It should equally be condemned in the context of discussions over The Treaty of Waitangi.

    Of course this is not to say that Pakeha and Maori individuals do not have duties to each other. The normal duties to not steal from each other or vandalise each others property, to refrain from rape and assault, etc still apply. These apply because these are general duties laid down by God. I am not bound to fulfil them because some other person signed a contract with a third party. Moreover these have nothing to do with race. I have a duty to not steal from a Maori individual because I have a duty to not steal from any human being. The duty would hold whether the person in question was Maori, Chinese, Persian or Tongan. The duty has nothing to do with a historical event in 1840.

    Nor are my comments meant to deny that one party to The Treaty was treated unjustly and unfairly by the other. There is probably good historical evidence that they were. My comments simply point out who the parties in question are. They are not Maori and Pakeha. They were the Crown and certain Maori groups.

    By all means let’s have a discussion about what the Crown should do to honour its obligations under The Treaty. I have no problem with the idea that a state should keep its obligations to other states and parties. I have no problem with the idea that government should both protect and respect the property rights of its citizens regardless of their race. I also have no problem with courts demanding the state compensate its victims if it can be proven in a court of law that the state has not done these things – one of the insidious features of the former government was its continual rejection of these principles. But stop suggesting that Maori and Pakeha are “partners” under The Treaty and that they and private individuals have obligations under it. They do not. As Dr Martin Luther King said, individuals should be judged by the content of their character not the colour of their skin.