Category: Publications

  • Another Day, Another Publication

    Matt is having a good day.

    Presently he is in San Francisco where this morning he gave the first of his talks, “Can Traditional Theism Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality? A Reply to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s Critique of William Lane Craig” to the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society. By all accounts it was well received with Matt already being in receipt of several requests from scholars in his field for copies of the paper.

    This afternoon he attended a panel discussion  featuring William Lane Craig, Paul Copan, David Bagget and Jerry Walls on divine command theory and the moral argument. Regular readers will know how much he would have enjoyed that!

    Tonight an email came through from the Westminster Theological Journal, a rather prestigious journal, informing him that his article “Feticide, the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint” has been accepted for publication.

    No prizes for guessing that I am extra proud of him today 🙂

  • Free eBook “Is Christianity True?”

    Not so long ago Apologetics 315 ran an essay series on the topic Is Christianity True? Twenty-three apologist bloggers contributed, Matt’s essay “Showing Christianity is True” was selected to be the concluding essay in the series, before Brian Auten’s conclusion.

    23 Essays Exploring the Truth of Christianity

    At the time, an audio version of each essay was created and the series was turned into a podcast. Now, Apologetics 315 have made the series available as a free ebook entitled, “23 Essays Exploring the Truth of Christianity.”

    Kindle Version | Mobi | ePub| PDF.

    Chris Reese – Foreword
    Brian Auten – Introduction
    Tawa Anderson – Does God Exist?
    Jim Wallace – The Best Explanation
    Wes Widner – Coherent, Consistent & Livable
    Richard Gerhardt – The Failure of Naturalism
    Bob Perry – Defrocking the Priests of Scientism
    Peter Grice – Orthogonal Complexity
    Chad Gross – Cumulative Reasons for Christianity
    Shelby Cade – Prophecy and Resurrection
    Luke Nix – Making Sense of the Resurrection
    Aaron Brake – The Facts of the Resurrection
    Amy Hall – The Historical Event of the Resurrection
    James Patrick Holding – The Impossible Faith
    Stephen J. Bedard – Christianity and Other Ancient Religions
    Anthony Horvath – Christianity Proved by the Nature of the Jewish Nation
    Mariano Grinbank – The Euthyphro Dichotomy
    Marcus McElhaney – Christianity is Objectively True
    Vocab Malone / Paul D. Adams – The Gospels Tell Me So
    Glenn Hendrickson – Christianity Explains Logic
    Brian Colón – Atheism: A Falsified Hypothesis
    Kyle Deming – Testing Christianity’s Core Truth Claims
    Matthew Flannagan – Showing Christianity is True
    Brian Auten – The Wise Man Seeks God

    H/T: Thinking Matters

  • Contra Mundum: The Judgmental Jesus

    Few things are thought to be more morally pernicious than the practice of judging others. Sometimes this is given a theological spin with people citing the Sermon on the Mount “Do not judge, or you too will be judged. For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you.” (Matthew 7:1-2).

    It is common for this imperative statement to be used as a kind of rhetorical club to silence moral critique of various cultural practices. When a particular practice is subjected to such critique those who engage in the practice will complain they are being “judged.” If the alleged judgers are Christian, the claim that “judging is contrary to what Christ taught” is typically added to the charge.

    I think this is a misrepresentation of the passage and an affront to common sense. I will address the latter point first. The claim that it is wrong to judge other people is problematic; it is so problematic that it is amazing that anyone gives it credence. For example, if it is wrong to judge other people then since Hitler was another person, it is wrong to say that what he did was wrong. To claim that his actions were wrong is to make a judgment about them and if judging is wrong then it is wrong to judge Hitler. Similarly, Martin Luther King Junior was wrong to criticise racism and doing so judged the actions of racists and William Wilberforce was wrong to make moral judgments about the slave trade as in doing so he was judging slave owners. Taken consistently, the claim that “it is wrong to judge” entails that we should have no legal system, no laws and no courts as all these things involve judging others by deeming certain conduct as wrong.

    The problems with this interpretation of Matthew 7:1-2 do not stop there. A little reflection will demonstrate that the claim that it is wrong to judge other people is incoherent. To claim that it is wrong to judge others is to make a moral judgment; in making the statement one is judging that a particular action is wrong. Moreover, when a person announces this to other people he or she is implicitly making a judgment about other people’s actions. To utter that it is wrong to judge others is to engage in judging others. This kind of thinking can easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo, it is analogous to the person who states, in English, “I can’t speak a word of English” or a person who tries to convince you of the truth of the claim “there is no truth.”

    Fortunately, one does not need to attribute to Jesus such absurd, incoherent, platitudes because it is doubtful that Jesus meant anything quite so stupid. Several factors bear this conclusion out. First, one should note that the claim, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” occurs as part of the Sermon on the Mount. In this Sermon, Jesus regularly used hyperbole to vividly illustrate a point. One should note that interpreting these hyperboles too literalistically leads to obvious absurdities. For example, Jesus states, when referring to the act of looking at another person’s spouse with lust, “If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and throw it away” (Matthew 5:9). It is evident that Jesus is not advocating self-mutilation but simply making his point about not lusting in a vivid, hyperbolic fashion. Similarly, he commands people to, “do good deeds before men,” (Matthew 5:16) but a few verses later he tells us, “not to do good deeds before men.” (Matthew 6:1). Taken in a strictly literalistic sense this is a contradiction. However, a reading of the context shows these apparently opposing statements are simply vivid illustrations of the same point; one’s good deeds should be motivated by a desire to honour God, to do the right thing and not by a desire to advance one’s own reputation. In light of such contexts the phrase, “do not judge,” should be seen for what it is, a hyperbolic statement illustrating the point elaborated in the surrounding verses.

    Second, when one seeks out this context one can see quite clearly the point being made. The phrase translated in the NIV as, “do not judge, or you too will be judged,” was originally written by Matthew in Koine (a Greek dialect). The Interlinear Bible gives the literal translation here as, “do not judge that you be judged.” In other words, do not judge others in a way that leads one to put oneself under judgement. The surrounding words support this conclusion,

    For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged, and with the measure you use, it will be measured to you. ″Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye? How can you say to your brother, ‘Let me take the speck out of your eye,’ when all the time there is a plank in your own eye? You hypocrite, first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.″ Do not give dogs what is sacred; do not throw your pearls to pigs. If you do, they may trample them under their feet, and then turn and tear you to pieces. (Matthew 7:2-6)

    Here the qualifications are evident. One is not to judge in a way that brings judgment on oneself. The reason for this (“for”) is that the standard one uses to judge others is the standard that one’s own behaviour will be measured by. Jesus goes on to illustrate, with a sarcastic example, precisely what he is talking about; a person who nit-picks or censures the minor faults of others (taking the speck out of their brothers eye) who ignores the serious, grave, moral faults in their own life (the log in one’s own eye). His point is that such faults actually blind the person’s ability to be able to make competent moral judgments. This suggests that Jesus is focusing on a certain type of judging and not the making of judgments per se.

    In fact, the conclusion that Jesus does not mean to condemn all judging of others is evident from the proceeding sentences in the above quote. Rather than engaging in the kind of judgment Jesus has condemned one should “first take the plank out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to remove the speck from your brother’s eye.” In other words one should try to rectify the serious moral flaws in one’s own life precisely so one can assist others with theirs. One needs to avoid hypocrisy in order to make constructive and effective moral judgments about others. This would make no sense if Jesus meant to condemn all judging by this passage.

    The reference to “pigs and dogs” in verse 6 further bears this out. Dogs and pigs, to Jews, were unclean animals and the term was frequently used to designate people considered to be of low moral character who were “unclean” before God. In this verse Jesus is simply repeating the Old Testament teaching to “not rebuke a mocker or he will hate you: rebuke a wise man and he will love you” (Proverbs 9:8). The implication, again, is that one should try to make constructive judgments rather than simply provoking anger. Constructive judgments involve making judgments.

    Just in case I have not belaboured the point enough, my interpretation is further reinforced by what follows after these passages. While reading a passage in its context is not the strength of many popular critics of Christianity, immediately after the cited passage Jesus goes on to warn about the dangers of religious charlatans, which he, rather judgmentally, refers to as “ferocious wolves” in “sheep’s clothing” (Matthew 7:15). In the age of Osama Bin Laden, David Koresh and Jim Jones the danger of such charlatans needs little further elaboration.

    In exhorting the requisite discernment, Jesus actually instructs his disciples to make moral judgments about others. He tells his disciples to judge whether a person is a false prophet or not by their “fruit.” Anyone familiar with Old Testament prophetic literature, as Jesus’ hearers were, would know that “fruit” is a metaphor for character. Isaiah’s use of the metaphor is paradigmatic; Isaiah famously described Israel as a vineyard that did not bear fruit. In the metaphor, fruit quite clearly referred to such things as right conduct, justice, morality, etc. Paul uses the same metaphor when he states that “the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control” (Galatians 5:22-23a). Jesus makes it clear that he is utilising this metaphor. He goes on to stress that in this context the fruit of a prophet is whether he or she “does the will of my Father” and is not an “evil doer.” It is clear then that Jesus here is exhorting his disciples to make moral judgment about other people, to critically evaluate other people’s lives, choices and actions and to make judgments about their spiritual authenticity based on this evaluation. All of this would be very odd if Jesus thought it was wrong to judge.

    Moral judgment of religious leaders, of oneself, of the organisations one is contemplating joining, of people one considers associating with, of the political leaders one supports at the ballot box and broader issues in wider culture is a task essential to both authentic spirituality and the competent navigation of everyday life.

    I write a monthly column for Investigate Magazine entitled Contra Mundum. This blog post was published in the February 10 issue and is reproduced here with permission. Contra Mundum is Latin for ‘against the world;’ the phrase is usually attributed to Athanasius who was exiled for defending Christian orthodoxy.

    Letters to the editor should be sent to: editorial@investigatemagazine.DELETE.com

    RELATED POSTS:
    Contra Mundum: What’s Wrong with Imposing your Beliefs onto Others?
    Contra Mundum: God, Proof and Faith
    Contra Mundum: “Bigoted Fundamentalist” as Orwellian Double-Speak
    Contra Mundum: The Flat-Earth Myth
    Contra Mundum: Confessions of an Anti-Choice Fanatic

  • John Loftus’ The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails

    John Loftus will soon release his new book The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails. As many readers will be aware John Loftus and the authors of this blog are not strangers to one another so it may not be much of a surprise to discover that the blurbs page of Loftus’ new book features very short reviews from a range of international scholars including Matt:

    Dr. Matthew Flannagan, Christian philosopher and Adjunct Lecturer in Philosophy for Laidlaw College and Bethlehem Tertiary Institute.

    The Christian Delusion is a comprehensive and representative presentation of contemporary skeptical thought. Anyone who wants to understand the position of contemporary free thinkers could not do much better than to read this book.

    Matt intends to write a more thorough review which we will submit for publication both nationally and internationally.

  • Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II

    In Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I, I noted that a defender of the permissibility of feticide, who does not also want to endorse infanticide and who defends the sentience criterion, must “identify a reason for holding that the potential of a human brain is morally relevant after” the fetus acquires sentience “but is not morally relevant before that point.” I also noted that this reason must be “not itself merely an ad hoc device for reaching the conclusion the defender of [sentience criterion] wishes to reach.” I sketched David Boonin’s position; Boonin has offered an justification of the sentience criterion which he claims achieves this. Boonin claims that he can account for the wrongness of killing in various cases in a manner that is (a) more parsimonious than Marquis’s account; and, (b) more salient. In addition to explaining why it is wrong to kill in these cases in a superior manner, he argues, (c) Marquis account is subject to counter examples that his account is not subject to. I will now address these arguments.

    Parsimonious
    Boonin argues that his account can explain the wrongness of killing in various cases in a manner that is more parsimonious than that suggested by Marquis. He argues as follows,

    [i] His own account appeals to only to one property of an individual to explain the wrongness of killing;
    [ii] Marquis account however appeals to two properties; and,
    [iii] Appealing to one property is more parsimonious than appealing to two.

    Premises [i] and [iii] are correct, Boonin appeals to only one property—that of having an ideal desire to live. Moreover, it is correct that appealing to one property to explain something is more parsimonious than appealing to two. The crucial premise here is [ii], Boonin states that Marquis’s account appeals to two properties to explain the wrongness of killing. Boonin characterises Marquis as holding to the following proposition.

    If an individual P has a future-like-ours F and if either (a) P now desires that F be preserved, or (b) P will later desire to continue having the experiences contained in F (if P is not killed), then P is an individual with the same right to life as you or I.23

    Unfortunately, Boonin provides little justification for this interpretation of Marquis. His claim relies on two citations from Marquis’s work. The first comes from Marquis’s paper, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” where Marquis states,

    When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my personal future, but also of what I would have come to value, Therefore when I die I am deprived of all the value of my future.24

    On the face of it, this citation suggests Marquis does understand a future of value in the way Boonin suggests. He understands a future of value to consist of both what one presently values and what one will come to value. The problem with this interpretation is that, as Boonin himself notes, later in the same essay Marquis explicitly repudiates this understanding. He states, “we desire life because we value the goods of this life, The goodness of life is not secondary to our desire for it.”25 Marquis concludes, “It is strictly speaking, the value of a human’s future [rather than the human’s future valuing of it] which makes killing wrong on this theory.”26 At best then, the evidence from Marquis is ambiguous, and at worst, he explicitly rejects the position Boonin attributes to him.

    Boonin’s second citation of Marquis is from a more recent paper, “Reply to Shirley.”27 In this paper Marquis had previously been challenged to “produce an account of what it would mean to say that an individual’s future is of value to him.”28 Here Marquis’s answer is:

    Consider some class of individuals at t1. Consider the hypotheses that those human individuals have a future of value of them at t2. Verify this by asking those individuals at t2 whether they believe their lives are worth living at t2 . Those who answer in the affirmative have a future of value at t1.29

    Boonin takes this citation as offering support for his interpretation of Marquis. He seems to think that Marquis suggests here that what constitutes a future of value is either that one now desires it or will come to desire it. This is dubious. Nowhere in this quote does Marquis say anything about a present desire and a future desire; it states merely that a person has a valuable future if they would at a future time consider their life worth living. Moreover, it is unclear whether Marquis considers this to constitute what a future of value is or whether it confirms that someone has one. In a later article, Marquis suggests that the former is correct as follows,

    How does killing victimize them? It harms them. Killing harms its victims by depriving them of all of the goods of life that they otherwise would have experienced. In other words, killing them deprives them of their futures of value. Their futures of value consist of whatever they will or would regard as making their lives worth living.30

    Here Marquis construes a future of value in terms of what a person will, in the future, regard as worth living. Boonin then rests [i] on insufficient evidence.

    Interestingly in his most recent article, Marquis makes it clear that he does not hold to the conjunctive account Boonin attributes to him. He states that his account,

    [M]akes reference only to the value of one’s future, not to the value of one’s present or past. Accordingly, the lack of parsimony that Boonin find in the future of value account is really a function only of Boonin’s statement of that account of the wrongness of killing, not the account itself. Because there is no good reason to include present desires in the statement of the future of value account, other than for the purpose of rejecting the account on grounds of parsimony, I shall discard the unwieldy locution of present or future desires and refer the to the account Boonin rejects as a future of value account.31

    Boonin’s argument here appears to attack a straw man. Premise [ii] is false and without [ii] Boonin’s parsimonious argument is unsound. Both Boonin and Marquis appeal to a single property.

    Salience
    Boonin’s second argument is that his account is more “salient.”32 By this he means that “it enables us to account for the prima facie wrongness of killing by understanding killing as one instance of a more general category of acts that are prima facie wrong: acts that frustrate the desires of others.”33 In support of this, Boonin cites a case of Hans who “has been dumped by his girlfriend and has plunged into a deep depression. He can think about nothing else and has no desire to go on living.”34 Boonin suggests that his account makes sense of this case in a straightforward manner. Hans would desire to live if he thought about his future rationally with full information in the absence of distorting influences like depression. On the other hand, he suggests that Marquis’s future of value account does not account for the case of Hans in a straightforward manner: “on [Marquis’s] account, the wrongness of killing is not explained by appealing to a feature that accounts for the wrongness of a more general class of wrongful actions. The wrongness of killing however becomes an anomaly.”35

    This objection, like the previous one, appears to be based on a misinterpretation of Marquis’s position, as Marquis points out:

    The future of value account makes killing Hans wrong for the same reason it is wrong to kill almost all other human beings. To kill Hans is to make him worse off than he otherwise would have been. To make him worse off than he otherwise would have been is to harm him.

    On the future of value account the wrongness of killing is based on the harm of killing. A present action cannot affect one’s past. Strictly speaking, a present act of harming does not make another worse off in the present either, for the present is instantaneous and harm, involving, as it does, causation, requires at least a small temporal interval for its effect to occur. A present act of harm affects the victim’s future. It makes someone worse off in the future. To make someone worse off is to reduce that person’s welfare, to reduce the quantity or quality of the goods in his future that she would otherwise have possessed. On the future of value account killing is wrong because it harms a victim.36

    Marquis’s account, then, “enables us to account for the prima facie wrongness of killing by understanding killing as one instance of a more general category of acts that are prima facie wrong,”37 that is, the category of acts that harm others. Moreover, I am inclined to think Marquis’s account provides a more plausible category of acts than that of Boonin’s. It seems to me far more obvious that killing is wrong because it harms another than that it is wrong because it prevents someone from doing something in the future that they presently desire to do.

    However, there is a way of reading Boonin that leads to the conclusion that both he and Marquis understand killing as a subclass of the duty not to harm others. It is common in the literature to define an individual’s welfare in terms of what they would ‘ideally desire’. Philosophers such as Richard M. Hare and Richard Brandt for example have defined welfare in this way. Consider Marquis’s claim, “To make someone worse off is to reduce that person’s welfare, to reduce the quantity or quality of the goods in his future that she would otherwise have possessed.” If Boonin is understood as adopting an ideal account of welfare, then to reduce a person’s desires is to frustrate their ideal desires. On this reading, both accounts are equally salient. Both understand killing as harming a person and reducing his or her welfare, they simply disagree as to how welfare is defined.

    Counter-examples
    Boonin’s third argument is that his account “is able to account for a counter example that Marquis’s version is unable to account for.”38

    [C]onsider, the case of Hans’ even more depressed brother, Franz. Like Hans, Franz does not currently value his personal future even though, as also in the case of Hans, his personal future contains many of the sorts of experiences that we take to be distinctively valuable. Due to a permanent and irreversible chemical imbalance in his brain, however, Franz is, and will always remain, completely unable to value the experiences that he has. Although he has a future-like-ours, he has no actual occurent desire to preserve it and he never will have such a desire.39

    Regarding this case Boonin suggests three things:

    [i] That it would be wrong to kill such an individual;
    [ii] That Marquis’s account entails that it is not wrong to kill such a person; and,
    [iii] That his own account, the ideal desire account, entails it is wrong to kill such a person.

    Curiously, in his most recent article Marquis concedes [ii]; he grants that his account does have this implication but he suggests that [i] is false.40 I think this move is unnecessary on Marquis’s part. By citing this as a counter example, Boonin assumes that Marquis holds that possession of a future of value is a necessary condition for possessing a right to life. This assumption is false. In Why Abortion is Immoral, Marquis made it clear that he was contending that a possession of a future of value was only a sufficient condition for possessing a right to life. Given this, it is simply false to claim that it is permissible to kill a person who lacks a future of value. All it affirms is that it is wrong to kill those who have such a future.

    Elsewhere, Marquis has argued there can be good reasons for extending the rule against homicide to cover those who do not have futures of value.41 While it may be true that an individual act of killing a person does not harm them, deprive them of a future of value, social endorsement and acceptance of a rule allowing such killing will harm people and, hence, for this reason, a rule against killing in situations like this is justified.

    Boonin does have a possible reply to this response, while Marquis’s account does not entail it is permissible to kill Franz, it fails to account for the wrongness of killing Franz and needs to be supplemented in order to succeed. Hence, if Boonin’s account can explain killing in this context, his account is better. The crucial question then is whether [iii] is correct. Is it the case that Boonin’s account does entail that it is wrong to kill Franz? Boonin argues that it does.

    [O]n the “present ideal dispositional desire” version of the future like ours principle, things look very different. For surely Franz’s desires about his personal future would include the desire that it be preserved if his desires were formed in the absence of the chemical imbalance that prevents him from having this desire. Although he has no actual desire to go on living, that is, it does make sense to attribute this desire to him as an ideal desire. And given this, my version of the principle implies that Franz does have the same right to life as you or I. . . . [M]y version of the future-like-ours principle is superior to Marquis’s.42

    Here I think Boonin conflates two separate questions. The first is the question of what Franz’s ideally rational self would choose for itself (i.e., the ideally rational Franz), and what Franz’s ideally rational self would choose for Franz’s actual self (i.e., his non-ideally rational self).43 If one asks the former question, then Boonin is correct; Franz would not choose to die. Franz’s ideally rational self would not suffer from depression and so would not desire to die.
    The answer to the second question is not so clear. Here we ask what an ideally rational self would choose if it knew that it would in fact have a future filled with miserable suffering and depression and be unable to enjoy any of the experiences that lie ahead. It is certainly not obvious that an ideally rational person would value a future made up of such circumstances.44

    The question then arises as to which of these two questions is the appropriate one to ask. Carson argues that is the latter and not the former that is pertinent.

    Suppose I have an irrational fear of dogs. A friend asks me to take care of his dogs while he is away on vacation. My ideally rational self would not fear the dogs and would not hesitate to look after them. Given my intense fear of dogs, however, things are likely to turn out badly if I look after the dogs. Why should I care that my ideal self wouldn’t be afraid of dogs? Wouldn’t it still be foolish for my actual self (with all of its phobias) to take care of the dogs? I might be incapable of adequately caring for them.45

    Carson’s point is that something in a person’s future is not valuable to them if it is something their ideal self would choose for their ideal self; many such choices would be harmful to them. Only if ideal desires are understood in the latter sense can it be plausibly maintained that what a person ideally desires is valuable to them. On the face of it, then, it appears that Marquis’s account does not entail this counter example whereas Boonin’s account does, that is, at least if he intends his account to lay down both necessary and sufficient conditions needed for a right to life.46

    At this point the defender of Boonin could make the following reply. Suppose one grants Marquis’s claim that there are good reasons for extending the rule against homicide to cover those who do not have futures of value. Presumably, a fully informed person would be aware of these reasons and, hence, Franz would, if fully informed, refuse to endorse a rule that allowed him to be killed. Franz would accept that his own future lacked value and was going to be miserable but he would also note that other people would be harmed if a rule allowing him to be killed were accepted and, hence, Franz would have an ideal desire not to be killed. If this response is cogent, then, one again, Boonin and Marquis’s accounts appear to be on par. Neither by themselves provide a reason for why it would be wrong to kill Franz and both can account for the wrongness of killing Franz when supplemented with Marquis’s other arguments on the topic. Boonin’s contention that his account provides a better explanation of the wrongness of killing appears mistaken. Both Boonin and Marquis’s accounts explain various paradigms of unlawful killing. Both appeal to a single property in doing so, “possession of a future of value.” Both explain killing in terms of reducing a person’s welfare and hence harming them. Both, by themselves, do not provide an explanation of why it is wrong to kill Franz and both can explain this when supplemented with the same further argument. The main difference between Boonin and Marquis is how they construe a ‘future of value’. Boonin understands this in terms of a future one has, a present ideal desire to preserve one’s future. Marquis understands this in terms of a future one will come to actually value in the future. The only other differences between them, at least on the factors Boonin cites, is that one entails that a fetus is human and the other does not. If one is to prefer one to another on the grounds Boonin provides, one can do so only by appealing to one’s beliefs about feticide. It seems, then, that Boonin has failed to provide a reason that is not itself “merely an ad hoc device for reaching the conclusion the defender of [sentience criterion] wishes to reach.”

    Boonin’s Conclusion
    A precisely analogous problem occurs when Boonin applies the modified FLO to the issue of feticide. Suppose, for the sake of argument, I grant that the modified FLO account provides necessary and sufficient conditions an organism must meet to posses a right to life. Why does it follow that a fetus does not posses a right to life? While it is true that fetuses lack actual desires to preserve their FLO’s, it is not at all clear that fetuses lack an ideal desire to do so. Marquis plausibly suggests that “If a fetus were rational and fully informed, it would desire to live” and concludes, “It follows that fetuses have an ideal desire to live.”47 Boonin takes exactly this line with infants. While infants lack the cognitive capacity to have any actual desire to exist, they have a right to life because they would have such desires if they were fully rational and able to engage in higher cognitive activities. Why can the same not be said of pre-sentient fetuses?

    Boonin’s response is to define ideal desires a particular way. He states that “ideal desires . . . are simply the content of actual desires corrected to account for the distorting influences of imperfect circumstances.” 48 Once this definition is granted, it follows that only beings with actual desires can have ideal desires. And hence only a sentient fetus can have a right to life. This is however precisely where the problem arises. There are rival definitions of ideal desires proposed in the literature and, as Marquis points out,49 Boonin gives little or no argument for adopting this particular definition. Moreover, nothing in his arguments for the modified FLO account requires this particular definition of ideal desires to be adopted. This last point is important. Boonin makes use of ‘ideal desires’ to avoid various counter-examples to the desire account of the wrongness of killing, and he argues for the modified FLO account on the basis of its ability to plausibly explain certain paradigms of wrongful killing. However, nothing in this line of argument requires Boonin to adopt one definition of ideal desire over another. Almost any definition of ideal desires on offer will get around the counter examples aforementioned and most such accounts will explain the paradigms Boonin appeals to. Consequently, Boonin’s argument appears arbitrary. He recommends his account on the grounds that it explains various cases better than a rival account which he assumes is the best available.

    However, there are other versions of the modified FLO account available which utilize other definitions of ideal desires, these accounts explain the cases equally as well as Boonin’s does. Some of these other versions entail that a fetus does have ideal desires. In the absence of some reason for preferring Boonin’s account over the others, the only factor that seems pertinent in deciding which version is correct is the accounts’ implications for feticide. It seems then that person’s beliefs about feticide will do most if not all the work in deciding which version to adopt. Once again, it appears that Boonin has failed to provide a reason that is not itself “merely an ad hoc device for reaching the conclusion the defender of [sentience criterion] wishes to reach.”

    Conclusion
    In Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I, I noted that a defender of the permissibility of feticide who does not also want to endorse infanticide and who defends the sentience criterion must “identify a reason for holding that the potential of a human brain is morally relevant after” the fetus acquires sentience “but is not morally relevant before that point.” I also noted that this reason must be “not itself merely an ad hoc device for reaching the conclusion the defender of [sentience criterion] wishes to reach.”50 It appears this challenge has not been met. Boonin’s argument for the modified FLO and his application of it to the issue of feticide appears arbitrary. His account is plausible only if one grants that feticide is not homicide from the outset.51

    24 Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” 345.
    25 Ibid., 350.
    26 Ibid.
    27 Don Marquis, “Fetuses, Futures, and Values: A Reply to Shirley,” in Southwest Philosophy Review 6.2 (1995): 263-265.
    28 Boonin, Defense of Abortion, 60.
    29 Marquis, “Fetuses, Futures, and Values,” 263-265.
    30 Don Marquis, “Abortion and the Beginning and End of Human Life,” The Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 34.1 (2006): 23.
    31 Don Marquis, “Abortion Revisited,” 410
    32 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 67.
    33 Ibid.
    34 Ibid., 70.
    35 Ibid., 76.
    36 Marquis, “Abortion Revisited,” 411
    37 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 74.
    38 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 76.
    39 Ibid., 76.
    40 Marquis, “Abortion Revisited,” 413.
    41 Don Marquis, “The Weakness of the Case for Legalizing Physician Assisted Suicide,” in Physician Assisted Suicide: Expanding the Debate, ed. Margaret P. Battin, Rosamond Rhodes and Anita Silvers (New York: Routledge, 1998), 267-278.
    42 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 76-77.
    43 This distinction comes from Carson, Value and the Good Life, 226.
    44 This is particularly the case when one considers that as Boonin defines ideal desires they are “simply the content of actual desires corrected to account for the distorting influences of imperfect circumstances.” It seems that there are plenty of actual people who when informed they will live for the rest of their lives in misery decide they do not want to continue living. Note the question here is not whether it is morally right to kill people with such desires, it is whether people with such desires exist.
    45 Carson, Value and the Good Life, 226.
    46 There is some ambiguity as to whether Boonin is proposing the modified future of value account as a sufficient or a necessary condition for possession of a right to life. In the earlier sections of A Defense of Abortion, Boonin appears to be proposing only the former. Boonin introduces his account on p. 64 where he states, “If an individual P has a future-like-ours and if P now desires that F be preserved, then P is an individual with the same right to life as you or I.” However, this states that the present possession of ideal dispositional desires is a sufficient condition of a right to life, not that they are a necessary condition.
    Moreover, Boonin appears to confirm this interpretation later on p. 84 where he states, “On the account I have been defending, then, all that is required for the newborn infant to satisfy the conditions sufficient for having the same right to life as you or I is that he has a future like ours and that he have actual conscious desires”. This only states that the account is intended to lay down a sufficient and not a necessary condition.
    Similarly, the argument Boonin provides for his account supports only a sufficient and necessary condition. His argument consists of providing an explanation of why it is wrong to kill in certain paradigm cases. He does not attempt to show that it explains why it is permissible to kill in paradigmatic cases of licit killing. No such cases are even mentioned.
    He spells his method out on p. 57: “Identify the property that most plausibly accounts for the wrongness of killing in cases B-E, and then determine whether that property is possessed by the individual in case A. If it is, then the best account of the wrongness of killing in general provides a sufficient reason to conclude that the fetus has the same right to life as you or I. If it is not, then the best account of the wrongness of killing provides no such reason (though this will still leave open the possibility that killing the fetus is wrong for reasons other than the reasons that best explain why killing you or me is wrong).”
    Boonin accepts if the “property” that “most plausibly accounts for the wrongness of killing” is not possessed by a fetus this “will still leave open the possibility that killing the fetus is wrong” for other reasons. However, when Boonin returns to this account 37 pages later he states that a fetus does not have a right to life because it lacks such desires. This is a fallacious inference. Such a conclusion follows only if Boonin is offering a necessary condition. Boonin has, it appears, committed the fallacy of denying the antecedent. The only charitable way to escape this conclusion is to understand Boonin as offering both a necessary and sufficient condition.
    47 Marquis “Singer on Abortion and Infanticide,” Singer under Fire, ed., Jeffrey A. Schaler (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, forthcoming 2009).
    48 Boonin, “A Defense of Abortion.”
    49 In “Abortion Revisited,” 413-414
    50 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 122.
    51 I thank Don Marquis for his assistance in writing this paper.

    This two-part series was originally published as: Matthew Flannagan “Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique” Ethics and Medicine – An International Journal of Bioethics Vol 25:2 (Summer 2009) 95-106. It is reproduced on this blog with permission.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Child Abuse
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion
    Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I

  • Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part I

    This two-part series was originally published as: Matthew Flannagan “Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique” Ethics and Medicine – An International Journal of Bioethics Vol 25:2 (Summer 2009) 95-106. It is reproduced on this blog with permission.

    Abstract
    Defenders of the permissibility of feticide commonly argue that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience: the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. In this paper I critique one of the more sophisticated versions of this argument, proposed by David Boonin in
    A Defense of Abortion. First, I sketch some prima facie problems faced by any appeal to sentience. Second, I examine Boonin’s attempt to defend an appeal to sentience against these problems by constructing a modified future like ours (FLO) account of the wrongness of killing. I argue that Boonin’s modified FLO defence of sentience fails. Both his argument for the modified FLO account and his application of this account to feticide rest on ad hoc arbitrary manoeuvres, manoeuvres which mean that the modified FLO account is a plausible criteria for the right to life only if one already grants that feticide is not homicide.

    Common in literature defending the permissibility of feticide is the contention that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience: the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. In this paper I criticise perhaps the most sophisticated version of this claim—that proposed by David Boonin. I first sketch some prima facie problems faced by any appeal to sentience, followed by an examination of Boonin’s attempt to defend an appeal to sentience against these problems. I argue that his defense fails.

    Some terminological issues need to be noted. I use the term fetus in a technical sense to refer to the product of human conception from eight weeks gestation until separation from the mother at birth. From birth, I refer to this organism as an infant. Prior to becoming a fetus at eight weeks gestation, I use the term embryo. Feticide means the killing of a fetus, infanticide the killing of an infant. Finally, when I talk of a fetus as a human being, by ‘human being’ I mean a being, the killing of which constitutes homicide. The term ‘human’ is ambiguous and has different definitions in different contexts, whether biological, legal, sociological or moral. When I discuss the moral question of whether feticide is unjustified homicide, I am not interested in whether a fetus falls into any given biological or sociological definition of human. I want to know whether it is one of the beings that the rules against homicide, or the rules allowing homicide in various circumstances, covers.

    The Appeal to Sentience: Some Initial Problems
    Common in the literature on feticide is the argument that killing an organism is not homicide unless the organism’s brain has developed enough for it to acquire sentience, the capacity for consciousness and the ability to perceive pleasure and pain. Despite its pervasive appeal, there are some prima facie problems with such an account. In chapter 3 of A Defense of Abortion, Boonin reviews various accounts and notes that they all fail for similar reasons. Boonin notes that those who attempt to ground humanity in the amount of brain development an organism has undergone face a dilemma: “Any appeal to what a brain can do at various stages of development would seem to have to appeal to what the brain can already do. Or to what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”1

    Either option leads to problems for a defender of the permissibility of feticide who does not also want to endorse infanticide. This is because “by any plausible measure dogs, and cats, cows and pigs, chickens and ducks are more intellectually developed than a new born infant.”2 Suppose, then, one takes the first horn and appeals to what the brain can already do. However, unless one wishes to affirm that cats, dogs and chickens are human beings, “appeals to what the brain can already do” will “be unable to account for the presumed wrongness of killing toddlers or infants.”3

    Suppose, then, one takes up the second horn of the dilemma and appeals to “what the brain has the potential to do in the future.”4 Boonin notes that this will entail that feticide is homicide. “If [such an account] allows appeals to what the brain has the potential to do in the future, then it will have to include fetuses as soon as their brains begin to emerge, during the first few weeks of gestation.”5

    The challenge for a person who wants to limit homicide to include only sentient beings is:

    [T]o identify a reason for holding that the potential of a human brain is morally relevant after the fetus has organized electrical activity in its cerebral cortex [when a fetus begins to acquire sentience] but is not morally relevant before that point, a reason that is not itself merely an ad hoc device for reaching the conclusion the defender of [the sentience criterion] wishes to reach.6

    To include infants and toddlers but not fetuses, the defender of feticide must ground the right to life in an actual psychological capacity that the former possesses and the latter lacks. Sentience seems to be the only plausible candidate. To rule out animals such as cats and dogs, an appeal to sentience must also include appeal to the potential an organism has to things such as self-awareness, rationality, and the like. However, in order for this to avoid attributing a right to life to fetuses, such potential must become morally relevant after the fetus is sentient and not before. Moreover, there must be reasons for this, reasons that are not just an “ad hoc device for reaching the [desired] conclusion.”




    Boonin’s Defence of Sentience
    In A Defense of Abortion, Boonin attempts to circumvent the above difficulty by making two distinctions. The first is between an occurrent and dispositional desire, “A desire of yours is occurrent if it is one you are consciously entertaining.”7 Boonin gives an example: “If this discussion is striking you as tedious, for example, then you may right now be experiencing an occurrent desire to put this book down.”8 A dispositional desire is “a desire you do have right now even if you are not thinking about it right at this moment.” He states, “I suspect, for example, that when you began to read this sentence you really did want to live beyond tomorrow evening, even though it is unlikely that you were entertaining just that desire consciously as you began to read this sentence.”9

    The second distinction is between an actual and an ideal desire. An actual desire is one “that you in fact have.”10 Boonin notes that a person’s actual desires can be formed under conditions where they “lack accurate information”11 or “under duress”12 or while they are “upset”13 and “not reflecting on the situation calmly.”14 Ideal desires are the desires we would have had were we not subject to various distorting influences of this sort; the desires we would have had were we calm, rational and accurately informed.

    These two distinctions avoid the common counter-examples. An unconscious person does not have an actual desire, but he or she has a dispositional ideal, a desire to live. Similarly, an infant, while lacking an actual desire to live, would desire to live if it were rational and fully informed.

    Understanding desires as ideal dispositional desires as opposed to actual occurent desires, Boonin goes on to suggest, “Killing people like us is the severe wrong that it is not just because it thwarts a desire that we have, but because it thwarts a particularly important desire that we have; the desire to preserve a future like ours.”15 This understanding of what makes killing wrong leads him to give the following account of a right to life: “If an individual P has a future-like-ours and if P now desires that F be preserved, then P is an individual with the same right to life as you or I.”16

    By ‘a future like ours’ (FLO), Boonin means a future existence like that of a typical human person such as you or I. FLO constitutes the “experiences which lie ahead of a typical human being.”17 Boonin refers to this as “the modified future like ours account,” which he uses to argue that a fetus does not have a right to life and hence killing a fetus is morally permissible. A pre-sentient fetus, Boonin maintains, lacks ideal desires to preserve FLO and consequently lacks a right to life. If one adds that the rule against homicide protects only beings with a right to life, a position Boonin appears to affirm, it follows that killing a pre-sentient fetus is not homicide.

    Much could be said about Boonin’s reasoning here,18 so I will limit myself to one line of criticism. Boonin himself acknowledges that any attempt to ground a right to life in sentience must “identify a reason” for holding this position. Further, this reason must not be “merely an ad hoc device for reaching the [desired] conclusion,” hence, the first question one must ask is what reasons Boonin gives for adopting the modified FLO account. Below I argue that he does not provide such reasons and under examination, his position does appear to be an “ad hoc device for reaching the [desired] conclusion.”

    Boonin’s Argument for the Modified FLO account
    Boonin develops his argument for the modified FLO account as part of a critique of Don Marquis’s widely anthologised essay, “Why Abortion is Immoral.”19 In this article Marquis contends that “the best explanation for the wrongness of killing is that killing deprives us of our futures of value.”20 Where a future of value consists “of all of the goods of life we would have experienced had we not been killed.”21 Marquis’s account has the implication that feticide is homicide. “Fetuses have futures like ours, for their futures contain all that ours contain and more. Therefore, (given some defensible assumptions and qualifications) abortion is seriously wrong on almost all occasions.”22

    Boonin’s approach is to sketch an account of the wrongness of homicide that both explains the wrongness of killing human beings in a series of cases better than Marquis’s account does and that, according to Boonin, entails that feticide is not homicide. Before criticising this argument, it is worth noting at the outset that even if it is substantially correct, it would not provide grounds for accepting Boonin’s position. The fact (if it is a fact) that his account is better than Marquis’s account does not show that Boonin’s account is correct or that it is the best theoretical account of the wrongness of killing. It merely shows it is better than one other account, that of Don Marquis. The fact that it is better than one account does not mean it is better than all accounts.

    Boonin’s argument provides an opponent of feticide with reasons for opposing feticide only if the proponent accepts Marquis’s account. If one argues against feticide without embracing such an account, his argument has little or no cogency. Despite this, it is worth examining whether Boonin is successful in showing his account is better than that of Marquis. Boonin contends it is because it can account for the wrongness of killing in various cases in a manner that is (a) more parsimonious than Marquis’s account; and, (b) more salient. In addition to explaining why it is wrong to kill in these cases in a superior manner, he argues, (c) Marquis account is subject to counter examples that his account is not subject to. In Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II, I will examine each of these three contentions.

    1 David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 125.
    2 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 121.
    3 Ibid.
    4 Ibid.
    5 Ibid.
    6 Ibid., 122.
    7 Ibid., 122.
    8 Ibid.
    9 Ibid.
    10 Ibid., 123.
    11 Ibid., 71.
    12 Ibid.
    13 Ibid., 72.
    14 Ibid.
    15 Ibid., 126.
    16 Ibid., 64.
    17 Ibid., 56.
    18 For example, Boonin’s claim that a fetus lacks ideal desires follows only because he chooses to define ideal desires as “simply the content of actual desires corrected to account for the distorting influences of imperfect circumstances.” However, Thomas Carson in Value and the Good Life (Notre Dame IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2000), 222-239, has offered powerful criticisms against defining ideal desires in this fashion.
    19 Don Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral,” in The Abortion Controversy: 25 Years after Roe v Wade, A Reader, ed. Francis Beckwith & Louis Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 339-355.
    20 Don Marquis, “Abortion Revisited,” Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, ed. Bonnie Steinbock, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 399.
    21 Ibid.
    22 Ibid.
    23 Boonin, A Defense of Abortion, 63.

    RELATED POSTS:
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 1
    Is Abortion Liberal? Part 2
    Sentience Part 1
    Sentience Part 2
    Viability
    Abortion and Child Abuse
    Abortion and Brain Death: A Response to Farrar
    Abortion and Capital Punishment: No Contradiction
    During, Sherwin & Hutchison on Backstreet Abortion
    Imposing Your Beliefs onto Others: A Defence
    Boonin’s Defense of the Sentience Criterion: A Critique Part II